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From the Editors
The present anthology is based on the volume Polska myśl przekładoznawcza. 
Antologia [Polish concepts in translation studies], which we published in Polish 
in 2013 with the Jagiellonian University Press in Kraków. We added three 
essays (by Małgorzata Tryuk, Tamara Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz and Tomasz 
Bilczewski) to the original table of contents. Anna Wierzbicka kindly sent us a 
recent paper on translatability to replace an older one we chose for the Polish 
publication. Elżbieta Tabakowska’s essay has also been replaced with a different 
piece on translation and cognitive linguistics. We also decided against including 
the original bibliography of Polish translation theory: instead, the bibliography 
at the end of this volume only lists the sources referred to in the essays. Most of 
them have not been translated into English, but wherever translations are avail-
able, we include them in the footnotes and the bibliography.
The footnotes in all articles have been edited for the purposes of the pre-
sent publication. This is especially the case of older texts; they tended to fea-
ture extended explanatory or interpretive notes, which we saw as irrelevant or 
referring to context unavailable to the English-speaking reader. Some notes were 
also added by the editors and translators. They are marked as [editors’ note] and 
[translator’s note] respectively. In a few cases, cuts were made in the main body 
of essays. These are marked with […].
For the convenience of our readers, in the main body of the text the titles of 
all referenced sources are given in English translation only, while the original 
titles are kept in the footnotes and bibliography. Polish translation studies in the 
1960s and the 1970s included many references to Russian (Soviet) research. In 
our anthology, all quotations and titles in Russian have been transliterated. Our 
thanks go to Krzysztof Ozga who kindly did this for us.
We would like to thank all contributors for agreeing to become part of this 
anthology and for helping us with the translation and editing. We are grateful 
also to the copyright holders of the work of deceased scholars for kindly granting 
permissions to use the material. Special thanks go to Anna Legeżyńska, who 
generously offered to edit the chapter from her book; to Elżbieta Tabakowska, 
who self-translated her essay and contributed greatly to getting some of the 
other translations correct from the point of view of linguistic accuracy; to Jolanta 
Wawrzycka, who revised her translation of Roman Ingarden’s essay specially for 
this publication; and to Małgorzata Tryuk, who checked some historical facts 




in editing the translations of the essays by Edward Balcerzan and Stanisław 
Barańczak.
Our very special thanks go to Zofia Ziemann, who revised all translations in 
the volume. Without her knowledge, professionalism, efficiency and good humor 
the book would have come out lame and wobbly, and working on it would have 
been much less rewarding.
Piotr de Bończa Bukowski and Magda Heydel
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Piotr de Bończa Bukowski and Magda Heydel
Polish Concepts in Translation Studies. 
Scholars – Theories – Paradigms
1  Early Translation Studies in Poland
In 1918, as Poland regained independence after the period of partitions which 
lasted for more than a century, one of the country’s leading writers, Stefan 
Żeromski, put forward a project for the Polish Academy of Literature. He argued 
that after the 123  years during which Polish identity was sustained to a large 
extent thanks to literature and art, the society and the state must recognize 
the need for an institutional patronage over authors and their work. Żeromski 
looked with irony at the claims, put forth by some writers, that the nation, with 
its material needs fulfilled, is prone to forget about the two torchlights of its 
development – literature and art – and for that reason is on the verge of turning 
into a herd of “clean, healthy, well-fed and happy livestock.”1 He saw compelling 
reasons for establishing a national institution for the development and promo-
tion of literature. One of them was the need to broaden the scope of literary cul-
ture over “wide areas of the intelligentsia and the people.”2 What Żeromski meant 
is simply that in order for the society to develop, citizens have to read and – he 
made this very clear – not just the good old books that saw Poland through the 
difficult political period, but also modern literature:  the current international 
literary production. If we want to educate new generations of readers, he argued, 
it is necessary to produce very good, reliable and high-quality translations form 
many languages. He presented an overview of literature translated into Polish 
from major European languages, concluding that there was an urgent need for 
competent renditions of both the classics and the new writing.3
It is both surprising and rewarding to find such a strong voice for the promo-
tion of translation in a funding document for a cultural institution in 1918. The 
fact that so early on in the history of modern Poland an eminent writer links 
the patriotic responsibility for literature with the broad-mindedness derived 
from the knowledge of international writing is a convenient starting point for 
 1 S. Żeromski, Projekt Akademii Literatury Polskiej, 2nd ed. (Warsaw-Kraków 1925), 
pp. 1–2.
 2 Żeromski, p. 5.












the presentation of the history of translation studies in independent Poland. 
The Polish Academy of Literature and the Polish PEN (established in 1925, also 
thanks to Stefan Żeromski) were very active in animating the production of 
lite rary translations, as well as translator training and theoretical reflection on 
translation as a cultural, social and linguistic phenomenon. A number of valu-
able studies, both descriptive analyses of the work of eminent translators and 
theoretical dissertations, were published in the interwar period.
One of them was an essay by Wacław Borowy,4 a literary critic and professor 
of English, which was devoted to the work of Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński, the most 
important Polish translator of French literature (Balzac, Stendhal and Proust, as 
well as Moliere, Montaigne, Diderot, Rabelais, Jarry, and many others). Inspired 
by the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce and his claim that the same content cannot 
be expressed in two different forms, and hence adequate translation is impossible, 
Borowy formulates his own definition of translation. For him, a translation is a cre-
ative work, a new expression, to use Croce’s term, remaining “close to its model.”5 
Borowy’s focal point is style as a technique of “re-expression” of the original in the 
target language. This area of research will become central for Polish TS in the 1960s.
Also the first attempts at defining the academic identity of the study of trans-
lation are linked to literary translation and comparative literatures. In the intro-
duction to her 1927 book on another eminent translator from French, Zenon 
Miriam-Przesmycki, Maria Szurek-Wisti claims that translation theory and 
criti cism define their own methodology as “sections of literature studies”. She 
refers to Italian and German thinkers to stress that translation research is an 
interdisciplinary field linked to philology, comparative literature, history and 
philosophy of culture and language, as well as psychology and aesthetics.6
Still, in the 1930s the research area was by no means well defined, also in the 
context of wider disputes within the realm of literary studies in Poland. On the 
one hand, Roman Ingarden was working on his phenomenological theory of 
lite rature, with its ahistorical perspective and non-linguistic poetics; on the other 
hand, there was Structuralism, inspired by Russian Formalists (the OPOJAZ) 
and the Prague Circle, postulating a close link between literary and linguistic 
studies. Franciszek Siedlecki, a vocal proponent of Structural thought, focused 
on the mediating function of language and factors of social communication.7 His 
 4 W. Borowy, Boy jako tłumacz (Warsaw 1922).
 5 Borowy, p. 12.
 6 M. Szurek-Wisti, Miriam-tłumacz (Krakow 1937), p. 5.
 7 See M. R. Mayenowa, “Wersologia Franciszka Siedleckiego i jej założenia teoretyczne.” 
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work on translation8 makes this latter aspect salient: Siedlecki studies the histo-
rical, linguistic, cultural and ideological factors influencing the translator’s work. 
This polarization will later become more visible, and the divide between phe-
nomenological and hermeneutic research on the one hand and that of Structural 
and linguistic approach on the other will grow, also strengthened on the ideo-
logical plane: the Structural paradigm was regarded left-wing and progressive, 
naturally inspired by work done in the Soviet Union, while Ingarden, with his 
inspirations in the German philosophical tradition and disregard for Marxism, 
situated himself at the opposite pole.
Soviet (and Russian) inspirations for research in translation came to Poland 
much earlier than the political doctrine, implemented only after World War 2. 
Back in the 1930s, Korney Chukovsky’s Art of Translation (1930) was read in 
Poland, e.g. by Julian Tuwim, a poet and translator (of Pushkin, among others), 
one of the towering figures in 20th-century Polish literature, author of brilliant 
self-analytical essays on poetic translation.9 Chukovsky claimed that the trans-
lator must aim to recreate the dynamics of the poetic style and avoid the poverty 
and unnaturalness of translationese. These thoughts found a vibrant resonance in 
the Polish literary milieu, since many of its central figures (e.g. Maria Dąbrowska, 
Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, Tadeusz Peiper, Bolesław Leśmian, Leoplod Staff) trans-
lated literature (mostly from French, Russian, German and English), commented 
on their own translation practice, and wrote translation criticism; they were also 
influential in later Polish research on the poetics of literary translation.
Philosophy of language and theory of meaning provided another context for 
the development of translation scholarship in the 1930s. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz 
worked on logical semantics and wrote on translation in the context of equiva-
lence of utterances in different codes.10 This direction will be taken in decades 
to come by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz or Anna Wierzbicka, working in the para-
digm of structural linguistics. On the other hand, the work of the anthropologist 
Bronisław Malinowski, situated within the area of pragmatic semantics, opened 
a path for the contextual theory of meaning, later developed by his disciple, J.R. 
Firth. It led to a holistic, functional theory of language, stressing its social role 
and close connection to culture11. This tendency in looking at language and 
 8 See F. Siedlecki, Pisma, pp. 645–690.
 9 See J. Tuwim, “Traduttore – traditore.” In: Pisarze polscy o sztuce przekładu 1440–2005. 
Antologia, ed. E. Balcerzan and E. Rajewska (Poznań 2007), p. 155.
 10 See K. Ajdukiewicz, “Sprache und Sinn,” Erkenntnis, IV, 1934, pp. 100–138.










translation will become central to the cultural turn in Translation Studies in late 
20th century.
The problem of translation is placed at the very center of Malinowski’s reflec-
tion on language. His method of “participatory observation,” whereby the 
anthropologist is for a long time deeply immersed in the community he or she 
studies, has an obvious connection to the experience of language. It is precisely 
language that gives the researcher access to the meanings of ritual, magic and 
everyday life. “The questions of language – Malinowski writes – are indeed the 
most important and central subject of all humanistic studies.”12 In his study 
of the problem of meaning in primitive languages, Malinowski juxtaposes his 
own experience gained during the fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands with the 
theory of linguistic meaning developed by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards. Using 
numerous examples, he presents the fundamentals of the concept of word as ac-
tion, immediately linked to the situational and cultural context.13 He rejects the 
concept of meaning as a value enclosed in an utterance, claiming that a word’s 
meaning is an outcome of an interplay of non-linguistic factors. Language is 
not just “an instrument of thought and of the communication of thought.”14 To 
regard it as such is “to take a one-sided view of one of its most derivate and 
specialized functions.”15 The proper function of language is action. Malinowski 
argues that “language in its primitive function and original form has an essen-
tially pragmatic character; that it is a mode of behavior, an indispensable ele-
ment of concrete human action.”16 He also rejects the idea that language is a 
simple reflection of the extra-linguistic reality, as the relationship between them 
is always mediated by culture. In his later work, Malinowki makes the discovery 
of the close connection between language and culture his starting point for fur-
ther argument.
In the passage from his Coral Gardens and Their Magic included in our 
anthology,17 linguistic meaning is addressed as a question of translation practice. 
 12 B. Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages”. In: C.K. Ogden, 
I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (New York 1923), p. 298.
 13 See M. Rakoczy, Słowo-działanie-kontekst. O etnograficznej koncepcji języka Bronisława 
Malinowskiego (Warsaw 2012).
 14 Malinowski, p. 297.
 15 Malinowski, p. 316.
 16 Malinowski, p. 316.
 17 Coral Gardens and Their Magic. A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and Agricultural 
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According to the author, the anthropological material he collected is funda-
mentally untranslatable, and thus the cultural reality he strives to study turns 
out to be unapproachable. The difficulty can be overcome by explaining the 
conditions of the translation process. If meaning is action in context, one cannot 
define translation in terms of a juxtaposition of linguistic systems. Procedures 
of reconstructing in your own language the meanings taken from the language 
of the other using philological analysis are false because they ignore the cultural 
and situational dimensions. The operation of translating is not an interlingual 
one, controllable if one establishes a set of semantic-linguistic units and rules of 
their mutual correspondence. It is rather a complex process of understanding 
the Other. Malinowski does not define any kind of formal procedure for transla-
tion – in the light of his principles this is neither possible nor useful. His concepts 
in translation are far ahead of their time, and can be regarded as harbingers of 
the Cultural Turn in Translation Studies, where translation is construed as inter-
cultural hermeneutics, a practice where the unit of translation is neither word, 
nor utterance, nor text, but the entire culture.
The 1930s were an intensive time in the development of literary and transla-
tion thinking in Poland. The Second World War put a halt to much of the aca-
demic and literary activities in this field, not least because publishing in Polish 
was banned by the Nazi authorities. Nevertheless, the achievements of the 1930s 
were not wasted; research continued, and right after the war, already in 1948, 
two important works in the field of translation studies were published: Seweryn 
Pollak’s “Some Problems of the Theory of Poetic Translation”18 and Stefan 
Szuman’s On the Art and Essence of Lyrical Poetry.19
Pollak’s is a theoretical study based on the author’s own translation experience 
in 1946–47 and on his reading of Soviet theorists, mainly Chukovsky, Fedorov 
and Smirnoff. It is from Smirnoff that Pollak inherited both the historical model 
of the development of translatorial thought and the concept of adequate trans-
lation,20 which is central to his own ideas. Chukovsky made him aware of the 
“social attitude of the translator” and his ideological entanglements:  he actu-
ally mentions a possible sociology of translation, outlined before by Franciszek 
Siedlecki.21 Pollak juxtaposes the Soviet translation school with the hermeneutic 
 18 S. Pollak, “Z zagadnień teorii przekładu poetyckiego”, Prace Polonistyczne 1948, vol. 6, 
pp. 191–210.
 19 S. Szuman, O kunszcie i istocie poezji lirycznej (Łódź 1948).
 20 Pollak, p. 194.











positions rooted in 19th-century German philosophy, concentrated not on the 
linguistic structures as such but the “spirit of the original.” Deeming the latter 
approach “reactionary,” idealistic and even dangerous, Pollak decidedly chooses 
the “progressive” path. Translation, he writes, is a recreation of the original in a 
different linguistic material. Since a work of literature is a set of coordinated and 
interlinked elements, their exact recreation is usually impossible. The translator 
has to decide on the hierarchy of those elements and choose the most impor-
tant ones, leaving what is less central behind and thus discovering the invariant. 
Pollak’s essay is an early example of an important current in Polish Translation 
Studies: inspiration with Soviet concepts, discussion around invariants, problems 
of style, ideology in translation, and the criteria of good translation. Pollak uses 
the word “equivalent” – probably for the first time in the Polish tradition.
Szuman’s analyses, on the other hand, seek inspiration in works from the 
1930s: Roman Ingarden’s theory of literary aesthetics presented in The Literary 
Work of Art (1931) and developed further in The Cognition of the Literary Work of 
Art (1937).22 According to Ingarden, a work of art is a multi-strata creation, char-
acterized by formal unity which stems from an inner relation linking the layers 
of word sounds, units of sense, schematized aspects and represented objects. The 
structure of literary work is ordered and it differs from that of a scien tific work 
because it includes “quasi-statements” (which give the represented objects only 
some aspects of reality). The literary work is schematic (it includes places of inde-
terminacy) and intentional, demanding concretization in the act of reception. 
Finally, it also includes artistic and aesthetic qualities, whose plurality creates the 
effect of polyphony. Szuman takes up several important elements of Ingarden’s 
theory; by comparing poetic translations with the originals, he studies the ways 
of artistic reconstruction of their aesthetic effects.
In the post-war period, Ingarden himself also returned in his work to the 
problems of translation. His paper “On Translations” resulted from his theo-
retical work, but also from the experience of translating and editing classic 
works of philosophy.23 In the passages from this analysis included in the present 
anthology, Ingarden concentrates on the specificity of translating a literary work 
as opposed to a scientific text. Further in his essay, he discussed the problems 
 22 R. Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk (Halle 1931). English edition: The Literary Work 
of Art. An Invstigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature, 
ed. and trans. G. G. Grabowicz (Evanston, Illinois 1973).
 23 R. Ingarden, “O tłumaczeniach.” In: O sztuce tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław 
1955), pp. 127–190; later published also in: R. Ingarden, Z teorii języka i podstaw 
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of translating philosophical discourse. Starting with his idea of the multi-strata 
and multiphase structure of literary work, he shows how translation consists in 
a process of replacement on the level of sounds, but also introduces changes into 
all the remaining layers. Depending on the scope and type of these changes, the 
work of literary art either retains or loses its individual identity. The difference 
between a faithful translation of a literary work and a faithful translation of a 
scientific text stems from the fact that in the latter case the translator focuses 
on using new sound material to represent in a clear manner the text’s concep-
tual content. The literary translator, on the other hand, strives not to disturb the 
polyphonic harmony of the aesthetic qualities in the strata of the literary work. 
Ingarden’s essay became an important voice in the exchange within the field of 
translation theory, but also an invitation for Polish philosophers to join in the 
debate, accepted i.a. by Jerzy Kmita and Halina Rosner.
2  The Foundations: PEN Club Translation Seminar; Works 
of Zenon Klemensiewicz and Olgierd Wojtasiewicz
The PEN Club Translation Seminar, a continuation of the pre-war efforts to 
re cognize the importance of translators in literature, was inaugurated in 1950 
with a lecture by the highly respected writer Jan Parandowski, and resulted in 
the publication of the 1955 volume On the Art of Translating.24 A decisive point 
in the development of translation thought in Poland, the book brought together 
contributions from writers, academics and critics. The most valuable ones were 
Ingarden’s text discussed above and “Translation as a Linguistic Problem” by the 
linguist Zenon Klemensiewicz. Presented in 1953 and first published in an aca-
demic journal in 1954,25 the essay is a pioneering work linking translation, so far 
conceptualized basically within the area of literary studies and criticism, with 
the domain of linguistics. Written and published independently from Jakobson, 
Nida or Vinay and Darbelnet’s work, Klemensiewicz’s essay is an attempt at 
creating a set of precise tools for describing the phenomenon of interlingual 
correspondence.
Klemensiewicz sees translation as a relation between two linguistic and sty-
listic systems which may be very far apart; the distance complicates the process 
and gives rise to various difficulties. Another set of problems stems from the fact 
that the language of the original is internally variegated. The author gives much 
attention to literary (“artistic”) language as the most demanding kind. Since the 
 24 O sztuce tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław 1955).








ideal of “fidelity” is grounded in a myth and cannot be sustained, Klemensiewicz 
(probably inspired by Alexandr Smirnoff26) introduces the concept of “adequate” 
translation. Adequacy, according to him, is a functional equivalence (he coins a 
Polish noun which stands for the same concept) which requires the substitution 
of the linguistic elements of the original with “those elements and structures 
of the target language which are, as far as possible, substitutes and equivalents 
with the same functional capacity, suitability, and efficacy, and in this, precisely, 
resides their adequacy, commensurability, equality of value.”27
Klemensiewicz stresses the fact that translation is a creative act and consists 
in the translator’s own and original realization of someone else’s thought. This 
requires affinity, a kind of kinship between the author and the translator. Seen 
from today’s perspective, Klemensiewicz’s ideas strike as shrewd and modern: he 
tackles on linguistic functionalism but also on hermeneutics; he underscores the 
creative element in translation, soon to be developed by Jiří Levý.
Soon after, in 1957, the first strictly theoretical work on translation was 
published in Poland: Introduction to Translation Theory by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz,28 
a sinologist and linguist from the University of Warsaw. His book, whose first 
chapter is included in the present anthology, was a result of many years of research 
aiming at greater precision in the theoretical description of the problem of trans-
lation. Wojtasiewicz, whose work is situated in the context of the Leipzig school, 
developing in Eastern Germany since late 1950s, puts considerable stress on the 
“operation of translation.” The use of the term “equivalent” in Wojtasiewicz’s 
argument implies that the goal of the operation of translation is to come up 
with a text evoking in the recipient the same kind of reaction (the same set of 
associations) as the source text did in the case of the original recipients. This 
ensures successful communication. Parts of Wojtasiewicz’s book are devoted to 
the question of untranslatability. He differentiates between two types of untrans-
latability: structural, where the structures of the languages involved differ; and 
conceptual, where it is impossible to evoke the same reaction. The latter type, 
Wojtasiewicz writes, stems from lack of equivalents or proper names in the target 
language and has to do with cultural aspects of translation.
Wojtasiewicz claims that the final conclusions he drew from his analyses came 
as a surprise: contrary to his expectations, the difficulty in translation results to 
a lesser extent from differences in linguistic structures than from gaps between 
 26 See A. Smirnoff, “Metodika literaturnovo perevoda.” In: Literaturnaya enciklopedia, 
Vol. 8 (Moscow 1934), pp. 526–531.
 27 See p. 67 in the present volume.
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cultural traditions. The author sees this conclusion as optimistic: while linguistic 
structures are unlikely to converge, cultures might. These optimistic claims may 
sound more than a little naïve today, in the era of intercultural studies; the same 
is true for Wojtasiewicz’s ambitions to formulate a strict scientific model for the 
understanding of translation. Nevertheless, his work reflects a very important 
stage in the development of both linguistic and cultural paths in Polish trans-
lation studies. His precise argumentation and the disciplined and linguistically 
grounded functional thinking link his book to Eugene Nida’s work, while the role 
he assigns to culture and the optimistic stance towards the problem of untrans-
latability bring to mind Roman Jakobson’s position. Wojtasiewicz’s book gave 
very solid foundations to Polish translation theory and, in spite of criticism, it 
remains an important point of reference.
3  The Dominant and the Style: Structural Paradigm of the 1960
The work of Klemensiewicz and Wojtasiewicz already included some traits 
of Structuralist thought, but it was since the 1960s that Structuralism became 
the main driving force in Polish Translation Studies. In 1958 Roman Jakobson 
vi sited Poland for the first time and taught a series of seminars which gave a 
strong Structuralist impulse to Polish humanities. In linguistics it came also 
from the Copenhagen School (Louis Hjelmslev) and the deductive methodology 
which inspired Andrzej Bogusławski and Anna Wierzbicka to research universal 
semantic primes. Another new research area, relevant also to translation studies, 
concerned semantic fields (Danuta Buttler29). Up until 1968, Structuralism deve-
loped in Poland dynamically and the concept of translation played an important 
role in the new discourse, which in its turn stimulated research in translation.
The most important center of translation studies in Poland in that period was 
Poznań, with scholars such as Jerzy Ziomek, who combined methods inspired 
by Structural linguistics with his competence as a historian and theoretician of 
literature. In 1965 he published a monograph on two Polish poets-translators: a 
16th century classic, Jan Kochanowski and a 20th century one, Leopold Staff: Staff 
and Kochanowski. An Attempt at Using Information Theory in Translation 
Research.30 In this pioneering study of the history of literature by means of lin-
guistic methods, Ziomek introduces the concepts of the semantic field and the 
 29 D. Buttler, „Koncepcje pola znaczeniowego,” Przegląd Humanistyczny 1967, Vol. 2, 
pp. 41–59.









dominant, which will be later taken over and redefined by his disciples, notably 
Edward Balcerzan and Stanisław Barańczak. Clearly fascinated by translational 
linguistics and perspectives of machine translation, Ziomek principally sought 
to describe the style of translation in terms of mathematical stylisticstatistics 
and information theory. At the same time, he tried to introduce elements of sty-
lometry, hoping that statistical methods may become a reliable way of verifying 
claims voiced on the basis of literary analysis.
Edward Balcerzan, the main figure of Polish Translation Studies since the 
1960s, in his early text “Translation Theory and Criticism in the Soviet Union” 
already postulated a need for developing a precise discourse for translation cri-
ticism to replace its rather impressionistic terms.31 Inspired by Soviet research, 
with its technological slant, he writes:  “as long as we lack a language for the 
description of translations, we cannot hope for any matter-of-fact criticism (crit-
icism with no language?), and as long as we lack matter-of-fact criticism, we 
cannot hope to move beyond futile declarations.”32 The two currents in transla-
tion studies, Balcerzan says, the literary and the linguistic, differ in their “rela-
tion to theory” (this claim, it is worth adding, turned out to be so powerful that 
to this day Polish scholars struggle to overcome the divide introduced here). 
Thus, the goal of translation scholars is to make the two meet in devising a pre-
cise language for a theoretical description of artistic translation. Chukovsky and 
Etkind argue that the integration of the two areas is possible within the frame-
work of Structuralistic research in style defined as a linguistic image of the cre-
ative personality of the writer. Balcerzan stresses that a work of literature is an 
orderly structure, hence a good translation consists in reconstructing the rela-
tions which link particular elements within the structure, as well as their con-
figuration within the text as a whole. “The translator has to be fully aware of 
the dominance of some of the elements”33 – he claims. The researcher or critic, 
in turn, has to be able to give account of the choices made within the act of 
translating.
This has implications for theorizing translation. If the literary work is defined 
as an intentional and organized structure, it is the entirety of the text, rather than 
its morphological elements, that becomes the basic unit of translation; hence the 
criterion of assessment for the relation between the original and the translation is 
 31 E. Balcerzan, “Teoria i krytyka przekładu w Związku Radzieckim”, Pamiętnik Literacki 
1966, vol. 57, pp. 223–243.
 32 E. Balcerzan, “Tłumacz i tłumaczenia. Wstęp.” In his:  Oprócz głosu. Szkice 
historycznoliterackie (Warsaw 1971), p. 232.







Polish Concepts in Translation Studies 23
defined as the reconstruction of the source text’s structural dominant. Balcerzan’s 
book on the bilingual work of the Polish futurist poet Bruno Jasieński, Style and 
Poetics in the Bilingual Work of Bruno Jasieński: Some Problems of Translation 
Theory, focuses on these questions.34 The author postulates a parallel between the 
work of the translator and the critic. Both start from an interpretative procedure 
defined, after Roland Barthes, as getting at meanings through “a disassembly 
and re-assembly of elements”35 whereby a new semantic value is produced. An 
analysis of the choices made by the translator against the background of all the 
possibilities offered by the source text and the target language, allows a precise 
description and interpretation of the differences between the source and target 
texts, and determining the value of the “deviations”. The “deviations” lose their 
negative connotations in this context. Balcerzan claims this process may be well 
described by the category of semantic fields. He defines them as ordered sets of 
words clustered around a focal term on the principle of similarity or adjacency. 
Areas of non-symmetric semantic fields across languages (e.g. lack of heteronyms 
or correspondences, differences of categorization) creates the so-called interme-
diary language. It is this intermediary language that the translator refers to while 
working on the translation.
The “disassembly and re-assembly” procedures are the main topic of 
Balcerzan’s essay “The Poetics of Artistic Translation” (1968, extended version 
1998)  which is included in our anthology36. Balcerzan’s superior category, 
informing the general poetics of translation, is the translation series, i.e. a chain 
of actual and potential retranslations. As opposed to original texts, a translated 
work always forms a part of a series, and the series is always open. The seriality of 
translation, a problem further developed in Balcerzan’s later work, is linguistic-
stylistic in nature, as it is the language and style of every element of the series 
that expresses the particular translator’s interpretation. Starting with a set of 
instructive (if minimalistic) examples of translation series, the author formulates 
a set of critical categories, a toolbox for a precise description of translation. He 
distinguishes the following elements of the translation process: the translator’s 
decisions and their subject, four types of transformations (reduction, inver-
sion, substitution, amplification), and what he calls “higher structures”. These 
include ways of translating in relation to the translator’s aims (interlinear, literal, 
 34 E. Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka twórczości dwujęzycznej Brunona Jasieńskiego. Z zagadnień 
teorii przekładu (Wrocław 1968).
 35 Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka…, p. 27.
 36 E. Balcerzan, “Poetyka przekładu literackiego.” In his: Literatura z literatury (Strategie 








simplifying, precise, free translations) and the types of translated work in rela-
tion to the recipient (authorial, polemical and covert translations).
Balcerzan’s proposition is grounded in a firm belief in the correspondence 
between elements of the linguistic systems involved and an unshakable tertium 
comparationis outside the literary work, which guarantees the existence of an 
invariant. The essay on poetics of translation remains highly inspirational as a 
point of departure for reflection on the translation process, not the least because 
of the wide scope of Balcerzan’s research. The author gives an overview of three 
areas of theorizing translation:  anthropological, linguistic and literary. In that 
sense, he takes an early step towards an interdisciplinary paradigm of translation 
studies. Many years later, the author himself described his position in the late 
1960s as that of an ardent believer in the “scientific tendencies” which dominated 
the humanities at that time. Nevertheless, the methodology he proposed opened 
a new epoch in the history of Polish translation studies and is still used both 
in descriptive and theoreticalprojects. His disciples, among whom Stanisław 
Barańczak took central place, developed Balcerzan’s concepts and found a wide 
spectrum for their practical applications.
4  The Art of Translating: Literary Translation  
Studies in the 1970s
Polish literary translation studies in the 1970s developed dynamically under the 
sign of Structuralism. In 1972 a conference on the history and theory of artistic 
translation brought together researchers from the universities in Kraków and 
Poznań, as well as Nitra (Slovakia). Published in 1974, the conference proceedings 
included papers by i.a. Anton Popovič (“The Model of Literary Communication 
and Translation”), Jerzy Święch, Jacek Baluch, Julian Kornhauser and Stanisław 
Barańczak. Barańczak’s contribution, “Artistic Translation as a ‘Self-sufficient’ 
and ‘Integrated’ Object of Interpretation,”37 was based on an analysis of Polish 
translations of Gottfried Benn’s poetry. The author uses Balcerzan’s method of 
studying the style and linguistic shape of texts in order to elicit interpretation. 
 37 S. Barańczak, “Przekład artystyczny jako “samoistny” i “związany” obiekt interpretacji 
(Na marginesie niektórych polskich tłumaczeń Gottfrieda Benna).” In: Z teorii i historii 
przekładu literackiego, ed. J. Baluch (Kraków 1974). English translation: “Artistic trans-
lation as a “self-sufficient” and an “integrated” object of interpretation. Notes on the 
margins to some Polish translations of Gottfried Benn”, trans. S. Gauger. In: Literature 
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“Self-sufficient” translations are those designed to function without reference to 
the original; the “integrated” ones are to be read in juxtaposition with the original. 
The difference is visible already in the way translations are published: “self-suf-
ficient” renderings would prototypically be printed on their own, “integrated” 
ones as bilingual editions and parallel texts. The two types of translations reflect 
the translator’s choices on the one hand and the mode of reading on the other. 
The former work as original texts; they aim at maximal transfer of content, which 
may result in some weakening of the aesthetic qualities of the poem. Barańczak 
notices how the translator’s choices are guided by the fact that the poems are 
going to be interpreted independently from the originals and how he or she may 
at times feel released from the duty to reconstruct the formal qualities of the text. 
In the case of “intergrated” translations, the emphasis is put on the artistic qua-
lities of the text, while the potential presence of the original text serves as a kind 
of back-up with respect to the literal sense of the original. On the other hand, 
in such a comparative reading process the translator’s choices are controlled and 
assessed.
Today, Barańczak’s conclusions may seem somewhat too mechanical and 
imprecise; however, the way he structures his argument, combining close reading 
with a sharp critical sense, indicates the direction of the further development 
of his work. His most important essays were published in the early 1990s on 
the margins of his own translation practice: he used his own renderings of the 
masterpieces of English language literature (including twenty-five Shakespeare’s 
plays), as authorization for his critique of other translators’ work. 
In the 1970s, literary translation was studied from various perspectives, 
although most approaches focused on literary style. In 1971, Anna Drzewicka 
published a monograph Some Problems of the Technique of Poetry Translation, 
a study of poetic individuality in translation as seen through stylistic analysis.38 
Drzewicka describes two methods of translating: textual and reconstructional. 
The year 1975 saw another collection of translation essays published under aus-
pices of the Polish PEN. As before, it combined scholarly dissertations, Polish 
and translated (Wojtasiewicz, Jakobson and Etkind were among the authors), 
with more personal contributions from practitioners. Seweryn Pollak, the editor 
of the volume, stressed the fact that literary translation, as an area of art, cannot 
be limited to the realm of theory.
 38 A. Drzewicka, Z zagadnień techniki tłumaczenia poezji. Studia nad polskimi przekładami 




Towards the middle of the decade, Zygmunt Grosbart published a number of 
papers on translation between related languages (specifically Polish and Russian), 
paying special attention to literary translation, which he saw as the focal point of 
all general qualities and principles of translation at large.39 Grosbart wrote also 
on the psychology of translation as a creative process and the role of translated 
literature in the national literary system.
The latter aspect was comprehensively discussed by Stefania Skwarczyńska 
in her seminal paper “Translation and Its Place in the National Literature 
and Culture” (1973), whose first part is included in the present anthology.40 
Skwarczyńska refuses to see translations as foreign texts enclosed in a new form 
of the target language. Such a way of thinking, she stresses, reflects the old fallacy 
of dualistic view on literature, where “the semantic content” is divorced from “the 
linguistic attire.” This is additionally combined with an equally false belief in the 
inviolable and unique character of any literary work. Skwarczyńska argues that 
if, on the contrary, we accord to translations the same status in the target culture 
as the originals enjoy, if we concentrate on the target rather than source domain, 
and if we read them using the literary norms of the target domain, we gain a 
new perspective. First of all, we will be able to assess the translation’s value in the 
national culture and discover that the target culture gained as many “authentic 
works of literature” as there were translations of any literary text. Polish lite-
rature has as many Hamlets, the author claims, as there were renditions of that 
play. The Polish Hamlets are Skwarczyńska’s material in the analytical part of her 
essay, which is not included in the present book. She singles out a number of 
factors influencing the position of the translated text in the target literature: the 
moment in the history of the literature, the relation of new translations to the 
preceding ones, and their genetic qualities. If this brings to mind Itamar Even-
Zohar, the association is perfectly valid. Skwarczyńska did not know his work, 
but clearly her inspiration came from the same sources: the Eastern European 
Structuralism, not only Russian (Yury Tynianov), but also Czech (e.g. Karel 
Horálek). Her text opened a new vista in Polish translation studies.
 39 Z. Grosbart, “Specyfika przekładu w ramach języków słowiańskich (Propozycje 
metodologiczne).” In: Poetyka i stylistyka słowiańska, ed. S. Skwarczyńska (Wrocław 
1973), pp. 112–119.
 40 S. Skwarczyńska, “Przekład i jego miejsce w literaturze i kulturze narodowej.” In: O 
współczesnej kulturze literackiej, vol. 1, ed. S. Żółkiewski and M. Hopfinger (Wrocław 
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5  Translatability and Translatorics: The Linguistically 
Oriented Research of the 1970s
In parallel to the literary translation research, the 1970s also saw the develop-
ment of linguistically oriented studies. In 1969, Witold Doroszewski, the doyen 
of Polish linguists, published his work “On the Idiomatic Nature of Languages,”41 
in which he argued that the idiomatic character of language hinders trans-
latability. Communication is possible on the level of shared experience, by 
arriving at the same extra-linguistic points of reference. People using different 
tongues cannot understand one another so they lack shared “experience related 
to words”. According to Doroszewski, translatability entails triggering  – by 
means of words – a reaction (a behavior) identical or similar to that triggered by 
the original. In the 1970s, the question of (un)translatability becomes the central 
point of interest for linguistically oriented Translation Studies in Poland. It is the 
topic of Elżbieta Tabakowska’s early paper on the Polish translation of Ulysses;42 
also Mieczysław Szymczak’s study of “The So-called Untranslatable Linguistic 
Categories”43 stresses the need to research linguistic universals in translational 
context. This path of inquiry will be soon taken by Anna Wierzbicka in her 
“Translatability and Basic Semantic Units” (1978).44
Wierzbicka started working on translation-related topics already in 1963, 
in her PhD thesis on the style and syntax of Polish Renaissance prose. Later, 
when her academic interests shifted to semantics, she became fascinated by the 
possibilities of machine translation based on a semantic language. Her research 
focused on universal semantic codes resulted in the theory of NSM (Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage), presented for the first time in 1972 in her book Lingua 
Mentalis. The need to solve the problem of untranslatability, which is the essen-
tial issue of linguistic relativism, seems natural in Wierzbicka’s research, as it 
stems above all from her interest in comparative, intercultural semantics, based 
on the assumption that all languages contain sets of universal, primitive terms 
that can be literally translated into any other language. Their exponents have the 
 41 W. Doroszewski, “O idiomatyczności języków”, Prace Filologiczne, 1969, vol.  19, 
pp. 5–22.
 42 E. Tabakowska, “The Polish Translation of James Joyce’s Ulysses and Some Underlying 
Problems”, Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace historycznoliterackie, vol. 24, 1973, pp. 141–156.
 43 M. Szymczak, “O tzw. nieprzekładalnych kategoriach językowych.” In:  Poetyka i 
stylistyka słowiańska, ed. S. Skwarczyńska (Wrocław 1973), pp. 21–26.
 44 A. Wierzbicka, “Przekładalność a elementarne jednostki semantyczne,” Przegląd 












same meaning in all languages.45 Languages and cultures appose and configure 
these terms; still, the very existence of these in-born elementary semantic units 
enables intercultural communication, which is realized in translation.46
Based on the NSM theory, Wierzbicka has been developing her multi-
directional, interdisciplinary research, combining semantics, pragmatics, socio-
linguistics, cultural anthropology, and even psychology, ethics and theology. 
Wierzbicka presents the heuristic potential of her theory, while improving and 
universalizing her model. She proves that NSM is an effective culture-neutral 
tool for comparing cultures and languages, allowing to describe differences 
and similarities between them. Thanks to the method of semantic explication, 
NSM helps avoid cultural biases when translating words from one language into 
another.
The paper “Translatability and the Scripting of Other Peoples’ Souls”, which 
is included in our anthology, is a good illustration of Wierzbicka’s method.47 
The author argues that translating indigenous categories into academic English 
precludes capturing and understanding indigenous perspectives. This exposes 
the anthropologist/translator to the charge that she/he is ‘scripting other people’s 
souls’ (to use Clifford Geertz’s expression). Analyzing cognitive and cultural 
categories from Australian Aboriginal languages, usually in connection with 
Anglo-cultural scripts, the author shows how the thought paths encoded in these 
languages can be explicated from the insider’s point of view, in neutral meta-
language directly cross-translatable into the indigenous languages themselves. 
Wierzbicka’s study leads to an optimistic conclusion as to intercultural commu-
nication: “we are not imprisoned in our own modes of thinking and perception 
if we can rely on a shared, universal set of concepts which provide us with a 
common intellectual currency for ‘understanding others’, and indeed, for under-
standing ourselves.”48
At the end of the 1970s, in the light of the development of semiotics, the sharp 
division between literary and linguistic approaches to translation seems to blur a 
little. This happens due to scholars who see Translation Studies as an interdiscipline 
 45 W. Wojtanowska, Język kluczem do kultury. Anna Wierzbicka i naturalny metajęzyk 
semantyczny (Wrocław 2016), p. 32.
 46 J. Bartmiński, “Droga naukowa Anny Wierzbickiej. Od składni polskiej prozy 
renesansowej do semantyki międzykulturowej”, Teksty Drugie 2011, no.  1–2, 
pp. 226–227.
 47 Wojtanowska, Język kluczem…, pp. 6 and 27.
 48 A. Wierzbicka, “Translability and the Scripting of Other Peoples’ Souls”, The Australian 
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anchored in the domain of semiotics. In practice, though, new research in TS was 
more strongly linked to linguistic paradigms, especially since it had been modi-
fied and elaborated upon by a research team at the Institute of Applied Lingustics 
in Warsaw. This institution became a hub for advanced research in translation 
teaching, as well as interpreting and specialized translation.
The main characteristics of the new school of “translatorics,” as its main pro-
ponent Franciszek Grucza called it, were: a scientific approach to problems of 
translation, an effort to delineate a separate discipline (hence the new name), 
and focusing on the problems of translation competence. Grucza’s programmatic 
paper, “Problems of Translatorics” (1976),49 defined the discipline as a science of 
linguistic translation, interested in the processes taking place in the translation 
system (construed in fact as the standard Structuralist model of the act of trans-
lation). Grucza differentiates pure and applied translatorics: the former describes 
and explains the system, the latter – perfects its functioning with a view to trans-
lator training. The main role in the system is assigned to the translator, who is 
also the focal point of translatorics, although other elements of the system also 
receive attention. Within the interdisciplinary framework, translatorics covers 
common ground with linguistics, textology, psychology and physiology; that 
said, linguistics remains its point of departure and reference. The field is fur-
ther divided into research on “informative” vs “aesthetic” texts; the latter field 
remains out of the scope of Grucza’s interest, which situates his work close to the 
Leipzig school of Translationslinguistik. Translatorics, with its conceptual unity 
and coherence played an important role in the practical development of transla-
tion and translator training in Poland.
6  Multilinguality and Literature: Hermeneutics 
and Translation History (the 1980s)
In 1975, Edward Balcerzan dubbed good translators “enlighteners” of foreign 
texts and literatures. “In the hierarchy of duties of the art of translation,” he wrote, 
“hermeneutical goals are the most important ones.”50 Jerzy Ziomek elaborated on 
this topic in his essay “Who’s speaking?”, where he asked: “Is it possible to trans-
late without understanding?”51 By way of an answer, Ziomek recalls Friedrich 
 49 F. Grucza, “Zagadnienia translatoryki.” In:  Glottodydaktyka a translatoryka, ed. 
F. Grucza (Warszawa 1981), pp. 9–27.
 50 E. Balcerzan, “Trudna rzecz jest jeden język drugim językiem dostatecznie wyrznąć”, 
Teksty 1975, vol. 6, p. 5.










Schleiermacher’s idea of interpretive translation, particularly demanding as far 
as the translator’s hermeneutic competences go. Referring also to Paul Ricoeur 
and Walter Benjamin, whose concepts had been present in the context of Polish 
translation studies, he conceptualizes understanding and subjective relations in 
translation in linguistic and pragmatic terms:  “We translate not only in order 
to assimilate a text from the foreign language, but also in order to see our own 
language in the shaft of light from the other language.”52
The author, who had used information theory as methodology in his early 
translation research, now looked at translation from a different perspective, to 
conclude that it is more than just re-coding on the level of language. He assessed 
the drive towards mathematical precision in theorizing translation as caused by 
the “inferiority complex of humanists” impressed by the technical complication 
of computers. These words come from the essay “Translation – Understanding – 
Interpretation,”53 included in the present collection. Here, Ziomek revises claims 
stemming from the structural paradigm in TS, negates the strict division between 
linguistic and literary translation research, and opens up a space for the herme-
neutic paradigm. He also juxtaposes interpretation seen as a way of reaching 
the truth with the procedure of analyzing translation shifts resulting from the 
difference between language systems or semantic fields, as well the translator’s 
individual choices.
It is not language that occupies the central position in Ziomek’s thinking, 
but rather the subject of the act of literary communication:  the person who 
experiences the world through language and in turn introduces his or her own 
experience into language. Languages, Ziomek claims, carry the social expe-
rience of their users. If this is true, any text on top of its semantic contents 
possesses also a certain specific character, which from the external perspective 
is recognized as foreign. The effort of the translator goes towards overcoming or 
underlining this foreignness. Returning to Schleiermacher’s idea of the two ways 
of translation, Ziomek revises the idea of fidelity (finding it actually irrelevant 
as a TS ca tegory) and the relation of correspondence and equivalence between 
utterances in two languages. He defines translation as interpretation, i.e. clarifi-
cation of the meaning of the source utterance; the source serves as a model for 
the meaning created in the target language. In Ziomek’s view, translation is lib-
erated from the comparative domain and can be conceptualized as a process of 
 52 Ziomek, “Kto mówi?”, p. 55.
 53 “Przekład – rozumienie – interpretacja.” In: J. Ziomek, Powinowactwa literatury. Studia 
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understanding and communicating experience which is linguistic in its nature 
and ethical in its aims. In translation, Ziomek writes, languages reflect each other 
as in a mirror and shed light on each other. Translation thus is not only interpre-
tation of a text but also of a language. Translating means “looking at one’s own 
speech in the light of the foreign one, and at the foreign in light of one’s own; it is 
admiration and critique, obscuring and illumination.”54 
Multilinguality of Literature and the Problems of Artistic Translation55 is the 
title of a 1984 collection of essays including a number of studies on the histo-
rical aspect of literary translation and thus marking a new opening in translation 
research in Poland. “We know rather well by now – its editor Edward Balcerzan 
writes – how to do translation theory,”56 but there is a need for more descriptive 
and historical research. The table of contents includes interesting contributions 
from Zygmunt Grosbart, Michał Głowiński, Anna Legeżyńska, Stanisław 
Barańczak, Marek Hendrykowski and Jerzy Święch. The latter had published 
an essay on “Translation and the Problems of Historical Poetics” already back 
in 1976.57 He discussed the role of translators in the communication strategies 
within literary tradition, with the reader occupying a central position. Święch 
actually analyzed the place of translations in the system of national literature, 
and although he was still much attached to the concept of the “proper” function 
of translating – namely representation of the original – still his argument intro-
duced a trait of a new, sociologically oriented approach, rather different form the 
dominant stylistic-linguistic models.
Święch revisits Balcerzan’s concept of translation series as a “specific cul-
tural code,” different from the binding code of the national literature; as such 
it “establishes its own norms of understanding texts” and shapes “the specificity 
of translation communication.”58 Hence, to put it in the language of contempo-
rary TS, Święch formulates the claim that translated literature forms a separate 
sub-system within the literary system in which it functions. His discussion, akin 
to the ideas of the Israeli School, on a different level of analysis continues and 
develops the propositions Stefania Skwarczyńska put forth in her text on the 
Polish Hamlets.
 54 P. 181 in the present anthology.
 55 Wielojęzyczność literatury i problemy przekładu literackiego, ed. E.  Balcerzan 
(Wrocław 1984).
 56 E. Balcerzan, “Słowo wstępne.” In: Wielojęzyczność…, p. 7.
 57 J. Święch, “Tłumaczenie a problemy historii literatury.” In: Z historii i teorii przekładu 
artystycznego, pp. 7–24.












Primarily a literary scholar, Święch was one of the people who altered the path 
of Polish studies in translation and allowed them to penetrate areas outside the 
equi valence paradigm. His essay “Translation and Self-commentaries” (1984) is 
precisely such a diagonal glance across the field and its methodology.59 The author 
investigates the paratextual framing of translation. Even if he does not recognize the 
full weight of paratexts as important sources for studying the social and political 
history of translation, Święch underscores the question of translators’ subjectivity, 
their specific poetic programs and ideological attitudes presented in the commen-
taries. He reads them as sources of knowledge about the translators’ biographies, 
both factual and intellectual. Within the Structural paradigm, translators had been 
construed as textual traces, deformations introduced by interpretation. Święch, on 
the contrary, draws conclusions concerning the process of translating, the inter-
pretive work and different “styles of reception,” as well as the designed roles for 
translators and the ways of their metaphorization. In his view self-commentaries 
enable the study of the nature of the translation process and its product, as well as 
the critical and auctorial competences of translators.
Święch’s essay was to a large extent based on the material collected in a ground-
breaking anthology called Polish Authors on the Art of Translating, published 
in 1977 by Edward Balcerzan.60 It gathered comments, analytical essays and 
reflections on translating by writers-translators, starting with mid 15th century, 
when the Polish language was being shaped as a tool for creating literature. It 
presents a wide array of topics, attitudes and observations – all together forming 
a kind of narrative on the history of translation in Polish. Święch sees a con-
siderable growth in the genre of “translatorial explication,” both in bulk and 
quality, which testifies to a growing self-awareness on the part of the translators. 
These commentaries, as he says, keep adding up to a “theory of the impossibility 
called translation”. The essay is an early instance of academic interest in the “non-
scholarly” theory, studied later for example by André Lefevere.61
Another important publication from the 1980s is Anna Legeżyńska’s book 
Translator and His Authorial Competences. Based on post-war translations from 
 59 J. Święch, “Przekłady i autokomentarze.” In:  Wielojęzyczność…, pp.  45–66. See 
pp. 191–213 in the present volume. 
 60 Pisarze polscy o sztuce przekładu 1440–1974. Antologia, ed. E. Balcerzan, (Poznań 1977). 
An extended version of this groundbreaking anthology, co-edited by E. Rajewska, was 
published in 2007 [editors’ note].







Polish Concepts in Translation Studies 33
Pushkin, Mayakovski, Krylov and Blok.62 We include large portions of its first 
chapter, edited by the author for the purpose of the present publication. The 
main claim of the book is that a translated work of literature is a joint creation 
of the author and the translator. The methodological context for Legeżyńska’s 
analysis comes from the Poznań School of Translation Studies, in particular 
with respect to the analysis and interpretation of traces of the translator’s cre-
ative presence at every level of the text organization. The other theoretical con-
text involved is the Structuralist model of literary communication proposed 
by Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska, who distinguishes intra- and extratextual 
subjective positions present in every text (1971).63 In Sławińska’s model, every 
intratextual and extratextual speaking subject (literary character, narrator, the 
image of the author and the author as a human being) is paired with a respec-
tive receiving subject. In translation, Legeżyńska suggests, the model is doubled. 
For her, the position of the translator as manifested in the text of the translation 
is the criterion for the description and assessment of translation practice. The 
translator’s competence in the intercultural dialogue, together with the posi-
tion he or she takes in the translated text, are studied against the background of 
changing historical landscapes of literature and society.
Legeżyńska’s book was soon followed by a work which took a further step 
towards the realm of the social. Wojciech Soliński’s Artistic Translation and 
Literary Culture. Literary communication and meta-communication (1987) 
looked at the presence of translated literature in the target culture from the 
point of view of literary communication and posited it as a practice within the 
framework literary sociology.64 Soliński discussed questions of translators’ social 
status, as well as translation as a problem of editing. Even if not all aspects of 
Soliński’s study are still relevant, it was without doubt a turning point in the 
development of translation sociology in Poland. While Legeżyńska’s book dealt 
with the intratextual mechanisms of literary communication, Soliński broad-
ened the area by including also the extraliterary as a legitimate object of trans-
lation studies.
 62 A. Legeżyńska, Tłumacz i jego kompetencje autorskie. Na materiale powojennych 
tłumaczeń z A. Puszkina, W. Majakowskiego, I. Kryłowa, A. Błoka, 2nd edition (Warsaw 
1999). For excerpts see pp. 235–249 in the present volume.
 63 See A.  Okopień-Sławińska, Semantyka wypowiedzi poetyckiej (preliminaria) 
(Wrocław 1985).









Anna Legeżyńska’s book had yet another aim, namely to develop a set of tools for 
translation criticism. As a disciple of the Poznań School, she recognized the fact that 
translation scholarship must be instrumental for the critical practice based on aca-
demic principles (cf. Balcerzan’s claim that without a precise language of description 
translation criticism is not possible), which would replace the impressionistic style 
of translation assessment. This topic was then undertaken by Monika Adamczyk-
Garbowska, the author of Polish Translations of English Fiction for Children. Problems 
of Translation Criticism (1988).65 Her monograph was innovative on two levels. First 
of all, children’s literature had not been a mainstream topic in Polish literary studies 
to date, not to mention translation studies (with a few exceptions); secondly, because 
the author introduced a new methodology based on Gideon Toury’s 1980 book In 
Serach of a Theory of Translation, which had not been known in Poland until then 
(and which also uses examples from a children’s classic, Wilhelm Busch’s Max und 
Moritz). Adamczyk-Garbowska’s book was not purely descriptive in Toury’s sense, 
as the category of translation mistake plays an important role in her argument; also, 
the presentation of Toury’s theory was not completely effective. Nevertheless, it is an 
important trace of the rising awareness of new trends in world TS.
The author whose work arguably had the greatest impact on the development 
of Translation Studies in Poland at that time and also triggered a huge increase 
in translation criticism and popular discussion around translation was the 
already mentioned Stanisław Barańczak. A scholar from Poznań and a disciple of 
Edward Balcerzan, since 1981professor of Polish Studies at Harvard, Barańczak 
was above all an eminent poet and one of the greatest translators of literature in 
the history of Polish letters. Barańczak’s most famous essay on translation, “A 
small, but maximalist translatological manifesto Or: An explanation of the fact 
that one also translates poetry with the aim of explaining to other translators that 
for most translations of poetry there is no explanation,”66 is the best example of 
his critical method – essayistic, ironic, brilliant and if not really adhering to strict 
academic discipline, still definitely rooted in the Structuralist methodology of 
the Poznań School of Translation Studies. His critical and methodological texts 
on translation were published in a book entitled Saved in Translation (1992).67 
 65 M. Adamczyk-Garbowska, Polskie tłumaczenia angielskiej literatury dziecięcej. Problemy 
krytyki przekładu (Wrocław 1988).
 66 S. Barańczak, “A small, but maximalist translatological manifesto, Or: An explanation 
of the fact that one also translates poetry with the aim of explaining to other translators 
that for most translations of poetry there is no explanation,” trans. A. Lloyd-Jones. In:, 
Literature from Literature…







Polish Concepts in Translation Studies 35
In his “Manifesto…” Barańczak offered the concept of “semantic dominant” 
(in his earlier works referred to as “stylistic dominant”), as well as the idea of 
“translation maximalism”. The concept of “dominant,” with its roots in Jakobson’s 
thought, bears traces of Barańczak’s early interest in Eastern European transla-
tion theories from the Structuralist paradigm, as well as Ziomek’s and Balcerzan’s 
theoretical vocabulary. A dominant, according to Barańczak, is the formal ele-
ment of the original’s construction which provides the key to its sense. Barańczak 
stresses that poetic form and content in a literary work constitute an indivisible 
unity and the whole of the literary text – a poem – is a meaningful structure. In 
Barańczak’s view the translator is at the center, as an interpreter who recognizes 
the nature of the dominant and then takes responsibility for the decisions taken 
in the translation process and the quality of its final product. A literary transla-
tion should present the fullest and most convincing interpretation of the meaning 
encased in the fullest and most convincing re-creation of the formal shape of the 
original. The principle of maximalism, on the other hand, obliges the translator 
to an imaginative answer to the original and is a strong voice in favor of trans-
lation as a creative work and the translator as the “other/second author,” whose 
prerogatives are quite wide. The practical advice – or rather commandments – 
are apparently extremely simple:  1. Never translate verse into prose; 2.  Never 
translate good poetry into bad poetry. Barańczak is famous for his ironic and 
witty style, which makes him not just an important translation scholar but also 
one of the most appealing critics, loved for his concepts and hated for his ruth-
less judgments.
The text included in the present anthology, drawing on translations from 
Gerard Manley Hopkins, was written before the “Manifesto,” in 1984,68 and 
reworked several times. Hopkins was a poet close to Barańczak for many reasons 
and the critic underlines their spiritual kinship, a category important in his trans-
lation criticism at large. The essay on Hopkins is a lucid presentation of the con-
cept of semantic dominant put into practical use. Hopkins’s poetry, Barańczak 
says making use of his Structuralistic vocabulary, presents a high degree of sty-
listic “overorganization” (complex and intricate poetic language), which serves 
as an equivalent to the complex and intricate content. The author discloses the 
process of creating meanings by way of translational interpretation, and in this 
way verifies his claim that every poem is a miniature “world model” governed 
by a set if intrinsic rules. The rules are specific to the one text only, establishing 
 68 S. Barańczak, “Poetycki model świata a problemy przekładu artystycznego.” 




its inner harmony and producing meanings. Barańczak’s essay is also a show-
case of his translation criticism. Compared with the work of his older colleagues 
from Poznań, Barańczak’s texts have a strong essayistic tone and expressive style, 
which earned him the image of a fierce polemist. It does not make his claims 
or findings less valid, just the opposite. His translations, together with their 
descriptions which outgrow the narrow area of academic life, radically changed 
the landscape for Translation Studies in Poland.
7  The End of the Beautiful Era and New Inspirations: 
Linguistically Oriented Translation Studies Since the 1980s
In the 1980s, as the influence of the Structuralist paradigm in linguistic and 
lite rary studies begins to weaken, the linguistically focused Translation Studies 
in Poland seem to enter a phase of crisis. 1981 saw the publication of a book by 
Henryk Lebiedziński, Elements of the General Theory of Translation, in which 
the author outlines his vision of the discipline in total abstraction from any 
connection with texts or cultures. Rather, he sees it as a study of “the relation 
between the translation and the original as dependant on the genetic relation of 
the ori ginal and reality.”69 His work, further developed in his next book, seems 
nevertheless to have been too general or too eccentric to ensure a development 
of this line of research. Also, at that time the international environment for 
research in translation changed radically. Within the international TS, the no-
tion of equivalence lost its central position as a concept organizing the field, 
and a more integrated approach, combining pragmatics, cognitive semantics, 
text linguistics and psycholinguistics began to gain more and more attention. 
Polish scholars in most cases were not able to take part in the new conversations 
within the field, partly for reasons reaching far outside academic life. In Poland 
and most countries of Central and Eastern Europe the 1980s and early 1990s 
were a turbulent period of political changes; limited access to Western sources 
and international collaboration on the one hand, and, on the other, the exhaus-
tion of the sources of inspiration both from the local research centers and from 
former Soviet Bloc countries, resulted in slowing down the production of new 
concepts.
One of the exceptions was Roman Lewicki, a professor of Russian language 
and linguistics, who continued to work on the question of translation stylistics. 
In his 1993 book Connotation of the Foreign in Translation,70 he postulated a need 
 69 H. Lebiedziński, Elementy przekładoznawstwa ogólnego (Warsaw 1981), p. 9.







Polish Concepts in Translation Studies 37
for non-normative, empirical research, focused on the textuality of translation 
and its functions in society. Hence his interest in translation reception, especially 
the connotation of the foreign: the elements of translated texts which produce 
the foreignizing effect, bringing in associations with foreign countries, cultures, 
languages. Lewicki centered his empirical research around the carriers of the 
foreign. He tested the salience of the foreignizing elements, the level of their 
recognition, as well as differences in the reception of translated vs. native texts. 
In his 2000 work Foreigness in the Reception of Translation,71 Lewicki – revisiting 
early claims of Malinowski and Wojtasiewicz – stresses the fact that translation 
is a problem of culture, not language. In the chapter included in the present 
anthology, the author looks at the problem of the foreign in translation from a 
wider perspective, linking it with the field of cultural anthropology and inter-
cultural communication. Based on his research, he claims that “one’s attitude to 
foreignness in translation reception is derived from, or perhaps even is a part of 
one’s attitude to foreignness as such, i.e. foreignness as a cultural category.”72 The 
value of Lewicki’s continually developed research consists above all in the fact 
that he describes one of the key notions of TS using concepts of today’s cul-
ture and intercultural studies in the empirical context. This direction will prove 
fruitful in overcoming the temporary deadlock in Polish Translation Studies.
The 1990s in Poland witnessed a transition period. After the first partly demo-
cratic elections in June 1989, which brought a victory to the forces of democratic 
opposition and subsequently led to the end of Communist regimes in Central 
Europe, a new epoch began, with much wider opportunities also for the academic 
milieu. International contacts and transfer of ideas became much easier. Polish 
scholars got access to new sources of inspiration and joined the global discussion 
on translation and intercultural communication. The Structural paradigm lost 
its central position; research in translation stylistics was continued within the 
framework of cognitive linguistics, a fairy new current in the study of language 
developed by the American scholar Ronald Langacker and introduced to Poland 
by Elżbieta Tabakowska, a Kraków-based linguist and translator. As a linguist, 
she was especially interested in the link between linguistics and poetics, in order 
to devise precise descriptive tools to study language processes and phenomena 
at work in an interlingual literary creation. Langacker’s grammar, which was an 
answer to the insufficiency of generative grammar for explaining the questions 
of meaning, alongside George Lakoff ’s and Mark Turner’s work on metaphor, 
 71 R. Lewicki, Obcość w odbiorze przekładu (Lublin 2000).






inspired Tabakowska to understand the style in translation as an expression of 
subjectivity and to look at poetic language and its translation as two distinct but 
related conceptualizations of a subjective position in physical and mental spaces.
Tabakowska’s work focuses on the concept of imagery understood as an ability 
to construe a particular scene differently depending on the ways in which lin-
guistic tools are being deployed. As she shows on numerous examples, looking 
at the dimensions of imagery in language enables a precise description of the 
artistic shape of the original as a linguistic creation. This in turn may lead to a 
formulation of the translator’s tasks or to a more careful assessment of translation 
quality. In her book Cognitive Linguistics and the Poetics of Translation (1993),73 
Tabakowska claims that if the linguistic shape of a text is a function of its subject’s 
positioning within physical and mental space, equivalence must be defined on 
the level of imagery in language. In this context, the unit of translation is not a 
word, a sentence or a text, but an image, a scene as construed by a particular 
conceptualizer in a particular set of conditions. A literary text in its entirety is 
a network of such linguistic scene construals. Equivalence in translation there-
fore should be studied on the level of imagery of the corresponding texts rather 
than on lexical or grammatical levels. Tabakowska’s book, written originally in 
English, appeared in Polish translation only in 2001,74 yet she published a fair 
number of papers on the tenets of cognitive linguistics (the new paradigm was 
also introduced by Ronald Langacker himself in a series of lectures he gave in 
Poland in 1993) and its implication for translation and translation studies.75
In her article “The Theory and Praxis of Cognitive Linguistics: An Oleograph 
and a Symphony for two Pianos,”76 presented here, Tabakowska claims that a 
thorough linguistic analysis of a source text done from the perspective of cog-
nitive linguistics can contribute to a fuller understanding of the translation 
process itself and a more adequate evaluation of its final product. The cogni-
tive paradigm allows to initiate a dialogue with literary studies and the theory 
 73 E. Tabakowska, Cognitive Linguistics and the Poetics of Translation (Tübingen 1993).
 74 E. Tabakowska, Językoznawstwo kognitywne a poetyka przekładu, trans. A. Pokojska 
(Kraków 2001).
 75 See her selected papers in translation studies: E. Tabakowska, Myśl językoznawcza 
z myślą o przekładzie. Wybór prac, ed. P.  de Bończa Bukowski and M.  Heydel 
(Krakow 2015).
 76 E. Tabakowska, “Językoznawstwo kognitywne w teorii i praktyce przekładu: oleodruk 
i symfonia na dwa fortepiany.” In: Między oryginałem a przekładem, ed. J. Konieczna-
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of translation based upon the notion of conceptual portrayals. According to 
Tabakowska, within the cognitive approach the aims of linguistics, translation 
theory and translation criticism converge. The point is to establish the relation 
between the linguistic form and the conceptual content it conveys. By analyzing 
a descriptive fragment of Norman Davies’ Europe in the original and her own 
Polish translation, Tabakowska exemplifies the claim that particular dimensions 
of imagery have their linguistic correlates. The comparison of both texts in terms 
of imagery reveals differences, often subtle, in the construction of the scenes. 
It can therefore be said that the translator – obedient to the conventions of the 
target language and guided by his/her own imagination – draws the same picture 
with a different line, or plays the same score in her own way.
This paper is a good example of how Tabakowska combines deep theore-
tical insights and illustrative case studies with true virtuosity, transferring 
knowledge to both translation scholars and practicing translators. She was 
also instrumental in introducing Translation Studies into the institutional aca-
demic structures in Poland at the turn of the 21st century:  she founded and 
was a long-time director of the Chair for Translation Studies and Intercultural 
Communication at the Jagiellonian University, which brought new energy to the 
TS scene in Poland, becoming a hub for translation training and new research 
in the field. Translation Studies at the Jagiellonian have developed dynami-
cally since the 1990s, with a number of publication initiatives, to mention only 
two journals: Między Oryginałem a Przekładem [Between the Original and the 
Translation],77 which developed from a conference and book series under the 
same title, and Przekładaniec. A Journal of Translation Studies.78 They have been 
publishing TS research for more than a quarter of a century now.
Apart from cognitive linguistics, another research inspiration has been 
intersemiotic translation or transmutation, a concept rooted in Jakobson’s tri-
partite division of the field of translation. With the rapid development of 
multimedial and multimodal communication technology, it has become one of 
the central issues for Polish translation scholars. With its source in Structuralist 
thought, research in audiovisual and intersemiotic translation has focused on 
film adaptations of literature within the context of semiotics. Already in 1970, 
Maryla Hopfinger published a paper on “Film and Literature.”79 She saw film 
 77 See: http://journals.akademicka.pl/moap.
 78 See: http://www.ejournals.eu/Przekladaniec/.
 79 M. Hopfinger, “Film i literatura:  uwarunkowania techniczne przekładu 









adaptation as a case of intersemiotic interpretation of the literary message and 
if the signs used in literature and film are mutually untranslatable on the level 
of the artistic material itself (she calls it “the level of building blocks”), they are 
partially translatable on the level of semantic structures and fully translatable 
on the level of cultural semantics, as cultural meanings can be expressed in any 
sign system. The topic was taken up many years later by Seweryna Wysłouch in 
her paper “Film Adaptation as Intersemiotic Translation”, included in the pre-
sent collection.80 Wysłouch situates film adaptation in a wider perspective of the 
correspondence of arts. She concludes that the coexistence of iconic and literary 
signs may be described in terms of concretization and intersemiotic translation. 
Film and literary signs are mutually translatable because, being secondary sign 
systems superimposed over verbal and visual ones, they find equivalents in dif-
ferent materials and retain analogical meanings. Other authors working in this 
area included Wacław Osadnik (“Film Adaptation as Translation”, 1995),81 who 
related his research to polysystem theory and suggested a shift in descriptive 
priorities in the study of adaptation from the concept of adequacy (faithfulness) 
towards acceptability, and Elżbieta Tabakowska, who wrote on intersemiotic 
translation in a yet another context in her “Between Image and Text, or on 
Intersemiotic Translation” (2009).82 Starting from the claim that every trans-
lation is an interpretation, she proposes a model analysis of the translation 
of visual signs into English text in the framework of cognitive theory of sign 
representation.
8  New Horizons: Polish Translation Studies in the 21st Century
The renewed interest in TS, together with the opening of international aca-
demic world in the 1990s, gave momentum to the discipline and brought about 
a large number of research projects across the country. Around the turn of the 
1990s and the early 2000s, there appeared a number of publications presenting 
a wider panorama of Translation Studies as a discipline, with a special emphasis 
on research in literary translation (Maria Krysztofiak’s Literary Translation in 
 80 S. Wysłouch, “Adaptacja filmowa jako przekład intersemiotyczny.” In her, Literatura a 
sztuki wizualne (Warsaw 1994), pp. 157–206. See pp. 263–285 in the present volume. 
 81 W. Osadnik, “Adaptacja filmowa jako przekład.” In: Kino według Alicji, ed. W. Godzic 
and T. Lubelski (Krakow 1995), pp. 69–77.
 82 E. Tabakowska, “Między obrazem a tekstem, czyli o przekładzie intersemiotycznym.” 
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Contemporary Translatorics, 1996)  or to recent theoretical paradigms in TS 
(Alicja Pisarska, Teresa Tomaszkiewicz, Contemporary Tendencies in Translation 
Studies, 1996).83 The Thesaurus of Translatorical Terminology (1998) edited by 
Jurij Lukszyn and his team was an attempt at ordering the conceptual system 
for the field.84 Another project with a similar agenda was undertaken in 2000 
by Urszula Dąmbska-Prokop who published an edited volume entitled A Small 
Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies.85 Ten years later she brought out a fol-
low-up, this time as her own book called The New Encyclopaedia of Translation 
Studies (2010).86 The aim of these books was to sum up and organize the relatively 
new research field, taking into consideration many various contexts and currents 
within it. Dąmbska-Prokop stresses that Translation Studies is an integrated, 
independent and interdisciplinary field, and although she does not include the 
contexts of anthropology, philosophy or postcolonial and gender studies, still 
the presentation she offers leaves no doubt that Translation Studies became an 
important element of the Polish humanities.
More recent publications, varied in terms of topics and methods, reflect the 
stabilization of the discipline in the country and its participation in the global 
exchange. The linguistic and glottodidactic current is continued at the Warsaw 
Institute of Applied Lingusitics. Krzysztof Hejwowski, the author of Cognitive-
Communicative Theory of Translation (2006), draws on Wojtasiewicz’s concept 
of untranslatability and ways of overcoming it.87 Jolanta Kozak, in turn, in her 
Literary Translation as a Metaphor. Between logos and lexis (2009) looks at trans-
lation in the philosophical framework, asking about its ontology.88 Since the 
1990s, the University of Silesia has published a book series edited by Piotr Fast, 
presenting a wide array of methodologies and approaches to translation; it is a 
valuable collection of the mainstream of Polish research in translation, including 
works of some authors featured in the present anthology.
 83 M. Krysztofiak, Przekład literacki we współczesnej translatoryce (Poznań 1996). See 
also her Translatologiczna teoria i pragmatyka przekładu artystycznego (Poznań 2011); 
A. Pisarska, T. Tomaszkiewicz, Współczesne tendencje przekładoznawcze (Poznań 1996; 
2nd ed. 1998).
 84 Tezaurus terminologii przekładoznawczej, ed. J. Lukszyn et al. (Warsaw 1998).
 85 Mała encyklopedia przekładoznawstwa, ed. U. Dąmbska-Prokop (Częstochowa 2000).
 86 U. Dąmbska-Prokop, Nowa encyklopedia przekładoznawstwa (Kielce 2010).
 87 K. Hejwowski, Kognitywno-komunikacyjna teoria przekładu (Warsaw 2008); see also 
his Iluzja przekładu. Przekładoznawstwo w ujęciu konstruktywnym (Katowice 2015).














In 2009, the editors of the present collection, Piotr de Bończa Bukowski and 
Magda Heydel, published an anthology of essays Contemporary Translation 
Theories (2009), which was well received and marked an important point in 
Polish Translation Studies as the first comprehensive presentation of the canon 
of international TS in the 20th century. In 2013, they authored another anthology, 
Polish Thought in Translation Studies,89 the basis of the present collection.
New contexts for Translation Studies in Poland have been provided by the 
development of cultural studies and the sociological framework in the human-
ities. This gave rise to a number of projects concentrating on intercultural 
communication and translation as international social practice. The Wrocław-
based scholar Elżbieta Skibińska initiated a research program which resulted in 
studies centered around translation and international reception of the work of 
Polish writers (Witold Gombrowicz, Tadeusz Konwicki, Stanisław Lem). Some 
of the new ideas engaged philosophical and anthropological concepts. Tadeusz 
Sławek, a philosopher and professor of English and American literature, in his 
essay “Calibanism. The Philosophical Dilemmas of Translation” (1991)90 looks 
at translation from the perspective of modern philosophy, especially Nietzsche 
and Derrida. For Sławek, translation is not a linguistic or cultural phenomenon, 
but belongs to the realm of understanding and interpretation, the realm of her-
meneutic debate on the nature and conditions of these processes. Hence, it is not 
different from what criticism (in the sense given to this word by deconstruction) 
does: both the critic and the translator aim at destabilizing the senses in the text, 
and study its resistant surface:  palpable, material, nonadjacent, penetrated by 
other texts. That surface consists of signs, the feature of a sign being that it can 
be repeated. In deconstruction every repetition involves change: the critic/trans-
lator repeats what has already been repeated and distorts what has already been 
distorted. The source, the original, is in fact always already divided, marked by 
difference.91
Sławek begins his essay with Nietzsche’s thought on translation and claims 
that if history is inscribed with difference and within the space of difference 
between two works, the relation between the original and the translation cannot 
 89 Współczesne teorie przekładu. Antologia, ed. P. Bukowski and M. Heydel (Krakow 
2009); Polska myśl przekładoznawcza. Antologia, ed. P.  de Bończa Bukowski and 
M. Heydel (Krakow 2013).
 90 T. Sławek, “Kalibanizm. Filozoficzne dylematy tłumaczenia.” In: Przekład artystyczny, 
vol. 1, ed. by P. Fast (Katowice 1991), pp. 7–17. See pp. 251–262 in the present volume.
 91 T. Sławek, “Vita femina. Dekonstrukcja jako styl krytyki,” In: Interpretacje i styl krytyki, 
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be described in terms of correspondence, faithfulness or treason. Firstly, the 
object of translation loses its outline, as we never translate a text only but also its 
“times;” secondly, since we are inevitably faithful to our own times, we betray the 
original. Hence, reflection on translation is a reflection on the present time where 
translation is a meta-consciousness of the present. Sławek brings forth the rela-
tionship between Prospero and Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest as a meta-
phor for translation. Kaliban symbolizes the translator, who, confronted with 
the Other, discovers the limitations of his own language, comes to understand 
the illusion of his completeness. Prospero, the figure of the author, by exercising 
his power over Caliban, allows him to discover worlds that are there outside the 
limits of his language and his world that he had thought were sufficient; Prospero 
shatters the peace of Caliban’s own home. Caliban’s reaction – rebellion and an 
attempted rape of Miranda – is a paradoxical answer of a translator, trying to 
cope with the overwhelming power of the author. The question of translation 
in the context of contemporary interpretation theories, particularly deconstruc-
tion, appears also in the work of Michał Paweł Markowski, a professor of lit-
erary theory, translator and author of a monograph on Derrida’s interpretation 
theory.92 Another author working in the same area is Adam Lipszyc. His book 
Justice at the Tip of the Tongue (2012)93 is a reading of Walter Benjamin’s phi-
losophy, with “The Task of the Translator” as a point of departure for a wide 
presentation of Benjamin’s concepts of the “ethics of language” or the “ethical 
philosophy of language”, as Lipszyc names it.
Another interesting interpretive path runs through the middle ground 
between translation and comparative studies, the area so well described in inter-
national TS by theorists such as Susan Bassnett or Emily Apter. Polish translation 
scholars are well aware of the contributions from new comparative studies, which 
are more often than not defined in terms of translation or as translation. Tomasz 
Bilczewski has published two books devoted to various aspects of comparison 
and translation:  Comparison and Interpretation:  Modern Comparative Studies 
versus Translation (2010), in which he presents a new assessment of the historical 
development of the field, with a special focus on the role of translation in devel-
oping new approaches to comparative analysis and expanding the creative power 
of literary comparative studies, and Comparison and Translation. Comparative 
 92 M. P. Markowski, Efekt inskrypcji. Jacques Derrida i literatura (Bydgoszcz 1997).






Studies Between the Anatomist’s Plate and Digital Humanities (2016)94, where he 
implements the category of translation and comparison to talk about narratives 
dealing with the experience of painful uprootedness and immersion in a world 
of incommensurate language and cultural realities.
In Bilczewski’s analyses, Translation Studies leaves the safe but limited area 
of academic pursuits in literature and language; it also goes beyond the concept 
cultural translation in its basic sense. The scholar addresses existential, histor-
ical, political traumatic contexts, venturing into a risky ground in between, with 
complex identities, negotiations between the selfsame and other, and creation of 
communities. Bilczewski’s essay included in our anthology 95 places the problem 
of translation within the framework of psychoanalysis and discusses several 
examples to present ways in which the language of literature problematizes the 
process of working through losses and reveals the post-traumatic condition of 
the subject. His principal material comes from Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation 
(1989), a description of forced displacement and of translating one’s self, and her 
After Such Knowledge (2004), which reflects on the experience of exile in a per-
spective of inherited trauma, passed down through generations.
Problems of translation within the framework of history and traumatic 
memory seem to be a rich domain of study in Central Europe, marked by the 
experience of the Holocaust as well as decades of rule of two totalitarian sys-
tems. There is space for theorization as well as a vast scope of material to ana-
lyze, translate and interpret. One such project has been recently undertaken at 
the Jagiellonian University in Kraków by Research Centers for Memory Cultures 
and for Translation Studies; it consists in translating the actual utterances of 
Polish bystanders interviewed by Claude Lanzmann in his documentary Shoah.96 
The new translations bring out the henceforth subdued voice of the bystanders, 
which was simply lost in translation, and describe the layers of meaning hidden 
in their form and contexts. The project, sheds light on the role of language, trans-
lation and non-translation in memory production and management.
 94 T. Bilczewski, Komparatystyka i interpretacja. Nowoczesne badania porównawcze wobec 
translatologii (Krakow 2010); T. Bilczewski, Porównanie i przekład. Komparatystyka 
między tablicą anatoma a laboratorium cyfrowym (Krakow 2016).
 95 T. Bilczewski, „Trauma, translacja, transmisja w perspektywie postpamięci. Od literatury 
do epigenetyki.” In: Od pamięci biodziedzicznej do postpamięci, ed. T. Szostek, R. Nycz, 
R. Sendyka (Warszawa 2013), pp. 40–62. See pp. 307–324 in the present volume. 
 96 Partial research results will be published both in Polish and English in Przekładaniec. 
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The historical material on the translators’ life and work in traumatic conditions 
is another huge field of research. In the anthology we present Małgorzata Tryuk’s 
paper on interpreters working in the Auschwitz death camp.97 The author looks 
at testimonies on how interpreters were recruited from among the inmates, what 
their role and position in camp hierarchy was, and how they were treated. This 
shocking account of the practice of translation within the multilingual environ-
ment under extreme pressure and in inhuman conditions sheds light on the his-
torical events themselves, the problems of memory and representation of trauma, 
as well as contributing an extreme case study to the field of translator studies.
The transdisciplinary nature of new developments of TS in Poland does not 
mean that research in literary translation as such has been abandoned altogether. 
The final paper in our anthology is an example of fresh and innovatory work 
in the area which has been the flagship of Polish translation research from its 
very beginning. Tamara Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz is the author of Modernist 
Translation. An Eastern European Perspective  – Models, Semantics, Functions 
(2016),98 where she proposes a typology of modernist translation in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In the chapter included in the anthology the author looks at 
a wide array of experimental forms of translation inspired by conceptual art. 
All of the practices she studies are avant-garde, overtly anti-illusionist and radi-
cal in their treatment of the concept of translation as construed by traditional 
approaches. Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz analyses the ways in which these 
experiments enter into relations with visual, installation and performance art, 
at the same time activating aleatoric and combinatory procedures for the con-
struction of target texts. Stressing intermediality and synesthesia, the cases she 
discusses introduce an inherent tension between sensory and intellectual cog-
nition in the translation process. They also promote the translator’s conceptual 
role in place of the traditional translational illusionism and are a strong voice for 
translator creativity.
Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz’s work illustrates how Polish Translation Studies 
combines international methodological and theoretical research framework 
 97 M. Tryuk, “ ‘You say nothing; I will interpret’: Interpreting in the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
Concentration Camp.” in:  Translation and Opposition, ed. D.  Asimakoulas and 
M. Rogers (Auschwitz-Bristol-Buffalo-Toronto- 2011), pp 223–243. See pp. 325–342 
in the present volume. .See also M. Tryuk, Ty nic nie mów, ja będę tłumaczył. O etyce 
w tłumaczeniu ustnym (Warsaw 2012).
 98 T. Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz, Modernist Translation. An Easter European Perspective. 
Models, Semantics, Functions (Frankfurt a. Main-Bern-Bruxelles-New York-Oxford-






with the specificity of the local environment. The author looks at some inte-
resting examples of Polish avant-garde art to read it in an enlightening way from 
the point of view of translation. At the same time, she makes use of the Eastern 
European paradigm of Translation Studies and finds the analytical tools as well 
as her material locally. Finally, by unpacking the translational meanings of Ewa 
Partum’s installations, she also adds a new understanding of the visual art pro-
duced in response to the existential, political and ideological tensions of this part 
of Europe; hence, she also contributes to the discussion on the wider sense of 
translation as one of the most important cultural practices of the contemporary 
humanities.
*
Any attempt at summing up the panorama of Polish concepts in Translation 
Studies or generalizing about the characteristic features of research done by 
Polish scholars is necessarily doomed to fail. By way of a closing remark it seems 
apt to stress the fact that the century that passed since Żeromski’s statement, a 
hundred years of work on theorizing and describing translation, translations and 
translators, brought a plethora of varied and fascinating material. The sample col-
lected in our anthology shows Polish Translation Studies as a rich interdiscipline 
which has always been involved in creative dialogue with literary, cultural and 
linguistic studies. The growing awareness of the role translation plays in the 
globalized world of the future, but also in understanding the past in the cultural, 
social and political dimensions, allows us to expect that the work of translation 
scholars will develop further in the international context.
Bronisław Malinowski
The Translation of Untranslatable Words
It might seem that the simplest task in any linguistic enquiry would be the trans-
lation of individual terms. In reality the problem of defining the meaning of a 
single word and of proceeding correctly in the translating of terms is as difficult 
as any which will face us. It is, moreover, in methodological order not the first 
to be tackled. It will be obvious to anyone who has so far followed my argu-
ment that isolated words are in fact only linguistic figments, the products of an 
advanced linguistic analysis. The sentence is at times a self-contained linguistic 
unit, but not even a sentence can be regarded as a full linguistic datum. To us, the 
real linguistic fact is the full utterance within its context of situation.
But still, as in all work of analysis, it does not matter very much where we 
begin. Since in the translation of texts we have to proceed by giving a word for 
word rendering, let us discuss this first. It will soon enough lead us into the 
apparently more complicated, but in reality more elementary, question of how to 
treat native texts and contexts.
Let me start with the apparently paradoxical and yet perfectly plain and abso-
lutely true proposition that the words of one language are never translatable into 
another. This holds of two civilized languages as well as of a ‘native’ and a ‘civi-
lized’ one, though the greater the difference between two cultures the greater the 
difficulty of finding equivalents.
Turning for a moment to more familiar European languages – anyone who 
has faced the difficulties of translating a novel or scientific book from Russian 
or Polish into English, or vice versa, will know that strict verbal equivalents are 
never to be found. Translation must always be the re-creation of the original into 
something profoundly different. On the other hand, it is never a substitution of 
word for word but invariably the translation of whole contexts.
It would be easy to skim the surface of any language for completely untrans-
latable terms. Such German words as Sehnsucht, or Sauerkraut, Weltschmerz or 
Schlachtfest, Blutwurst or Grobheit, Gemut or Gemeinheit are not to be equated 
to any word in English, or, for that matter, in any other European language. Such 
English words as ‘sport,’ ‘gentleman,’ ‘fair-play,’ ‘kindness,’ ‘quaint,’ ‘forlorn’ – to 
mention only a few from a legion – are never translated in a foreign tongue; they 
are simply reproduced. International currency has been achieved by many Italian 




painting. If we were to enquire why these, with certain French words referring 
to technicalities of love-making such as liaison, maitresse, au mieux, complai-
sance; or to culinary compositions and details of menu; to fashion or to niceties 
of literary craft, such as belles-lettres, mot juste, connaisseur are untranslatable – 
the answer would be easy. In each culture certain aspects are more openly, 
minutely or pedantically cultivated: sport in England, good cooking and love-
making in France; sentimentality and metaphysical profundities in Germany; 
music, noodles and painting in Italy.
Words referring to moral or personal values change their meaning deeply even 
if the form is similar: compare French honneur, Spanish honra, English ‘honor,’ 
and German Ehre; or ‘faith,’ foi, Glaube and fe; or patrie, Vaterland, ‘home,’ and 
la peninsula. English changes east of Suez; it becomes a different language in 
India, Malaya and South Africa. The question whether American is English is 
very fruitful from the present point of view: you cannot swear in English in the 
U.S.A. and vice versa. You cannot order your food in an ‘eat-house’ nor ‘get out-
side your drinks’ by the same verbal symbols in a ‘saloon’ as in a ‘pub’; while 
Prohibition has introduced words corresponding to the change of institutions 
and values surrounding drink. In brief, every language has words which are not 
translatable, because they fit into its culture and into that only; into the physical 
setting, the institutions, the material apparatus and the manners and values of a 
people.
With all this, it might appear that such words, however frequent, are but freaks 
or peculiarities. Surely, it will be contended, numerals, parts of the body, terms 
of relationship, conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions, words as ordinary as bread 
and butter, milk and meat, are simply, plainly, adequately and completely trans-
lated between any two languages of the Western cultures. A brief consideration 
convinces us that this is not so. Were we to aim merely at achieving some approx-
imate indication of correspondence between two words, sufficient to order a 
meal, to bargain over the price of an umbrella or ask our way in the street, then 
even the linguistic instruction supplied on a few pages of our Baedecker, cer-
tainly a cheap pocket dictionary or an Ollendorf, will give adequate translations. 
But if in our scientific analysis we define words as devices used in a number of 
verbal and situational contexts, then translation must be defined as the supplying 
of equivalent devices and rules. This makes our point clearer: there is no simple 
equivalence between two languages ever to be found which could be used right 
through, replacing the German word by the English, or vice versa.
Let us take the simplest example, the numeral ‘one,’ un, ein. They correspond 
closely in counting. But un homme, ein Mann is not ‘one man’ but ‘a man.’ ‘One 
man one vote’ could not be translated by un homme un vote, nor is ein Mann ein 
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Wort translatable into ‘one man one word.’ Nor is c’est un homme honnête equiv-
alent to ‘this is one honest man.’ As soon as we come to derived uses, to subsid-
iary meanings, to idiomatic handling of words, the equivalence breaks down. 
Translation as an act of putting ‘one’=un appears to us at once as a matter of 
rough, preliminary, makeshift arrangement which has to be supplemented by a 
long series of additional data.
Or take the parts of the human body: we have at once to face up to the fact that 
the conventional restrictions, euphemisms, and twists obfuscate the meaning 
in English to a much larger degree than in French or in German. For instance, 
‘belly’ is not equivalent to Bauch or ventre; ‘stomach’ reaches almost to the knees, 
legs are curtailed in their upper reaches. Such words as ‘breast,’ gorge, sein, Brust, 
Busen become untranslatable. And in English again the word ‘navel,’ associated 
in a daring anatomical metaphor with an orange, shocks many a continental 
damsel who thinks herself absolutely protected by English prudery on this side of 
the Channel. ‘Eye,’ ‘hand,’ ‘foot,’ and ‘arm,’ ‘mouth’ and ‘ears’ seem so well defined 
and precise that here a simple = might be enough. But even here some European 
languages, for instance Slavonic, use the term ‘hand’ often to embrace the ‘arm’, 
as in Polish and Russian, where instead of having ‘feet’ and ‘legs’ we have only 
lower extremities. Moreover, in every European language the derived and meta-
phorical and idiomatic uses of ‘eye,’ ‘hand’ and ‘foot’ are so little co-ordinated 
that they cannot be equated. ‘My two legs’ could not be set = meine zwei Beine; 
it would have to be meine beiden Beine. We neither eat nor sleep linguistically 
in the same manner: while the Englishman ‘sleeps with,’ the Frenchman couche 
avec. As to eating, a Frenchman’s bien manger becomes in German gut speisen, 
while the Englishman ‘dines well’. As regards adverbs and conjunctions, no one 
brought up in a continental language will ever live down the absence of déjà, 
schon, już, uzhe, già or ya. Such German adverbs or particles as doch, nanu, also, 
the French mais non, mais oui – not equivalent to the German aber nein, aber 
ja – can neither be equated nor reproduced in English.
We have now whittled down our paradox to the platitude that words from 
one language are never translatable into another; that is, we cannot equate one 
word to another. If by translation we mean the supplying of the full range of 
equivalent devices, metaphorical extensions and idiomatic sayings – such a pro-
cess is of course possible. But even then, it must be remembered that something 
more than mere juggling with words and expressions is needed. When we pass 
even from one European country to another we find that cultural arrangements, 
institutions, interests and systems of values change greatly. Translation in the 
correct sense must refer therefore not merely to different linguistic uses but 
often to the different cultural realities behind the words. All the new systems of 
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teaching modern languages – whether it be Toussain-Langenscheidt, Pelman or 
Berlitz – have in practice fully adopted this contextual theory of language and 
realized the untranslatability of words. In the case of words which have to be 
international, e.g. scientific terms, congresses have to deal with their unification; 
and it can only be achieved because the apparatus of science is uniform, because 
such arrangements as the metric system have been widely adopted and because 
the institutional side of scientific training, laboratory organization and academic 
life is sufficiently similar.
In diplomatic documents and international treaties, which must not contain 
any linguistic ambiguity, we are again faced with the difficulty of finding a safe 
and unequivocal common denominator to untranslatable words. Whether this 
is mainly due to the fact that diplomatic language is used to conceal thought – 
according to the definition of one of the most famous diplomats of history – 
or whether it honestly attempts to serve its purpose, need not be discussed 
here.
The translatability of words or texts between two languages is not a matter 
of mere readjustment of verbal symbols. It must always be based on a unifica-
tion of cultural context. Even when two cultures have much in common, real 
understanding and the establishment of a community of linguistic implements is 
always a matter of difficult, laborious and delicate readjustment.
When two cultures differ as deeply as that of the Trobrianders and the English; 
when the beliefs, scientific views, social organization, morality and material 
outfit are completely different, most of the words in one language cannot be even 
remotely paralleled in the other.
Let us turn at once to our own special case, that of Trobriand agricultural 
terminology. The simplest word to be considered is ‘garden’. But obviously the 
English term may suggest anything from a suburban plot to a park, from an al-
lotment to a market-garden, and in none of these senses, nor yet in any of the 
metaphorical extensions to which this word is liable, could it be translated into 
Trobriand. So that at once we are faced with a serious ‘gap’ in the vocabulary of 
our Melanesian friends. For they really have no word corresponding to our gen-
eral term ‘garden.’
Instead they have a series of words:  bagula, buyagu, tapopu, kaymata, 
kaymugwa, baleko, each of which describes a certain type or kind, aspect or 
phase of ‘garden.’ But to ‘translate’ any of these native terms by equating it to an 
English word would not merely be wrong, but impossible; or rather it would be 
impossible to find an English word exactly corresponding to any one of the na-
tive ones. Furthermore, to label the native term by even a combination of English 
words is at least misleading.
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What then is the correct procedure? Let me exemplify it on one of the words 
just mentioned – the native term buyagu – by making a methodological reinter-
pretation of the technique adopted in Division I (§§ 16–26) of Part V. First, we 
had to remind the reader of the general context of situation within which the 
word buyagu could be used:  that is, to indicate the social, legal and technical 
arrangements by which a portion of cultivable soil is ear-marked for next year’s 
gardens and recognized as ‘the future gardens.’
Then I  give the merely approximate but useful English label ‘garden-
site,’ which I  have used throughout the descriptive chapters in order to avoid 
repeating the native term constantly. But this compound term has to be imme-
diately redefined by fuller English circumlocutions, such as ‘land under cultiva-
tion at a given season,’ ‘the land intended for cultivation,’ ‘all the land within the 
common enclosure’. These circumlocutions obviously derive their meaning from 
the reader’s knowledge of how land is cultivated in the Trobriands; that is, tracts 
of land consisting of one or two fields (kwabila) are put under cultivation and a 
common enclosure is made round them, which converts the area into one com-
munal garden. This meaning is illustrated in Text 3, where ‘garden-site’ and ‘the 
garden as a whole’ is defined by its economic as well as by its technical character-
istics. In the definition of the term buyagu the reader has then to be reminded of 
the manner in which a garden-site is physically delimited for the natives, first by 
the boundary belt and later by the fence (§ 17).
Throughout its analysis we see that the word is progressively defined by refer-
ence to the ethnographic description, supplemented by additional information 
concerning linguistic usage. In paragraph 17 this parallelism of verbal use and 
real situation shows clearly: “as soon as this (i.e. the bush) is cut buyagu, ‘garden-
site’ becomes opposed to odila, ‘bush,’ ‘all the land outside,’ also called yosewo, 
‘uncut bush outside the garden-site’.” It is through the opposition of the word 
buyagu to the two words odila and yosewo and, in the sentence following the 
one just quoted, to the words kapopu and kaulaka that the term buyagu is more 
closely defined. The relation of this term to the cognate terms, bagula and baleko 
(§ 20), is equally important; as well as the negative fact that one of the terms for 
division of land, the term kwabila, is never used to describe a garden in process 
of cultivation. Thus, the definition of a word consists partly in placing it within 
its cultural context, partly in illustrating its usage in the context of opposites and 
of cognate expressions.
Turning to paragraphs 20–25, we see how the words buyagu, bagula, baleko 
are defined by placing them within a series of terms with mutually exclusive uses. 
It is clear that in all this the definition is partly based on the long descriptions 
of the main ethnographic account, but also largely on the contrast between the 
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terms to be defined and their opposites, and also on the comparison between the 
respective area of each of the three terms.
It is interesting to note that, in his definition, the native informant himself 
reproduces the context of situation first:  “When we clear the bush there re-
mains the uncut scrub, there comes into being the garden-site” (Text 2). Here 
we have an indication that the term buyagu in its most characteristic form can 
be used at the clearing; that it marks the opposition between the uncut scrub 
and the land which is being prepared for cultivation. In the second part of this 
definition text:  “When we stand on the boundary belt, on one side (we have) 
the uncut bush, on the other the garden-site,” the native further defines the two 
terms by putting before us the concrete situation in which we can have one of the 
opposites on each hand. He then attaches the verbal labels to either side of the 
picture respectively.
The need of a clear context of situation for certain words is even more obvious 
in Text 3, where my informant reproduces the sociological as well as the physical 
context. We have an indication that strangers arriving at a garden would first 
enquire about the ‘garden as a whole’ (buyagu) and then about the ‘individually 
owned portions’ (bagula). In this text we find also the interesting grammatical 
feature that one word, and one word only, of the three expressions which we 
have roughly translated by the English ‘garden’ can be used verbally, and that this 
word bagula in its nominal form corresponds to the dynamic conception ‘garden 
as actually cultivated’. In a full commentary on these texts a number of other 
grammatical points would have to be considered. For instance, the use of the 
possessive pronoun ‘his’ in Text 4 correlates a semi-economic, semi-legal claim 
to the whole garden site on the part of the magician with the meaning of the term 
buyagu, ‘garden as a whole’; while the possessive ‘his,’ referring to the individual 
owner, has a definite economic meaning and is connected with the synonymous 
use of the terms bagula and baleko.
We see then that it is impossible to define a word by mere equation. Translation 
in the sense of exact and exhaustive definition of meaning cannot be done by 
affixing an English label. Our paradoxical heading ‘Translation of Untranslatable 
Words’ is obviously based on a two-fold use of the term ‘translate’. If we under-
stand by ‘translate’ the finding of verbal equivalents in two different languages, 
this task is impossible, and the Italian adage traduttore, traditore holds good. 
Translation in the sense of defining a term by ethnographic analysis, that is, by 
placing it within its context of culture, by putting it within the set of kindred and 
cognate expressions, by contrasting it with its opposites, by grammatical analysis 
and above all by a number of well-chosen examples – such translation is feasible 
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and is the only correct way of defining the linguistic and cultural character of 
a word.
Thus, while for practical reasons we have to adopt a certain rough and ready 
English equivalent for each native term – an equivalent, which functions as an 
aide-mémoire or rough label, but lays no claims whatever to translate the na-
tive term – the real translation is contained in the combined ethnographic and 
linguistic description, which we have exemplified on the one term buyagu, but 
which will be found illustrated in the few hundred words cited in the course of 
Part V.
Take, for instance, the apparently simple case of a technical implement. What 
do we achieve in the rendering: dayma = ‘digging-stick’? A digging-stick is not 
an implement familiar to an English curate or clerk, even if he happens to be an 
amateur gardener; he has never seen one, never heard of one, certainly never 
used one; and even if he knows that peoples exist who break their soil and plant 
their seed by means of a pointed stick, he still does not understand the term 
unless he also realizes that the use, the type and the institutional setting of a 
digging-stick are not the same in every primitive culture. But to the reader the 
meaning of dayma has become real in that he knows something about its mate-
rial, shape and size; the technical uses and economic associations, even the values 
and sentiments which the digging-stick derives from its daily employment and 
from the part it plays in magic and ceremonial. He is able to place it within the 
gardening scheme of the Trobriands. All he now needs is a general linguistic 
description of this word, of its various uses outside gardening, of the set of terms 
to which it belongs, and of its grammatical characteristics. All this the reader will 
find in Division VI (§ 5).
When we translate kema by ‘axe’ we have to be even more on our guard, 
because here we are dealing with an object which also exists and functions in our 
culture and it is very important not to assimilate the uses, the form and the mate-
rial of the native implement with those of our own. In so far as the axe is used in 
gardening, I have described most of its technical functions and also its magical 
role. And the meaning of the term kema is in the last instance to be derived, not 
from the substitution of ‘axe’ for the native word, but from our knowledge of the 
role which it plays within native culture, here more specifically within native 
gardening.
All this refers also to such words as kaylepa, ‘magical wand,’ kaytukwa, ‘staff,’ 
kali, ‘fence,’ tula, ‘boundary pole’. In every case the English words merely supply 
a mnemonic counter, while the meaning of the native terms is given in the 
descriptions and through linguistic analysis. The word kamkokola I have only 
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occasionally translated as ‘magical prism, so far is the native word removed from 
anything which could be rendered by an English equivalent.
Thus, it is only because we know the world of ideas, the various activities, 
the economic rules of Trobriand gardening that we can grasp the linguistic side 
of Trobriand agriculture. It is what we might call their context of culture which 
supplies us with the relevant elements whereby we can translate these words. 
Translation then becomes rather the placing of linguistic symbols against the 
cultural background of a society, than the rendering of words by their equivalents 
in another language.
At times it is necessary in ethnographic description resolutely to go beyond 
the verbal and even, as we shall see, beyond the conceptual outfit of the natives. 
The term ‘garden,’ used throughout my descriptive chapters is, as we know, an 
example of this, for it does not correspond to any native word. At the same time, 
I did not use this word in its English meaning, and I trust that, especially towards 
the end of Volume I, the word ‘garden’ did not conjure up to the reader a cabbage 
patch with a border of geraniums or pansies, but that he saw the fence enclosing 
yam vines, taro, some bananas and a patch of sugar-cane.
In the same way, in speaking about ‘agriculture’ and ‘gardening’, about ‘labor’ 
or the ‘organization of garden work,’ about ‘leadership’ and ‘economic depen-
dence,’ I was using abstract scientific terms which have no counterpart what-
ever in native speech, and yet have their meaning defined by facts belonging 
to Trobriand culture. The ethnographer has constantly to go beyond the native 
outlook and introduce certain categories which are not native. At the same time, 
in building up his concepts the ethnographer must never go beyond native facts. 
The question as to how far certain terminological lacunae, such as the absence 
of words for ‘garden,’ ‘work,’ mana (magical force), ‘crops,’ and so on, signify the 
absence of native concepts, or even the absence of sociological realities, is still to 
be examined (cf. Div. VII of this Part).
Returning now to the mechanism of translating words, the truth of the prin-
ciple that only full ethnographic description can serve as a basis for linguistic 
analysis becomes very evident when we deal with sociological terms.
Kayaku, whether in its more general meaning of ‘sociable reunion’ or in 
its narrower sense ‘garden council’ – the German words gesellschaftliches 
Beisammensein approach perhaps the native idea more closely – is obviously not 
at all translated by either English equivalent. What really supplies us with the 
meaning of this native term is an account of the place which the kayaku occupies 
in the scheme of gardening: the character of the deliberations, the nature of the 
business transacted, the legal consequences of the typical harangues, and its cere-
monial and magical framework. And this applies to all magical activities, all legal 
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acts and all the other sociological and ceremonial phenomena which we have 
met with in our descriptions. Kayasa, yowota, gabu, and so on such meaning as 
these words have acquired has come from the description, not from the English 
label which we affixed to them for the sake of convenience.
We have found that the word kayaku has two different meanings:  ‘sociable 
reunion’ and ‘garden council.’ We find a similar phenomenon in the word 
towosi, which signifies ‘garden magician’ and ‘garden magic’ (cf. Part V, Div. VII, 
§§ 10–14). With the term towosi a formal analysis of its structure will help us 
to decide which meaning is primary. Such a formal analysis, which by showing 
certain affinities between the word discussed and others indicates probable 
derivations, further demonstrates the necessity of giving a special place to the 
linguistics of gardening over and above mere descriptions of gardening.
Multiplicity of meanings will be found a characteristic of most native words, 
even of such simple terms as pwaypwaya, ‘earth,’ ‘land,’ ‘soil,’ ‘cultivable soil,’ 
‘economically appropriated soil’; valu, ‘village,’ ‘place of human habitation,’ ‘spot,’ 
‘home’; dakuna, ‘stone,’ ‘coral rock,’ ‘stony soil’; bagula, ‘area under cultivation,’ 
‘individual garden;’ or, in a verbal form, ‘to garden,’ ‘to cultivate,’ or, in a com-
pound adjectival form ‘cultivated;’ buyagu, ‘garden enclosure,’ ‘garden-site,’ ‘cul-
tivated land’ as opposed to the bush. The detailed analysis of each will convince 
us beyond doubt that the natives do distinguish between these various meanings. 
If we were to index the sound we would find that the meaning of pwaypwaya 
(1)  is very definitely laid down by the context in which this word occurs, and 
distinguished from pwaypwaya (2), pwaypwaya (3), and so on. The meaning is 
differentiated also by grammatical indices, by the possibility of substituting a 
synonymous word, by emotional tone and by circumlocutory phrases. In no case 
have I found any confusion in the mind of the speaker as to which of the several 
distinct realities he wished to indicate by the use of one homonym or another. 
The differentiation of meanings can be seen if we take the word, not in isolation, 
but in conjunction with other words, sometimes with synonyms, sometimes with 
opposites. Thus, as we shall see the word odila can be synonymous in certain uses 
with the word yosewo (Div. I, § 17) and then it can again be interchangeable with 
the word baleko (Div. I, § 15). In the first sense it is antonymous to buyagu, in the 
second sense to the body of words describing land not put under regular cultiva-
tion, words such as dumya, rayboag, kaboma, weyka, valu.
The contention that homonyms – that is, words which have the same sound 
but different meaning – should not be lumped, should not be represented 
as one word with a vague confused meaning, but rather as a series of distin-
guishable linguistic units, will be proved abundantly throughout the following 
pages. The extreme theoretical importance of doing this cannot be exaggerated. 
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Carelessness in dealing with this problem, or probably a wrong theoretical atti-
tude, has been responsible for a great deal of misleading information, some-
times on such extremely important and crucial native words as, for instance, the 
Melanesian word mana (magical force), kinship terminologies, dogmatic terms 
relating to such concepts as ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘God,’ and sociological appellations. To 
this question we shall still have to return in the course of our theoretical analysis.
We can now lay down a number of points, some theoretical and some prac-
tical, which it will be necessary to bear in mind throughout the following analysis:
 (1) The mere lexical equation of an English and a native word is necessary for 
practical convenience but theoretically inadequate. For practical conve-
nience it is necessary because if we used a native term wherever possible 
an ethnographic book would become an unreadable jumble of native and 
English, of native technical expressions and sociological concepts sticking 
out of the grammatical framework of the English language.
 (2) At times it becomes necessary to use an English term with Trobriand 
implications, that is, a word from our own language in a native sense. For 
an ethnographic description must not merely reproduce the native outlook, 
still less confine itself to the native linguistic compass, but must operate with 
general sociological concepts.
 (3) The correct translation of each native term, besides its rough and ready 
labelling, is indispensable. This is achieved by reference to ethnographic 
descriptions and by the placing of the word in its context of culture, in the 
context of cognate words and opposites and in the context of appropriate 
utterances.
 (4) The various meanings of a homonym must be kept apart. We have to con-
sider the use of the same sound with several distinct meanings, not as a 
linguistic vagueness or lumping together or confusion, but as what it really 
is – a series of distinct uses.
All these considerations simply mean that language is a part, and an essential 
part at that, of other cultural realities. The language of agriculture enters deeply 
into the Trobrianders’ gardening activities. Unless we know how they make their 
gardens we can give no sense to their terms, nor meaning to their magical for-
mulae, nor yet develop any interest in their gardening phraseology. Without this 
cultural foundation linguistics must remain always a house of cards. Equally 
true is it that without the language the knowledge of any aspect of culture is 
incomplete.
This is really tantamount to saying, as we did above, that language is a cul-
tural force in its own right. It enters into manual and bodily activities and plays 
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a significant part in them, a part sui generis which cannot be replaced, even as it 
does not replace anything else.
What this part is, however, and in what consists the placing of a word 
against the context of culture, we still have not defined with any precision. It is 
obvious that words do not live as labels attached to pieces of cultural reality. Our 
Trobriand garden is not a sort of botanical show with tags tied on to every bush, 
implement or activity. It will be our business to reconstruct what speech achieves 
in a primitive culture, or, for that matter, in a highly developed one.
But first it is necessary to realize that words do not exist in isolation. The 
figment of a dictionary is as dangerous theoretically as it is useful practically. 
Words are always used in utterances, and though a significant utterance may 
sometimes shrink to a single word, this is a limiting case. A one-word sentence, 
such as a command, ‘come,’ ‘go,’ ‘rise,’ a ‘yes’ or a ‘no,’ may under exceptional 
circumstances be significant through its context of situation only. Usually a one-
word sentence will have to be explained by connecting it with utterances which 
preceded it or which follow. To start with single words – even if such words 
might occasionally be uttered in isolation – is the wrong procedure. But this 
I do not need to elaborate; for it is now a commonplace of linguistics that the 
lowest unit of language is the sentence, not the word. Our task is rather to show 
that even the sentence is not a self-contained, self-sufficient unit of speech. 
Exactly as a single word is – save in exceptional circumstances – meaningless, 
and receives its significance only through the context of other words, so a sen-
tence usually appears in the context of other sentences and has meaning only as 
a part of a larger significant whole. I think that it is very profitable in linguistics 
to widen the concept of context so that it embraces not only spoken words but 
facial expression, gesture, bodily activities, the whole group of people present 
during an exchange of utterances and the part of the environment on which 
these people are engaged.
I have spoken several times of the context of cultural reality. By that I mean 
the material equipment, the activities, interests, moral and aesthetic values with 
which the words are correlated. I shall now try to show that this context of cul-
tural reality is strictly analogous to the context of speech. Words do not live in 
a sort of super-dictionary, nor in the ethnographer’s notebook. They are used in 
free speech, they are linked into utterances and these utterances are linked up 
with the other human activities and the social and material environment. The 
whole manner which I have adopted for the presentation of my linguistic and 
ethnographic material brings the concept of context to the fore. Not only have 
I tried in the definition of technical terms to show how these terms form groups 
of kindred entities, not only have I tried, by placing the linguistic account against 
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an outline of real activities, to give them life and body; but the division of the 
linguistic material under headings which closely correspond to the chapters of 
the descriptive account keeps every word, every phrase and every text within its 
proper context of culture.
[1935]
Zenon Klemensiewicz
Translation as a Linguistic Problem
Translation sparks our interest – increasingly, in recent times – above all in terms 
of its practical use and efficacy. It is, after all, the linguistic structure which is the 
means of exchange, the means of mutual transmission and assimilation of the 
cultural legacy of various nations. Hence its vast significance in artistic and aca-
demic literature, its socio-political importance in the propagation of the products 
of human thought in the most diverse fields. This aspect rises above others in 
planning a translation project as one of the most crucial factors affecting the cog-
nitive, socio-political, or artistic/aesthetic stance of a given readership.
Naturally, it is a good translation that can serve these important tasks. And 
here is a new source of interest in translation. What should a good translation 
be like; what is to be done to create a good translation? Mistakes are pondered, 
achievements are analyzed, translation techniques are established based on posi-
tive and negative experiences, and a normative theory of translation is created as 
a superstructure for these strategies.
However, we can look at it from another point of view, as a linguistic problem 
for example, as a particular rendering of the relationship between two languages, 
or more precisely, two language and style systems. This point of view has not 
yet been considered. Henryk Elzenberg, Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński, and Wacław 
Borowy,1 whose works contain a great many remarks of value for translation 
theory, primarily call attention to translation deficiencies – their core and roots. 
Yet linguistic interpretation broadens the scope for proper evaluation of the dif-
ficulties and errors in translation, its desired accomplishments, and the correct 
approach of the translator. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate the 
problematics of translation from this more general linguistic perspective.
The term “translation” has two meanings, which dictionaries outline as: 
1. Translating a text from one language into another 2.  A  text translated into 
another language. We might phrase it differently: “translation” means either the 
act of translating, or the product of the translation act.
 1 W. Borowy (1890–1950)  – Polish historian, literary critic and translator; T.  Boy-
Żeleński (1874–1941) – Polish writer, critic and eminent translator of French litera-






As a result of the completed act of translation we have two parallel language 
products:  the basis (the original) and the derivate (the translation). Their jux-
taposition or comparison allows us to assess the value of the translation and 
provides material for constructing normative directions for translation.
From a linguistic stance, on the other hand, it is important and interesting 
to trace the very process of translation in its course and development, and its 
circumstances, which are part of the nature of human activity.
Here we have entered the field of fundamental concepts: language, thought, 
and their relation to reality. Objective reality comprises things, events, and phe-
nomena. Thinking reflects this objective reality by grasping general attributes 
of things and isolating lasting ties and relationships between particular aspects 
of reality. Language is the reality of thought, it is in language that the thought 
becomes realized; language and thought, thought and language are inseparable. 
The original verbal creation (artistic, academic, journalistic etc.) is the reality 
of thought that reflects a fragment of the objective reality. What we mean by 
“thought” is not only various concepts and judgments but also their entire 
complexes that reflect the intricate structure of the pertinent fragment of reality. 
We visualize this in Fig. 1.
There now emerges a derivative verbal creation, a translation of the original 
work. We depict their relationship in Fig. 2.
This means that the translator is not dealing directly with reality (r), but with 
a thought about reality (t) contained in linguistic forms (l1). The translator aims 
to communicate the thought about this reality with as much truth as the author 
of the original, but using different linguistic forms of languages l2, l3, l4 etc. This 





Fig. 1: An original verbal creation 
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We will arrive at an answer to this question at the end of the present discussion, 
when we have been made conscious of the entire course of translation in terms 
of linguistic facts and concepts.
For the time being, we shall content ourselves with saying that the act of 
translation is an instance of contact – with some deliberate exaggeration I would 
say:  confrontation  – between two languages:  the language of the original (l1) 
and the language of the translation (l2,l3, l4) etc. as ways of rendering the same 
thought content and – let us add an aspect of major gravity and consequence – a 
varying degree of emotional or volitional charge.
If we are to realize the importance and consequences of this fact of lin-
guistic confrontation, we must again provide a few linguistic definitions and 













Fig. 2: A derivative verbal creation 
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it is an internally organized structure, a grammatical and lexical construct, 
whose parts take a particular shape as conditioned by a certain phonetic system. 
Language is comprised of words which have a particular phonetic form and are 
associated with certain meanings which are ascribed to them; these words are ar-
ranged into meaningful sets according to the binding directives of syntax. Every 
national language is a singular and unique grammatical, lexical, and phonetic 
system; the components of this system are shaped and function according to 
norms specific to that language alone.
The question arises if the elements of two language systems, although varied 
and distinct, are somehow parallel and interchangeable, allowing for a simple 
substitution of an element of language l1 for an element of language l2. This is not 
so. The linguistic means of expression of thought, its shades of emotion and voli-
tion in a lexico-semantic system, the linguistic means for the grammatical use of 
words in sentences of various types differ across languages.
The degree of this diversity can also vary. The greatest diversity occurs in the 
case of typologically different languages. This is not the place to go into detail and 
provide examples to demonstrate the vast distance of, say, an isolating language – 
such as Chinese, whose monosyllabic units with a lexical function have no 
suffixes or inflexion, while the same phonetic constructions can change their 
meaning through a complex system of intonations, and syntactically function 
through their position in the sentence  – from the fusional type of language, 
such as Polish and other Indo-European languages, where words are inflected by 
means of suffixes that also express various grammatical categories: case, number, 
gender, person, mood, tense etc., and designate the syntactic function of the 
word in the sentence. There are many such different types of languages. Also, 
the sentence structure may be highly diverse, depending on how its three basic 
elements, namely subject, predicate, and object, are expressed, which of them is 
the sentence nucleus, and if the parts of the sentence remain autonomous, or are 
subject to various kinds of incorporation etc.
But even within the same language type, and moreover, in the same linguistic 
family, languages differ not only in sound structure, in the phonetics of words – 
which is naturally and readily noticeable to anyone. They also differ in the scope 
of the lexical/semantic units, i.e. words that correspond in their basic meaning 
may diverge in their secondary meanings or emotional coloration, or a partic-
ular thought content can find linguistic expression in one language but not in 
the other. Particularly instructive here, and deserving a separate lecture, or even 
a series of lectures, is the problem of idiomatic phrases, i.e. fossilized phraseo-
logical groups whose meaning as a whole goes beyond the meaning of the parts, 
such as “Indian summer,” “throw in the towel,” “make tracks,” etc.
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Two languages differ in their repertoire and usage of grammar:  take for 
example the aspect, i.e. the difference between perfective and imperfective verbs, 
such as (in Polish) robić (IMPERF) – zrobić (PERF), pisać (IMPERF) – napisać 
(PERF), and siadać (IMPERF) – siąść (PERF), so crucial to the Slavic languages, 
but wholly absent, for instance, in German and French, whose nouns, in turn 
are definite or indefinite as indicated by articles der, die, das, ein, eine, ein, le, la, 
or une, which the Slavic languages are missing. Let us consider the usefulness of 
uninflected participles in building participle clauses, such as “I sat there reading,” 
“I fell ill having left Kraków,” and the impossibility of such constructions in the 
German language, for example. Then let us note the relative freedom in Polish 
word order, and its rigidity for example in German, which has a decisive effect 
on the way sentences are constructed, on the image of sentences. And there are 
many such systemic discrepancies and incompatibilities. They occur even in 
languages that are most closely related, e.g. two Slavic languages.
Therefore, translation cannot be conceived in the literal sense of the term, 
namely, that an element of thought content X shaped linguistically into a form A 
is being set free from A, released, extracted from it, transferred, reshaped into the 
precisely equivalence form A’, so that as a result, X/A might be equal to X/A’. To 
some extent this correspondence exists, but there always remains a zone of some 
discrepancy, and the more the two languages are systemically remote, the wider 
this zone becomes, while the field of correspondence contracts.
This is a theoretical, linguistic rationalization of an old practical warning not 
to translate literally, and thus not to do things “Chinese-style,” according to the 
anecdote of the Chinese man who, in order to paint a fish correctly, was above 
all intent on counting its scales. In this kind of translation the syntax, intona-
tion, and euphony vanish, leaving only words with their general “dictionary” 
meaning – what gets lost is their meaning in their context, hence the national 
language is cruelly mangled.
This is not, however, the end of the difficulties that arise with the divergence 
of the language systems of the original and the translation. We must also recog-
nize that the language of the original, i.e. whatever national language, is not a 
homogenous whole. There is, of course, the standard language which is taught 
in schools, basically used by the working intelligentsia2 (though not exclusively), 
 2 After the Second World War, a new kind of intelligentsia emerged in Poland, recruited 
mainly from workers and peasants. It was then that the term “working intelligentsia” 
was coined, which in fact was the equivalent of the English concept of the white-collar 
worker. The term “working intelligentsia” belonged to the language of the Communist 




serving as the official language, described in grammar books, recorded in dictio-
naries, and regarded as representative in contacts with foreigners. There are also 
the regional languages, country dialects, which are geographically diverse, as well 
as city dialects. It is the works written in the standard language that get translated 
most often. But this, too, is not homogenous. The standard language in its con-
versational function, in its spoken (colloquial) function, differs from its written, 
literary variety. The vocabulary and sentence structure in free chit-chat and in 
a published work are different. Also, literary language may vary, depending on 
what needs it is meant to serve and in what particular field it functions.
Because the material of translation is, above all, literary language, we should 
pause for a moment to make a somewhat closer inspection of its functional 
va rieties, which have enormous significance in the act of translation.
Let us begin with the varieties which we shall call the artistic language. Its 
function is to create a vivid and evocative image of reality by focusing the reader’s 
imagination on an internal experience of the events depicted in language in as 
tangible a way as possible, on becoming acquainted with the characters involved, 
on delving into other people’s emotions and aspirations, on exploring the artist’s 
ideology contained in the work. This language has a distinct vocabulary, an 
abundance of concrete expressions that give it a visual and sensory impact in 
presenting reality. It also contains a rich vocabulary of internal states, feelings, 
moods, aspirations, and desires. It commands a wide range of synonyms, to 
express subtle shades of meaning and delicate variations of emotional coloring. 
Artistic language permits archaisms, dialectal and regional expressions, as long 
as they serve the intended style. It permits neologisms, and the use of old words 
in new meanings. Sentences are narrative/descriptive; there are many nominal 
sentences, elliptical and anacoluthic structures, due to their emotional content 
and power of expression, many syntactical structures found in dialogue, as well 
as mixed structures, where dialogue interferes with description or narrative, nar-
rative with description, especially in free indirect speech.
Things are different when it comes to academic language. Its function is 
to make true statements about reality, achieved through faithful and precise 
description of purposefully observed facts and processes, and an explanation of 
these facts and processes contained in answering the question of why they have 
occurred, and why in such a form. There are many different sciences, but each 
of their languages is significantly marked with the importance of reasoning as 
the essential scientific procedure, i.e. the gaining of new knowledge based on 
the givens. Thus, the vocabulary of academic language strives toward unambi-
guity, toward a terminology that ensures communication and prevents multiple 
understandings of the same subject of investigation. In this terminology we are 
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struck by the presence of foreign expressions, “learned” vocabulary, artificial to 
a large degree, and built on Greek and Latin roots. Academic vocabulary avoids 
emotional coloration, which can affect the precision of meaning; it also avoids 
synonyms, which blur the boundaries between sharp definitions. It does not use 
archaisms or dialects for style. There are, however, many neologisms, which are 
necessary in naming new results in the progressive cognitive investigation of 
reality. The syntax of academic language is also particular; its main aim is un-
ambiguity, clarity, and precision. As such, academic sentences have the tendency 
to aim for exactitude, to veer away from syntactic structures loaded with emo-
tion, preferring to use sentences that precisely express various links of the rea-
soning process, to stress the cognitive relations of connectivity and dependency 
between these links within one, often multiple-clause sentence, or between par-
ticular sentences in a tightly wrought context.
There remains the third main variety of literary language, the mixed one, of 
which some elements can influence the emotions and imagination of the reader, 
while others seek to increase the reader’s knowledge with depictions ofthe life 
of society and the practice of human behaviour within it. This variant is applied 
widely, from political speeches, sermons, and journalism, to administration 
announcements or official documents.
Finally, we should recall the facultative professional and social varieties of 
language, e.g. hunting, school, or thieves’ lingos.
It is evident that depending on what variety of the general national language the 
original belongs to, the tasks set before the translator will vary, and so will the diffi-
culty of the translation. The greatest difficulty will indisputably be found in works 
written in artistic language, which are the overwhelming majority of translations. 
In these we find not only the special complex vocabulary and unusual syntax that 
we mentioned just moments ago. The difficulty increases when we acknowledge 
that a significant attribute of the artistic work is its being multi-systemic in terms 
of language and style: we have narrative language and the language of descrip-
tion, the language of colloquial dialogue, in which we find the peculiar linguistic 
features of the participants, varying due to age, temperament, gender, education, 
profession, class, and thus, dialects, provincial twangs, technical vocabularies, 
individual qualities, vulgarities, archaisms, and neologisms. A certain structural 
multiplicity of levels also appears in syntax. Various peculiarities and divergences 
from the norm of the official language may meet, alternately appear, and inter-
mingle in the same work. They are meant to serve a particular stylistic function, 
which they can do only if they are authentic, i.e. if they truly exist in the language 
of a certain epoch, in the language of particular social circles, in the language of 
the people whom the writer of the original introduces into his artistic vision.
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We might add that authors also have their individual linguistic attributes, 
conditioned by their personal characteristics, epoch, education, class and ideolo-
gical standing, the intellectual and emotional atmosphere in which their writing 
matures and bears fruit.
We shall only touch upon one more possible peculiarity of the artistic work, 
one which is expressed outside of its intellectual content and which supports its 
emotional, expressive and impressive charge, yet remains an independent source 
of aesthetic impact:  the phonetic shape of its verse forms, conditioned by the 
prosodic resources of a given language. These include stress, vowel length, and 
intonation; within the framework of grammatical norms and lexical resources 
they permit certain verse forms, rhythmic patterns, phonological words, and 
stanzaic structures. Thanks to them the demands of euphony are met and ono-
matopoeic effects achieved.
I shall remind the reader that all these means of expression are contained 
in the original language in a system that is internally and organically intercon-
nected, where each grammatical, lexical, and stylistic element has a particular 
function, functional capability and efficiency. I reiterate: this system cannot be 
replicated beyond a given language. The thought content as well as emotional and 
volitional load are enmeshed in the language of the original. The translator’s role 
is to render it without diminishing its communicative or expressive-impressive 
power, containing it in the forms of another language system, which has different 
means of expression at its disposal.
Is this at all possible? And if so, to what extent? Here we come to an issue that 
is crucial from both practical and theoretical standpoint, including linguistic 
theory – the limits of translation, or translatability.
The concept and demand of “fidelity,” conceived in the sense of literalness, 
has been sufficiently compromised in translation practice, and on certain philo-
sophical grounds it has led to doubts as to the very possibility of full linguistic 
expression of thoughts or correct translation. Instead, another concept of the 
relation between the translation and the original has been formulated: the con-
cept of adequacy or completeness.
The essence of adequacy can be encapsulated in the following way. The ori-
ginal should be conceived as a system, and not as the sum of its parts, as an 
organic whole, and not as a mechanical set of elements. Every element of this 
system, every part of the whole is given a particular communicative and stylistic 
function intended by the author. In the whole work, in its every section, in its 
every chapter, and in its every sentence – in a word, in all its dimensions – the 
function of the parts is executed against the backdrop of the whole, there is a 
constant interplay of the parts and the whole. This is the source of the work’s 
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effect on the reader, at the level of both the core of the content, the significance of 
the work, and the ideological, emotional, aesthetic charge. The task of the trans-
lation is not to copy, not to recreate, not to speak of converting the elements and 
structures of the original, the words, sentences, prosodic units, visual language 
etc., but to capture their functions and to replace the original with those elements 
and structures of the target language which are, as far as possible, substitutes and 
equivalents with the same functional capacity, suitability, and efficacy, and in 
this, precisely, resides their adequacy, commensurability, equality of value.
In some cases, this will entail equating the elements of the original and the 
translation: word for word, form for form, sentence for sentence, stylistic device 
for identical stylistic device, verse structure for identical verse structure and so 
on. In others it will mean only approximating the elements differing in form 
and/or meaning, though functioning identically toward the aim intended and 
marked out by the original writer. This may be reduced to the following formula:
a(l1) does not equal a(l2)
but
a(l1) equals X (l2)
f = a(l1)
This means that the work in the language of the translation is not a faithful and 
slavish reflection, a repetition of the grammatico-lexical and stylistic elements 
of the work in the original language; it is a carefully chosen construct of 
grammatico-lexical and stylistic elements in the language of the translation that 
can faithfully and effectively render the work’s impact on the reader’s psyche the 
author intended.
When choosing elements in the target language to render the original, one 
needs to bear in mind that they are not the aim of translation, they are only 
a means to achieving this aim:  such a rendering of the whole original in the 
translation that will affect the reader in the same or most similar fashion as 
the original affected the native speaker of the language in which it was written. 
Sometimes, this does not occur without sacrifices, which are the inevitable effect 
of the confrontation of two language systems that differ to various extents. The 
translator’s efforts should be to limit this sacrifice to an unavoidable and justified 
minimum.
A theoretical outline and formulation of the concept of adequacy is some-
thing new: but we must admit that this criterion has long since been met in the 
work of great translators. It suffices, for example, to recall the stance of Cicero, 
who reportedly said of his translations of Demosthenes’s speeches that he ren-
dered them not as a translator, but as an orator, giving his readers an account of 
the significance and the gravity of the words, and not their number.
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The degree of difficulty in meeting the demands of adequacy can vary. It is 
easier to achieve in academic language, owing to the properties discussed above. 
There are no archaisms or dialects, there are no inventive stylistic devices, there 
is no emotional factor, no individual hallmarks; the everyday standard language 
reigns, along with its intellectual content. There must be fidelity in translating 
the terminology and the flow of reasoning, but the latter does not suffer even 
if the translator departs from the syntactic structures of the original, dividing a 
long multipartite complex sentence, for example, into two shorter ones or more, 
adhering to the syntactic directives of the target language (e.g. in a translation 
from German).
The difficulties multiply in works composed in artistic language. Here the 
point is not only to communicate the specific content of the story and the 
description, not only to remain true to the vision, but also to ensure its effect on 
emotions, imagination, and the reader’s volition. Here every shade of meaning, 
every delicate shade of emotional coloring in a word or sentence has its value 
which must not be underestimated. Here an archaism can characterize a person 
or an epoch, a dialect or technical term is a crucial factor in the artistic truth of 
a character or the local and social color. Here visual language – such as it is, and 
not otherwise – is a necessary means to render the intended evocative vision. 
Here the author’s individual style must be respected, for it is what makes the 
writer distinctive and forges his stance in writing. Could one translate Proust, for 
instance, by reworking his characteristic complex multi-clause sentences into a 
series of shorter ones? In poetry the difficulties only increase, owing to the neces-
sity of preserving the rhythmic and euphonic qualities of the original.
Are there any works that cannot be adequately translated? I believe that there 
are. These are works shaped in such an individual linguistic form that their trans-
lation is, for various reasons, impossible. Let us take, for example, Kazimierz 
Tetmajer’s In Rocky Podhale;3 a translation of this work into standard language 
would deprive it of all the truth and charm of the people living in a distinct and 
peculiar land; a translation into a highland dialect of the target language, in turn, 
would result in an unbearable falsification of reality, caused by the clash between 
the particular and geographically defined linguistic framework and the realities 
of the life of Polish Tatra highlanders, which differ from those of inhabitants of 
the mountains who speak other languages. The same applies to highly archaized 
 3 Kazimierz Przerwa-Tetmajer (1865–1940)  – Polish poet and novelist, a member 
of Young Poland Movement. His brilliant collection of sketches and tales In Rocky 
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works, such as Władysław J.  Dobrowolski’s Hawk’s Grief or Maria Bechczyc-
Rudnicka’s “The Twenty Lambs of a Painter from Ravenna.” Also untranslat-
able are Tuwim’s “Słopiewnie” [Word-songs]4, though one might try to imitate 
them. One might say that adequate translation is possible for any work created 
in any standard national spoken or written language of a given epoch, which in 
no way precludes the use of archaisms, dialects, and other departures from the 
commonly accepted norm, as long as their use is stylistically motivated and sys-
temically conditioned; where there is not yet a national language, a folk dialect 
can serve its function. This limitation is no threat to culture; the vast majority of 
writing, including some of the most outstanding works, are written in the stan-
dard national language, and these can be assimilated through adequate transla-
tion and made available to other nations. Valuable works that do not meet this 
condition are few in number; a person who desires to know them must do so in 
the original language. In any event, the finest translation could never replace all 
the virtues of coming in contact with the original.
From the point of view of adequacy, the translator must demonstrate the 
ability to accurately capture the functional value of the original’s elements, using 
a lively, insightful, and sensitive analysis of the relationship between its parts and 
the whole. This is a very rigid demand.
To meet them, the translator must posses a fair number of qualities and as-
sets, of which many have surely been already mentioned in different contexts, 
so I  shall only give a general outline of them now. It is clear that the trans-
lator must have a perfect command of the language into which he is translating, 
most often the translator’s native tongue, as well as the language of the orig-
inal. We can be sure that neither an automatized familiarity with grammar and 
vocabulary nor a conversational fluency suffices in this context. Here we need 
a conscious, objective, reflective approach to matters of language; at least basic 
linguistic training would be recommended to sharpen the translator’s attention, 
and direct an inquisitive gaze toward phenomena which often go unnoticed or 
undervalued.
 4 W. J. Dobrowolski’s (1906–1978) book Jastrzębia boleść (1938) is a “Masovian novel” 
written in a stylized medieval Latin. M. Becherzyc-Rudnicka’s (1888–1982) story 
Malerza raweńskiego owieczek dwanadzieście (1937), modeled on 16th-century Italian 
legends was written in a language stylized as 15th-century Polish. Julian Tuwim’s 
(1894–1953) poetry collection Słopiewnie (1921) was a language experiment based 




The translator must know the reality the author picures in the original 
work: the people, their customs and habits, the culture, the country, its landscapes 
and its nature, in a word – the realities, and only this will allow the translator to 
fully understand the text and avoid its misinterpretation and an erroneous selec-
tion of lexico-semantic equivalents.
The translator must consciously avoid an insincere, inaccurate standpoint 
toward the original, which might result in seeing what was not in the author’s 
original intention, or not perceiving what the author did in fact intend, thus 
misrepresenting the author for a particular reason deriving from a subjective 
ideological, political, aesthetic, literary-critical etc. stance. There are, after all, 
translations that are formally correct, free of glaring grammatical and sty-
listic mistakes or missteps that disrupt the reading process, but which reveal 
misrepresentations, distortions, or falsifications when compared more closely 
with the original texts.
But all these important, necessary, and rare assets are insufficient if one 
basic condition is unfulfilled. This is the creative attitude of the translator. 
As we have seen, the translator’s achievement is determined by the ability to 
use the resources of the language of translation according to their functional 
equivalence with the linguistic resources used by the author of the original. 
The translator must deeply and independently experience, consider, and intuit 
the content and effect of the original, powerfully and subtly delve into and 
incarnate himself in the reality the author of the original experienced directly, 
while the translator sees it and apprehends it through the author’s words. The 
translator must take on this standpoint in order to liberate the content and 
effect of the original from the unique forms of one language and bring it to 
life, configure it in the distinct and individual forms of another language. 
Neither knowledge of his own language and the original language, nor even 
long and in-depth experience will help if it is mechanically applied. What is 
necessary is the creative act; another person’s borrowed idea must be rendered 
in the translator’s own and original way, without trimming the content or the 
expressive-impressive effect of the original. And here we find one important 
warning and vital caution:  the choice of author and work to translate must 
consider an affinity, a kinship, a congeniality between the original author and 
the translator.
Thus, too, we have a response to the question posed at the beginning of this 
paper concerning the role of the process of translation. Neither reproduction, 
nor transformation, but co-creation. Quod erat demonstrandum.
And if it has been even partly successful, this paper has, apart from showing 
the linguistic problematics of translation, served a second role I  assigned for 
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it: it was to be an expression of both great respect the linguist has for and great 
demands he sets before the translators, while fully understanding the enormous 
linguistic and education impact of translation on readers, and the historically 
proven and highly valued influence of translation as one of the driving forces in 
the development of the national language.
[1954/1955]
Translated by Soren Gauger

Olgierd Wojtasiewicz
Introduction to a Theory of Translation
Definitions
Let us note that there is no precise definition of translation, either as a certain 
operation or as its result (the word rendering generally pertains to the outcome of an 
act of translation, not the act itself; this study adheres to this convention).1 Lexical 
definitions in various dictionaries cover this matter in a very superficial fashion. 
For example, let us look at several definitions from some well-known dictionaries 
of various languages, quoted in the original, as it would be methodologically inad-
missible to use a translation to examine the definition of translation, thus using a 
particular operation in defining the this very operation. This is why the English 
renderings provided in brackets are only there to guide the reader unfamiliar with 
a given foreign language, and are not binding in terms of the argument; identifying 
whatever imprecisions they may exhibit should not undermine the conclusions we 
go on to draw. For the same reason, we limit ourselves to the more widely-known 
European languages, and shall not be supplying definitions from Chinese dic-
tionaries, for instance, although the Chinese language will have a significant role 
to play in examples cited further on. Quoting the original would be futile, while 
supplying only the translation is impossible for the above-mentioned methodolog-
ical reasons.
Polish:
Tłumaczyć  – z jednego języka przekładać na drugi mowę czyją lub pismo2 [to render 




Perevod: 1. Deystvie po glag. perevesti-perevodit’… 2. Tekst (ili ustnaya rech’), perevedennyy 
s kakogo-n. yazyka na drugoy yazyk.
Perevesti:  6. Perelozhit’ s odnogo yazyka na drugoy, Vyrazit’ chto-n. (kakoy-n. tekst, 
ustnuyu rech’) sredstvami drugogo yazyka.
 1 The word rendering is used here as an equivalent of the Polish przekład, a synonym of 
tłumaczenie – they both mean translation [editors’ note].










Perelozhit’: 6. Perevesti na drugoy yazyk (ustar.) [to translate from one language into 
another, express something (a text or oral statement) through another language].3
We have supplied only partial and approximate translations of the definitions. 
We should note that perelozhit’ and perevesti are used to define each other in the 
above extracts from Ushakov’s dictionary.
English:
Translate: 1. Express the sense of (word, sentence, book) in or into another language…4
French:
Traduction… Action de traduire, de transposer dans une autre langue… [Translation… 
the act of translating, of transposing into another language].5
German:
Übersetzen, Übersetzung, Wiedergabe eines sprachgestalteten Sinngehalts mit den 
Ausdruckmitteln einer anderen Sprache…6 [Translate, translation – rendering the con-
tent formulated in one language using the means of expression of another language].
The above examples demonstrate that an intuitive notion of the concept of trans-
lation is widespread, even prevalent, which results in the absence of a felt need 
for a definition. We most frequently find attempts to formulate a definition by a 
circuitous route: not by establishing what is central to the act of translating, but 
rather by indicating what conditions should be fulfilled by its result. In these 
cases, “fidelity” is the most frequently raised and most strongly emphasized 
requirement, though it remains imprecise. Many negative statements are tied to 
this concept: that fidelity cannot be reconciled with the aesthetic demands of lit-
erary translation etc. It should not surprise us that circuitous attempts to define 
the term provide no concrete results to serve as the basis for further discussion.7
Bearing in mind, however, how much confusion the use of intuitive concepts 
has caused in logic and the basics of mathematics, as well as other disciplines 
such as physics, it would be good to limit the intuitive nature of the concepts we 
introduce and use.
While it may be difficult in the humanities to achieve the precision found in 
the hard sciences, this is no reason why the humanities should not make broad 
 3 Tolkoviy Slovar Russkovo Yazyka, Vol. III, eds. B. M. Volin and Prof. D. N. Ushakov.
 4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 4th edition (Oxford 1950), p. 1357.
 5 Larousse du XX-e siècle, Vol. 6 (Paris 1933).
 6 Der Grosse Herder, Vol. 11 (Freiburg 1935).
 7 In the author’s opinion, one of the finest definitions of translation has been given by 
Alexander Fraser Tytler in his treatise On the Principles of Translation as far back as 
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use of the experience of other fields, which employ greater precision and, just as 
importantly, use other methods. Thus, it seems appropriate to begin with a defini-
tion of translation that is annotated where needed with additional explanations; 
these explanations turn out to be indispensable, as the imprecise concepts of the 
humanities can mean that a definition will include terms that themselves require 
definition or, at least, clarification. I propose the following definition:
The act of translation consists in formulating an equivalent in one language of 
a statement previously formulated in another language.
Explanations:
 1. The stress falls on the act of translating. The result (“an equivalent in one 
language”) corresponds to what we generally call the “translation,” in the 
sense of the action’s result (and thus, a certain kind of “text”).
 2. The length of the original text plays no fundamental role. This can be a multi-
volume work or a single word. In very short texts, or single words, we ought 
to bear in mind that their brevity might cause the text to be polysemous, and 
thus impossible to translate in an unambiguous fashion. Sometimes, however, 
the context facilitates an unambiguous translation of even a one-word text.
 3. The above-cited lexical definitions do not, of course, cover the concept 
of language, which is also apprehended intuitively. This is insufficient for 
our study.
By “language” we mean a system of signals people use to communicate in space 
and in time. In principle, a moment of time is always a factor, but for practical 
purposes we can ignore it when the passage of time between the sending and the 
reception of a signal plays no essential role (in direct conversation, with traffic 
signals, in telephone or radio communication etc.). In certain cases, when we are 
dealing with recorded signals, such as an encoded message, the circuit of sender 
and recipient can be restricted to one and the same person (a code created for the 
sole purposes of the writer).
We understand the notion of “signal” quite broadly here, somewhat unlike 
its colloquial sense, as the material aspect of an expression (to borrow Henryk 
Greniewski’s terminology),8 and thus, a spoken or written text (regardless of its 
length), a road sign, an audio or optical signal in a narrower sense, a chess nota-
tion, a map, etc.
 8 Henryk Greniewski (1903–1972) – Polish mathematician, logician and computer 
scientist, pioneer of computer technology in Poland, author of Cybernetics without 




The notion that the sender ascribes certain signals to certain states of mind 
(or the nervous system) and that the recipient ascribes certain states of mind to 
certain signals plays a vital role here. It seems that this notion should be seen as 
primary in language theory – or at least in some of its forms.
Interpreting language as a system of signals (or signs) is familiar to linguists 
as well. Depending on the circumstances, a signal can serve a purely communi-
cative function, or a communicative-expressive one (if it expresses the sender’s 
subjective state).
The next important step is distinguishing between natural and artificial 
languages. Natural languages have developed spontaneously, through evolu-
tion, and serve the general communication needs of ethnic groups (nations or 
nationalities), and, at least in the initial phases of their development, they are 
closely tied to speech (what is meant here is those pictorial languages which, for 
various reasons, have departed from phonetic languages over time, such as “lit-
erary” Chinese, or wen-yen, Medieval Latin, etc.). Artificial languages are those 
which are created by adopting certain signals “all at once;” at the same time, 
these are usually specialist languages pertaining to fairly narrow fields, i.e. serve 
to describe a fairly narrow section of reality (e.g. the language of mathe matical 
symbols, chemical formulae, road signs, various types of maps etc.), and as such, 
they cannot satisfy “the general communication needs of ethnic groups.” In terms 
of this last point, the artificial languages that attempt to imitate the universality 
of natural languages (e.g. Esperanto) would make an exception. They differ from 
natural languages chiefly in that they are created in a short period of time by one 
person or several people, while natural languages are created over the course of 
long and anonymous development. It should be added that artificial languages 
are generally far more “codified” than natural languages, whose systems typi-
cally contain gaps that permit a certain amount of freedom in using the signals. 
Moreover, the rules that apply in natural languages are created ex post, through 
the codification of language habits, already conventionalized or in the course of 
conventionalization, while the rules that apply in artificial languages are created 
right away along with the language itself.
From the point of view of translation theory, there are four possible transla-
tion combinations:  from a natural language into a natural one, from a natural 
language into an artificial one, from an artificial language into a natural one, and 
from an artificial language into an artificial one. This paper will address only 
translation between two natural languages. This is in accordance with the intui-
tive understanding of the notion of translation, also shared by the above-quoted 
lexical definitions, wherein “language” undoubtedly refers to “natural language.” 
In this combination the problems are most difficult to grasp precisely because 
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of the above-mentioned “slack” in codification (or formalization) of natural 
languages, which, in turn, precludes the formalization of the act of translation.
In terms of the remaining combinations, the matter is easier to solve, bearing 
in mind that the specific cases need to be analyzed. As a general rule, it is impos-
sible to translate from a natural language into a specialized artificial one (i.e. 
not the Esperanto type), because the latter is only capable of describing pre-
cisely defined aspects of reality. Translating a sentence as simple as “It rained 
in Warsaw yesterday” into the language of chemical formulae is not possible, 
of course. Translating from a natural language into an artificial language of the 
Esperanto type is partially possible (cf. the concept of partial translatability 
below), but is complicated by the fact that the vocabulary and idioms of such 
artificial languages are generally far more limited than the vocabularies of na tural 
languages, while expanding the vocabularies of these artificial languages (which 
would seem to contradict the raison d’être of these languages) would lead to the 
creation of complex borderline cases, in which an artificial language would begin 
to turn into a natural language.
Translation from an artificial language into a natural language is essentially 
possible, which is not to say that it is practical:  a detailed natural-language 
description of a map of Poland from a school atlas, taking into account all the 
geographical features, including the delineation of the borders, the course of 
rivers and transportation lines, the contour lines, the location of cities and towns, 
mountain peaks, and lakes, the spatial relationships between various points 
(distances and directions according to points of the compass) etc. would surely 
fill a sizeable volume, while not giving the reader any mental picture. Translation 
between two artificial languages depends on whether these languages describe 
the same aspects of reality. If they do, total translatability may occur (e.g. in the 
translation of a mathematical decimal notation into binary and vice versa, or 
the translation of one system of logic symbols into another and the reverse). 
If they do not, however, total untranslatability may take place (e.g. the transla-
tion of chemical formulae into chess notation and the reverse). The next point 
addresses the existence of mixed languages. These are natural languages that, 
to some degree, make use of artificial languages. The first variant would be the 
languages of many scientific works, where, in the midst of a natural language, e.g. 
Polish, we find segments of an artificial language, such as mathematical notation, 
chemical formulae, artificially created medical terminology, botanical or zoo-
logical terminology (e.g. based on the Linnaean system) etc.
The second variant includes examples where a text originally formulated in a 
natural language, e.g. Polish, is transmitted or recorded in an artificial language, 
e.g. Morse code (in the form of light, audio, or telegraph signals), or in Braille.
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In the first variant the matter is simple, as we can easily divide the text into 
sections written in a natural language and an artificial language (or languages, if, 
for example, in a medical paper we are dealing with both medical terminology 
and chemical formulae). In the second variant, the matter is somewhat more 
complicated, though it does seem that, given the original formulation of the text 
in a natural language, we ought to give it pride of place, and ascribe to the arti-
ficial language merely a supporting role, all the more so in that the whole thing 
could be easily back-translated into the natural language in which it was origi-
nally formulated. (This is a certain simplification. In a more detailed analysis we 
can, and probably should, accept that, for example, reading out loud in Polish a 
text written in Polish means translating from the written Polish into the phonetic 
Polish. More complicated examples might be singing the words of a text supplied 
with musical notation, or reading a Polish text out loud in English etc. In this 
last case we are dealing simultaneously with translation in the common sense 
and with a transposition of a visual language into a phonetic one, which takes us 
beyond the limits of our present discussion).
In effect, mixed languages can be omitted in our study, as every mixed 
language can be reduced to parts drawn from natural and artificial languages. 
(The mixed languages group includes also the languages of macaronic texts, 
combining elements of various natural languages).
 4. The above definition seems to cohere with the intuitive concept of translation, 
understood rather superficially. It also seems that the intuitive interpretation 
begins to fail us when we attempt to clarify the concept of “equivalent” in 
narrowing our definition. In what case ought we to acknowledge (phonetic 
or written) text b in language B as the equivalent of text a in language A? To 
answer this question, we must introduce a supplementary definition, which 
in turn will require some explanation:
 a. Text b in language B is the equivalent of text a in language A if text b evokes 
the same reaction (set of associations) in the receiver as text a.
 b. It makes little difference if the receiver is the same person (familiar with 
both languages) or different people.
 c. The phrase “the same reaction (set of associations)” raises the most 
reservations and doubts. We might object that even one text (in one and 
the same language) evokes various reactions in different people, citing 
examples of various interpretations of literary texts by various people 
(well-known “varying” or “new” readings of texts by critics, directors, and 
actors), even in cases when a text does not contain passages that are debat-
able from the philological point of view. We might take a step further and 
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cite equally familiar cases where one and the same text (e.g. a literary work, 
a private letter with no literary qualities etc.) evokes different responses in 
the same person at different moments, e.g. once read or heard at a young 
age, and then again at a mature or elderly age; we might thus claim that 
every set of associations evoked in the receiver by a given text is unique 
and that the above supplementary definition is worthless.
We might also cite some new formulations in the field of logic and cybernetics, 
i.e. the concept of relatively isolated systems.9 According to this concept, the 
human nervous system is a relatively isolated system, the nervous receptors 
being its input points and the brain (or its parts) its output point (future brain 
research may introduce corrections here, though these will be immaterial as far 
as the structure of a relatively isolated system is concerned). Effectors will not 
be taken into consideration here, as what interests us is the “mental” response, 
a certain state of the centers of the central nervous system, and not the possible 
further consequences, such as gestures, verbal responses, changes in blood cir-
culation etc. Apprehending a text means creating distinguishable states in some 
input points. In the case of the phonetic text, the distinguishable states occur in 
the inputs known as aural receptors; analogously, when it comes to a written text 
it is the visual receptors that come into play, while with a three-dimensional text 
(e.g. one written in Braille), we are dealing with tactile receptors. Each output 
state is unequivocally defined by all present and past input states, including those 
which would not seem to be connected with a given text (or even any text at all). 
There are no sign systems based on the sense of taste, and thus there are no texts 
that function through taste receptors; this does not mean, however, that par-
ticular taste experiences (i.e. past distinguishable states in some input points of 
taste sensors) have no role to play in our response to some texts.
Given the above, we can clearly see that there cannot be two human nervous 
systems, or in simpler terms, there cannot be two people in whom all past and 
present input states were identical, if only because their nervous systems would 
have had to be located in exactly the same point in space. From this we also see 
that we cannot speak in the strict sense of the same reactions of two different 
people to the same text, even if it is in the same language.10
My references to concepts derived from cybernetics are probably not indis-
pensable, but they strike me as interesting insofar as they provide an example of 
 9 Cf. H. Greniewski, Elementy logiki indukcji (Warsaw 1955).







yet another “semantic interpretation” of the notion of relatively isolated systems, 
thus demonstrating the fecundity of this concept.
On the other hand, we face the irrefutable fact that languages do fulfill their 
communicative function, and as such, there is no denying that the responses 
evoked by a given text in different people can be quite similar, if not identical. 
The degree of similarity is doubtless higher when it comes to scientific prose 
than in the case of poetry, but in any case, it is quite considerable. Our sup-
plementary definition thus retains its validity, though perhaps with the added 
re servation that the phrase “the same” ought not to be understood as defining 
two things that are identical sensu stricto, but is to be interpreted as signifying a 
very high degree of similarity.
We are dealing with a similar case in translation, or when there is a simi-
larity in responses evoked, on the one hand, by the original, and on the other, by 
the translation. Despite all possible reservations, there is no denying that people 
largely use translation as a way of extending the communicative function of one 
language or another.
Here, however, we ought to make a rather important reservation: we are not 
concerning ourselves with purely individual reactions (or associations). As such, 
we shall not take into account, for instance, a man who compulsively associates 
the French word genou (but not the Polish kolano or the English knee, etc.) with 
the legs of his French governess, nor someone for whom the sight of a rose, or 
its pictorial representation, or the word “rose” read or heard in any language 
he knows, evokes a memory of eating chicken broth on a veranda. (The former 
example is more tightly bound with linguistic matters, as the reaction occurs 
based on the word, i.e. an element of language. Moreover, such a person will 
respond to the French text differently than to other languages and thus, in 
terms of the present discussion, he will have a different response to the French 
original and to its Polish translation, but the same response to an English ori-
ginal, for example, and its Polish translation. In the latter example, the stubborn 
association will come regardless of the language, and even as a reaction to non-
linguistic stimuli, e.g. in seeing illustrations, paintings, a film, etc.).
Leaving aside purely individual responses, triggered in every person at least 
in a minimal degree (this arises from the fact that there are no two people who 
would respond to a thing in an entirely identical fashion), takes us to accepting 
the concept of a certain type of group reaction, i.e. a type of reaction shared 
by members of a certain group. In theory this is a simplification (or, as some 
might prefer, a fiction), but it is a simplification confirmed by observable facts 
which demonstrate that languages do serve a communicative function, albeit 
with varying degrees of success. Since the subject of our interest is translation, 
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we shall focus on group reactions characteristic of specific language groups. 
We must however notice it may be necessary to acknowledge within language 
groups also some groups distinguished according to different criteria, such as 
the level of education. In some cases (e.g. in academic texts) a shared reaction 
type conditioned, for example, by belonging to the same professional group yet 
different linguistic groups might prove more pivotal than a shared reaction type 
conditioned by belonging to the same linguistic group and different professional 
groups. And thus, we arrive at average types of reactions found in various social 
groups, allowing us to achieve a greater objectification of these reactions; their 
objective or intersubjective nature is, after all, a condition for communication 
between people.
To illustrate the foregoing, here are two examples of different reactions that 
arise from belonging to various linguistic groups.
In translating a poem by Nicolás Guillén about Cuba, the poet’s native island, 
Zofia Szleyenowa11 realized at one point that the passages about God would 
evoke unintentionally humorous associations in the Polish reader, given the 
famous Polish expression Jak Kuba Bogu, tak Bóg Kubie.12 This association would 
probably not arise with the translation of this poem into any other language, but 
in the Polish translation it asserted itself so overpoweringly, contrasting with the 
general tone of the work, that it was necessary to replace the word “Cuba” with 
“island.”
When translating the most common Christian prayer, “The Lord’s Prayer,” 
into the Inuit language, it was necessary to substitute “our daily bread” with a 
phrase that means “our daily fish” in Inuit, as the Inuit language has no word for 
“bread,” and in this prayer, “bread” does not mean a grocery product made of 
flour in a certain way, but rather the most common and basic sort of nourish-
ment. For the Inuit, this most common and basic sort of nourishment is fish.13
This attribute of Inuit vocabulary is, of course, rooted in extra-linguistic 
matters, which we shall cover later on, but this does not alter the fact that, in the 
 11 This example was supplied at a gathering of the Translation Section of the Warsaw 
Branch of the Polish Writers’ Union.
 12 “As Jacob gave to God, so God gave to Jacob.” The untranslatability of this saying, which 
means that one can expect an adequate reaction to one’s behavior, stems from the fact 
that the diminutive form of “Jacob” and the word for “Cuba” are identical in Polish 
(Kuba) [translator’s note].
 13 Quoted from memory, on the basis of information taken from the press before 1939. 
Personal communication with received in 1954 from Ewa Szelburg-Zarembina on 








above respect, the group reaction that results from belonging to Inuit-language 
speakers is quite different from the group reaction that results from belonging to 
English-language speakers, for example.
 5. Another note to the primary definition: the translation (equivalent) is a phe-
nomenon that chronologically follows the original. This observation is rather 
prosaic, but it seeks to avoid misunderstandings that could arise with regard 
to simultaneous translation (translations generally performed viva voce, at 
congresses etc.). Here too, despite the name, the translation chronologically 
follows the original, though the gap that divides the production of the orig-
inal from that of the translation may well be very short.14
 6. With regard to the primary definition and the preceding remark, we ought to 
explain the relationship between the language of the original and the language 
of the translation, and specifically, whether this relationship involves the 
equality of the two languages, or the primacy of one over the other. Here 
too we encounter various and conflicting views. It is said that the language 
of the original in some way takes precedence over the language of the trans-
lation, as the original contains the primary formulation, and the translation 
a derivative one. On the other hand, it has been said that the language of the 
translation is dominant, as the wording of the translation must always remain 
consistent with the requirements of the target language, regardless of how the 
original is formulated.
It seems that two matters must be distinguished here: the relationship between 
the original and the translation, and the relationship between the language of the 
original and the language of the translation. Following our primary definition, 
which states that the translation is an equivalent of the original, the original and 
the translation are on an equal footing. Should it occur, however, that for various 
reasons the translation cannot be a full equivalent of the original, we ought to 
acknowledge the primacy of the original over the translation.
This last assumption is often confirmed in practice:  in literature, the orig-
inal is generally regarded to be superior over the translation, and insofar as 
this is possible, it is recommended that the original be read; in terms of diplo-
matic documents rendered in several languages, it is often accepted that, when 
 14 In “simultaneous” translation of a longer improvised text the beginning of the transla-
tion (as a whole) can arise prior to the creation of the end of the original (as a whole), 
but if we arrange juxtapose? the equivalent parts of the original and the translation, 
then there can be no doubt that every individual part of the original will be created 
prior to each equivalent part of its translation.
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doubts arise in interpretation, the text rendered in one particular language is 
decisive. As such, experience tells us that the translation is often not the equiva-
lent of the original. Here we ought to distinguish between two moments: 1) the 
experience-based conclusion that, in practice, the translation might not corre-
spond to the original, which might be because of circumstantial factors, such as 
the translator’s incompetence or unfavorable conditions for properly rendering 
the translation (e.g. insufficient time), or 2) an impossibility owing to objective 
primary causes, precluding the formulation of text b in language B as an equiva-
lent of text a previously formulated in language A.
The issue of this impossibility will be examined in further chapters of the 
book. For the time being, we might offer a somewhat “mathematical” expres-
sion of the relationship between the translation and the original: the translation 
is ≤ the original, which means that the translation can, albeit not always does, 
matches (or is an equivalent of) the original.
When it comes, however, to the relationship between the language of the ori-
ginal and the language of the translation, our assumption is that both languages 
are equal. Specifically, between the language of the translation and the language 
of the original there is no relationship like between a metalanguage and a 
language, for a metalanguage is a language we use to speak of another language, 
while a translation is not a description of another language, but an equivalent of 
a formulation already existing in another language. As such, the language of a 
translation cannot be regarded as a metalanguage (with regard to the language 
of the original).
We have thus arrived at the following conclusion:
The operation of translating text a formulated in language A into language B 
consist in formulating text b in language B, so that text b should evoke the same 
associations in the reader, or a very close approximation thereof, as those evoked 
in the reader of text a.
[1957]




A More Precise Definition of Translation of Literary 
Work and the Notion of Translation Fidelity in the 
Scholarly Work and in the Literary Work of Art
Considering the organic character and the structural uniformity of the literary 
work, it turns out that its translation is not, as it might have seemed initially, 
a simple exchange of the phonetic sounds of the original into the phonetic 
sounds of another language, with all the other strata and their interconnections 
remaining—automatically, so to say—untouched. Extracting just one element 
from this complicated organism and replacing it with another (from another 
language) inevitably causes changes in all other components of the work and, 
more importantly, in their resulting harmonic composition. These distortions 
sometimes reach deeply enough into the work’s inner structure to cause changes 
so significant that an entirely new work emerges. It is hard to talk about “trans-
lation” in such cases; instead, we should really talk about paraphrasing, about 
writing a new but similar work, or about imitation, etc. Thus, the very notion 
of “translation,” and especially its “faithfulness,” needs to be revised and defined 
differently for scholarly works and for literary works of art.
Translation of a work of literature (especially of the artistic kind) is always 
to some degree a reconstruction, carried through by an exchange of at least 
(in very rare border cases) just the word sounds of the source language 
into those of the other language, but it is usually accompanied by manifold 
changes in all the remaining strata of the work, and even in the very stratum 
of the linguistic sound formations (as far as derivative phonetic phenomena 
of this stratum are concerned, such as the “melody” of the language). These 
changes, however, can be of such a nature that either, in spite of them, the 
work maintains its individual identity or this identity is violated and in “trans-
lation” we receive an entirely new work, markedly different in quality from the 
ori ginal. In considering the work’s individual identity, resp. its identity in 
translation, it is highly important to separate the purely structural role of 
some of its components (or moments) from the perceptual-aesthetic role 
of often the same, but more often  – different, parts of the work (that is to 
say, from their role as the elements and moments of the work’s unique visual 






The structural role of the work’s component consists, first of all, in its par-
ticipation in the composition of the work (as its element) and, secondly, in 
that it enables the emergence of other elements in the work. Thus, for instance, 
the structural role of the semantic stratum consists mainly in the fact that 
the meanings of words (or sentences) participate in the whole of the work, as 
well as in the fact that they condition both the occurrence in the work of the 
represented objects and their actual contents. The combining of the individual 
word meanings into sentences, and of sentences into larger units, brings about 
the occurrence of, first of all, represented objects, processes, and states of affairs, 
and, second, all their specific arrangements and manifold interconnections, etc. 
Also, the occurrence of aspects in the work, and especially in the literary work 
of art, is partly influenced by the elements of the semantic stratum, though these 
elements cannot do without the structural role and cooperation of the stratum 
of word sounds. But also the semantic stratum has certain structural impor-
tance for the very sounds of words, because they cease to be just “empty” sounds 
(purely phonetic formations), and become phonetic-language formations: on the 
basis of purely phonetic material, there crystalizes a typical form of the word 
sound, identical to manifold uses of “the same” word in spite of potential indi-
vidual differences in the actual phonetic material. Also, as I tried to show else-
where, thanks to the meaning bound to it, the word sound acquires particular 
secondary visual characteristics, emotional, etc.
Thus, the structural role of the semantic stratum in a work of literature, and 
especially in a literary work of art, is particularly important, if not decisive for the 
work’s overall composition and its individual identity. The perceptual-aesthetic 
role of this stratum, on the other hand, is relatively minor, secondary, and often 
almost neutral. However, in this respect a considerable difference arises between 
scholarly works and literary works of art, and therefore this matter requires a 
separate discussion of both cases.
The identity of a scholarly work, both in terms of its perceptual and structural 
appearance, is decided by the meanings of sentences, that is to say, by the whole 
semantic stratum. It is the most important stratum for the perception of a schol-
arly work because it contains the result of cognizing of a certain reality, a pro-
cess recorded in the work. Everything else in such a work, both structurally and 
perceptually, plays an auxiliary role. In particular, the word sounds are impor-
tant only inasmuch as they determine the word meanings in a given language. 
Perceptually, the word sounds are important inasmuch as they allow us to recog-
nize the meanings of the words we deal with. Besides, some properties of word 
sounds may facilitate either the reader’s direct cognition of the objects which 
the work is concerned with, or the manner in which he imagines them. The 
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other strata of a scholarly work, namely the stratum of aspects and the stratum 
of represented objects, are usually secondary if the work is used in its proper 
function, i.e., to convey to the reader knowledge about objects existing inde-
pendently of the work, and to direct the reader’s thoughts towards these objects. 
Similarly, any derivative properties resulting from interconnections between its 
strata, such as, for example, the polyphonic-harmonic qualities, are irrelevant to 
how the scholarly work appears before the reader engaged with it for purely cog-
nitive purposes. They are irrelevant, that is to say, even if these new moments of 
the work do appear in the reader’s field of vision due to various circumstances: 
they do not change the meaning of the sentences nor do they influence his cog-
nition of a given segment of reality. Therefore, if those other strata of a scholarly 
work, or secondary properties and phenomena resulting from interconnections 
between them, undergo changes in translation, this does not influence the work’s 
individual identity, as long as the semantic stratum is not altered as a result. 
This circumstance is decisive in considering the notion of translation fidelity in 
a scholarly work, which I shall address below.
[I] n the literary work of art, there occurs an important discrepancy between 
elements structurally significant for the work’s identity and those which emerge 
in the process of concretization of the work (especially during its proper aesthetic 
perception) and which are crucial to its ultimate visual concretization. That is, 
in this case – as before – the structurally significant and fundamental elements 
are the meanings of sentences comprising the semantic stratum of the work, as 
well as the entire sound stratum (not only the sounds of particular words, but 
also their emotional character and such derivative phenomena as the rhythm, 
the melody of the sentence, etc.). Dependent on these two complete strata is the 
structural constitution of all other strata of the work and of the harmonic quali-
ties derived from interconnections between them.
[…]
In considering problems connected with translation and its “fidelity,” we have 
to juxtapose scholarly works and literary works of art, first of all, in their percep-
tual form, in order to account for the differences between them that have just 
been identified.
The reconstruction that accompanies translation of scholarly work retains the 
work’s identity (or identicality) and therefore is “good” or “faithful” as long as the 
exchange of word sounds from one language to another alters neither the sense 
of the sentences in the original (as much as it is at all possible!) nor their order 
(resp. their logical correlations), even if, as a result of the exchange, disturbances 
occur in the derivative formations of the sound stratum, in the stratum of 
aspects and, consequently, in the whole polyphonic harmony of aesthetically 
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valent qualities. In other words, if in the process of translation the so-called “lit-
erary values” of the whole work change in one way or another, then, unless the 
change affects the work’s cognitive dimensions, it does not bear on the fidelity 
of translation. Translation (under these assumptions) presents the reader with 
the same objects as the original work and it allows him to cognize these objects 
in the same manner – which is exactly what constitutes the work’s identity and 
its scholarly value. But it is not so with the translation of a literary work of art. 
Such a translation is “good,” meaning “faithful,” only when new linguistic sounds 
of particular words, in spite of the numerous changes of the derivative qualities 
they must and do introduce, do not disturb the polyphonic harmony of aestheti-
cally valent qualities, with simultaneous preservation, if possible, of the semantic 
stratum of the work. Since the role of the sound stratum is much more important 
for the identity of a literary work of art than for a scholarly work, it is much more 
difficult to arrive at a “good” translation of the former than it is of the latter. In 
such a translation it is necessary to preserve not only the sense of sentences but 
also the manifold derivative characteristics of the sound stratum, as well as a 
number of efficacies connected with it in relation to other strata of the work and, 
more importantly, in relation to the polyphony of aesthetically valent qualities, 
and all this in spite of the exchange of word sounds.
[…]
Sources of Difficulty in Obtaining a “Good” (Faithful) 
Translation of Scholarly Works and a Literary Works of Art
The difficulties that stand in the way of obtaining good translations of literary 
works stem from the differences between the language of the original and the 
language of the translation. The reasons for the occurrence of such differences, in 
turn, lie in the relationships between the sound stratum of linguistic formations 
and their meanings. Let us begin, then, with the analysis of these relationships 
and connections between the two sides of language, first only in very general 
terms, applicable to any given “national” language.
There are, as we know, two opposing theories of this relationship: one, stem-
ming from Democritus, is conventionalistic, and the other one, which can be 
traced back to Plato’s Cratylus, is anticonventionalistic. The first proclaims no 
necessary connection between the word sound and its meaning, not even a “sub-
stantive” one. Therefore, if there actually occur some sounds “connected” to cer-
tain meanings, this is the result of human volition alone, and in particular a 
certain (tacit) agreement between people communicating with one another. In its 




with any sound we might assign to it. Now, according to the second theory, there 
is a certain substantive, perhaps even necessary connection between the word’s 
sound and its meaning, regardless of our volition or agreement. Certain partic-
ular meanings occur only in connection with certain particular sounds. Both 
theories still have their followers. At the same time, both, in their traditional, 
relatively simplistic form, consider only one function of language, that which 
manifests itself in the process of ascribing meanings and sounds to each another. 
To determine their correctness or falsity, as well as the limits of their possible cor-
rectness, one has to consider all functions performed by linguistic formations, 
especially by words. Also, one has to consider the differences between artificial 
languages, created purposefully to serve certain objectives, and the so-called 
“natural” languages, which have emerged in the course of a long historical pro-
cess, accompanied by the so far unexplained degree of deliberate efforts and 
decisions on the part of the members of a given linguistic community.
As far as artificial “languages” are concerned, created mainly for scientific 
purposes  – that is, highly “symbolic” languages, which mainly use graphical 
symbols devoid of phonetic equivalents or only having such equivalents in the 
form of abbreviated phonemata that cannot really pass as full word sounds – 
they are, indeed, created from primary symbols as a result of a number of 
agreements. In this case, it seems correct to claim that there is no essential con-
nection between the primary symbol and its meaning.1 We can therefore create 
symbols and their sounds quite randomly, assigning them to any meanings we 
choose. It has to be noted, however, that artificial languages are also usually lim-
ited to fulfilling only one of the functions that linguistic formations normally 
perform, namely the function of ascribing certain symbols to certain objects 
through certain meaning (that is, the function today usually referred to, after 
Bühler, as the function of representation, Darstellungsfunktion).2 At first glance, 
it would appear that the conventionalistic theory is also correct when applied to 
the so-called natural languages, a fact confirmed, it seems, by the very existence 
of many such languages. After all, how are they different from one another if 
not primarily in having the same meaning assigned to often entirely different 
sounds? It is apparent, then, that there is no intrinsic bond between a partic-
ular sound and a particular meaning, if in another natural language the latter 
 1 As far as complex symbols are concerned, the difference is that the very arrangement of 
symbols usually exhibits some connections with the meaning of the whole formulation.
 2 The identification of three functions of language presented by Bühler in his Sprachtheorie 
(1932) and credited to him in our country, is actually much earlier; already Twardowski 






is bound to a completely different sound. A marginal question here is whether 
the conventionalistic theory is also correct in claiming that “the bond” between 
sound and meaning results from deliberate agreements or from some other 
cause, difficult to explain. And it seems that it is only because the assertion about 
the necessary connection between the word’s meaning and sound is false that 
translation of literary works of art from one language to another is possible. On 
the other hand, however, it also seems that if the conventionalistic theory were 
fully correct, it would have been always possible to translate each work abso-
lutely faithfully, without the manifold difficulties encountered especially while 
translating a literary work of art. Therefore, it should at least be accepted that 
not all languages were created as a result of random and purposeful agreements 
or that not everything in the existing languages was the effect of such processes, 
and that it is not in all respects that the bond between the word sound and its 
connotations is as loose as the conventionalistic theory has it.
To realize fully the state of these matters, let us look again at the functions 
that, according to contemporary views, are or can be fulfilled by words and other 
linguistic formations.
It is customarily accepted now, after Bühler, that the word has three 
functions: a) of representing certain objects (Darstellungsfunktion): the reference 
of a word to an object takes place through what we call the word’s “meaning”; b) 
of expressing (Ausdrucksfunktion); and c) of informing the collocutor what the 
speaker has in mind (Appelfunktion). Polish linguists often refer to this as the 
function of “communication.”3 A more detailed analysis of these issues makes it 
imperative, however, to introduce further differentiations.
First of all, the function of representation can be performed in two different 
ways, often by the same word, but in such cases usually one form of represen-
tation dominates over the other. An object can be represented either purely 
“notionally,” entirely through thought-derived denotative intentions,4 or “imagi-
natively,” through evoking imaginational aspects of objects designated by word 
 3 In our country, we often refer to this “communication” ambiguously, confusing “infor-
mation” with “presentation.” Moreover, it is falsely understood just what is supposed to 
be “communicated”: the matter is presented as though the actual mental experience of 
the speaker were “communicated” rather than the meaning of the linguistic formation.
 4 I have demonstrated elsewhere that such “meaning” of the word, too, contains various 
heterogeneous elements, e.g., in the name: the material content, formal content, the 
vector of direction, etc., but it is impossible to discuss them here; these differences, how-







meanings. By referring to purely “abstract” words, we usually have in mind 
those words whose function of representation is performed only in a “notional” 
manner, without the participation of imaginational factors. However, by refer-
ring to “concrete,” “live,” “vibrant” words, we usually have in mind those words 
that refer to objects not only through meaning, but also through their connec-
tion to imaginational aspects of particular objects. In everyday language, the 
“concrete” words are predominant, but in scientific (especially mathematical) 
languages there is a prevalence of words that fulfil representational function only 
in a “notional” manner.
To contrast just one informative function with those of representation and 
expression does not seem correct either, and it may be preferable to divide this 
seemingly one function into two. That is, “informing” someone about something 
would refer strictly to the function of the word or phrase that consists in awak-
ening in the listening subject precisely the same, or at least very similar denota-
tive (or imaginational, but in any case cognitive) intentions as those embedded 
in the word used by the speaking subject. This function of the word is, of course, 
one of the means of affecting another individual psyche through language. It is 
however, of a very special type. It induces the listener to co-think about the same 
object and in the same manner as meant by the words directed to him.5 But there 
is also another mode of affecting someone through language, often connected 
with informing, namely, that of stimulating someone to various psychological or 
even psycho-physical behaviors that go beyond simple co-thinking. Most often, 
it consists in awakening in another person the states of being moved, of wanting 
and of desiring, or possibly, causing psycho-physical states of readiness to act as 
a reaction to the words addressed to him as he understood them. “Informing” 
(more or less correctly understood) conditions “affecting” in this new sense; 
however, the latter can often occur even when “informing” is highly imperfect. 
It seems therefore advisable that “informing” be limited strictly to the function 
of evoking co-thinking and understanding (and perhaps also co-imagining of a 
given object), and contrasted with “affecting” in the narrower sense of inducing 
in others reactions of being moved, of wanting and of desiring, or the actual 
actions. But at the same time, as I have indicated, “informing” has to be clearly 
separated from “expressing.” Informing occurs thanks to the word meanings 
being shared by collocutors. A  person spoken to “understands” the meaning 
of words and is thus influenced to co-think about the object that the speaker 
 5 Thus understood, “informing” has nothing to do with the function of “expressing”, 




has in mind and, possibly, to co -imagine it. Thus, the person does not turn to 
the speaker and the speaker’s experiences. However, (linguistic) “expression”: a) 
shows the psychological state of the speaker or the subject expressing his expe-
rience, and, b) it does so not through the meanings of the uttered words but 
through the manner in which they are uttered, in particular the tone of the ut-
terance. Linguistic expression is but a special type of the function of expressing 
as such, which is usually realized in the person’s behavior, facial expression, ges-
ture, and also voice, in particular the tone. Someone who understands the other’s 
expression turns all his thoughts (or, in broader terms, experiences) toward 
that person, toward his experiences and psychological states, and not toward 
the subject of this person’s utterance. This fact differentiates clearly between the 
function of expressing and the function of informing through words’ represen-
tational power. It does not alter the above differentiation because we often talk 
about our own states or experiences. In such a case, indeed, the collocutor learns 
about our experiences and directs his thoughts toward them, but that is possible 
not because of the function of expressing, but because our words refer to our 
experiences due to their inherent meaning.
I cannot discuss here in detail all the functions of language and their mutual 
relations and interdependencies. Suffice it to just ask whether the claim about a 
complete lack of connection between the word sound and its “meaning,” that is, 
its “representational” function, concerns only this relationship, or whether it also 
pertains to other functions of the word, i.e. the relationship between the word 
sound and the word’s expressive and informative function, as well as affecting 
the collocutor.
Now, with the exception of onomatopoeia, which is a rather unique phenom-
enon in language, it seems indeed that there is no close connection between the 
word sound and its purely notional meaning. However, this holds true only if 
by the word sound we mean a certain scientific abstraction (rather than a con-
crete element of everyday language): the purely phonetic side of the word sound, 
disregarding, first of all, the secondary moments brought about by the meaning 
connected to a given sound (cf. words that are “lively,” “celebratory,” “bombastic,” 
“dirty” etc.), and, second, the tone (e.g., “kind,” “elevated,” “threatening,” “sharp,” 
“gentle,” “forbearing,” “tolerant,” “excited,” “calm,” etc.) which accompanies the 
words in a particular utterance. However, when we consider the “word sound” 
in its full range of emotional appeal that stems from its meaning, and especially 
when we consider its contextual and situational tone, i.e., when we consider the 
“word sound” in the form in which it actually occurs and fulfils its functions 
in a living language, constituting the linguistic reality, then we must conclude 
that the connection between sound understood in this way and the manifold 
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functions of a word is not at all as loose as proclaimed by the conventionalistic 
theory. First of all, the function of “imaginational” representation is closely 
related to certain properties of the full resonance of the word and it either does 
or does not occur, depending on whether a given word carries sounds equipped 
with some secondary characteristics capable of evoking in the listener the appro-
priate imaginational representation(s) of the object designated by this word (this 
refers not only to nouns but also, for instance, to verbs). Secondly, this function 
is played out differently depending on which ancillary, possibly emotional 
moments occur in a given word sound. There are words that are dead in this 
respect (e.g., “regular cuboid”) and do not stimulate our imagination, and there 
are words that are active (e.g., “dice”). Exactly the same pertains to the relation-
ship between the word sound and the functions of expression and affecting. In 
this case, however, one has to take into account not only the full word sound, 
along with its manifold extra-phonetic characteristics, but also the speaker’s 
manner and the “tone” of the utterance. And here it is not only the accomplish-
ment of these functions that depends on whether the word sound and the mode 
of its utterance at all contain the moments necessary to trigger said functions of 
the word, but there is also a close connection between the way in which the given 
word affects the collocutor (how it moves him, what of the inner states of the 
speaker it can or does express) and what the full word sound and the manner of 
uttering it are. Studying both living speech in conversation, especially in various 
conflicts of life, and the literary works of art, especially dramatic and lyrical ones, 
reveal beyond all doubt that such close correlations between word sounds or the 
tone of utterance on the hand and the word’s functions mentioned above on the 
other do indeed exist, although it must be acknowledged that a rigorous theoret-
ical study of the kinds of such correlations and the regularities they exhibit is still 
in its infancy. But the practical knowledge about them, as well as the ability to 
use correctly the appropriate words in appropriate, concrete life situations, or in 
appropriate places in literary works of art, is undoubtedly abundant and vast: on 
the one hand, in people who interact with others and who have polished their 
interpersonal skills (the activists), and, on the other, in talented artists:  lyrical 
poets and dramatists, as well as actors. Even the informative function to some 
extent depends on word sound, although the most important part is played here 
by the word meaning. We all know from everyday life, however, from experience 
we gain, for instance, as teachers, that whether or not we manage through words 
to evoke in our listeners their co-thinking about the objects we speak about 
depends to some degree also on the words we use. There are words (as far as their 
sound is concerned) more and less easily understood, words more “convincing” 
to the listener and words that are “difficult to grasp”. Why it is so (whether habits, 
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various circumstances unrelated to language as such, or the properties of spoken 
language play a role here) is another question; whatever the answer, it will not 
alter the simple and familiar fact that some words, although they possess the 
same “content” as others, somehow “pass by our ear,” whereas others are heard 
and understood “right away.”
The relationship between the word’s sound and its functions is therefore not 
as simple as the two opposing theories see it: it is neither as loose, random, and 
dependent on our agreement as the conventionalistic theory has it, nor as tight 
and necessary as the opposing theory proclaims. But precisely because this rela-
tionship is so complex and assumes such diverse forms, it becomes clear that 
in this respect there can and indeed do occur considerable differences between 
various ethnic languages. It happens that in one language certain expressions 
are characterized by a markedly close connection between the two elements of 
a word, whereas in another language expressions equivalent in meaning do not 
exhibit such closeness. This considerably limits the degree of fidelity that can be 
achieved in translation. It is the looseness of the relationship between the purely 
phonetic side of the word sound and its purely notional meaning that makes 
translation possible at all. But the difficulties that limit the degree of fidelity stem 
precisely from closer connections between the full sound of the word and the 
manner in which it fulfils all of its functions.
Before I discuss, just by way of example, certain details of these matters, first 
I have to stress that the differences between scholarly works and literary works 
of art account for the fact that these difficulties are different in scholarly works 
and in literary works of art.6 Limiting ourselves only to the fundamental con-
trast between these two types of works, we could prima facie say that in sci-
entific works (especially of the abstract -deductive type) the most important, 
and in many cases the only function of language is the notional representation 
of objects whose cognition a given work registers and transmits. However, the 
function of informing is not quite insignificant here, as these works have to be 
 6 Naturally, it must be borne in mind that within the constraints of this brief sketch I am 
forced to make shortcuts and simplifications of theoretical situations. Particularly, it 
cannot be ignored that there are various types of science and, consequently, of scien-
tific works, from abstract-deductive mathematics and formal logic to descriptive works 
on nature or history. Similarly, there are numerous types of literary works of art, from 
lyrical and dramatic ones to epic novels or reportage narratives. In these various types 
of scholarly and literary works, their language also performs different functions. 
Consideration of these details must lead to some modifications of the assertions that 




“readable” by and “understandable” to the intended reader. But in the literary 
work of art, all of the aforementioned functions of language play an important 
role, although not an equally important one in all works. For example, in purely 
lyrical works, the functions of expression and of affecting the reader (espe-
cially emotionally), as well as the function of imaginational representation, are 
all particularly important, whereas the function of purely notional representa-
tion, although undoubtedly belonging the totality of the functions of language 
in a lyrical work, plays a rather subordinate role. To some extent, it is similar 
in the case of a dramatic work. But in an epic (narrative-descriptive) work, it is 
the representational function in both forms that comes to the foreground, and 
the function of expression becomes subordinate (or sometimes vanishes), 
whereas the function of affecting the reader remains here equally important to 
the whole of the work; its efficacy determines, among other things, what we call 
the artistic value of the work.
However, since in the literary work of art all functions of language distin-
guished here play a more or less important role and since, with the exception of 
the function of purely notional representation which to a considerable degree 
remains in a conventional relationship to the phonetic side of the word, all the 
other functions of language strictly depending on the full word sound and its 
manner of utterance, it becomes clear that the replacement of concrete word 
sounds in a given work with the sounds of another language (with the words 
having approximately “the same” meaning) can, and often must, cause essential 
changes in the functions performed by a particular word in the original work, 
and thus must cause disturbances in both the particular strata of the literary 
work of art and in the polyphonic harmony of its aesthetically valent qualities. 
Because in translating a literary work of art the foremost concern is to preserve 
fundamental characteristics of this polyphonic harmony and the details and 
aesthe tically valent qualities in all strata of the work, it is so much more difficult 
in this case to achieve translation “fidelity”, which depends here on other factors 
than is the case with purely scholarly works. Literary works are not composed 
of isolated words but of multiplicities and sets of words closely interconnected 
with one another both in their (notional) meaning and in all their remaining 
functions, and even their sounds. From a number of consecutive word sounds, 
higher order linguistic sound formations emerge (melodies, lines, rhymes, 
rhythms, etc.); they become not only separate musical phenomena within the 
whole of the work, critical as far as its influence on the readers is concerned, 
but they also – it cannot be forgotten – play an important role in the realiza-
tion of the expressive function, as well as in actualizing appropriate aspects of 
objects referred to in the work. The exchange of particular word sounds from 
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one language for another only too often leads to changes in higher order lin-
guistic sound formations. As a result, new disturbances occur in the structure 
of the work’s strata, as well as in its polyphonic harmony I shall come back to 
this point.
Some Differences between Languages and the Resulting  
Difficulties in Translation
Precisely because the functions performed by everyday language, and also by 
the various types of language of literary works based on everyday speech, are 
much more numerous and diverse than the functions of scientific language (still 
varied in different types of science), a greater number of heterogeneous factors 
influences the development of everyday natural language than in the schol-
arly one. Whereas with respect to the latter, the most important considerations 
are only those that influence the linguistic formations’ capacity to contain the 
results of cognition of objects in a given discipline so as to pass them on to 
other scholars, in the development of common language there is a great variety 
of circumstances that play a role. For this language not only has to fulfil much 
more diverse needs of the members of a much wider community, but it is also 
more deeply rooted in the life of an individual person. A linguistic community 
undergoes a number of changes itself and its development is conditioned by var-
ious factors, which results in manifold mutations of its language. The process of 
the formation and transformation of everyday language is very slow and long, 
and only to a small degree is it regulated by the active and intentional human 
operations (in cultural communities – through schools, the press, etc.). Changes 
occurring over such long periods of time are often overlooked by members of 
the linguistic community. The scholarly language (especially in the case of some 
scientific disciplines) is regulated to a much higher degree, mainly by being 
adjusted to the newly discovered facts in a given field, as well as by increasingly 
better precision in defining meanings (notions) and the ensuing terminolog-
ical agreements. Similarly, the so-called “literary” language clearly undergoes 
the process of standardization due to research on language, the establishment of 
grammatical norms, the influence exerted by the works of prominent writers on 
their readers, etc. However, as far as the actual development of common, (ethnic) 
language is concerned, normalization of language has a rather secondary influ-
ence in relation to the influence of the variety of factors stemming from the psy-
chology of the members of a given linguistic community, from social relations, 
from the clash of different cultures due to changes in the political situation, etc. 




incomparably greater and deeper than those between the respective scientific 
languages (e.g., within the same field, or between the languages of two different 
disciplines of the same ethnic language). They are not limited to the purely pho-
netic side of word sounds; they include especially the derivative moments of 
word sounds, as well as their various mutations and, moreover, the manifold 
spheres within the very semantic formations characteristic to both languages 
and of the relations between them. Let us try to identify some of these differences 
between languages, for they are the factors that cause the difficulties in trans-
lating literary works of art. While such works cannot utilize artificial linguistic 
formations found in scientific languages, they have to, despite all changes that 
these works introduce into the everyday language, rely on this language and 
avoid the artificiality that scientific or technical works can afford.
 1. If we limit ourselves initially only to names, we will be struck by the fact that 
the names which denote “the same” in two different languages often do not 
mean the same. The creation of meanings of words is a derivative function 
of, among others, cognizing certain objects, particularly perceiving them 
in some kind of manner. This perception can be diverse to the extent that, 
for example, in looking at an object we are struck by a certain feature (e.g., 
color), while someone else notices some other feature and sees that object 
as a sub specie of that feature (e.g., sub specie of its shape or intended use; for 
instance, someone asks “What is it?” and the answer is “a plough,” and not, 
say, “a chunk of steel fastened to bent wooden rod”). As a result, sometimes in 
the meaning of two names denoting the same thing in two languages (or two 
similarly named objects, if we deal with general names), there occur moments 
that render it through an entirely different feature, selection of features, or a 
different holistic moment And it may so happen that the name of an object 
rendered in one language through a certain feature does not find in another 
language a name that would render it through the same feature that was re-
corded in the vocabulary of the original language. In such cases, the word A in 
one language does not have its exact semantic equivalent in another language, 
although in that other language there exists the word B, which means the 
same. The word A, then, is not, strictly speaking, translatable into the other 
language, unless, of course, we artificially create a new word with exactly the 
same meaning. Such neologisms, however, are rarely accepted by language, 
and we always perceive them as odd coinages, even when their sound has 
been rendered “in the spirit” of a given language.
 2. The second linguistic phenomenon that often renders faithful translation 
difficult if not impossible is the fact that different languages often have very 
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different semantic units. This is also connected with the diverse manners of 
perceiving – in the broad sense of the word – the objects in the world around 
us: with the degree of differentiation of this world into independent objects-
units. Even within the realm of the same linguistic community, some may 
see two independent wholes where some others see just one. They there-
fore create one-word names for the units whose designation by such a name 
others find insufficient and use two words bound by a syntactical relationship, 
such as combining a noun with a verb. A similar phenomenon takes place 
when one language exhibits a tendency to use general names and to com-
bine them, if needed, with adjectives that narrow the range of their meaning 
without having separate names equivalent to that narrowed meaning  – 
whereas in another language such names do exist and there is no need to 
use noun-adjective compounds to denote what is thus designated by a simple 
name. For instance, in one language containers that are similar but have dif-
ferent uses are denoted with one general name supplemented with different 
adjectives, whereas in other language each such container has a separate 
name (cf. German names for wine-glasses used for different types of wine, 
etc.). It may seem that it is irrelevant for the fidelity translation whether a 
given word is rendered through one or more words. But it is not unimportant 
in cases where, for example, for the sake of the rhythm of the verse we have 
to maintain a certain economy of words, a consideration that goes beyond 
the semantic stratum of the work and reaches into the structure of the sound 
stratum. But even purely semantically, it is not exactly the same [whether one 
or more words are used]. For, undoubtedly, where we use a one-word name 
(instead of a more general word combined with the adjective that narrows 
down its meaning), its meaning often denotes an object sub specie of a certain 
qualitative feature, whereas the compound bypasses it and renders an object 
sub specie of a typological moment and an isolated moment of a given feature. 
Therefore, the qualitative shape of an object rendered through two words is 
different than that rendered through one. In a scholarly work, this may not 
be important, but in a literary work of art, it can introduce a change that can 
influence the qualitative harmony of the whole work.
 3. Another characteristic of the difference between two languages concerns var-
ious types of polysemy of particular words. Let us consider two names, A and 
B, in two different languages, and that both are polysemous but both possess, 
among all the meanings connected with their sounds, a certain meaning x 
which denotes the same thing in the same manner. Beside the meaning x, the 
name A also contains a sequence of meanings: y, z …, whereas in the name B, 
there is a partly different sequence:  y, k, l … In addition, the polysemy of 
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the two names may not be clearly visible nor easily erased by their contexts. 
Under such conditions, the use in translation of the name B in place of 
A introduces into the text a different kind of polysemy than the one present 
in the original; this constitutes an instance of infidelity in translation. In the 
scholarly work, it is possible to remove this kind of ambiguity either through 
a clear definition of a given term to the exclusion of all other meanings, or 
through the addition of qualifiers that restore the polysemy of the original. 
But in the literary work of art such means are often inadmissible, be it because 
of the necessity to preserve the melody of the sentence or verse, or because it 
is generally unthinkable to supply an artistic text with clarifying definitions. 
Undoubtedly, however, it often happens that the change in the polysemy of a 
given word in translation does not matter because the context removes the 
meaning that does not count, so that while reading we do not even think that 
a given word has any other meanings.
 4. It is also difficult to substitute in translation the so-called “idioms” or stock 
phrases common in one language (and usually having a different meaning 
than is suggested by the dictionary meanings of words that make them up), 
with the “appropriate” or equivalent idioms in another language. It is often 
impossible to preserve in translation the idioms characteristic of the original 
language. Translated “word for word”, they would not only sound nonsen-
sical […] but they could introduce an entirely different meaning than that of 
the original idiom. But it is not always possible to find in another language a 
phrase equivalent to the one in the original. A given expression may simply 
not have formed in one language, and has to be rendered through a set of 
words which may ultimately mean the same, but which will not function as 
a stock phrase; its use may thus produce aesthetically and expressively an 
entirely different effect than the original phrase.
 5. There are numerous fundamental differences between languages with respect 
to both declension and conjugation (even if we limit ourselves only to the 
Indo-European languages). The differences I  have in mind here are exem-
plified by the various number of grammatical cases, morphologically for-
mulated tenses and their functions in particular languages, etc. This causes 
difficulties especially in translating literary works of art, although, undoubt-
edly, one can always find equivalent forms, even if not quite synonymous. But, 
for example, German lacks a proper imperfectum, and Polish lacks various 
past tenses which developed in English or French; this means that, strictly 
speaking, some phrases of one language cannot be rendered in another, even 
using some additional words, which, especially in literary works of art, will 
always strike as incongruous, and anyway such additions are often impossible 
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due to other, extra-semantic reasons. To some degree, the same also applies to 
substituting a simple noun in a certain grammatical case which does not exist 
in another language by an undeclined noun and an appropriate preposition. 
In a scholarly work, this usually does not matter; however, for example, in a 
lyrical poem, it may weaken certain artistic effects or introduce new effects, 
absent from the original.
 6. Great difficulties in translating literary works of art are also caused by 
differences in the syntactic forms common in one language but non-existent 
in the other. Substituting them with (approximately) equivalent phrases often 
changes the sentence’s dynamics, thus affecting the clarity or opacity of its 
structure, its expressiveness, etc. These are, again, important matters for pre-
serving the “style” of the original literary work of art, yet usually secondary 
(though not always insignificant) in the translation of a scholarly work. Here 
we could also include the sentence word order, which in some languages is rig-
orously fixed (e.g., in German), and in others (e.g., Greek or Polish) it is quite 
free, or it is used in sentence structure for other purposes. For instance, the 
German rule of the so-called simple and reverse word order in the main clause, 
or of placing the verb at the end of the subordinate clause, is against the spirit 
of, for example, the Polish language. By obeying it while translating a text into 
Polish, we would produce syntactical incorrectness highly incongruous aes-
thetically (although there are such translations of, for example, Kant’s works, 
or of Tacitus’ Germania). These rules are also very rigid; that is, they have to 
be applied regardless of the actual content of subordinate clauses. Changing 
the word order causes grammatical error, unbearable to the German ear, and 
introduces no positive semantic effect in the development of the sentence’s 
meaning. However, in other languages (e.g., in French), the transposition of 
a word in a sentence sometimes does alter its sense, thus playing a syntactic-
logical role, and it is rather devoid of negative grammatical consequences. But 
retaining the shade of thought achieved in, say, French, by placing a given 
word in a particular position in the sentence cannot be achieved by the same 
means in German, because this would be inconsistent with grammatical rules. 
This goal, therefore, has to be achieved by other means, for example by adding 
certain words that do not occur in the original; then, however, the shade of 
thought which is indeterminate but only intimated by the whole sentence 
often becomes only too obviously specified – an effect really inadmissible in 
a literary work of art, because that which was just hinted at yet unstated now 
becomes stated (or else, it will not be stated at all, simply vanishing from the 
text). The so-called “long sentences” are used frequently in German literature 
even by highly acclaimed authors and great stylists (cf. novellas by Kleist, the 
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late novels by Thomas Mann, etc.), and in many cases, they certainly do not 
constitute stylistic “errors”, nor are they marked in German by the “heaviness” 
that their non-Germans readers or translators so often complain about. Such 
sentences cannot, however, be retained in Polish, or in French or English. They 
are simply incompatible with the linguistic habits, the style of thinking, etc. 
But replacing them with a number of shorter and simpler sentences, admis-
sible and often used in translations of scholarly works, leads to an entirely 
different dynamics of the emerging text, an entirely different architectonics 
of sentences and sentence formations of the higher order, and, correlatively, 
also to an entirely new structure of the represented world than in the orig-
inal. All these factors, although often unavoidable in translation, change the 
artistic shape of the work: they deprive it of certain individual characteristics 
and artistic efficacy embedded within and, instead, they introduce a number 
of new features, so that, artistically, we deal with an entirely different entity, 
sometimes worse, but often even better than the original. Here, then, is the 
locus of all the difficulties in rendering the “style” of a particular author or 
another language in general. In artistic prose this is often less significant, but 
in poetry, be it dramatic or lyrical, we run into unsurmountable difficulties – 
precisely because the structure of the sentence determines not only its purely 
logical sense (that is, the function of representing certain objects in more or 
less complex states of affairs), but also the function of affecting others; both 
functions have a tremendous structural and artistic significance in poetry 
and drama. Particularly in drama, the words uttered by individual characters 
are not so much to inform the audience or the reader what these characters 
are going through, what they think, feel, or plan, as they are a form of the 
character’s affecting other characters entangled in the same plot. Therefore, in 
drama, a change in syntax plays sometimes a crucial role, as it may change [the 
work’s] impact. Often such a change unavoidable, because retaining the orig-
inal syntax in translation would lead to just the opposite effect and to a very 
different impact than a given sentence has in the original. Hence, it is often 
impossible to slip between Scylla – a caricature of the original if its syntax is 
retained – and Charybdis – a complete change of the effects of utterances if 
new sentence syntax is introduced, one that matches the rules of the language 
of translation.
 7. Difficulties of a new kind ensue where the necessity arises, as it does in all lit-
erary works of art, especially those written in verse, to preserve not only the 
same semantic units, but also all artistically and structurally pertinent features 
and phenomena of the work’s sound stratum. In literary masterpieces, the 
sound stratum is structured in such a way that its qualities, especially various 
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sound phenomena of a higher order, collaborate, as I  said before, with the 
semantic stratum in constituting the stratum of aspects, in bringing about 
emotional qualities and other aesthetically valent qualities; at the same time, 
they contribute significantly to fulfilling the function of expressing the inner 
states of the presented characters or the function of affecting the reader. The 
sound stratum participates in the polyphonic harmony of the work’s aes-
thetic values. The more excellent the work, especially a poetic one, the more 
profound is the role of the sound stratum in its above-mentioned capaci-
ties, and the more difficult it is to replace it, since the work, in its qualita-
tive harmony, is a unique, unfalsifiable entity. Now, at the foundation of the 
sound stratum lie the individual word sounds, none among which, if taken 
in isolation, could likely fulfil any (or at least the majority) of the aforemen-
tioned functions; they are fulfilled only by sets of words, by their selection 
and their proper ordering. The exchange of these sounds for the word sounds 
of another language (usually entirely different from the original) results in 
the fact that it is extremely difficult to match these words so that, on the one 
hand, they carry the meaning necessary to preserve the sense of the sentences 
which make up the work, and that, on the other hand, they lead to the same 
language formations and higher order phenomena which are present in the 
original, and finally, that all these formations also possess the same artistic-
structural efficacy in relation to the other strata of the work and to its poly-
phonic harmony. Just to preserve the rhythm and the melody of verse, which 
is connected, among others, with the order of vowels, is extremely difficult 
if, simultaneously, the sense of sentences is to be preserved. Dissimilar word 
sounds of another language, chosen because of their meaning, cannot usu-
ally be arranged into the same rhythmic formation because they introduce 
different sets of vowels and consonants. This results in changes in the melody 
of the verse, in the impossibility of creating the same rhymes as in the orig-
inal, etc. Usually, we must content ourselves with formations only similar to 
the original, as long as the efficacy of their expression and affect, and their 
capacity to actualize aspects is preserved. Requirements posed by the pos-
tulate of preserving identical sense are usually at odds with those posed 
for translation in respect to the preserving the artistic efficacy of the sound 
stratum. Usually, words in two different languages have sounds that are dif-
ferent to such a degree that the two sets of sounds generally yield highly dis-
similar formations and derivative phenomena, and thus entirely different 
capacities of the language sound stratum. Thus, more often than not transla-
tion either departs from the original with respect to the qualities of its sound 
stratum and lacks the appropriate artistic efficacy, while retaining the units 
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of sense of the semantic stratum, or, conversely, it differs from the original 
in some details of the semantic stratum, being thus more or less unfaithful 
in this respect, while its sound stratum approximates the original. However, 
because linguistic sound phenomena of a higher order (e.g., the melody of 
verse) are very often qualitative features that can appear on the basis of dif-
ferent selectons of qualities (here: the sounds of particular words), it is not 
impossible, contrary to common belief, to endow the sound stratum of the 
translation with such word sounds that, in spite of their difference from the 
original, there will occur the same, or at least very similar, derivative qual-
itative feature, and consequently, the artistic efficacy of this stratum will be 
preserved in the translated work. This is a rare case, though, because beside 
the selection of properties of both languages, it requires a double talent on 
the part of the translator:  first, the ability to hear in the original work all 
those properties of its sound stratum that determine its artistic efficacy and 
character, and, second, the ability to understand on which properties of the 
phonetic foundations of verse they all depend. On the other hand, talent is 
necessary in order to find in the sound material of the language of transla-
tion those words whose sound combination and succession would result in 
the same artistic effects of the whole stratum as in the original. Only a careful 
analysis of particular translations could show where and why translations, 
quite good in their semantic fidelity, are artistically completely disappointing 
in their failure to coordinate the efficacy and the artistic quality of the sound 
stratum with the semantic stratum and with the whole of the work. General 
reflections alone will not tell us any more about the matter. It only needs to 
be stressed yet again that all these difficulties diminish considerably in works 
of prose, although this also depends on the type of work. To illustrate this, we 
could juxtapose highly lyrically effective prose by Żeromski on the one hand 
and the prose by Kraszewski or Prus7 on the other. In scholarly works, how-
ever, especially in mathematics or physics, these difficulties either do not exist 
at all or they emerge only sporadically, mainly because some of these works 
might have same “literary values,” which bring them closer to literary works 
of art and which sometimes fulfil cognitive functions and contribute to the 
cognitive efficacy of the work.
[…]
 7 Stefan Żeromski; Bolesław Prus – Polish writers, see editors’ notes on 125 and 284 in 
the present volume. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812–1887) – Polish novelist, historian 




I believe that I  have thus presented the most important aspects of the 
differences between the translation of literary and scholarly works, indicating a 
number of fundamental difficulties encountered in this respect. Yet I have not, of 
course, exhausted all problems that emerge here.
[1955/1972]
Translated by Jolanta Wawrzycka
Edward Balcerzan
The Poetics of Artistic Translation
Many scholars see it as problematic that the poetics of translation should exist as 
a distinct field in the humanities. Custom dictates that we speak more of transla-
tion theory, or of the duties of translation criticism, than of poetics.
Why is this? In our present-day understanding and sensibility poetics first 
responds to a general question – “How does the literary work exist?”1 – and then 
offers us the tools of analysis and interpretation (of description and explication) 
of works that allow us to study literature on its proper ontological plane, which 
cannot be reduced to other planes (e.g. sociological, psychological, etc.). The 
poetics of artistic translation should, therefore, pose a similar question: “How 
does the literary work translated from a foreign language exist?” Later on, it 
should necessarily find evidence that, although a translation is also a “normal” 
literary work, although it is governed by the same structural laws, it exists differ-
ently from works of native literature. And only after uncovering this distinctive-
ness, after demonstrating this “differently,” can it move on to developing its own 
research tools – its own system of concepts and terms.
It is my belief that artistic translation is subject to its own laws in addition to 
the universal laws of literature, and thus it exists, to phrase it with caution, some-
what differently from native-language works, and consequently, the poetics of 
artistic translation has all due raison d’être. I shall confine myself to the most basic 
arguments. The native literary work, written “directly” in the native language, 
is a one-time, or, in other words, a write-once statement. The essence of the 
single original work is its assumed uniqueness. Even if there are two versions 
of the same original piece by the same author (such as the two versions of Leo 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace), these are the exceptions that confirm the rule. In such 
cases, the scholar, publisher, and reader select one version which they acknowl-
edge to be canonical. With translations, the reverse occurs. A  translation of a 
foreign-language work is always one of many possible expressions. Multiplicity 
and repeatability are therefore essential attributes of translations. The same 
foreign-language work can serve as the basis for a whole series of translations 
in a given language. (For example, there are three Polish translations of The Lay 







of the Love and Death of Christoph Cornet Rilke, five Bulgarian translations of 
the Polish national epic Pan Tadeusz [Master Thaddeus], four Polish versions of 
Mayakovsky’s “Oblako v shtanakh” [A Cloud in Trousers] etc.).
Translation thus exists in a series of translations. A series is the basic form of 
existence for artistic translation. Such is the specificity of its ontology. Even if a 
foreign-language work has been translated into our tongue only once, we appre-
hend this translation as the beginning of a series of other translations that will or 
may be created in future. It is vital that both a partially realized and a potential 
series are open to further development. They are sequences which, for all prac-
tical purposes, are infinite; they are open sets. Thus, in an open-ended series, with 
its constant readiness to include new and competing solutions, every translation 
is, as it were, “open.” It opens up in two different directions: toward the foreign-
language original, and toward the competing components of the series. This 
“openness” of the translation also poses a danger. The original can question both 
the meaning and the poetics of a given translation. The competing components 
of the series can also question it, or even eliminate it from circulation.
I believe this should suffice to close the opening remarks with the comment 
that examining an artistic translation requires special instruments, which should 
be the subject of interest of a separate discipline: the poetics of translation.
The Poetics of Artistic Translation in Literary History
Even as it is taught in schools, the history of literature notes the contribution 
of the art of translation to the development of national literature. Grade-school 
students find out, for instance, that Raj duszny [Little Garden of the Soul] is 
a translation by Biernat of Lublin. They encounter literary protagonists of past 
epochs, such as Till Eulenspiegel, Aesop, or Marcolf, who have appeared in our 
culture thanks to translators and through translations. They are aware of the 
direct or indirect links to foreign-language literary traditions found in Mikołaj 
Rej, Jan Kochanowski, and Łukasz Górnicki. Precisely – links that are direct or 
indirect. Even the simplest information in this field requires that we use ele-
mentary concepts from the poetics of translation. The concept of translation 
alone will not suffice. On the one hand, the degree of dependence of the trans-
lation on the original, and on the other hand, the kind of innovations intro-
duced by the translator make the variants of the translated works differ. If we call 
Kochanowski’s Psałterz [Psalter] a “translation,” we call Górnicki’s Dworzanin 
Polski [Polish Courtier] a “new remake,” while Biernat of Lublin’s Żywot Ezopa 
Frygi [Life of Aesop of Phrygia] is a “versified remake,” etc. Nor can we deny that 
the more precise the set of concepts from the field of poetics the literary historian 
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has at their disposal, the clearlier they can define the nature of a given work. 
The concepts of poetics are not there in order to satisfy someone’s disinterested 
proclivity for “pigeonholing.” The concepts of poetics of translation are there to 
give justice to both the original and the translation; they should describe the 
translator’s standpoint, and finally, evaluate the role that a given translation has 
played in the native literature.
From this we can see that the poetics of artistic translation sees its real appli-
cability for literary history, a subject whose practical interests lie in the develop-
ment of poetics of translation. At any rate, this is how it should be; unfortunately, 
more often than not this is not the case. The majority of works on literary history, 
especially textbooks, make only occasional reference to the poetics of translation, 
reluctantly, as it were, limiting themselves to the two above concepts:  “trans-
lation” and “remake.” Or:  “faithful” and “unfaithful” translation. Yet there is a 
vast range of intermediate variants between the “translation” and the “remake,” 
and a dozen ways to be “faithful” or “unfaithful” to the original. It is easy to 
confuse these variants, particularly in attributing the so-called “influences and 
dependencies,” which undoubtedly do exist in literatures of various languages. 
There is a constant exchange of artistic qualities. This is, however, an exchange in 
which the foreign-language text has several barriers to cross: natural languages, 
the literary traditions of the two different national cultures, and the rules of the 
art of translation binding in a given time. The diversity of the transformations 
that a work can undergo in the act of translation leads to more or less visible 
changes in its original meaning. Who and what can be the source of “influence” 
in such conditions? It can be the author of the original. In that case the matter 
is simple. It can also primarily be the translator. This also simplifies things. We 
receive either a “faithful translation” or an “unfaithful remake.” Most often, how-
ever, the source of the “influence” is both the foreign-language writer and the 
native-speaking translator. Then everything becomes more complicated:  we 
must summon the apparatus of poetics of translation in order to separate what 
has come from “abroad” into the native culture, and what has been produced “on 
site,” by the translator. In the translator’s workshop.
“The Catcher in the Rye over a Precipice”
The claim presented in Section One ought to be documented with a precise 
analysis of a series of translations of a single foreign-language work. Instead, we 
shall attempt the following maneuver – rather than a whole literary work, we 
shall take a part of it: its title. There are works in which the role of the title cannot 




main theme, the poetic concept, the key to a stylistic code. Jerome Salinger’s 
The Catcher in the Rye2 is among these. The word “catcher” is a baseball term. 
It is associated with “grabbing,” “catching,” indirectly also with “hunting.” The 
languages into which Salinger’s novel has been translated have no strict equiv-
alent for the word “catcher.” Every translation solves this problem differently. 
Many attempt to hold onto the metaphorical value of the title and to remain 
within the field of meanings marked out by the title of the original. The Finnish 
and Serbian titles: The Hunter in the Rye (Sieppari ruispellossa and Lovac u razhi, 
respectively). The Czech translation: He Who Hunts in the Rye (Kdo chytá v žitě). 
One of German versions: The Man in the Rye (Der Mann im Roggen). The Polish 
version:  Wanderer in the Grain Field (Buszujący w zbożu). A  Spanish transla-
tion: The Hidden Hunter (El cazador oculto). All these suggestions eliminate the 
moment of surprise and mystery. The contrast between the words “hunter” and 
“rye”, or “man” and “rye”, is nothing out of the ordinary. The second group of 
translations salvage, as it were, the drama of the original title’s metaphor, intro-
ducing the motif of the precipice taken from the novel. The Estonian transla-
tion: “The Precipice in the Rye” (Kuristik rukkis). A Russian translation: “Over 
the Precipice in the Rye” (Nad propast’yu vo rzhi). The Korean translation: “The 
Precipice” (단애 ). The remaining translations make no attempt to render the 
metaphor in Salinger’s title. In itself, this would not be dangerous. But these 
changes often mean altering the reader’s expectations. “The Heart Catcher” 
(the French translation, L’Attrape-cœurs) suggests a swashbuckling romance. 
“The Young Holden” (the Italian translation, Il giovane Holden) sounds like the 
first part of a family saga. “Savior in Time of Need” (the Swedish translation, 
Räddaren i nöden) makes us expect a thriller with a moral at the end. “Lonely 
Journey” (the Dutch version, Eenzame zwerftocht) puts us in mind of adventure 
and travel literature. “Life of a Man” (another Italian translation, Vita da uomo) 
could in fact correspond to any genre.
If a single title of a foreign-language work can refract into so many translation 
variants, appealing to such diverse fields of meaning and to so many conventions, 
 2 Information on the translations of the title of Salinger’s novel comes from V. Rossels’s 
paper “B masterskoy perevodchika,” Tetradi perevodchika (Moscow 1966), pp. 12–15. 
The list of English equivalents of respective titles was restored after Salinger’s bibli-
ography by Donald M. Fiene, originally used by Rossels as the source for his Russian 
translations. See: D.M. Fiene, “J. D. Salinger: A Bibliography,” Wisconsin Studies in 
Contemporary Literature 4.1. (Winter), 1963, pp. 109–149. Having travelled in trans-
lation via English, Russian, and Polish, some of these versions may eventually differ 
from Balcerzan’s Polish approximations [editors’ note].
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it is easy to imagine to what transformations the semantic whole of the original 
might succumb in the act of translation. How many “influences and dependen-
cies” confirmed by literary history need to be questioned, reinterpreted, and 
redescribed.
Note Added in 1997
In the first version of this article I limited my description of the translation 
series to a single translation:  the marvelously multiplied meanings of the 
title of Salinger’s famous novel. Today I see that this example might provide 
a somewhat distorted image of the series. This is because the title of a work 
(be it literature or film) tends to be changed by the translators more often 
and emphatically than other aspects of the work, and unceremoniously so. In 
the truly rueful history of film title translation this is seen more sharply than 
in literature. Ever since the interwar period, when, for example, the Soviet 
comedy Vyesyoliye Ryebyata [Happy Guys] was shown to Polish audiences 
under the title Świat się śmieje [The World Is Laughing] – doubtless because 
of the idiomatic trap of the word Ryebyata – the carte blanche of translators 
for the silver screen has been exercised to terrifying effect. Small wonder, 
then, that one method of salvaging the original intention, in which the title 
often plays a major role, in Poland has been to entirely forgo the translation 
of film (and music) titles, or to publish original titles alongside their Polish 
translations.
The essence of a translation series is not the destruction of the meanings 
designed in the original, but the tension between what blasts out these meanings 
and what consolidates them.
To demonstrate this game, let us have a look at the (truly astonishing!) series 
of Polish translations of a certain very famous (and extremely succinct) text by 
William Shakespeare: “Why, let the stricken deer go weep…”.
The diversity of the fifteen Polish translations of the famous quatrain from 
Hamlet simply staggers the reader. There is no agreement among translators as 
to the profiles or the “names” of the protagonists of the bloody forest incident. 
Whoever could it be? A fallow deer, a moose, a deer, a stag, a single protagonist 
or a collective one, a beast (an animal) with no particular characteristics – or an 
ill-defined mass, a wilderness? Of course, our translators are fairly unanimous in 
understanding what happened to this creature of many names. They say it has 
been wounded (hurt, struck, hit – these words are synonymous, though subtle 
differences emerge from the varied names. Most of the terms suggest an image 




indicate another sort of aggressor: an animal can be wounded by another animal, 
one that is stronger and predatory).
But how does the bleeding primeval forest/woods/groves-dweller act in the 
translations? The material gives evidence to a distressingly tangled array of pos-
sibilities. “It fell breathless,” cries one. “It flees” (and thus lives), another claims. It 
does not yet suffer, but “goes to weep,” a third interjects reassuringly. And the rest, 
each in their own way, say it “weeps” “sobs,” “spills tears,” “goes mad,” “sways,” 
“cries with pain,” “chokes a roar…” Indeed, a reader could only take a doubtful 
approach to such a wealth of translations of a single work. What a chaotic mess! 
(As in Adam Mickiewicz’s romantic ballad “Powrót taty” [Father’s Return]: “This 
one said this, and that one said that…”). The more differences we find, the more 
intense our feeling of falsity, of the betrayal of the original. When the same thing 
is translated in so many various ways not all the translators can be right!
However, the moment we inquire into the overall meaning of this “Polish 
Shakespeare” we find that the entire series of translations retains practically the 
same meaning. The following construct of ideas repeats with stubborn consis-
tency:  1. Someone suffers. 2.  Someone is saved. 3.  Someone’s suffering saves 
someone else. 4. That is how things go in this world.
All the translations capture the twofold construction:  thesis and illustra-
tion. First the illustration, then the thesis. From the specific to the general. 
This is, perhaps, more peculiar than the discrepancy in the details. After all, fif-
teen translators over a space of 150 years (1840–1990) understood almost the 
same content in the Shakespearean quatrain! Subsequent epochs, generations, 
ideologies, and individuals humbly took the lesson of the brilliant playwright 
without attempting to insert their own truths or mottoes. (Although the politi-
cally sensitive might see evidence of the epoch taking its effect in the 1953 trans-
lation, with the menacing words, “Someone sleeps, and to someone sleep has 
been forbidden” – highly reminiscent of the prison atmosphere of Stalinism).
The intellectual innovations, on the other hand, do command our atten-
tion. Here is one (most recent) departure from the norm sanctioned by tradi-
tion: fourteen translators found the opposition of the sacrifice and salvation in 
the world of living creatures, while only one (in the vein of Ecclesiastes) found 
it in the transformations of time (“For there is time of sleep and time to be vigi-
lant”). But there truly are few differences in the overall understanding.
If this be the case, then why were so many translations produced? We 
have to return to the point of departure. To the details, be they visual, lexi-
cal, rhythmic, or in intonation. To asking which images most powerfully stir 
the reader’s imagination:  the animal “dashing through the wood,” the doe 
that “flashes merrily through the forest,” or the herd that “runs off into the 
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woods”? Which phrase rings more true and more clearly illuminates the poet’s 
theme: “This is the way of the world”? “For this is the meaning of existence”? 
“Thus, the world turns”?
Thus, we return to the mysteries of artistry. Every new artistic convention 
begs for a new translation.
And the great tournament continues – for 150 years and counting.
Second Note Added in 1997
We find the least discrepancies within a series when it comes to translations of 
the Bible. Identical phrases are often repeated in consecutive translations; some-
times changes are required by the obscurity of the original. As a general rule, 
the differences in translations are limited to subtle variations of synonyms, word 
order, intonation, and rhythm.
There are two reasons for the differences in the Polish translations of the fifth 
verse of Psalm 136. The first is the vagueness of the original Hebrew words (the 
collective lament of the Judean exiles says: “may my right hand forget”, for which 
attempts have been made to replace “may my right hand be forgotten,” or with 
more graphic images of corporal punishment: may it “die,” may it “wither”). The 
second cause is a question of eloquence, or pure aesthetics.
Here are a few versions in translation (there are more):
Jeślibym cię zapomniał, Jeruzalem,
niech zapomniana będzie prawica moja!
[If I were to forget you, Jerusalem,
may my right hand be forgotten!]
(trans.: Jakub Wujek)
Jeśli zapomnę cię, Jeruzalem, niech zmartwieje ma prawica.
[If I forget you, Jerusalem, may my right hand die.]
(trans.: Leopold Staff)
Jeśli zapomnę cię, Jeruzalem,
niechaj zapomniana będzie prawica moja!
[If I forget you, Jerusalem,
let my right hand be forgotten!]
(trans.: Wojciech Bąk)
Jeśli zapomnę ciebie, Jeruzalem, niech uschnie moja prawica.
[If I forget you, Jerusalem, may my right hand wither.]
(trans.: Czesław Miłosz)
Jeruzalem, jeśli zapomnę o tobie, niech uschnie moja prawica.
[Jerusalem, if I forget about you, may my right hand wither.]




The more texts that accumulate in a series (biblical or otherwise!), the more we suc-
cumb to the (cynical?) illusion that the retranslation no longer requires contact with 
the original or even any knowledge of the original language (or languages). All that 
is required is a paraphrase, an intralinguistic translation: from Polish into Polish.
The Poetics of Translation in the General Theory  
of the Art of Translation
The poetics of artistic translation is not merely part of a more general theory 
of the art of translation. This is because the general theory does not, at present, 
constitute a uniform whole. It crumbles into several viewpoints, it flows in seve-
ral streams. It is more convenient to speak of various theoretical concepts of 
translation. Each of them creates a proposition of sorts for poetics, but none 
entirely identifies itself with poetics. We shall name three among the most active 
concepts: the anthropological, the linguistic, and the literary. Because some of 
the claims formulated in these disciplines intersect, particularly in terms of the 
conceptual apparatus of information theory, a “hodgepodge” of notions might 
easily arise; I would suggest making the basic division on the level of theore-
tical reflection. An anthropological approach to translation operates at the level 
of a “system of systems” of human culture. Anthropology is interested in all 
“languages” spoken by humans and thus in every act of the transfer of informa-
tion. From an anthropological perspective, translation is primarily intersemiotic, 
i.e. it involves the transfer of a message between two sign systems, each of which 
exists differently and in a different substance. An example is the translation of an 
initiation rite into a myth.3
The translation of a ceremonial into an act of linguistic communication (T. 
Tzivyan).4 The translation of a literary work into a film or a play. Anthropology 
attempts to resolve a problem that is vital to us here, namely the issue of mutual 
translatability and untranslatability of communications belonging to various 
systems. The same issue pertains to various ethnic languages. A major role in 
anthropology has been played by Whorf ’s hypothesis which assumes the impo-
sition of a vision of the world encoded in an ethnic language upon the users of 
this language (or, as D. Segal phrased it, “a global image of the world”5), with 
 3 V. Ogibenin, “Zamechaniya o strukture mifa v ‘Rigvede’.” In his: Trudy po znakovym 
sistemam (Tartu 1965).
 4 T. Tsiv’yan, “K nekotorym voprosam postroeniya yazyka etiketa …”
 5 D. Segal, “Zametki ob odnom tipe semioticheskikh modeliruyushchikh sistem …” 
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rigorously set forms of perceiving reality, isolating objects, their hierarchical 
interrelations etc. According to an extreme interpretation of Whorf ’s hypothesis, 
ethnic languages are untranslatable, hermetic, closed to acts of complete trans-
lation. In its polemics with Whorf, anthropology seeks positive (or optimistic) 
solutions, in close contact with linguistics.6
From a linguistic perspective, a text produced in a language can be divided 
into two planes: the plane of content and the plane of expression (or the “deep” 
structure and the “surface” structure). In other words:  into the “content” and 
the “form.” Translation transforms the plane of expression while preserving the 
plane of content. According to linguists, describing the act of translation and 
programming it for a machine will be most effective when we can distinguish 
basic units of meaning on the plane of content. One of the latest projects to 
separate these units of meaning seeks to define the “content” of an expression 
through a description or a paraphrase. In communicating within a single natural 
language we translate the meanings of words and the significance of utterances – 
paraphrasing them, i.e. using “other words.” The same law governs interlingual 
communication. A foreign phrase that has no direct equivalent in our language 
is explained through paraphrase. The plane of expression changes. The plane of 
content remains unchanged.
Though the literary concept of translation borrows heavily from linguistic 
experience, it cannot accept its model of utterance, as it strives to resolve the 
translator’s difficulties less on the textual level than on the level of the work, 
which consists of more “planes.” Linguistic components of the plane of expres-
sion can constitute the main content of an epic poem or novel. The linguistic 
“deep structure” often reveals itself to be the “surface” of a drama or poem. 
In other words, in the literary work the signifier turns into the signified, and 
the signified becomes the signifier; “One serves as a backdrop for the other” 
(Yuri Lotman). Of course, paraphrase cannot be taken for a universal principle 
of translation. That would take us to absurd conclusions, wherein, instead of 
finding equivalents for the rhymes of Pan Tadeusz, the translator would describe 
various “units of meaning” created by various rhymes “in his own words.”
Many differing definitions of literary translation orbit the notion of trans-
lation as structural reconstruction, rendered not only in a language foreign to 
the original, but also in the signs of a foreign literary tradition (poetics, style, 
genre etc.). Poetics clarifies individual aspects of literary translation theory. It 
 6 The anthropological aspect of the theory of translation is broadly covered by G. Mounin 




is not, as I have said, a part of literary theory, because, on the one hand, it is 
linked to concepts of anthropology or linguistics; on the other, it has its sepa-
rate tasks, which cannot be reduced to the tasks of any of the other disciplines 
described here.
The Poetics of the Translation Process
The category of the speaking subject is fundamental to poetics. As I have already 
mentioned, the translated work most often “splits into two”:  one part “comes” 
directly, as it were, from the author of the original, and the other part comes from 
the translator. The poetics of artistic translation must therefore be interested in the 
translator’s “behavior” toward the author; the point, obviously, is not in exploring 
what the person translating might have thought, but in determining how their 
decisions were captured in the text. The need to describe evident decisions of the 
translator has been long felt by translation theory; the traditional “moralistic” or 
“ceremonial” examinations of “fidelity” or “betrayal” belong to this problem area, 
as do issues of “compromise” and “struggle” (K. Chukovsky).7 Today’s knowledge of 
the art of translation favors a typological description of the translator’s “behavior.” 
There objectively exist two kinds of the translation act. The first might be called 
“translation proper,” and the second, “interpretation.”
Translation proper involves a search for semantic and emotional equivalents of 
the original signs – among the signs of the language of the translation. The translator 
aims to replace the words of the original with heteronyms, e.g. “лошадь” – “horse,” 
“drei” – “three” (Roman Jakobson).8 When there is no heteronym, the translator 
falls back upon the system of structural coreferences between the two languages, 
and between the two literary traditions. It is in this system that the translator seeks 
optimal solutions. This set of systemic coreferences is sometimes called an interlan-
guage or a “go-between language.” Depending on the level of difficulty, the function 
of the go-between language can be served by a dictionary, grammar, or comparative 
stylistics, another foreign language, a third literary tradition, etc. It can also be a 
system of mathematical formulae programmed for a translation machine.
What can be done when it is not possible to establish systemic coreference on 
the plane of language? At this point, one goes beyond both language and litera-
ture. One draws directly from reality. It is precisely the search for solutions in our 
knowledge of reality that is an interpretation of the original.9
 7 K. Chukovsky, Iskusstvo perevoda (Leningrad 1930), pp. 13–24.
 8 R. Jakobson, M. Halle, Podstawy języka (Wrocław 1964), p. 119.
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One example: “When Neruda writes: ‘a muzo butterfly’ we have to add ‘a blue 
muzo butterfly,’ when he writes ‘a marvelous jacaranda tree’ we have to add: ‘a 
violet jacaranda tree;’ for the poet who on a daily basis sees the blue butterfly 
and the jacaranda tree covered in violet blossoms, the colors are contained in the 
name, while we have to explain them to our readers.”10
Neither translation proper nor interpretation ever appear in their “pure” 
form. (Apart from a translating machine, which is unable to resort to looking at 
reality.) The two types of translation activities generally intersect. Nonetheless, 
in certain historical translation poetics we can easily perceive a focus on one 
or the other way of translating. Certain schools are dominated by the cult of 
translation proper (Valery Briusov, Lubimov’s school). In others, interpreta-
tion is programmatically applied (Enlightenment practices, Artur Sandauer). 
Translation proper attempts to do justice to the author of the original, to speak 
in his voice. The translator here contents himself with the role of an intelligent 
transmitter. Interpretation, in turn, makes the translator the main speaking sub-
ject. The translator retells in their own fashion the story of the world referred to 
in the original and existing beyond the text, or, as Ivan Kashkin phrased it, “in 
the beyond-text.”
Types of Translation Transformations
In the translation process the original undergoes various transformations, moti-
vated in various ways. We might speak of four fundamentally different types 
of transformations (familiar to Ancient rhetoric), which apply both to a text 
(or more precisely:  to sections of texts) and to the entire work (the structural 
constructs of a work). These are:
 1. Reduction, i.e. reducing a section of the text by certain components or 
removing certain properties from the stylistic construct;
 2. Inversion, i.e. changing the word order, expressions, or higher-level structures;
 3. Substitution, i.e. substitution of some components;
 4. Amplification, i.e. supplementing the text with new components, often 
inferred, concealed in ellipses.11
The issue of transformative changes appears most clearly in the versification part 
of the translation poetics, in researching “equilinearity” (the correspondence 
 10 J. Iwaszkiewicz, “Słowo wstępne.” In: P. Neruda, Pieśń powszechna (Warsaw 1954), p. 7.
 11 V. Koptilov, “Transformatsiya khudozhestvennogo obraza v poeticheskom perevode,” 








between the translation and the original in terms of length and numbers of lines 
or stanzas) and “equirhythmicity” (the correspondence between the translation 
and the original in terms of rhythmic structure).
Ways of Translating
More detailed taxonomies of translation are, by necessity, assembled into var-
ious configurations, as they are taken from various (sometimes contradictory) 
theories of translation. An interesting attempt to formalize a description of 
the translation process is found in the above-mentioned book by Ryevzin and 
Rozentzveig. The authors discriminate between a few types of translation which 
are fundamentally different in terms of the level of difficulty: literal, simplifying, 
precise, adequate, and free.
The basis for this classification involves the concept of the supercategory. Two 
units of translation – the smallest signifying and informative segments of the 
text – belong to the same supercategory if the first unit comes from the original 
language and the second one from the language of the translation, and if one can 
establish one-to-one relationships between them (e.g. “Wandzeitung” and “wall 
newspaper”). If it is not possible to establish a one-to-one relationship between 
translation units, then they belong to different supercategories, e.g. “bistro” and 
“diner.” Within two given natural languages, L1 and L2, there is generally a certain 
group of units that belong to different supercategories.
Interlinear translation occurs in the sphere of units belonging to the same 
supercategory. This is the simplest situation, involving a simple recoding of the 
message. More complicated situations arise from a lack of one-to-one semantic 
relationships between the units of these languages.
Literal translation works as though it were possible to establish a one-to-one 
relationship between the units of the two languages. In terms of content, the text 
created through literal translation belongs to L2, while on the plane of expression 
it belongs to L1 (the language of the original). The authors are not interested in 
mistakes and oddities that result from literal translation, but rather in the very 
mechanism of mistakes, as a way of analyzing certain aspects of the act of lin-
guistic communication.
Simplifying translation involves replacing a given element of L1 with another 
element that has a one-to-one equivalent in the language of the translation. First 
an intralingual translation is performed, and only then an interlingual one, most 
often for the translation of syntactic constructions.
Precise translation is a further extension of a simplifying translation:  the 
translator performs an intralingual translation in the original language and 
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then an interlingual translation, but he does not stop with the resulting expres-
sion and seeks in the language of the translation a one-to-one equivalent of that 
expression, such that might capture the meaning, and at the same time maintain 
the stylistic value of the original. If this operation is fully successful, if the sty-
listic value of the original and the section of the translation remain the same, 
and attaining this identical value does not infringe upon combination rules in 
the system L2, and does not contradict the context, then we have an adequate 
translation.
Finally, we have free translation, in which the rules of one-to-one relationships 
between elements are not taken into account.
Other scholars, such as Vinay and Darbelnet, suggest that we speak instead of 
variants of fragments of a translated work, in which transformative changes are 
of a local nature. It would seem that Vinay’s and Darbelnet’s chart could also be a 
basis for classifying entire translations. All the more so in that the categories they 
propose work with regard to strategies of translating single words, sentences, and 
phraseological units.12
These are, firstly: borrowings, or repetitions of a word or sentence from the 
original, such as bistro. Secondly:  calques, or the mechanical replication of 
fo reign language units, often in defiance of the norms of the target language, e.g. 
“He is a very sympathetic person.” Thirdly:  the literal translation, also known 
as the philological, or heteronomous translation. Fourthly:  transposition. In 
Jerzy Ziomek’s phrasing: “Transposition is what authors call a method of trans-
lation that involves replacing one expression, phrase, or term with another of 
related meaning.” Fifthly:  modulation. “Modulation is a change that involves 
respecting the structures of the language into which one is translating – ‘modu-
lation’ is applied when a literal translation would be possible and even grammat-
ically correct, but it would not render the spirit of the language” (Jerzy Ziomek). 
Sixthly: equivalence, which mainly concerns the text on a stylistic level. In this 
case, a shift in the meaning of the words is justified by a similarity of stylistic 
function. For example: Bruno Jasieński’s kula śnieżna, ulęgałka (snow ball, wild 
pear) from his poem “Słowo o Jakubie Szeli” [A Word on Jakub Szela] was trans-
lated by D. Samoylov by the “equivalent” of “apple of snow.” Seventh: adaptation. 
Here we have a case in which the names of things or situations have no corre-
sponding term in the target language.
 12 This typology is described in detail by Jerzy Ziomek in his book Staff i Kochanowski. 





Here the translator can use either the original name (which takes us back to 
“borrowing”) or find an equivalent (Jerzy Ziomek). As we can see, the first six 
variants are linked to translation proper, while the seventh, adaptation, is a spe-
cial case of translation interpretation.
I said at the beginning of this section that fragmentary solutions can dominate 
the whole of the translated work. In such a case, we would call the whole trans-
lation a “modulation” or an “adaptation,” mindful of the quantitative, and espe-
cially the qualitative dominance of this or that translatorial strategy. Naturally, 
a borrowing or a calque has the least chance of being dominant. At first glance, 
a borrowing should not count at all here. A work where borrowing dominates 
would be a simple transcription of the original, not a translation. Nonetheless, 
there does exist a certain peculiar sort of “non-rational” poetry that suggests that 
the translator use borrowing as one of the important solutions. Poems of Velimir 
Khlebnikov, Aleksey Kruchonykh, Bozhidar, Olga Rozanova, Alargov (Roman 
Jakobson) and other Futurists are composed of words that are entirely new to 
the original language, “invented” by the poet. Here we can seek equivalents more 
suggestive to the recipient’s “ear,” though many words can simply be left intact. In 
Khlebnikov’s poem based on the onomatopoeia of a storm:






there is, of course, the option of polonizing (or anglicizing) the sound clusters 
(“Ho-ha, Ha-ho,” for example, in place of “Goga, gago”), yet borrowing seems a 
crucial element in identifying the translation with the original. As such, it is the 
organizing principle for the whole of the translation.
The calque plays an important role in the structure of the whole translation 
with equal rarity. Most often it is a negative feature, creating linguistic monsters; 
it is a sign of the thoughtlessness of the translator; such cases are of no interest 
here. It seems that style might provide a chance for the calque. The emulating of 
foreign stylistic models, allegedly inconsistent with the spirit of native literature, 
can be a revolutionary act. It can be the “discovery of a style” (Efim Etkind).13 The 
translator who first made a calque of Faulkner’s use of syntax discovered a new 
style in Polish narrative prose.
 13 E. G. Etkind, Poeziya i perevod (Moscow-Leningrad 1963). 
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Variants of the Translated Work
We obtain another configuration of variants when we ask about the real sender 
of the translation. Here, above all, the variant known as the authorial translation 
stands out, in which there is only one “sender”:  the author of the original has 
translated the work into a foreign language by themselves. We would be mis-
taken to suppose that the authorial translation is always closest to the original. 
This is not always the case. The authorial translation can just as often be a revi-
sion, as evidenced by the Russian authorial translation of Bruno Jasieński’s Palę 
Paryż [I Burn Paris] (of 1934). Jasieński-the-translator changed the system of the 
literary tradition of his own original. He shifted the original Polish Palę Paryż 
from a Futurist code to a Socialist Realist code. The transformative changes, i.e. 
reduction, inversion, substitution, and amplification – involved the novel’s plot, 
the construction of characters, and the idea of the whole work.
The role of the sender also defines the variants of polemical translations, i.e. 
translations made to question the value of the original. Mayakovsky’s poems 
translated by Julian Przyboś are polemical. The Polish poet had not reconciled 
himself to the Expressionist flourishes of the Russian’s poetics, the pathos-filled 
“gigantophone” of his style, and his translations put these attributes excessively 
on display. Hyperbolizing traits of one’s opponent is, as we know, an effective 
polemical strategy.
Another variant of the translatorial polemics is the translation which I suggest 
we call “covert.” The text of such covert translation has, at first glance, only one 
sender. The name of the foreign-language original’s author has been omitted. 
This does not mean, however, that we are dealing with ordinary plagiarism. The 
covert translation is not plagiarism in that it reconstructs only fragments of a 
foreign-language work in a native language, generally giving them new functions 
and a new significance. It is not plagiarism also because it presupposes that its 
ties with a particular foreign-language work will be recognized. Readers must 
identify the encryption. Only in this manner can they decipher its polemical 
motivation. Bruno Jasieński’s “Pieśń o głodzie” [Song of Hunger] is a covert 
translation of Mayakovsky’s “Cloud in Trousers.”
[1968]





Translation and Its Place in the National 
Literature and Culture
1   
One characteristic of the tendencies in contemporary culture development  – 
I am taking into account the interwar period, and in particular the period fol-
lowing the Second World War – is the continuing1 growth of translation activity 
around the world,2 and the steadily rising interest in the very phenomenon of 
translation and its problems. These processes have already led to important 
changes in the situation of translation, both in terms of translatorial practice 
and social demands placed on it, and in terms of theoretical examinations of the 
subject. This change has manifested itself in various spheres of social reality, for 
example in the following developments:  translation activity has largely moved 
from the hands of numerous amateurs to those of professionals aware of their 
multifarious responsibilities; the public opinion increasingly adds the ideal of 
a translation’s congeniality3 to the old requirements of “fidelity” or “creative 
fidelity”; the old reflections on the premises, standards, and aims of translation, 
which used to be generally based on observation and experience, have evidently 
given way to academic examination of its foundations, which means a transition 
from an empirical interest in translation to a theoretical one.4
And it is here, in the field of theoretical investigation of translation, that a true 
leap has been made nowadays in the history of its modern development, which 
in turn signals a major increase in its international significance. Translation 
 1 A casual glance at the historical schools of translation yields such titles as:  E. 
Cary, La traduction dans le monde moderne (Genève 1956); Y.  D. Levin, “Ob 
Istoricheskoi Evolutzyi Principov Pyeryevoda” in Myezhdunarodnyie Sviazhi Russkoi 
Literatury: Sbornik Statyei, ed. M. P. Alexeyev, Moscow-Leningrad, pp. 5–63; cf. also 
F. Ross Amos, Early Theories of Translation (New York 1920) [The footnotes in the 
whole chapter have been edited for the present publication – editors’ note].
 2 Robert Escarpit mourns the fact that the translation movement is still too weak and 
one-sided in relation to its significance. See his: La revolution du livre (Paris 1965), 
pp. 100–101.
 3 Cf. D. Aubry, “Préface” to Georges Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction 
(Paris 1963), p. 12.














has gained the status of an object of academic study.5 It has in a significant way 
entered the sphere of linguistic research,6 as well as literary theory and philo-
sophical studies,7 though these latter sometimes ground the discussion of trans-
lation problems in the area of cultural anthropology and cultural studies in its 
widest sense.8 They introduce translation into the theoretical underpinnings of 
their own subject of study and into their own methodology, without limiting 
themselves to a historical look at its previous forms, norms, and achievements, 
 5 Here we are most indebted to the Russian school, and to Andrei V. Fedorov in particular; 
cf. A. V. Fedorov, “Osnovniye Tyeorye Pyeryevodam,” Voprosy Yazykoznaniya 1952, 
No. 5, pp. 3–22; A. V. Fedorov, Vvyedyeniye v Tyeoriyu Pyeryevoda (Moscow 1958).
 6 It was above all Fedorov who discussed translation issues in the context of linguistic 
research, while at the same time acknowledging the relevance of literary research, as 
was visible in the second edition of his work (cf. note 5). Roman Jakobson laid the 
foundation for a theory of translation from the perspective of general linguistics, e.g. 
in his “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” In: On Translation, ed. R. A. Brower 
(Cambridge MA 1959), pp. 232–239. In Poland this kind of research was under-
taken by Z. Klemensiewicz, “Przekład jako zagadnienie językoznawstwa.” In: O sztuce 
tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław 1955), pp. 85–97 [see pp. 59–71 in the present 
volume – editors’ note].
 7 We should note the polemic between adherents of a strictly linguistic approach to 
translation (the Soviet school until 1958) and adherents of a primarily literary perspec-
tive (E. Cary, La traduction dans le monde moderne…). Today there is no shortage of 
translation theory from a literary theory perspective. The distinction here comes with 
the kind of text being translated. And thus, with regard to poetry, we have E. Etkind, 
Poeziya i Pyeryevod (Moscow 1963), and in Poland E. Balcerzan, “Sztuka tłumaczenia 
a styl” in: Studia z teorii i historii poezji, ed. M. Głowiński (Wrocław 1967), series 1, 
pp. 33–71; E. Balcerzan, “Poetyka przekładu artystycznego,” Nurt 1968, No. 3 (40), 
pp. 23–26 [see pp. 105–119 in the present volume – editors’ note]; at the crossroads of 
philosophy and literary theory we have i.a. Roman Ingarden, “O tłumaczeniach.” In: O 
sztuce tłumaczenia…, pp. 127–190 [see pp. 85–104 in the present volume, in a short-
ened version – editors’ note]; J. Ziomek, Staff i Kochanowski. Próba zastosowania teorii 
informacji w badaniach nad przekładem (Poznań 1965); and in various areas of philos-
ophy, O. Wojtasiewicz, Wstęp do teorii tłumaczenia (Wrocław 1957); E. Delavenay, La 
machine à traduire (Paris 1959); “Préface” to G. Mounin, La machine à traduire (The 
Hague 1964); I. Ryevzin, V. Rozenzveig, Osnovi Obshchevo i Mashinnovo Pyeryevoda 
(Moscow 1964); J. Kmita, “Z problemów semiotyki sztuki. O przekładalności dzieła 
literackiego,” Nurt 1968, No. 8 (40), pp. 20–22.
 8 Cf. i.a. E. A. Nida, “Linguistics and Ethnology in Translation – Problems,” Word 
1945, No. 2, pp. 194–208; Nida, “Principles of Translation as Exemplified by Bible 
Translating.” In: On Translation…, pp. 11–31; cf. G. Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques 
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as literary history has done for nearly half a century. Of course, the incursion 
of translation into these disciplines only became possible in the twentieth cen-
tury, when new and groundbreaking approaches in the humanities shifted and 
expanded their horizons. Above all, and importantly for all humanities, struc-
tural and functional linguistics crystallized,9 then also distributional linguis-
tics,10 as well as information theory and semiology. We should also point out 
the importance of the increasing collaboration of various disciplines in research 
practice, resulting from integrative tendencies in scholarship. To the above-listed 
fields we might add ethnology, social psychology, and above all sociology.
Another sign of the presently growing significance of translation around the 
world, apart from the place it has come to occupy in the world of modern academic 
research, is the well-known solicitude it enjoys by from an international institution 
no less than UNESCO, as well as the care for its quality and stature on the part of 
PEN Clubs, initiated by Poland even before World War Two. This care manifested 
itself in efforts to ensure a proper place for translation in literature, and a proper 
position for translators in the civitas litteraria.
These and other symptoms of past and present changes in the situation of trans-
lation also show an increasing awareness of the importance of translation for the 
development of international culture. Indeed, from the perspective of the universal 
ideals of fraternity, unity, and the spiritual community of all humanity, translation 
is one of the yardsticks and tools for bringing together various national cultures and 
various cultural spheres, for shaping and strengthening international or universal 
culture.
Could it be, then, that translation has become a tool for stripping national 
cultures of their identities? Should it be relegated beyond the sphere of national 
literatures?
The very attempt to answer this question in the affirmative would be tanta-
mount to a fundamental misunderstanding. Above all: we do not view interna-
tional consciousness and culture as emerging from an elimination or suppression 
of national consciousness and culture. On the contrary: the specificity, vivacity, 
and strong consolidation of national cultures – the cradle of a national culture 
being a national consciousness11 – are the most fertile soil for the international 
 9 For its significance in the humanities, see C. Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale 
(Paris 1958), especially chapt. 2:  “L’analyse structurale en linguistique et en 
anthropologie”.
 10 Cf. G. Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction, p. 30 ff.
 11 This concept lies at the basis of the cultural theory of Bronisław Malinowski, e.g. in 








consciousness and a requirement for development of an international culture on 
their foundations. As Chałasiński12 claims, citing Franz Fanon, “it is at the heart 
of national consciousness that international consciousness establishes itself and 
thrives.”13
If we then extrapolate the foregoing to translation issues, we find that if trans-
lation is to serve international consciousness and international culture effec-
tively, it must first serve the national culture. When we say “to serve,” we mean a 
particular sense of the word – to serve the vitality of a given national culture, to 
energize it, deepen it and creatively expand it, not just mechanically increase the 
quantity of text linguistically accessible to wider circles of a national community, 
at best enticing them (superficially and temporarily) with the novelty or “exoti-
cism” of a work foreign to their native soil.14
With this approach to the matter, translation problems will be clearly different 
depending on the spheres of culture to which a given translation belongs.
Our further investigations will strictly pertain to the translation of literary 
works, and thus to literature as a separate sphere of culture. But before we move 
on to discussing translation in the context of national literature, we shall have a 
few remarks on the latter.
2   
We define “national literature,” of course, not only as a collection of works in the 
language of a given national community, but as an open-ended structure, and 
as a mark of a particular historico-literary process. Thus, it is our assumption 
that every work of national literature is, from a historico-literary perspective, a 
link between literary tradition and the present, with its specific lines of develop-
ment; that it makes live contact with the whole of the national culture, actively 
entering its “bloodstream” with its ideological/thought content, artistic shape, 
and social dynamism. This aspect of a particular literary work – and it is found in 
every work, born as it always is from a particular national culture – allows us to 
speak of its value in the national culture. This is even when, in certain historico-
cultural conditions and circumstances, the language of a given work is not that of 
przeobrażenia świata współczesnego,” in his Kultura i naród. Studia i szkice (Warsaw 
1968) p. 23.
 12 J. Chałasiński, “Kultura i naród a przeobrażenia świata współczesnego…,” p. 11.
 13 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. R. Philcox (New York 2004), p. 180.
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a given community (as in the case of Latin used by Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski15), 
which would seem to indicate the primacy of national-cultural value as opposed 
to the national language as a criterion for including a work in a certain nation’s 
literature. Of course, with regard to national-cultural value, a typology of quality 
and a hierarchy of degree enters the picture, as it always does with value. For this 
value can differ in quality and degree, depending on the quality, dynamics, quan-
tity, and range of functions a work serves in the national literature and culture as 
a whole. A reliable test of the national-cultural value of literary work should be 
its rootedness in the consciousness of the wider social spheres, its assimilation by 
society as a kind of spiritual property, with which there is a vivid emotional rela-
tionship, the creation of a permanent or long-lasting aesthetic sensitivity toward 
it, and a submission (more or less conscious, more or less enduring) to the ideo-
logical and philosophical suggestions and advice it proffers. Furthermore, we 
come to its rootedness in the literary, historical, and cultural tradition, and its 
bearing on the contemporary world and upon the future of the national art, 
culture, and history. This high national-cultural value is found in the works of 
our great Romantic poets (and this is also what makes them great), with Adam 
Mickiewicz at the forefront, as well as Cyprian Kamil Norwid’s works, though 
society’s response was belated here, and those of Henryk Sienkiewicz, Stanisław 
Wyspiański, and Stefan Żeromski.16
This matter of the national-cultural value of a literary work, placing it in the 
framework of a national literature, has a particular impact on the issue of trans-
lation. It chiefly concerns the question of whether a foreign translated work 
belongs to the national literature defined by the language of the translation.
 15 Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski (1503–1572) – Polish Renaissance scholar, humanist and 
theologian, dubbed as “the father of Polish democracy,” the author of Commentariorum 
de Republica emendanda libri quinque. [editors’ note].
 16 Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) – Polish poet, dramatist, essayist, translator, philologist, 
and political activist. A key figure in Polish Romanticism; author of Pan Tadeusz (1834), 
the Polish national epic; Cyprian Kamil Norwid (1821– 1883) – Polish poet, dramatist, 
painter and sculptor. He belonged to the second generation of romantics, lived abroad 
most of his life, and died in poverty in Paris; Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846–1916) – Polish 
writer, Nobel Prize laureate; author of historical novels, including the international 
bestseller Quo Vadis: A Narrative of the Time of Nero (1896); Stanisław Wyspiański 
(1869–1907) – Polish playwright, poet, painter and designer of the Young Poland 
generation. Author of a series of symbolic, neo-romantic drama; Stefan Żeromski 
(1864–1925) – Polish novelist, dramatist, and social activist, “the conscience of the 







The issue of translation belonging or not to the national literature of its 
language is undoubtedly the main problem concerning translated work, given 
that its resolution has consequences in various vital fields of social practice 
that concern translation, including, first and foremost, research. By the same 
token, solving this problem is not easy, particularly within the framework of 
literary theory.
There is considerable resistance here in the natural discrepancy between 
“translation” in its most general understanding, i.e. as a foreign work dressed in 
the garb of the native language, and currently prevailing claims about the lite-
rary work as such. Above all, in this definition of translation we have an utterly 
dualistic way of thinking, sharply dividing the content of a translated work from 
its linguistic garb. Moreover: by this notion the foreign work, i.e. the original 
literary text, is divorced from its linguistic form and reduced solely to its con-
tent. The dualistic manner of thinking that informs this definition of translation 
and its results collides with a monistic way of thinking found in the currently 
prevailing definitions of the literary work, whether conceived strictly through 
the unique artistic organization of the language matter or through the absolute 
unity of the semantic content and the artistic and linguistic form. Similarly, the 
introduction of the genetic aspect to define a translated work stands in marked 
contradiction with the contemporary tendency to conceive of the literary work 
in descriptive or Structuralist categories.
The extent of this discrepancy is enhanced by the contradiction between the 
generally acknowledged fact of the uniqueness of the literary work and its invi-
olability, its immunity to the alteration with time, and the fact that this same 
literary work is subject to multiplication and variation, not only through trans-
lation into different languages, but also within any one of those languages. There 
are multiple variants because – quite apart from the paradoxical nature of the 
“transfer” of the literary work from its proper linguistic form into a foreign lin-
guistic shape – there is no denying in our day that the ideal of total “fidelity” 
in translation is no more than an unattainable ideal; its attainment is blocked 
by four insurmountable linguistic obstacles, persuasively outlined by Georges 
Mounin:17
 1. the differences in language structures with regard to their semantics;
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 2. the differences in the “visions of the world” in different languages (their var-
ious ways of capturing, phrasing, and building an image of the objective 
reality, its fragments and aspects)18;
 3. the different forms of social experience in different national collectives, while 
every language – which serves, after all, to facilitate communication within 
the respective community  – corresponds to a particular structure of these 
experiences in a given linguistic collective;
 4. the tie between every language and the geographic, civilizational, and cultural 
reality within its limits of its ethnic reach, which restricts and sometimes even 
precludes the communication of a work created elsewhere. Hence, we should 
not be surprised that a literary scholar looking at the literary work from the 
perspective of world literature has difficulty accepting that “Hamlets” in other 
languages, though they may function under the same title and under the 
name of the same author, are equal to Shakespeare’s English Hamlet, as they 
are but various versions of the original.
And yet it might be possible to remove or at least mollify the difficulties and 
doubts, if, for the good of the translation, we were to agree that the literary 
work is a cultural fact. Here, in particular, we are taking the perspective of the 
national culture – since we are addressing the issue of translation belonging to 
the national literature of its language – and as such, the national literature. It is of 
fundamental importance that we establish whether translation can be attributed 
with national-cultural significance, the way an original work can.
We soon find there is no way to deny translation the national-cultural value. We 
find examples of translations of an outstanding value in every nation’s literature, 
even when they have not been designated as “classics,” as have August Wilhelm 
Schlegel’s renderings of Shakespeare’s dramas, or Baudelaire’s translations of Poe. 
By way of proof – si licet to put side by side the names of these translators – 
Mickiewicz’s translation of Byron’s The Giaour, and Józef Paszkowski’s rendering 
of Hamlet.19
Before we attempt to argue this on the basis of analyzing some facets of 
Paszkowski’s translation of Hamlet, we should stress that the approach of cultural 
studies, which basically equates translation with original work in national litera-
ture, in the pivotal category of national-cultural value, decides that it belongs 
 18 This is the “Neo-Humboldtian” standpoint in linguistics.
 19 Józef Paszkowski (1817–1861) – Polish poet and translator, known mainly for his 







to the national literature, automatically dispelling doubts (more implied than 
voiced expressis verbis) of the part of literary theory. Representing the standpoint 
of cultural studies, Zofia Szmydtowa waves these doubts aside when she states:
When a translation enters the literature of its language, it is subject to the same laws as 
native works. Like them, it can fade away, not standing the test of time, or it can be as 
resilient as the great masterpieces.20
Nonetheless, it is hard to come to terms with the coexistence of two justified 
yet contradictory views on the same problem. As such, it is worth trying – with 
all due respect to the independence of either discipline – to reconcile these two 
positions by looking more closely at the phenomenon of translation in light of 
the defininions of the work of literature in literary theory.
Firstly, let us note the possibility of subduing the genetic aspect in defining 
the translation as a “foreign work,” an aspect which is evidently opposed to more 
recent definitions of a work of literature in Structuralist/descriptive categories. 
Here the “sharpness” of the concept of “foreignness” is mollified when we recall 
that the subject of an original work generally bears traces of being derivative, and 
thus “foreign,” albeit to a different extent and in a different manner, of course. We 
see this in how many works acknowledged as original are based on folk tales, in 
the way themes and motifs wind through literature, in the presently discovered 
patterns of adopting plot lines previously shaped in one form of art by other 
forms of art.21 Moreover, the definition of the literary work has not, so far, taken 
into consideration the theme; this includes the question of the theme being origi-
nal or derivative, i.e. the question of its “foreignness.” Thus, it seems that we may 
pass over the notion of a “foreign work” in the definition of translation, with a 
view to endowing the translation with full citizenship vis-a-vis the original work 
within the sphere of a national literature.
We might also temper the above-mentioned antinomy between “dualistic” 
thinking about translation and “monistic” thinking at the root of how we define a 
literary work. The “duality” in translation does not manifest itself in a sharp divide 
between the semantic content and the linguistic form. On the contrary: they are 
so closely connected, so intense is the cross-penetration of the “foreign” work and 
the native linguistic tissue (in its full historico-cultural color) that the new work 
achieves its own individual literary form. This is what led Boris Tomashevsky to 
 20 Z. Szmydtowa, “Czynniki rodzime i obce w przekładzie literackim.” In:  O sztuce 
tłumaczenia…, p. 112.
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claim that, alongside the French Béranger and the German Heine, there is also a 
Russian Béranger and a Russian Heine.22 This intimate connection is the result of 
mutual and bilateral interdependencies between the foreign work and the tissue 
of the local language. The foreign work adopts certain attributes of a native work, 
and the native tissue, to a certain degree, assimilates attributes of the linguistic 
tissue of the original work, a tissue that works as a model here. In the translation 
there is a unity of “form and content,” as in the original literary work. This also 
means that it earns the right to take an equal position in the national literature. 
It ceases to be a “foreign work.”
If we opt to acknowledge the translation to be a literary work equal to the 
original, and if we look at it in terms of the literature indicated by its language 
and not in terms of the literature of the original, then we automatically dispense 
with doubts focused around the uniqueness and inalterability of the original lite-
rary work and the fact that translation yields its multiple variants. From this 
perspective, every translation is simply a literary work equal to an original work 
in the literature and national culture which it joins through language. Indeed, 
translation introduces to a national literature as many authentic literary works as 
many renditions have been made. Yes, Polish literature has as many “Hamlets” as 
there are translations of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. And we cannot speak of a simple 
multiplication of the original through translation, for the original changes, and 
not only in terms of language:  in every translation the content is crystallized 
differently, a content nolens volens assimilated in a new form, and somewhat 
altered – if only through shifts in emphasis. For this process involves interpreta-
tion and reinterpretation, sometimes extracting some deeply hidden aspects of 
the original. The basic difference that occurs between the original, which is one-
of-a-kind and inalterable, and the translation is that in the case of the original, 
interpretation and reinterpretation can only be external (in criticism and literary 
studies), while in the case of the translation they occur within. With regard to 
the original, the translation is also to some degree an indicator of the translator’s 
“critical approach.”
If national-cultural value is decisive in including a work in a national litera-
ture, and if we ascribe this value to a translation, as a self-sufficient, fully-fledged 
literary work within a national literature, then we see no reason why conclusions 
derived from the theory of a literary work as a fact of a certain national culture 
should yield to a theory of literature that defines a work in terms of the text itself. 
 22 B. Tomashevsky, “La nouvelle école d’histoire litteraire en Russie,” Revue des Etudes 




At any rate, we do not suppose – and we have tried to show it – that these two 
standpoints are, contrary to appearances, irreconcilable, that they turn out to 
diverge in a significant way. We ought better to speak of them, perhaps, as mutu-
ally complementary when we interpret their premises correctly.
The most important matter, however, as it concerns how we study the par-
ticular facets of literature, is that we cease to sidestep the question of whether 
translations belong to national literature. For it is more sidestepping that we 
are dealing with than any attempts at describing or affirming this belonging, or 
at denying it and thus assigning the translation a different place in the world 
of national literatures. The special importance of this issue manifests itself in 
research practice in that, despite this sidestepping, certain solutions, or tenden-
cies toward this or that solution, are present (albeit not always consistently) in 
the very way the literary material is treated, how it is underscored or neglected, 
ordered and placed in a hiererchy. Until recently, the prevailing tendency was for 
more negative solutions. Only recently have we seen attempts to resolve the issue 
of a translation belonging to the national literature of its language.
4   
The approach to translated works in overwiews of particular national literatures 
best shows the unclear status of translation with respect to the national literature. 
Here translations are generally omitted, or mentioned only in passing, as if they 
were second-class citizens. A certain exception is made for “classic translations,” 
such as the above-mentioned translations of Shakespeare’s dramas by Schlegel, or 
Baudelaire’s renderings of Poe’s tales. But then we must ask whether Baudelaire’s 
congenial translations would have found their place in the greater scheme of 
French literature had he not been the author of Fleurs du mal – that is, if we were 
not “affixing” a yet another achievement – albeit a peripheral one – to the writer.
Another exception primarily concerns older translations which are in fact 
remakes – those in which the content of the original work was more or less thor-
oughly domesticated, and the linguistic tissue played a major role in the develop-
ment of the native literary language and native poetics. Among these are works 
inseparable from the history of Polish literature, like Piotr Kochanowski’s trans-
lation of Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered and Łukasz Górnicki’s translation/remake of 
Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier.23 Place of honor in this category goes to Juliusz 
 23 Cf. R. Pollak, “Gofred” Tassa – Kochanowskiego (Poznań 1922); R. Pollak, “Triumfy 
‘Gofreda’ i ścieżki cierniste ‘Orlanda.’ ” In: Wśród literatów staropolskich (Warsaw 1966), 
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Słowacki24 for his translation of Calderon’s The Constant Prince, whose Polish 
title even departs from the original’s El principe constante.25 Yet in the case of 
remakes, the criterion of fidelity to the original text did not apply.
As such, it would seem as though waiving the principle of translation fidelity 
favors the production of valuable works of national literature.
This sounds both paradoxical and alluring, but it is not altogether accurate. 
On the one hand this is because we need to characterize the historical poetics of 
the translation by demonstrating their organizing principles, and not those prin-
ciples which are not relevant to them; in the present case the organizing principle 
is the translator’s freedom with respect to the foreign text.
On the other hand – and this introduces us in medias res to the historical pro-
cess determining the fickle fate of translation with regard to national literatures – 
the concept of “waiving” suggests not only the very existence of the principle 
of faithful translation at the time, but also the availability of this principle to 
the translator. This principle has undoubtedly existed from almost the dawn of 
our era, but it only pertained to the translation of the Bible and liturgical texts 
of the Church, where it held firm. Let us recall the “College of Seventy,” which 
Parandowski called “semi-legendary:”26 the producers of the first Greek trans-
lation of the Holy Scripture, the Septuagint; let us recall St. Jerome, the author 
of the Vulgate; and finally, the countless translators of the Holy Scripture into 
national languages. This gave the principle of fidelity a sacred dimension, so to 
say. Applying the same principle to secular works, therefore, would have had a 
touch of the profane. The first gesture of this profanation would seem to be the 
(rather inconsistent) attempts of Renaissance humanists and writers to apply the 
principle of fidelity to translations of ancient literature. Here we have in mind 
the outstanding translators of Ancient texts such as Etienne Dolet or Jacques 
1961), Vol. 1, pp. 1–45; cf. also T. Milewski, “Główne etapy rozwoju polskiego języka 
literackiego,” Ruch Literacki 1960, Nos. 1–2, pp. 19–27.
   Piotr Kochanowski (1566–1620) – Polish nobleman, royal secretary, poet and trans-
lator. He is famous for his translations from Italian, especially Ludovico Ariosto’s Orlando 
furioso and Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberate; Łukasz Górnicki (1527–1603) – 
Polish humanist, poet, political commentator, also royal secretary and chancellor 
[editors’ note].
 24 Juliusz Słowacki (1809–1849) – Polish poet, dramatist and translator, a key figure of 
Polish Romanticism [editors’ note].
 25 Cf. a comparison of Książe niezłomny with the original in: J. Kleiner, Juliusz Słowacki. 
Dzieje twórczości, Vol. 4: Poeta-mistyk (Warsaw 1927), Part 1, pp. 204–228.








Amyot in France.27 Yet this gesture was less aimed to eliminate the sacred in 
favor of the profane than to elevate Antiquity to the heights of the sacred. Each 
of these translators “believed in his pagan’s heart” in the truly divine greatness 
of Antiquity.
The principle of translation fidelity was only desacralized once and for all in 
the eighteenth century. Small wonder that it was at this time that the first sub-
stantial (though not the first ever) treatise on translation was written based on 
this principle:  Alexander Fraser Tytler’s Essay on the Principles of Translation 
(1790), revived in Poland by Wacław Borowy.28 And it should come as no sur-
prise that a translation theory was established by proponents of the principle of 
fidelity, the French Encyclopédistes, headed by Voltaire. The profane prevailed. 
From then on, the principle of translation fidelity became the basis of all transla-
tion theory, although it did not immediately subdue the popularity of translation 
based on a freer approach. In the Romantic period, free translation prospered 
(on the crest of the Baroque revival), while coexisting with the first translations 
that rigorously adhered to the principle of fidelity. Later, free translation was 
merely an offshoot of Romanticism, such as Krystyn Ostrowski’s Polish transla-
tion of Hamlet, published in 1870.29
The triumph of fidelity in translation, which was also tantamount to elevating 
the author of the original to the place of highest importance, had vital implications 
for literary studies and the status of translation in national literatures.
Translation is incorporated in the sphere of the original’s native literature, 
though in a marginal capacity; it has served as proof of the global expansion of 
the original work, and thus, of this work’s native literature. We find testimony to 
this, perhaps, in the fact that scholarly competences with respect to a translated 
work are increasingly taken over from experts on the national literature of the 
translating language by experts on the native literature of the original. It is no 
accident that our most outstanding scholars of Polish translations of Shakespeare 
are experts on English-language literature:  Władysław Tarnawski,30 Stanisław 
 27 J. Bellanger, Histoire de la traduction en France (Paris 1903); A. de Blignères, Essai sur 
Amyot e les traducteurs français du XVI siècle (Paris 1851).
 28 W. Borowy, “Dawni teoretycy tłumaczeń.” In his: Studia i rozprawy (Wrocław 1952), 
Vol. 2, pp. 7–30.
 29 On Polish translations of Shakespeare’s Hamlet see Shakespeare in Poland: Translations, 
http://internetshakespeare.uvic.ca/Library/Criticism/shakespearein/poland12/ 
[editors’ note].
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Helsztyński,31 alongside a Polish-literature expert who is exceptionally compe-
tent in English literature, Wacław Borowy.32 Nor should it come as a surprise – 
from the perspective of this sovereign principle of translation fidelity  – that 
scholars of the literary tradition of the original are among its translators: Hamlet 
has been translated into Polish by Władysław Matlakowski, Andrzej Tretiak, 
Władysław Tarnawski, and Witold Chwalewik.
Comparative studies situated translation between national literatures, or 
rather at their contact point, or in the field marked out by their intersection. 
In particular, the early twentieth-century French comparative school, which 
passionately examined the world dissemination of masterpieces through 
translations, uprooted translations from their national literatures and situated 
them within the radius of the shining stars and suns of the world’s literary fir-
mament.33 This was consistent with tendencies in comparative studies itself, as 
well as those in literature as such, which strove to topple the boundaries between 
national literatures in favor of a single world literature. A recent proposition by 
Dionýz Ďurišin34 that comparative studies should take over the study of trans-
lation, having placed it at the core of its research, is a logical extension of that 
historical standpoint in comparative studies. It also neatly crowns the tendencies 
to situate translation outside of national literatures.
Finally, the principle of fidelity prevailing in translation has one more con-
sequence for its place in the world of literature. The translation research field 
and evaluation criteria derived from this principle have resulted in separating 
translations from other, original literary works. Thus, an independent depart-
ment is emerging in literary and linguistic research: translation studies, in which 
translation is the sole object of research. We can see quite clearly groups of trans-
lation scholars forming ad hoc, in both linguistics and in literary theory. They are 
 31 S. Helsztyński, “Przekłady Szekspirowskie w Polsce wczoraj i dziś,” Pamiętnik Teatralny, 
1954, Vol. 2 (10), pp. 3–91; S. Helsztyński, “Polish Translations of Shakespeare in the 
Past and Today,” Zeitschrift fur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 1964, Vol. 2, pp. 183–198.
 32 W. Borowy, “Przekład Shakespeare’a i teatr.” In his: Studia i rozprawy…, pp. 31–54; cf. 
also J. Krzyżanowski, “Szekspirologia wojenna i powojenna,” Nauka i Sztuka, 1948, 
Vol. 7, pp. 17–56.
 33 This is expressed in research theory and practice, particularly in the work of 
F. Baldensperger, including: Goethe en France, (Paris 1904); La littérature, création, 
succès, durée (Paris 1913).
 34 D. Ďurišin, “Woprosy srawnitielnogo izuczenija literatur i analiz pierevodcheskogo 











chiefly interested in this fidelity to the original in the translation, in various types 
of this fidelity, and various ways in which it is achieved.
In our day, the principle, postulate, and criterion of a translation’s fidelity to 
the original are so deeply ingrained in the consciousness not only of the intel-
lectual elite, but also in the society at large, that any departure from it seems 
impossible. It does not seem sensible either; nor necessary. On the other hand, 
it seems we must struggle against its extreme consequence, i.e. the separation of 
translations from the rest of the world of literature – so that it might be intro-
duced into the national literature of its new language. The path toward this end 
seems fairly simple. It would involve applying all the same criteria to the trans-
lation as pertain to the original work, without abandoning, of course, fidelity to 
the original.
Naturally, if we outline the matter in this way, translation appears in a special 
light. It emerges as the result of a particularly difficult creative act that holds 
many responsibilities. It acquires dignity and greatness. In such a case, its posi-
tion in the national literature cannot be marginal.
If we accept the criterion of fidelity vis-a-vis the foreign language text in 
evalu ating the translation, yet we join this criterion to all the others for eval-
uating a work of original national literature, we find that fidelity fades some-
what in comparison to when it is the sole criterion for evaluating a translation. 
It fades in that all the other criteria have a chance to step forward, clearing room 
for other ways of evaluating the translation. Essentially, this scholarly strategy 
resembles approaches to older translations, where the translator was more at lib-
erty. It resembles this standpoint, but never identifies with it, much as, in the 
eyes of the contemporary scholar, the translation sensu stricto is never identical 
to the remake.
We should stress that, in present-day theory, there is a growing tendency 
to include translation in the national literature of its new language under the 
above-mentioned conditions. Szmydtowa, whose approach was already men-
tioned, testifies to this when she stresses that, “in entering the literature shaped 
by its new language, the translation is subject to the same laws as the native 
works.”35 Karel Horálek speaks in a similar vein in his paper “Literary Genres 
from the Standpoint of Translation Issues”:  “… translations are an important 
part of national literatures,” and furthermore, “… from the perspective of the 
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socio-cultural function, the division between original and translated literature is 
of minor importance ….”36
In the nineteenth century the principle of fidelity to the original text was facili-
tated by the apotheosis of the creative artist, already visible in the Pre-Romantic 
era: the apotheosis of the poet releasing his works in volcanic eruptions of pas-
sion. Standing opposed to the Classicist concept of the poet aspiring urso labore 
to formal perfection, this apotheosis resulted in neglecting the work on form, 
demoting it to the level of craftsmanship. Thus, with regard to translation, there 
was a one-sided glorification of the creator of the original work and contempt 
for the workmanlike labors of the translator. Before this view, which outlasted 
the Romanticism that gave birth to it, faded out entirely, Modernism revitalized 
and perhaps even reinforced it with a cult of genius and originality, supported 
and taken well into the twentieth century by various factions of the “philo-
sophy of life,” from the Dilthey and Spranger schools to the Vitalist movements 
of English and French philosophy, the Bergson school, and the Croce school. 
Consequently, the original became absolutely central to the business of trans-
lation, and its author the omnipotent lawgiver; the linguistic substance of the 
translation became merely a question of the translator’s greater or lesser abilities. 
This view ingrained itself so profoundly in the general awareness that it did not 
even require justification or intellectual check. This became the driving force in 
perpetuating convictions of the dominance of the foreign work in translation, 
and the source of all hesitations and academic aberrations on the subject of the 
translation’s place in the national literature.
But there are other driving forces that have begun to oppose this force and its 
consequences, inspired by new directions in today’s poetics and criticism. These 
take two approaches.
One of these is tied to the present anti-Romantic poetics rehabilitating labor, 
intellectual exertion, rational activity, the writer’s technique, the craft of ars, 
téchne, in the name of an anti-inspirational concept of art. We usually see the 
origins of this new poetics in Ezra Pound’s work and self-commentaries, then 
in those of T. S. Eliot. In Poland this role was played by the poets of the Krakow 
Avant-garde. A  backlash against the cult of genius and originality in favor of 
fine and thoughtful work that molds the linguistic material of the literary piece 
was also at the heart of new movements in criticism. Here we have in mind the 
Russian Formalist school, then the school in Czechoslovakia, focused around the 
 36 K. Horálek, “Rodzaje literackie z punktu widzenia problematyki przekładowej,” 




Cercle Lingustique de Prague. It is no coincidence that translation was examined 
by the Russian Formalists, and that they opposed the way it had been approached. 
Here, for the first time, the role of translation in the domestic historico-literary 
process was appreciated, and thus translation was decidedly included within the 
sphere of the national literature. This was expressed on the international arena 
by Boris Tomashevsky in his 1928 paper “La nouvelle école d’histoire littéraire 
en Russie,” the first text to present the premises and research interests of the 
Formalist school to the West:
The assimilation of foreign elements is, above all, their adaptation. Translated litera-
ture should thus be studied as a constitutive part of the literature of particular nations. 
Alongside the French Béranger and the German Heine, there is also a Russian Béranger 
and a Russian Heine, adapted to the needs of Russian literature, and doubtless fairly 
remote from their Western namesakes.37
Undoubtedly, this concept of the original and the translation being homonyms 
sounds bold indeed when juxtaposed with the contemporaneous apprehensions 
(and misapprehensions) of the translation in literary theory.
The second approach that sustained and supported in living poetics and in 
criticism the new opposition toward the one-sided dominance of the foreign 
work in the translation is astonishing in that it accommodates (sometimes 
avidly) theoretical presumptions opposed to those of the first approach. This 
would seem paradoxical, yet it becomes natural when we understand the dia-
lectic of the historico-cultural processes. Opposing intellectual movements 
sometimes join forces, and at times create a thrust that affects the historical pro-
cess in a seemingly different field.
What is meant here is the living poetics’ response to the call for literature to 
become involved in the revolutionary reconstruction of society. The history of 
this call dates back to the statements of the major figures in Marxism – from 
Marx himself and Engels to Lenin – and chimes with the call of such revolu-
tionary democrats and critics as Vissarion Belinsky and Nikolay Chernyshevsky. 
It is accompanied, from a distance, by the call of “leftist” criticism of various 
shades, whose ideological wellspring goes back to the times of the bourgeois 
revolution of the eighteenth century. Consequently, even in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century we find living poetics postulating a conscious, revolu-
tionary, or at least critical stance toward contemporary life in social and political 
matters, whether international or national. What corresponds with this poetics 
 37 Cf. B. Tomashevsky, “La nouvelle école d’histoire litteraire en Russie,” Revue des Etudes 
Slaves 1928, Vol. VIII, Nos. 3–4, p. 237.
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in literary studies is an interpretation of the work based on objective reality, with 
all its characteristic historical processes, be they social, class-based, or cultural, 
including literary. These assumptions naturally result in looking at the literary 
work from the perspective of cultural studies, with an understanding of culture 
and its processes that corresponds with these premises, of course. In Marxist 
literary theory, combating the cosmopolitan designs that are sometimes visible 
in leftist criticism, particularly in the West (in France), the issue of national cul-
ture and literature assumed a prominent place as early as the 1930s. As such, 
the Marxist approach could not place translation outside the framework of the 
national literature.
We can see that the new approach to translation took varied, though at times 
converging paths toward introducing it into the sphere of the national litera-
ture indicated by its language, and thus toward eclipsing the omnipotence of 
the original in favor of stressing the translator’s ideological or artistic crea-
tive accomplishments, and thus, in favor of the national-cultural value of the 
translation.
And yet, as we have stressed, this new standpoint has not identified itself with 
that of “yesteryear,” which pushed translation towards remake, as it only tones 
down the presence of the foreign work in translation rather that treating it as 
non-existent. Therefore, in translation studies of the new orientation the pres-
ence of the foreign work foists certain specific issues that need to be addressed, 
although they are only partly (at best in terms of the linguistic juxtaposition of 
the translation and the original) unrelated to the problems imposed on scholars 
of the original work of national literature. As such, a special sphere of research 
problems corresponding to the specifics of translation itself has emerged for the 
translation scholar.
Skimming past the close comparison of the original text with its translation 
(for this is a field most thoroughly explored by academia), let us turn our atten-
tion to a few aspects of these specific problems which are tied to the value of 
translation in national culture.
5   
Foremost among the special problems that the translation scholar is faced with 
is that of the time of appearance of a given translation in the history of litera-
ture. This is related to the question of why this foreign work was added precisely 
at this developmental stage of the national literature. Did a crisis emerge in the 
historico-literary development, and why? Did the dominant poetics prove insuf-




observe? Did a disruption of the social and political order disqualify the lit-
erature of the times as an ideological exponent of the old ruling class, as the 
Marxists might have inquired? Or was it that the balance between absorption 
and expansion that marks the healthy development of a national culture, even if 
only for its own use, tilted toward absorption, thus increasing (with or without 
necessity) foreign import? Was the import advantageous for the development 
of the national culture and within it, for the development of an international 
consciousness, or was it irrelevant, or even harmful? What was the role of the 
translator’s social consciousness with regard to this historical moment – his or 
her individuality, talent, or sense of responsibility? We might produce many 
more questions of this sort.
Another set of questions is related to whether the translation in question was 
the first rendering of the original work or one of its consecutive versions. In the 
former case, the scholar should be especially keen to establish if the original text 
had been previously known in intellectual circles, and particularly among artists. 
And if so, how it had been received; did this work make its mark on the native 
literature? In researching the first full translation of the work – whether close to 
or distant in time from the literary effects of this reception – it is crucial to define 
the relationship between the translation and the effects of the immediate recep-
tion of the foreign literary work in the native literature. This means studying 
the translation’s roots in the native literary tradition. Shakespeare’s Hamlet had 
already been so deeply and creatively rooted in the consciousness of our great 
Romantics and their work that the first full translation, coming much later on, 
faced a mighty Polish tradition of its reception. Is a given translation going to 
weave into such a tradition, becoming a living link in a chain open to the future, 
or not? That is the question.
If a translation of a foreign work is not the first one, but one among many, 
and not the last, the scholar must inquire  – apart from investigating its rela-
tion to the historical moment, the needs of the national culture at a given stage, 
etc. – into the translation’s relationship to the previous and subsequent versions. 
Does it make use of the earlier translations, and if so, in what way, and to what 
degree; and does it pass on its own achievements to subsequent renderings? 
We believe that the greatest expression of admiration for Józef Paszkowski’s 
translation of Hamlet, which the critics denied the position of a “classic,”38 was 
Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz’s confession that, upon embarking on a retranslation of 
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Hamlet almost one hundred years later, he consulted only Paszkowski’s transla-
tion, apart from those by the Schlegels and Boris Pasternak.39 The same goes for 
a gesture by Jerzy S. Sito, the most recent translator of Hamlet, whose translation 
includes Paszkowski’s rendering of Hamlet’s song from Act III, Scene 2: “Why, 
let the stricken deer go weep […],”40 acknowledging it as “classic” and well-estab-
lished in the shared consciousness.
At any rate, examining the ties between a given translation and earlier versions 
requires a particular sensitivity to the stage of the eternal sparring match in the 
poetics of the time between the “classical” principle of perfection and the prin-
ciple of originality, of constant novelty in art. The exclusive patronage of the 
principle of perfection, tempting translators to use what is best in translations to 
date, could pose a danger to the new work of national literature (i.e. every new 
translation) reducing it to a mosaic and thus depriving it of unity of style.
Finally, the genre diversity of the original text foists diverse problems upon 
both the translator and the translation scholar. Without delving too deeply into 
the subtle differences between a piece of lyric poetry and a work of epic prose, 
we cannot sidestep the special issues that arise when it comes to drama. This 
complies with our theory41 of the fundamental difference between the literary 
art, whose genres are the lyric and the epic, and the dramatic/theatrical art, to 
which the drama belongs. One staple repeated anecdote is Prospér Mérimée’s 
sarcastic observation on a translation of Gogol’s Government Inspector that the 
translator faithfully rendered the words of the text, but did not translate the 
drama itself.42
A drama is designed to be viewed by an audience, which means that every 
dramatic text for the theater contains a “theatrical vision,”43 an expression of the 
artist’s consciously dealing with all the materials of the theatrical art, and not 
only the language. By the nature of things, the “vision of the stage” adheres to 
the theater contemporary to the playwright; and thus the “vision of the stage” in 
Shakespeare’s dramas was shaped by the Elizabethan stage, not the Medieval or 
Ancient conventions. Dramatic masterpieces are marked by their wide spectrum 
 39 W. Shakespeare, Romeo i Julia, Hamlet, trans. J. Iwaszkiewicz (Warsaw 1954), p. 6.
 40 W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, książę duński, trans. J. S. Sito (Warsaw 1968), p. 8.
 41 See e.g. S. Skwarczyńska, “Zagadnienie dramatu,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, 1949, Vol. 45, 
1–2, reprinted in Studia i szkice literackie (Warsaw 1953), pp. 95–121.
 42 G. Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction…, p.  14, Quoted in:  E. 
Cary, Comment faut-il traduire?, Cours polycopié de l’Université Radiophonique 
Internationals, 1958, p. 5.












of “visions of the stage”44 (in all respects), so that they can be suitably rendered in 
future theaters that differ in type, style, and conventions.
Hence, the translator of the older dramatic work has the obvious task of commu-
nicating its “theatrical vision” in the translation, yet this comes with the dilemma 
of whether, in the name of literal fidelity to the dramatic text, it should be rendered 
with reference to the now-historical theater of its time, or if it should be altered in 
translation to fit the type and style of contemporary theater. An argument in favor 
of the latter solution is the fact that a drama, by its nature, is meant to have a social 
impact through the theater, as well as that the national culture into which the trans-
lation incorporates the foreign work expects this input from the foreign culture to 
have as wide an impact as possible, and thus, not only to be read, but first and fore-
most, to be put on stage.
Of course, the point is not for the translator to attempt to relieve or replace 
the play’s producer. It is more a question of providing the latter with dramatic 
material that is as compatible as possible with the type and style of the con-
temporary theater. This means considering the fact that the contemporary the-
ater makes informed use of the spoken language and all its nuances, rather than 
only involving a recital of a text in the written language, as, for example, in the 
Medieval45 and in the Classical French Theater. Also, it must be borne in mind 
that the contemporary principle of coordinating the utterance with the actor’s 
movement, gesture, and behavior, the principle of pace and rhythm in a play, is 
incompatible with the syntactic flow of “serious” verse usually found in drama, 
which could serve not only a theater based on recitation, but also later theat-
rical conventions, where realism flexibly obliged the actors’ interpretations of 
the internal meanderings of the phrases of this “serious” verse, particularly 
when enjambments could be used to give lines the flow of “realistic” prose. To 
this we might attribute, on the one hand, the theatrical success of Paszkowski’s 
late-nineteenth-century Hamlet until recent times; a translation whose versifi-
cation implies that the translator intended to conform the work to the Polish 
literary tradition, and yet to “service” the original with an equivalent versifica-
tion. On the other hand, there is recent appearance of Sito’s translation, which 
is remarkably bold in breaking with the verse form of the original and adapting 
 44 E. Souriau, “Les grands problèmes de l’ésthétique théâtrale,” Les Cours de Sorbonne, 
Centre de Documentation Universitaire (Paris 1956), pp. 16–17.
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it to the style of present-day theater.46 Finally, the translation of an older work 
“geared” toward the contemporary theater must take into account that this thea-
ter is as remote as possible from the ambition of an antiquarian reproduction of 
older drama and theater; that their age will, at best, be signaled by allusions and 
stylizations. This is reflected in translation in the choice of vocabulary, selection 
of syntactic forms, and use of present-day language conventions.
Of course, this state of things with respect to the translation of older drama 
suggests a distinction between translations according to their intended social 
reception, or more precisely, the form and aim of this reception. We thus come 
to a range of translation types; in some translations, there is the possibility of two 
or even more types converging.
On one end of this scale we find translation intended for the academic recep-
tion of the original, and thus reflecting the present-day knowledge of the ori-
ginal with academic rigor; of the Polish translations of Hamlet, the renderings by 
Matlakowski and Chwalewik would seem to fall into this category. We might call 
these academic translations. They are meant to be received in reading only, and 
strictly from scholarly viewpoint.
The second type aims to provide the reader with a maximally faithful rendi-
tion of the philosophical and literary qualities of the work. The relevant Polish 
translations of Hamlet here are by Tretiak and Tarnawski. We might call these 
literary-philological translations.
In close proximity to the latter type we find translations chiefly aspiring 
to recreate the poetic virtues and puissance of the original, but based on the 
special capabilities of the target language with a view to evoking an aesthetic 
response in the reader, or the reader and the theater audience. The perception 
of the written text facilitates the appreciation of the beauty of the translation’s 
language more than the theatrical reception does, owing to the fact that in the 
theater the audience cannot pause in the work as it moves toward the end. In our 
view, Paszkowski and Iwaszkiewicz are the Polish translators of Hamlet who took 
this approach. We might call this type an artistic literary-theatrical translation, 
reserving the term “artistic literary translation” for a translation intended exclu-
sively for reading (Skłodowski’s Hamlet seems an example of this).
Finally, we have a kind of theatrical translation that is strictly intended for 
theatrical reception; its publication makes sense only in terms of documentation 
 46 J. S. Sito calls it a “intonational verse,” defined “both through the dramatic situa-
tion whose content it bears and through its unique intonation, inherent to a given 
work.” “Individual parts of my verse are built based on a musical phrase…,” (William 




and practical purposes of the theater. Here, we typically find that the original is 
adjusted to serve the needs of the contemporaneous theater and the “taste” of the 
theater-going public. Examples of such theatrical translations are the chronologi-
cally first and last of the Polish translations of Hamlet, by Bogusławski (based on 
a remake by Friedrich Schröder and the translation by A.W. Schlegel) and Sito 
respectively.
This classification of translations of old dramatic works according to their in-
tended social reception, and the forms and aims of this reception, intersects with 
their classification based on the translator’s stance toward the original, which 
expresses itself in a whole range of types,47 from a translation which intends to 
be absolutely faithful to the original, to the “free” translation, to the paraphrase 
translation, to remakes, and those again of various kinds. This shows us the 
complex multi-aspectual nature of translation as a work of a national literature. 
This multi-aspectual nature, arising from various sources and various transla-
tion aims, leaves a profound mark on every translation, and is another research 
problem that exclusively pertains to translated works in a nation’s literature.
[1973]
Translated by Soren Gauger
 47 The wide range of translation forms is covered by Edward Balcerzan in his article 




Translatability and the Scripting of Other 
Peoples’ Souls
An ‘International Semantic Alphabet’ as a Tool 
of Cultural Translation
Translatability of meanings and ideas is a key issue in linguistic anthropology. 
If anthropology aims at “understanding ‘others’ (uncapitalized and plural),”1 
then obviously anthropologists must be interested in the meaning of what those 
‘others’ say. But to understand what speakers of a language other than our own 
say, we need to be able to translate it, or to have it translated, into our own 
language. For this, we need to know what their words—especially, their cul-
tural key words—mean. Thus, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural understanding 
requires translatability; and the limits of translatability place limits on cross-
linguistic and cross-cultural understanding.
What are those limits, then? It has been well known2 that words generally 
don’t match in meaning across language boundaries.3
It is less widely recognized that sentences and longer passages are even less 
translatable than words. For example, the well-known American translator Edith 
Grossman writes: “the meaning of a passage can almost always be rendered faith-
fully in a second language, but its words, taken as separate entities, can almost 
never be. Translators translate context.”4
In my view5, detailed comparison of almost any translated passage with the 
original will show otherwise. This does not mean, however, that languages are 
 1 C. Geertz, “Culture, Mind, Brain/Brain, Mind, Culture.” In:  Available Light, ed. 
C. Geertz (Princeton: 2000), pp. 203–217.
 2 At least since Locke’s wonderfully clear discussion in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. See: L. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford 
1959), vol. 2, pp. 48–49.
 3 Recall also Malinowski: “Let me start with the apparently paradoxical and yet perfectly 
plain and absolutely true proposition that the words of one language are never trans-
latable into another.” See p. 47 in the present volume. 
 4 E. Grossman, Why Translation Matters (New Haven 2010), p. 71.
 5 See e.g. A. Wierzbicka, “Arguing in Russian: Why Solzhenitsyn’s Fictional Arguments 














‘incommensurable’, as Sapir once incautiously put it: “In as much as languages 
differ very widely in their systematization of fundamental concepts, they tend to 
be only loosely equivalent to each other as symbolic devices and are, as a matter 
of fact, incommensurable”6. If languages were really fundamentally ‘incommen-
surable’ there would be no possibility of accurate translation and, consequently, 
no possibility of understanding what exactly ‘others’ are saying.
My own work and that of Cliff Goddard and other colleagues leads us to the 
conclusion that, despite the limits of translatability, languages are not incommensu-
rable because, as evidence suggests, they share a common conceptual core—a set of 
fundamental human concepts and their inherent grammar.7 This is what the NSM 
theory of language is all about. The acronym ‘NSM’ stands for ‘natural semantic 
metalanguage’. The idea is that the conceptual shared core of all languages can 
serve as a neutral metalanguage for describing and comparing all languages and all 
culture-specific discourses. Furthermore, this shared core, which can be articulated 
by a reduced version of any language, makes accurate translation of meanings and 
ideas, including those encoded in cultural keywords, in principle possible.
Such accurate translation is seldom practical:  in everyday communication, 
and in translation of written texts, shortcuts and approximations are generally 
far more useful than a perfectly faithful transfer of meaning from one language 
to another. Genuinely accurate translation can, however, be a very effective tool 
of cross-cultural explanations and comparisons. “Of course, comparison is both 
possible and necessary,”8 Geertz admits, somewhat reluctantly. But comparison 
requires a common measure, in the case of conceptual comparisons, a concep-
tual common measure; and such a conceptual common measure requires some 
shared concepts. The NSM list of universal semantic primes, presented in Tab. 1, 
offers such a common measure.
The NSM table of universal semantic primes provides an answer to 
Leibniz’s quest for an alphabetum cogitationum humanarum, an ‘alphabet 
of human thoughts’, which, he thought, could provide a common measure 
for comparing, articulating and sharing ideas across languages and 
 6 E. Sapir, “Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages.” In: D. H. Hymes (ed.), 
Language in Culture and Society (New York 1964), p. 128.
 7 See e.g. C. Goddard and A. Wierzbicka (eds), Meaning and Universal Grammar: Theory 
and Empirical Findings, (Amsterdam 2002); C. Goddard, Semantic Analysis, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: 2011); C. Goddard., A. Wierzbicka, Words and Meanings: Lexical Semantics 
across Domains, Languages, and Cultures (Oxford 2013).
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cultures.9 At the same time, it provides a semantic analogue of the International 
Phonetic Alphabet, the invention of which allowed the sounds of the world’s 
languages to be recorded in an accurate and standardized way, independent of 
the native language of the transcriber.
Primes exist as the meanings of lexical units (not at the level of lexemes). 
Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes. They can 
be formally complex. They can have combinatorial variants or ‘allolexes’ (indi-
cated with ~). Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.
It is largely because it permits a standardized transcription of meanings in a 
system independent of the language and culture of the investigator that NSM can 
Tab. 1: The NSM table of universal human concepts
I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, 
PEOPLE, BODY
KIND, PART
THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE




KNOW, THINK, WANT, DON’T WANT, FEEL, 
SEE, HEAR
SAY, WORDS, TRUE
DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/
SOMETHING) BELONG TO ~BE (SOMEONE’S)
LIVE, DIE
WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG 
TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, 
NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE





















 9 See A. Wierzbicka, “The Common Language of All People: The Innate Language 






be an effective culture-neutral tool for the translation of meanings and ideas and 
thus, for ‘understanding others’. Furthermore, since this ‘International Semantic 
Alphabet’ can be accessed, and used, through a trimmed-down version of any nat-
ural language, it allows the meanings of cultural ‘others’ to be transcribed ‘in their 
own words’, without letting the investigator’s own language (e.g. English) come 
between the indigenous meanings and the conceptual world of the investigator.
The analogy between NSM and the IPA is far from perfect, if only because 
the latter is, to some extent, arbitrary (there could be alternative systems of 
transcription), whereas NSM, which is the result of empirical cross-linguistic 
investigations, is not. Thus, the key difference is that the IPA was invented 
whereas NSM was gradually discovered (over many years of empirical, as well as 
analytical investigations). Both systems, however, provide a method of standard-
ization and a stable, neutral framework for the transcription of ‘raw material’: in 
one case, sounds and in the other, meanings.
Conventional interlinear glosses formulated in English (or whatever the 
language of the investigator happens to be) do not provide a neutral framework 
for semantic ‘transcription’, since more often than not they cannot be translated, 
with exactly the same meaning, into other languages. In this, they differ pro-
foundly from NSM explications, whose hallmark is their cross-translatability.
The metaphor of an alphabet, with its historical antecedent in Leibniz’s thought, 
should not deceive anyone into thinking that NSM offers a universal mental lex-
icon without outlining at the same time a universal grammar. Meaning and ideas 
cannot be compared and explained through words alone; they can only be com-
pared and explained through sentences, that is, through words arranged into 
meaningful sequences. No one understood this better than Leibniz, who aimed 
at establishing a lingua mentalis rather than just a mental lexicon. NSM, too, is 
a mini-language:  along with a mini-lexicon of 65 universal primes (matching 
the empirically established lexical common core of a large sample of natural 
languages) it includes also a mini-grammar (also matching the empirically estab-
lished grammatical common core of a large sample of natural languages).
For example, the lexicon of NSM English represents a radical reduction of 
the full English lexicon, and the grammar of NSM English represents an equally 
radical reduction of full English grammar. At the simplest level, grammar can 
be thought of as a matter of what can be combined with what. In this sense, 
semantic primes have their own grammar, which is the same in all languages. For 
example, in all languages specifier primes (THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE) 
can be combined with the universal ‘substantives’ SOMEONE, SOMETHING, 
PEOPLE, and KIND, as will be evident in NSM texts presented in sections 
3 and 4.
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Taken together with their associated grammar, semantic primes constitute the 
shared semantic-syntactic core of all human languages. Now that its structure is 
substantially understood, this shared core can be used—and is being used—as an 
analytical metalanguage for the exploration of the full lexicons and grammars of 
individual languages. It provides a non-arbitrary standard tertium comparationis 
(common measure), which is free from any English-specific terminological bias.
The same metalanguage can also be used for exploring ideas, values, emotions, 
social norms, ethno-biology, and so on, allowing an integrated approach not only 
to lexicon and grammar, but more broadly to language, culture and cognition. 
Hundreds of explications have been published, including, i.a., nouns for body 
parts, kin relations, artefacts, and natural kinds; verbs for physical acts and activ-
ities, speech-acts, and emotions; adjectives (property words) for physical quali-
ties, dimensional properties and colors; and discourse particles and interjections 
as well as morphological categories and syntactic constructions.
This is the larger mission of linguists in the NSM paradigm, who, in addi-
tion to their studies into conceptual universals in language, have published 
numerous studies into language-specific and culture-specific aspects of indi-
vidual languages. The NSM program has the most productive record in cross-
linguistic and cross-cultural semantics on the contemporary scene.10
Calling NSM an effective culture-neutral tool is not tantamount to claiming 
that it is perfect and that there is no room for further improvement. But the 
effectiveness of NSM as a standardized framework for comparing and explaining 
meanings across languages and cultures does not depend on its perfection or 
even on the absolute universality of the primes.
On this point, too, it is worth invoking Leibniz, who wrote of his projected 
universal language:
Although this language depends on true philosophy, it does not depend on its per-
fection. That is to say, this language can be established even if the philosophy is not 
perfect: as our knowledge grows, this language will also grow. In the meantime, it can 
marvelously help us to use what we do know, to see what is lacking, and to invent the 
means for getting there, and especially to resolve controversies in matters which depend 
on reasoning.11
 10 A bibliography and downloads are available at:  www.griffith.edu.au/humanities- 
languages/school-languages-linguistics/research/ natural-semantic- metalanguage- 
homepage.






The Hawaiians, the Dangs, and the Anglos
Richard Collin notes that in his short story, “El idiomaanalitico de John Wilkins” 
Jorge Luis Borges “imagines an artificial language invented to permit the expres-
sion of any human thought.”12 Using for this purpose Umberto Eco’s term ‘effable,’13 
Collin comments: “some linguists believe that all natural languages possess what is 
awkwardly called effability.”14
The ‘effability’ of all existing natural languages (in Eco’s sense) is clearly an illu-
sion, but the NSM texts presented in this paper (and elsewhere in NSM literature) 
suggest that, in contrast to natural languages as such, reduced versions of natural 
languages (known as their ‘NSM versions’) are indeed—at least within certain 
limits—‘effable’ (and ipso facto, cross-translatable): whatever can be expressed in 
one of them can be expressed in any other, without addition, subtraction, or distor-
tion of meaning.
Geertz writes:
Over the past twenty-five years or so, the post-everything era (post-modernism, struc-
turalism, colonialism, positivism), the attempt to portray “how the ‘natives’ think” (or 
thought), or even what they are doing when they do what they do, has come in for a good 
deal of moral, political, and philosophical attack.15
Although Geertz evidently wants to distance himself from the spirit of the ‘post-
everything’ era, he does seem to be sincerely skeptical about any attempts to portray 
“how the ‘natives’ think”. In my view, such skepticism is misplaced. How could we 
possibly seek to understand others if we didn’t try to grasp ‘how they think’? “The 
days of simple ‘the Dangs believe, the Dangs don’t believe’ anthropology seem truly 
over,” Geertz says. But without some further comment, this statement can be mis-
leading. As I see it, questions like ‘how do the Dangs think?’, ‘what do the Dangs 
believe?’ are, in principle, legitimate, and indeed necessary, if we wish to come close 
to ‘understanding others’. But they are only legitimate on certain conditions. I will 
list four.
The first condition is that we ask such questions not only about ‘Dangs,’ but 
also about our own speech communities, and in particular, about ‘Anglos’. As 
 12 R. Collin, “Moving Political Meaning across Linguistic Frontiers,” Political Studies 
2012, p. 2.
 13 U. Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language (Oxford 1995), p.23.
 14 Collin, Moving, p. 2.
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I have discussed in many publications16 while there are many ‘Englishes’ in the 
world and many cultural worlds associated with them, there is also a cultural 
world associated with what Braj Kachru calls “the English of the Inner Circle”17 
and what I  have called ‘Anglo English.’18 Denying this usually leads to taking 
cultural norms and assumptions associated with ‘Anglo English’ for the human 
norm. An NSM perspective helps to free us from the blind Anglocentrism of 
such a position and allows us to recognize that, alongside Dangs, Hawaiians, 
Russians, and all the other human cultural groups (changeable, of course, and 
fluid, but nonetheless recognizable), there are also ‘Anglos’.
The second condition is that we interpret these questions as applying to 
ways of thinking, and ways of understanding, shared by many rather than by 
all members of a given speech community. Obviously, it is not the case that all 
Anglos—or all Dangs—think the same (about anything). This doesn’t mean, 
however, that there are no shared cultural assumptions among many Anglos, or 
many Dangs.
The third condition is that when we attribute widely shared assumptions and 
understandings to either Anglos or Dangs, we provide direct linguistic evidence 
for such attributions, and that this evidence is presented (inter alia) ‘in their 
own words’. For example, the existence, and high frequency, of the words ‘fair’ 
and ‘unfair’ in English (Anglo English), and the common forms of discourse 
based on these words (e.g. starting a sentence with the words ‘to be fair…’, or 
commenting: ‘this is unfair’) provide evidence for the generalization that many 
‘Anglos’ often think about human relations in terms of the conceptual categories 
‘fair’ and ‘unfair’. Mutatis mutandis, the same condition applies to attributing 
assumptions to ‘the Dangs.’
The fourth condition is that when we attribute shared understandings and cul-
tural knowledge to a group of people we try to posit only beliefs that they could, 
in principle, express in their own language. The language of the investigator can 
 16 See e.g. A. Wierzbicka, English: Meaning and Culture, (New York 2006); A. Wierzbicka, 
“Anglo Scripts against ‘Putting Pressure’ on Other People and Their Linguistic 
Manifestations.” In: C. Goddard (ed.), Ethnopragmatics: Understanding Discourse in 
Cultural Context (Berlin 2006), pp. 31–63; A. Wierzbicka, Experience, Evidence and 
Sense: The Hidden Cultural Legacy of English (New York 2010).
 17 B. Kachru, “Standards, Codification and Sociolinguistic Realism: The English Language 
in the Outer Circle.” In: R. Quirk, H. Widdowson (eds), English in the World: Teaching 
and Learning the Language and Literatures (Cambridge 1985), pp. 11–30.








be used for convenience as a shorthand for indigenous ideas but it cannot be the 
only medium in which those ideas could be expressed.
Geertz writes:
The mere claim ‘to know better’ which it would seem any anthropologist would have 
at least implicitly to make, seems at least faintly illegitimate. To say something about 
the forms of life of Hawaiians (or anybody else) that Hawaiians do not themselves say 
opens one to the charge that one is writing out other peoples’ consciousness for them, 
scripting their souls.19
To my mind, there is nothing inherently wrong with the claim ‘to know better’, 
because someone who has studied a subject deeply may indeed ‘know better’ 
than someone who has never studied it at all. This applies not only to ‘knowing 
others’ but also to knowing one’s own community. For example, most ‘Anglos’ 
are not aware of the existence or the exact nature of Anglo cultural scripts, and 
indeed many Anglophone linguists and anthropologists reject the proposition 
that there are any such scripts associated with ‘Anglo English.’20 I believe that to 
know better, Anglo scholars need to study ‘Anglos’, in a way that is on a par with 
studying Hawaiians or ‘Dangs.’
In principle, then, I don’t see anything wrong with saying something about 
Hawaiians (or anybody else) that they themselves do not say. But to say some-
thing about Hawaiians (or anybody else) that Hawaiians could not themselves 
say (in their own words, because they have no such words) indeed opens one 
to the charge that one is ‘writing out other peoples’ consciousness for them, 
scripting their souls’.
‘Loyalty’ vs. ‘Sharing Goods with Kin’
Consider, for example, the following passage from a book entitled Language and 
Culture in Aboriginal Australia:
 19 C. Geertz, “Culture,” p. 102.
 20 See e.g. Wierzbicka, English; Wierzbicka, “Anglo Scripts”; C. Goddard, “Not Taking 
Yourself too Seriously in Australian English: Semantic Explications, Cultural Scripts, 
Corpus Evidence,” Intercultural Pragmatics 6(1): 2009, pp. 29–53; A. Wierzbicka, “ ‘Early 
interactions’ in Australian English, American English, and English English: Cultural 
Differences and Cultural Scripts.” In: M. Haugh, K. Schneider (eds), (Im)politeness in 
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Another cultural value which is important in non-traditionally oriented Aboriginal 
societies, as in traditionally oriented societies, is loyalty to kin. Aboriginal people expect 
each other to be loyal to a wide extended family.21
But as far as I  have been able to ascertain, there is no word for ‘loyalty’ in 
Australian Aboriginal languages, and so if one attributes to people in Australian 
Aboriginal societies a belief in the value of ‘loyalty to kin’, one is, in my view, 
open to the charge of ‘scripting their souls.’
The concept embodied in the English word loyalty (or French loyauté) 
comes from a European cultural tradition. The historical roots of this concept 
can be gleaned from the following definition offered by the Oxford Australian 
Dictionary:  “loyal:  steadfast in allegiance; devoted to the legitimate sovereign 
or government of one’s country.”22 Other dictionaries of English offer similar 
definitions. For example, The Longman Dictionary of the English Language (1984) 
defines the word ‘loyal’ as “unswerving in allegiance” and the Collins Cobuild 
English Language Dictionary (1991) states that “Someone who is loyal remains 
firm in their friendship or support for someone or something, e.g. Most Tories 
remained faithful to the Government.”
What these definitions either state or imply is a continuity in a person’s sup-
port for someone else (‘steadfast’, ‘unswerving’, ‘remains’) and their undertaking 
not to ‘betray’ the other person’s legitimate expectation of support and to stay 
‘on their side.’
These are, of course, only approximations, but clearly they are not 
approximations which would correspond to a way of thinking common 
in Australian Aboriginal societies. Judging by the literature on Australian 
Aboriginal cultures, and especially, on kinship-based requests and demands, 
one could venture the following approximation as closer to the norm that Diana 
Eades really has in mind:
THE ‘WALYTJA’ NORM
many people think like this:
“if someone is my ‘kin’ (walytja) it is good if I do good things for this someone
when this someone says to me: “I want you to do something good for me”
it will be good if I do it, it will be bad if I don’t do it”
 21 D. Eades, “Language and the Law:  White Australia vs Nancy.” In:  M. Walsh and 
C. Yallop (eds.), Language and Culture in Aboriginal Australia (Canberra 1993), p. 188 
(emphasis added).






Thus, consider the examples offered in the entry for walytja (roughly, ‘kin’) in 
Goddard’s Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara to English Dictionary:
walytja
one of the family, a relation, a kinsman. Someone you care for, and who cares for you 
… Paluruwalytjatjutakuwatjilarinyi. He’s pining for his relations./Papulankunytjawiya. 
Nyuntumpawalytjapalatja Don’t stare at her. That’s one of your relations (e.g. to a young 
child). Ananguwalytjangkapalkunangatjiningi, palungurpatjamantinyuntu. I  thought 
I was asking of a relation, but I guess you must be a stranger to me (i.e. a reproach to 
someone unwilling to give).23
The same norm is further highlighted by the entry on the verb ngatjini (roughly, 
‘ask for something in the name of kinship’):
ngatjini
ask, demand, request to be given something. Usually in connection with implied 
right to expect results, on account of kin obligations. (Person asked takes locative 
ending—la/-ngka, etc.):  Palurutungunpungkulangatjiningi, kana putupainu. He really 
pressed his request, and I  couldn’t get rid of him. /Naipakungatjintjikitja-nayananyi, 
karatjikutu. I’m going to the garage to get someone to give me a knife. /Palurungalya-
pitjalangayulangatjinu. He came and asked me (for something).
Clearly, this is not about ‘loyalty,’ but about the norm that one should do something 
good for a relation (e.g. give them something they want), especially when one is 
asked to do so. The key point is that ‘loyalty’ is, essentially, about not doing some-
thing bad to someone else (the person to whom one is being ‘loyal’), whereas the 
Aboriginal norm is, essentially, about doing something good for someone else (a 
person to whom one is related). Roughly speaking, a person who is described as 
‘disloyal’ is not someone who doesn’t help someone else, or doesn’t share resources 
with him or her, but someone who ‘betrays’ another person, against all expectations.
Using NSM, we could explicate loyalty more accurately along the 
following lines:
loyalty
it can be like this:
    someone thinks like this about someone else:
      “I know that at some times after this time
         some people can do some bad things to this someone
      if this happens, I will not do these things with these people
      I can’t do it, I don’t want to do it
      this someone can know this”
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    because this someone thinks like this,
      when at some times after this some people do bad things to this 
other someone
      this someone doesn’t do these things with these people
 it is good if it is like this
This is only an approximation, but it helps us to make the key differences between 
loyalty and the walytja norm more transparent: the contrast between ‘not doing 
bad things to someone else’ and ‘doing good things for someone else’, and the role 
of ‘continuity’ in loyalty (‘remaining steadfast’).
It is interesting to note that in his classic essay “Of cannibals” (written in 
1578–80 and directed against European moral ethnocentrism), Montaigne cited 
‘loyalty’ as an example of a moral absolute.24 Thus, he wrote famously: “Each man 
calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have 
no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions 
and customs of the country we live in” (I: 30). This didn’t stop him, however, 
from extolling the ‘courage’ and ‘valor’ of ‘South Sea’ cannibals, and of expressing 
horror at ‘treachery’, ‘disloyalty’, ‘tyranny’ and ‘cruelty,’ which, he says, “are our 
ordinary vices” (I: 30).
For Montaigne, then, these are examples of moral absolutes:  ‘courage is 
good’, ‘cowardice is bad’, ‘disloyalty is bad’, ‘cruelty is bad’, ‘valor is good’. Or, 
more precisely: desloyauté, cruauté, and lacheté are bad, courage and vaillance 
are good. Most of the examples cited by Montaigne translate reasonably well 
from (modern) French into (modern) English (although lacheté doesn’t mean 
the same as ‘cowardice,’ and implies ‘a lack of moral fibre’ in general rather than, 
specifically, ‘cowardice’).
Needless to say, the fact that loyauté in present-day French appears to match 
the present-day English ‘loyalty’ does not mean that the same was the case in the 
sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. In fact, the definitions provided by Antoine 
Furetière’s (1690) dictionary of French suggest that there may have been some 
changes here, as well as continuity. Thus, in the entry for loyauté we read: “Quand 
on fait homage d’une terre au Seigneur dominant, on lui promet foi and loyauté. 
On prometen se mariant, une foi et loyauté reciproque.”25
 24 Cf. R. A. Shweder, “Relativism and Universalism.” In D. Fassin, (ed.), Companion to 
Moral Anthropology (Chichester 2012), pp. 85–102.
 25 “When a vassal pledges allegiance to his lord he promises him fidelity and loyalty. 
In marriage, one promises reciprocal fidelity and loyalty,” Le Dictionnaire Universel 






The material cited by Furetière in this and related entries suggests that in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the meaning of loyauté may have been closer 
to ‘pledging allegiance’ (and being faithful to that pledge) than it is now and may 
have been closer to the formula below:
loyalty/loyauté (an older meaning)
 it can be like this:
  someone says to someone else at some time:
  “I kn ow that some people can do some bad things to you at some time after this time
I want you to know that when these people do these things, I will not do these 
things with these people”
  because this someone says this,
 when at some time after this some people do bad things to this other  someone,
  this someone doesn’t do these things with these people
  this someone thinks like this at that time:
  “I can’t do things like these, I don’t want to do things like these”
 it is good if it is like this
Whether or not Montaigne’s virtue of loyauté corresponds exactly to the meanings 
of the present-day words loyauté and ‘loyalty’ is a point which would require fur-
ther investigation. In any case, however, it seems clear that these words don’t have 
exact semantic and cultural equivalents in Australian Aboriginal languages.26
Linguistic and ethnographic evidence suggests that in Australian Aboriginal 
cultures, if someone violates norms like the walytja norm this is seen as a case not 
of ‘disloyalty’ but of something like ‘selfishness’. In Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara, 
the relevant words are ngurtju and its derivates, glossed in Goddard’s dictionary 
as follows:
ngurtju
selfishly, greedily, without sharing: Nyuntukukaungkunytjawiyangkungurtjungkungalku
nu. You selfishly ate all the meat, without giving any to anyone else.
ngurtjuringanyi
be or act selfishly, keep something to yourself: Maini ngalya-uwa, ngurtjuringkuwiyangku. 
Give me some food, don’t be selfish.
ngurtjunytju
selfish person, thinking only of yourself: Anangungurtjunyungkukutjupakungalturingku
laungkunytjawiya. A selfish person doesn’t feel for and give to others.
 26 For a wealth of data on the moral lexicon of one of them, Warlpiri, see L. Hiatt, “The 
Moral Lexicon of the Warlpiri People of Central Australia,” Australian Aboriginal 
Studies 1 (2007), pp. 4–30.
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The strength of the norm ‘to do good things for one’s relatives when they ask’ 
is well illustrated in an Aboriginal story from north-western New South Wales 
about the Durupa people discussed recently by Luise Hercus:
The Durupa came down from Mabu Crossing on the Cooper.
They came here (i.e. to Tibooburra)
There was a big mob here, all those people in a big heap (of stones) here now.
They ask for rain-stone and they won’t give to them.
A little boy was sent over by the Durupa, but they wouldn’t give it to ‘m.
There used to be plenty of grass seed, nardoo, oh plenty. Pig weed. some were camped 
out, some coming in.
“Alright you can all go away tomorrow but this little boy can stay.”
This little boy was running about call them uncle. People [said?] “That’s not your uncle, 
they’re strangers,”
They wouldn’t give them rain-stone, only red ochre.
All went away hunting next morning. The Durupa made big clouds. Some were coming 
back with weeds, some with meat.
Hailstones came and killed them all. That’s how those stones here.27
In her commentary on this story, Hercus writes:
This is a common theme of traditional stories: when someone asks for something, even 
if it is a very precious possession, as this rain-stone was, one can try to fob them off with 
other just slightly less precious things, like red ochre … But one ultimately has to give 
away one’s treasure. The local people would not give it even to the little boy who claimed 
kinship with them. That is why the locals got killed.
Clearly, this is not a story about disloyalty. Concepts like ngurtju and ‘disloyalty’ 
are very different. The difference between them highlights the disparity between 
norms like the walytja norm and the Anglo cultural scripts associated with the 
word loyalty.
Translating Social Categories from Dalabon into English
Presumably, by describing the Aboriginal cultural norm in terms of ‘loyalty’ 
rather than ‘kinship obligations’, as it is more commonly done, Diana Eades 
was trying to make it sound like something that her readers could identify with, 
and be in sympathy with, and one can appreciate that. Her aim was no doubt 
to validate an unfamiliar cultural norm—an understandable and in itself valu-
able project. Nonetheless, the cost to cross-cultural understanding is, in my view, 
too high.






The same applies to Nicholas Evans’s attempt (in his splendid book Dying 
Words) to offer English readers a glimpse of the social world of the speakers of 
the Australian language Dalabon. The cognitive category that Evans is trying 
to explain is usually referred as ‘disharmonic’. Evans glosses this element of 
meaning as “the two of them, who are in odd-numbered generations with respect 
to one another” and he puts this gloss in the first person, as if it represented the 
speaker’s perspective. To quote:
To round this chapter [“Social Cognition in Grammar”] off, let us put together some of 
these themes by seeing how all the socially relevant dimensions of experience we have 
touched on go into building a single inflected word in Dalabon, a language that makes 
you attend to rather different social categories from what English grammar directs you 
to. (Dalabon is a polysynthetic language, … which condenses into a single word what 
would take a sentence in English.) Here is the word:
Wekemarnûmolkkûndokan.
“I’m afraid that the two of them, who are in odd-numbered generations with respect to 
one another, might go, with consequences for someone else, and without a key person 
knowing about it; by choosing the form of words I do, I hereby indicate that one of those 
carrying out the action is a mother-in-law of mine or equivalently respected relative.”
… Intricate as it is, this one-word example only scratches the surface of how languages 
use their grammars to construct and update their speakers’ ever-unfolding dossier of the 
social universe they move in.28
But strictly speaking, this cannot be how the native speakers of Australian 
languages think because their culture has no concept of ‘odd number’ and their 
languages have no words for it (not even for ‘number’, let alone ‘odd number’). 
As I  wrote in my Semantics, Culture and Cognition, “terms such as … ‘odd-
numbered generations’ … useful as they are as an analyst’s shorthand, cannot 
represent native speakers’ meaning.”29
Of course, Evans did not invent the term ‘odd-numbered generations’. It is 
a traditional technical term in Australian linguistics, which can be found, i.a., 
in Ken Hale’s classic paper “Kinship Reflections in Syntax:  Some Australian 
Languages.”30 What is novel about Evans’s use of this term is that he puts it in the 
mouth of a Dalabon speaker, in an attempt to enter the Dalabon speakers’ mental 
world and to present their social cognition from an insider point of view.
 28 N. Evans, Dying Words:  Endangered Languages and What They Have To Tell Us, 
(Chitchester 2010), pp. 77–79 (emphasis added).
 29 A. Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture and Cognition (New York 1992), p. 358; see also 
A.  Wierzbicka, “Semantics and the Interpretation of Cultures:  The Meaning of 
‘Alternate Generations’ Devices in Australian Languages”, Man 21 (1986), pp. 34–49.







Translatability and the Scripting of Other Peoples’ Souls 157
This is a bold move for which I believe Evans should be applauded. If in this 
‘post-everything’ era one still wants to try to understand ‘how the natives think’ 
one must make that move and try to speak, sometimes, in the first person.
By explicating the Dalabon speaker’s meaning in a first-person mode, Evans 
is, of course, not implying that the Dalabon speakers carry the knowledge of 
their social categories in their heads in a propositional form and could easily 
articulate it themselves. He is evidently trying to explicate the tacit knowledge of 
a Dalabon speaker—knowledge that is unconscious but which, in Sapir’s words, 
could in principle be ‘dragged to the light’ of one’s consciousness.
Articulating one’s tacit knowledge in propositional form may not be a tra-
ditional cultural practice in an Aboriginal society. This does not mean, however, 
that if it is articulated, empathetically, by a linguist or anthropologist it cannot be 
assessed by a native speaker as something that ‘rings true’, or not—provided, of 
course, that it is articulated ‘in their own words’—or in the words of their second 
language (such as Aboriginal English) which match ‘their own words.’
As I  hope to show in a moment, we can try to enter the mental world of 
speakers of a language like Dalabon by relying on indigenous conceptual catego-
ries such as ‘father’ and ‘mother’, but not on technical terms such as ‘harmonic’ 
and ‘disharmonic,’ ‘odd-numbered,’ and ‘even-numbered.’
No one was more aware of the unconscious character of grammatical catego-
ries than Franz Boas, who wrote of the concepts encoded in them that “although 
they are in constant use, they have never risen into consciousness.”31 At the same 
time, in writing his grammars of American Indian languages Boas strove to treat 
“the inner form of each language … as though an intelligent Indian was going to 
develop the forms of his own thoughts by an analysis of his own form of speech.”32
To pursue Boas’s mental experiment further, we may ask:  in what language 
could a Dalabon speaker develop the forms of his (her) own thoughts encoded 
in the grammatical categories of his (her) own language? Presumably, in his (her) 
native language, not in English (and if in English, then not in Anglo English 
molded by Anglo culture and history but in that inner core of English which is 
shared with other languages).
But would the indigenous languages have the necessary resources for their 
speakers to be able to articulate the forms of their own thoughts? Sapir, for 
one, had no doubt that they would, for while he too believed that languages are 
 31 F. Boas, “Linguistics and Ethnology.” In: D.H. Hymes (ed), Language in Culture and 
Society (New York 1964), p. 19.






unconsciously patterned, he also firmly held that “the content of every culture is 
expressible in its language.”33
An interpretive formulation like ‘odd-numbered generations’ radically 
distorts the indigenous perspective, by relying on the culturally alien concept of 
‘odd number’. Moreover, it oversimplifies and distorts the social model implicit 
in the indigenous perspective—a model evidently based on prototypes (which 
can be articulated through indigenous words like ‘father’ and ‘mother’) and on 
provisions for extensions.
Clearly, what lies at the heart of the ‘disharmonic’ category is the contrast 
between parents and their children, whereas the ‘harmonic’ one is modeled on 
the relationship between two people who have the same father and mother (i.e. 
siblings). These are the focal categories, lost in the ‘odd-numbered generation’ 
approach. Since for speakers of a language like Dalabon the social universe is 
divided into two categories, based on those focal relationships, the prototypical 
‘harmonic’ and ‘disharmonic’ categories can be extended to many other interper-
sonal configurations, both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’. But a characterisation that 
denies the key role of those focal points distorts the structure of the indigenous 
socio-cognitive model.
In fact, this is how anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown in his classic 1930–
1931 work The Social Organization of Australian Tribes first described the feature 
of Australian kinship systems which later came to be linked with technical terms 
such as ‘harmonic’ and ‘disharmonic’ or ‘even’ and ‘odd-numbered generations’:
Another important principle of the Australian system is connected with the 
relations between persons of different generations. The relationship of genera-
tion has its origin in the family in the relation of parents to children. It becomes 
of importance in general social life because social continuity requires that the 
body of tradition possessed by the society shall be handed on by one generation 
to the next, and this handing on of tradition entails a relation of superiority and 
subordination as between one generation and the next. The generation of parents 
must have authority over the generation of children … As between persons who 
are separated by an intervening generation a new situation arises. If we call the 
generations 1, 2 and 3, then those of generation 1 exercise authority over those 
of 2 and those of 2 over those of 3, but … persons of 1 and 3 are brought together 
 33 E. Sapir, “Language,” in: D. Mandelbaum, ed. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in 
Language, Culture and Personality (Berkeley 1949), p. 10.
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into a different kind of relationship which, in spite of the difference in age, links 
them together on terms of familiarity and almost of equality.34
Thus, as Radcliffe-Brown envisaged 80 years ago, it is the relationship between 
parents and children which provides a conceptual anchor for the distinction in 
question—or, more precisely, the relationship between children and their mothers 
and fathers.
In his 1982 study of the ‘alternating generations’ phenomenon in Dalabon, lin-
guist Barry Alpher records a revealing comment on the ‘disharmonic’ category 
offered by a native Dalabon speaker, Don Bununhoa: ‘like mother and father.’35 As 
this comment shows, from an insider’s perspective, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are the focal 
categories, and this is what is lost in the ‘odd-numbered generation’ approach. Since 
for speakers of a language like Dalabon the social universe is divided into two cat-
egories, based on those focal relationships, the prototypical ‘harmonic’ and ‘dishar- 
monic’ categories can be extended to many other interpersonal configurations, both 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal.’ But a characterization that obliterates the key role of those 
focal points—‘mother’ and ‘father’—distorts the structure of the indigenous socio-
cognitive model. To do justice to the indigenous perspective we need to account for 
both the prototypes and the extensions. By proceeding in this way, we can ensure 
both the predictive power of our analysis and its psychological reality and, at the 
same time, we can avoid putting our own words into other people’s mouths and our 
own concepts into their heads.
Trying to provide a characterization of the cognitive categories in question 
that would be more faithful to the indigenous perspective I would propose, first, 
two explications based on the prototypes indicated above, and second, several 
‘cultural scripts’ for extending these prototypes to other relationships.36 Thus, for 
 34 A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, The Social Organization of Australian Tribes (Sydney 1973), 
pp. 432–33.
 35 B. Alpher, “Dalabon Dual Subject Prefixes, Kinship Categories, and Generation 
Skewing,” in: J. Heath, F. Merlan, A. Rumsey, eds., Languages of Kinship in Aboriginal 
Australia (Sydney 1982), p. 21.
 36 ‘Cultural scripts’ are statements which are framed entirely or largely in the metalan-
guage of semantic primes and which articulate norms and understandings shared by 
people of a given speech community. These statements may relate to different aspects 
of thinking, speaking and behaviour. The theory of ‘cultural scripts’ (as the term is used 
here) is a sister-theory to NSM semantics. The first explicit statement of this theory 
can be found in my 1994 article “ ‘Cultural scripts’: A semantic approach to cultural 
analysis and cross-cultural communication.” In: L. Bouton, Y. Kachru, Pragmatics and 
Language Learning (Urbana-Champaign 1994), pp. 1–24. Since then, this approach has 








the ‘disharmonic’ aspect of the Dalabon word cited by Evans I would propose an 
explication based on the contrast between parents and their children:
disharmonic
I think about these people like this:
“they are not people of the same kind
they are like two people are if one of them is the father of the other one,
they are like two people are if one of them is the mother of the other one”
It could be said, of course, that a characterization of the ‘disharmonic’ category 
phrased in terms of ‘odd-numbered generations’ in Evans’s gloss, is only a place-
holder for the speaker’s meaning. But if so, then the question must be asked: what 
is the speaker’s meaning that this phrase is a place-holder for? The explication 
above purports to answer this question. This explication does not claim that only 
parents and children are treated as ‘disharmonic’. On the contrary, the use of the 
word ‘like’ indicates that these two categories are regarded as prototypes for a 
much wider range of relationships.
The same kind of conceptual structure based on a prototype can be found, 
I believe, in the ‘harmonic’ category, as the phrasing of the formula below shows:
harmonic
I think about these people like this:
“they are people of the same kind
they are like two people are if the father of one of them is the father of the other one,
they are like two people are if the mother of one of them is the mother of the other one”
publications by many NSM researchers. See in particular: C. Goddard, A. Wierzbicka, 
eds. Cultural Scripts: Special Issue of Intercultural Pragmatics 1(2): 2004, pp. 153–166; 
C.  Goddard, ed., Ethnopragmatics:  Understanding Discourse in Cultural Context 
(Amsterdam 2006). The ‘cultural scripts’ approach shares some of its basic assumptions 
with a number of other approaches in linguistic anthropology, especially those devel-
oped by Dell Hymes, “The Ethnography of Speaking.” In: J. Fishman, ed., Readings of the 
Sociology of Language (The Hague 1968), pp. 99–138; Roy D’Andrade, The Development 
of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge 1995); R.A. LeVine, “Preface: Japan as Front 
Line in the Cultural Psychology Wars.” In: H. Shimizu and R. A. LeVine, eds. Japanese 
Frames of Mind: Cultural Perspectives on Human Development (Cambridge: 2001), 
pp.  xi–xxii, Naomi Quinn, “Universals of Child Rearing,” Anthropological Theory 
5(4): 2005, pp. 475–514; “The Self,” Anthropological Theory 6(3): 2006, pp. 365–87) 
and Richard Shweder, Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology 
(Cambridge, MA 1991). Its crucial and unique feature is a reliance on the metalanguage 
of universal semantic primes – a feature which makes NSM-based cultural scripts 
cross-translatable into the languages of the people whose cultural norms are being 
portrayed.
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These explications have been formulated in words which are known to have 
exact equivalents in many Australian Aboriginal languages37 and so they have a 
claim to psychological reality that formulations like ‘odd-numbered generations’ 
cannot have. By themselves, however, they do not have sufficient explanatory 
power to predict that, for example, a person’s grandparents will be placed in the 
‘harmonic’ category, and great-grandparents in the ‘disharmonic’ one. To ac-
count for this, we need to combine the explications with ‘cultural scripts’ which 
would show who is to be treated as someone of the same kind as the speaker (or 
the person spoken of). I would propose several such scripts, formulated in the 
same metalanguage of simple and universal human concepts as the explications. 
Since the phenomenon of ‘alternating generations’ is widespread in Australian 
languages,38 these scripts appear to apply right across Australia and are by no 
means restricted to Dalabon. The foundational one is a script which lies behind 
what anthropologists and linguists call ‘generational moieties’:
[A] A CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR THINKING ABOUT PEOPLE AS TWO PARTS OF 
ONE BIG SOMETHING
people know that people can think like this:
“people here are like one big something, this something has two parts
many p eople are part of one of these two parts,
these people are people of one kind
many other people are part of the other of these two parts,
these people are people of another kind”
This script outlines the basic social structure of an indigenous group, as seen 
from an indigenous perspective: the overall unity, the division into two halves, 
the resulting categorization of people as people of two kinds, depending on the 
membership in (belonging to) one half or the other. On this foundational script 
[A] another very general script is based—a script for categorizing other people 
in relation to oneself:
 37 Cf. C. Goddard, “Lexical Primitives in Yankunytjatjara.” In: C. Goddard, A. Wierzbicka, 
eds. Semantic and Lexical Universals: Theory and Empirical Findings (Amsterdam 1994), 
pp. 229–62; J. Harkins, D. P. Wilkins, “Mparntwe Arrernte and the Search for Lexical 
Universals.” In: Goddard, Wierzbicka, Semantic and Lexical Universals, pp. 285–310; 
E. Knight, “Hyperpolysemy in Bunuba, a Polysynthetic Language of the Kimberley, 
Western Australia.” In: C. Goddard, ed. Cross-Linguistic Semantics (Amsterdam 2008), 
pp. 205–24.
 38 As noted already by Radcliffe-Brown in: Social Organisation and A. P. Elkin in: The 






[B] A  CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR THINKING ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE IN 
TWO WAYS
people know that everyone can think about other people in two ways
they can think about some people like this:
“I am someone of one kind, these people are people of the same kind”
they can think about some other people like this:
“I am someone of one kind, these people are not people of the same kind”
Apart from ethnographic evidence discussed in the anthropological literature, 
this script is also supported by linguistic evidence discussed in dictionaries and 
grammars of Australian languages. For example, Alpher writes:
The Dalabon language … spoken in south-central Arnhem Land, obligatorily 
marks the person and number of the subject of the sentence by means of a prefix 
to the predicate word … If the subject is dual (two in number), the choice of prefix 
further marks a feature of the kinship relationship of the two referents: darruh-
gobarrah-bon ‘two brothers go’, but be-go geh-bon ‘a father-and-son pair go,’ 
both with -bon ‘go’ (present), but with distinct 3Du prefixes barrah- and geh-. 
Similarly, for first person dual exclusive (1DuEx) subject, there are two prefix 
forms, yarrah- and ngeh-, as in ngeh-bon ‘my father and I go.’ For the subject of a 
transitive verb, the distinction is maintained … The feature that is marked is, in 
general, ‘same alternate-generation level’ vs. ‘different alternate-generation level’ 
(i.e. the set of generations including ego’s own and those of his/her grandparents 
and grandchildren vs. the set of generations of ego’s parents and children).39
In their Dalabon dictionary, Evans et al.40expand on Alpher’s description with 
revealing contextual information:
compared to the ‘free pronouns’ and possessive pronouns, there’s another group here—
abbreviated ‘dis’ for ‘different sides’ or ‘disharmonic’. These are used of people belonging 
to odd-numbered generations, or who are on different sides of a location (e.g. opposite 
sides of a river, or hunting an animal or burning off from opposite sides), or who are 
seen as in opposing groups (e.g. enemies in a story). Compare barrah-bon ‘they two go 
 39 B. Alpher, “Dalabon Dual Subject”, p. 19. In his study of Dalabon kinship grammar, 
Alpher notes that ‘anomalous dyads’ such as a European travelling with a European, 
are treated as disharmonic (p. 73). This supports, I think, both the psychological plau-
sibility of the component ‘someone of the same kind’ and the validity of the reference 
to how people can think about other people. The possibilities of social manipulation 
of the harmonic/disharmonic distinction discussed in this and other papers in Heath 
et al. (Languages of Kinship) also support the relevance of the reference to ‘thinking,’ 
and not just to biological relations between people.
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(same sides, or relation in even-numbered generations like brother or grandparent and 
grandchild)’, keh-bon ‘they two go (opposite sides, or relations in odd-numbered gener-
ations like parents and children)’.
From the general script [B] it follows that everyone in the community will be 
able to think of many other people as being someone ‘of the same kind as me.’ 
This is stated in the masterscript [C]:
[C] A CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR IDENTIFYING WITH MANY OTHER PEOPLE
people know that everyone can think like this about many other people:
“I am someone of one kind, this is someone of the same kind”
As foreshadowed in the explication of the so-called ‘harmonic’ category, the pro-
totype for classifying people as being ‘of the same kind as me’ lies in a person’s 
relationship with the people who have the same mother and father (that is, with 
people who in English would be described as one’s siblings). This can be articu-
lated in script [D] :
[D] A  CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR IDENTIFYING WITH PEOPLE WHO SHARE 
ONE’S MOTHER AND FATHER
people know that someone can think like this about someone else if it is like this:
this someone’s father is this other someone’s father,
this someone’s mother is this other someone’s mother
The prototype for the opposite category, i.e., for those with whom a person 
cannot identify, lies in a person’s parents. This is articulated in script [E] :
[E] A CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR CONTRASTING ONESELF WITH ONE’S MOTHER 
AND FATHER
people know that it is like this:
someone can’t think like this about someone else 
if one of them is the father of the other one
someone can’t think like this about someone else 
if one of them is the mother of this other someone
The cultural scripts based on the opposing prototypes of siblings [D] and parents 
[E] can be projected onto numerous other people in the community on the basis 
of two very simple principles: one can identify with all the people with whom 
one’s parents cannot identify, and conversely, one cannot identify with anyone 
with whom one’s parents can identify. These two simple principles can be articu-
lated by means of cultural scripts [F] and [G]:
[F] A  CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR IDENTIFYING ONESELF WITH PEOPLE WITH 
WHOM ONE’S FATHER AND MOTHER CAN’T IDENTIFY
people know that it is like this:
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  someone can think like this about someone else
   if this someone’s father can’t think like this about this other someone
  someone can think like this about someone else
   if this someone’s mother can’t think like this about this other someone
[G] A CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR CONTRASTING ONESELF WITH PEOPLE WITH 
WHOM ONE’S FATHER AND MOTHER CAN IDENTIFY
people know that it is like this:
  someone can’t think like this about someone else
   if this someone’s father can think like this about this other someone
  someone can’t think like this about someone else
   if this someone’s mother can think like this about this other someone
At this point we need to note that the scripts presented so far may not be suf-
ficient to account for the relationship between a person and this person’s 
grandchildren. We know (or can deduce) how the grandchildren will think 
about their grandparents as being people ‘of the same kind’ but nothing has been 
said so far about how the grandparents will think about their grandchildren.
To account for the ways the ‘upward’ perspective (from children to their 
parents’ parents) is complemented by a ‘downward’ one (from parents’ parents 
to their grandchildren) we need to posit an assumption of mutuality: if I can 
think of you as being someone of the same kind as me, then you can think 
about me as someone of the same kind as you. Conversely, if I can’t think of 
you as being someone of the same kind as me, then you can’t think like this 
about me either. These assumptions, which are a basis for a vast network of 
links between people, both vertical and horizontal, can be articulated in cul-
tural script [H] :
[H] A CULTURAL SCRIPT FOR MUTUAL IDENTIFICATION WITH OTHERS
people know that it is like this:
  if someone can think like this about someone else,
   then this other someone can think like this about this someone
  if someone can’t think like this about someone else,
   then this other someone can’t think like this about this someone
This script explains, to some extent, why great-great-grandparents can be thought 
of in the same way as grandparents (and great-great-grandchild in the same 
way as grandchildren) whereas great-grandparents (and great-grandchildren) 
cannot, because the relationship between persons who see one another as being 
people of the same kind is presented as transitive. Thus, if I can think about my 
grandmother as someone of the same kind as myself, and she can think like this 
about her own grandmother, then I can think like this about my grandmother’s 
grandmother, and the same applies ‘downwards.’
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The idea that people would think of those in the fourth ascending (or de-
scending) generation in one way and those in the third in another because three 
is an odd number and four an even one, seems bizarre. Attributing such an 
idea to Aboriginal people (as Evans’ formula may seem to do) exoticises them 
unnecessarily.41
The identification of children not only with their siblings but also with their 
grandparents may at first also seem strange to many Anglo Australians, but on 
reflection they probably can perceive a certain logic in this: if the children are 
contrasted with the parents, and parents with their own parents, then it is not 
beyond comprehension that the children and the grandparents may fall into one 
category and the parents into another. But this can make sense in terms of a 
contrast between children and their parents, not in terms of some magic of even 
and odd numbers.42Evans says that “until you have the concept of ‘harmonic’ 
vs. ‘disharmonic’ generations you cannot make even … the unavoidable move 
of using Dalabon subject correctly.”43 But while he highlights the importance 
of this concept, he doesn’t explain what this concept is. He also says, quite poi-
gnantly, that when a language like Dalabon dies “no one’s mind will again have 
the thought-paths that its ancestral speakers once blazed.”44 But if so, it is all the 
more important to try to understand those thought-paths as best we can; and 
I don’t think we can understand them through academic English.45
Describing ‘how Aboriginal people think’ in terms of English phrases such 
as ‘odd-numbered generations’ or ‘disharmonic’ is, in my view, misleading and 
indeed open to the charge that one is ‘writing out other people’s consciousness 
for them.’ It does not follow from this, however, that we cannot try to understand 
what the shared modes of thinking and shared cultural scripts of Aboriginal 
people are, and that we have to accept the sterile and self-defeating intellectual 
fashions of which Geertz wrote:
Postmodernists have questioned whether ordered accounts of other ways of being in 
the world—accounts that offer monological, comprehensive, and all-too-coherent 
 41 Cf. R. Keesing, Kin Groups and Social Structure (New York 1975).
 42 It would be easy to devise several more cultural scripts referring, specifically, to one’s 
father’s father, father’s mother, mother’s father and mother’s mother. Whether or 
not these more specific scripts would allow us better to explain what Evans calls the 
Dalabon speaker’s “ever unfolding dossier of the social universe they move in” is a 
matter for further investigation.
 43 Evans, Dying Words, p. 159.
 44 Evans, Dying Words, p. xviii.












explanations—are credible at all, and whether we are not so imprisoned in our own 
modes of thought and perception as to be incapable of grasping, much less crediting, 
those of others.46
As I hope the explications and cultural scripts presented in this paper demon-
strate, we are not imprisoned in our own modes of thinking and perception if we 
can rely on a shared, universal set of concepts which provide us with a common 
intellectual currency for ‘understanding others,’ and indeed, for understanding 
ourselves.
Again, I do not claim that either the explications or the scripts posited in this 
paper are perfect just as they are and that there is no room for improvement. I do 
not believe, however, that they can be improved by shifting back from indige-
nous categories like ‘father’ and ‘mother’ to non-indigenous ones like ‘odd num-
bers’ and ‘even numbers.’ Geertz’s point about the value of trying to understand 
other people’s conceptual worlds through ‘their own words’ stands.
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Based on our intuition and the common meaning of the word “interpretation,” 
it is easy to agree that a translation is an interpretation: we interpret when we 
are explaining something that is not comprehensible to someone who does not 
understand, using the means of comprehension available to that person. In this 
sense the translator-Hermeneut (H) who knows two natural languages (L1 and 
L2) explains the meaning of the Utterance (U1) made by the Sender (S) in L1, 
by presenting it as U2 to the uninitiated Novice reader (N), who is only familiar 
with L2.
At a first glance we already see that this approach to translation as interpre-
tation does not entirely concur with the understanding of “understanding” in 
hermeneutics (a), with scientific explanation (b), or with some definitions that 
have taken root in translation theory.
 (a) Ricoeur says that “Interpretation … is the work of thought which consists 
in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding 
the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning.”1 If the first part of this 
definition could, with certain reservations, apply to translation (the meaning 
invisible to the Novice), the second, which speaks of “unfolding levels of 
meaning,” cannot be applied here (except in freely translated variations on a 
theme taken from the original work).
 (b) If the utterance in the original language (U1) is considered the explanandum, 
and the utterance in the language of the translation (U2). is the explanans, 
then the translation from one natural language to another (be it applied or 
artistic) meets few requirements of proper explanation, and above all, it does 
not meet the condition specified by the rule that the “explanans should not 
be identical to the explanandum in terms of the information it contains, and 
it should not contain the explanandum as one of its parts.”2 Furthermore, if 
 1 P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, trans. D. Ihde (London/New York 2004), 
p. xiv.











we accept that “a condition vital for a given sentence that is the explanandum 
to be explained by a given conjunction of sentences known as the explanans” 
is the circumstance that “the explanandum derives from the explanans,”3 
then translation is not, of course, a scientific explanation.4
Nonetheless, I believe that translation is a certain kind of interpretation, which 
deserves our attention owing to more general methodological issues. Before we 
investigate ways of understanding translation and understanding through trans-
lation, we should clear up a terminological misunderstanding that makes the 
rounds of translation theory, namely categorizing “interpretation” as a type of 
translation.
Due to a dispute between two orientations in translation theory – “linguistic” 
and “literary”  – we have come to distinguish between two types of transla-
tion: the “ordinary” translation and the translation that is an interpretation,5 or, 
in other words, the linguistic (logical and contextual) and the situational (refer-
ential, extra-linguistic) translation. “Ordinary” linguistic translations (including 
machine-made ones) are limited to understanding the form and the information 
about the message’s linguistic parts. The situational (referential, extra-linguistic) 
translation, on the other hand, aims to understand the essence of the message, to 
gain knowledge of the referential subject (the referent).
 3 J. Kmita, Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej (Warsaw 
1971), p. 18.
 4 I am leaving aside the highly complicated, not to say sensitive question: What is science? 
No one doubts that mathematics is a science. If so, perhaps we ought to trust Danuta 
Gierulanka’s arguments on mathematical cognition? She distinguishes three forms of 
understanding: 1) understanding the meaning or intention (sender-oriented? – J.Z.), 
2) understanding the structure, and 3) understanding the role (a pragmatic orienta-
tion? – J.Z.). In each of these cases understanding consists in moving from what is 
directly given to what is ultimately grasped. See D. Gierulanka, Zagadnienie swoistości 
poznania matematycznego (Warsaw 1962), pp. 61–64. To understand a text means to 
intellectually grasp something of the field to which it pertains. But in understanding 
through the text, the meaning of the text itself is sometimes not used to the full (p. 83). 
I should stress the word “used” because this approach lets us see the text not as an 
obstacle, but as a certain value. This value appears to varying degrees depending on 
the disciplines – least of all in mathematics, where the text is “disregarded” to an extent 
incomparable to any other science (p. 150). We generally call this “disregard” for the 
text “transparency,” which, depending on one’s point of view, might be an advantage 
or a shortcoming.
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Alexander Ludskanov writes that one can understand and translate the 
Russian sentence Krivizna tryekhmyernovo prostranstva (K) oznachayet po’etomu 
nalichiye dyefekta ili izbitka u treugol’nikov without identifying the referent of 
the phrase krivizna prostranstva. To understand the form (allegedly) “I need not 
understand the essence of the phrase krivizna prostranstva at all […]. It suffices 
that I see (or establish) – i.e. obtain information about this linguistic (signifying) 
means which will tell me that – that krivizna prostranstva means ‘spatial curva-
ture’ in this context.”6
There are many reasons why we cannot accept this distinction. Firstly, the 
example is convenient because it uses formalized language, which is the language 
of science insofar as it guarantees precise correspondence between the signifier 
and the signified in two texts in different languages. Secondly, the understanding 
of “spatial curvature” is gradable:  without the knowledge of mathematics this 
concept cannot be fully understood, but partial understanding, i.e. the under-
standing of the components alone (curve, curvature, space), is, after all, an 
understanding “of sorts.” Thirdly, Ludskanov’s argument that a digital machine 
can accurately translate this phrase (this statement, or set of statements), and 
thus understands this phrase, is flawed, because a digital machine that renders 
krivizna as “curvature” or Krümmung, and prostranstvo as “space” or Raum in 
the context of krivizna prostranstva, i.e. “spatial curvature” or Raumkrümmung, 
understands nothing, because the understanding of concepts and their 
relationships and the corresponding linguistic symbols have been previously 
determined by the human programmer of the computer’s actions.
What Rozenzveig and Revzin, and Ludskanov in their wake, have called lin-
guistic translation is a certain form of imperfect routine “rough” or “raw” trans-
lation, a form known for ages, sometimes inaccurately called a “philo logical 
translation.” Today it has become a major methodological issue due to the infe-
riority complex of humanists, impressed by the technical complexity of how 
computers work. Friedrich Schleiermacher, a classic figure of hermeneutics, 
used the term das Dolmetschen (as opposed to das Übersetzen) with regard to 
translation in which the translator (be it a person or a computer) uses a facili-
tated program that frees him from the need of continual recursion from the sign 
to the concept and the referent.7
 6 A. Ludskanov, Tłumaczy człowiek i maszyna cyfrowa, trans. K. Leski, A. Naumow 
(Warsaw 1973), pp. 80 ff.
 7 F. Schleiermacher, “Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens” (1813). 
In: Sämmtliche Werke, Abteilung 3, Band 2 (Berlin 1838), pp. 207–213, or in: H. J. Störig 






The Polish language has no equivalents for dolmetschen and übersetzen, and we 
shan’t provide any ad hoc attempts here.8 We shall be using the term “translation”, 
as we are chiefly concerned with how far understanding is involved in transla-
tion, and the gradation of an understanding translation.9 For there are not merely 
two translation variants (situational and linguistic), though there does exist the 
extreme option of translating without understanding the referents: this is how a 
digital machine translates (at a high speed and capacity), and so too (probably in 
an incompetent way) does a person who is unfamiliar with either language, but 
who possesses the relevant dictionary and grammar book.10 From the extreme of 
“zero-referential” translation in practice we move on to translations in which an 
the understanding of the “essence” increases or decreases depending on the type 
of text, but never ceases to be necessary.
2   
Let us take utterance U1 articulated in language L1 (e.g. Je vais à la maison), and 
then utterance U2 articulated in language L2 (e.g. “I’m going home”). The Novice 
does not understand U1. For him, the transformation of U1 into U2 is an act that 
makes the incomprehensible comprehensible; it is the explanation of someone’s 
verbal behavior pertaining to situation R1 (the shared referent) known to both 
the Addresser who produced U1 and to the translator (H) with a command of L1 
and L2, as well as the Novice, who only has a command of L2.
 8 Olgierd Wojtasiewicz [see pp. 91–107 in the present volume – editors’ note] suggests 
(all too arbitrarily, I believe) that we call a translation an action, and a rendering the 
outcome of this action.
 9 “All understanding is interpretation [Auslegen], and all interpretation takes place in 
the medium of a language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the 
same the interpreter’s own language.” This claim of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and 
Method, trans. J. Wiensheimer and D. G. Marshall, London 2013, p. 407) is quoted by 
Werner Koller (Grundprobleme der Übersetzungstheorie (Bern and Munich 1972, p. 65) 
as an argument supporting the thesis contained in the chapter title “Translation as the 
Production of Comprehensibility” [Übersetzen als Herstellung von Verstehbarkeit]. The 
following chapter is called “Translation as Interpretation and Creation [Neuschöpfung].” 
Here the author apprehends interpretation as imitation or reconstruction, recreation.
 10 The example of the possibility of a translation from one language to another rendered 
by a person familiar with neither language but with the relevant lexical/grammat-
ical instructions (just as a computer has a program to use) is provided by Zinovij 
Rovenskij, Avenir Uyemov, and Yekaterina Uyemova (Filozoficzny zarys cybernetyki, 
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In such a case, I would say that the translation is an interpretation, because it 
elucidates the meaning expressed in L1 by building a model for this meaning in L2. 
U2 is thus a model of U1.
We have tacitly assumed that U2 is an adequate model of U1, because U1 is also a 
model for U2, and because the referent we are speaking of is identical and known to 
all three participants in the communication act (A, H, N). We have thus performed 
the optimization we need as a point of departure for an analysis conducted in 
hypothetically sanitary laboratory conditions.
In practice, the correspondence between the two utterances walks a fairly thin 
tightrope. Though in colloquial terms we immediately understand and translate Je 
vais à la maison as “I’m going home,” which in turn we render as Ich gehe nach Hause, 
which becomes Idu domoi, and then back to Je vais à la maison, after a moment’s 
reflection we begin to doubt if we can indeed treat the relationships between these 
phrases as reflexive, symmetrical and transitive, i.e. equivalent.11 For what if we try 
to add not a final clause to the phrase je vais, but an adverbial of manner: Je vais (en 
auto)? It then turns out that the speaker fährt, and not geht. And if a Frenchman says 
je vais à cheval then an Englishman will now be “riding a horse,” and a German can 
only reiten, not gehen or fahren.
If our means of transportation is the subway, things get even more compli-
cated. The Berliner has his U-Bahn, the Parisienne her métro, and the Londoner the 
underground. What will the Pole in Warsaw do when he finally has this means at his 
disposal? Will he travel by metro or SKM [szybka kolej miejska, fast city train]? I sus-
pect it will be metro, and in this way the history of our knowledge of means of trans-
portation will be expressed. At any rate, our Pole in Warsaw of the future or today’s 
Paris pojedzie metrem (is going to travel by metro, from the infinitive pojechać) or 
wsiądzie do metra (is going to board the metro, from the infinitive wsiąść), but never 
weźmie (is going to take, from the infinitive wziąć) the metro, as a Frenchman does 
(prendre le métro). Nor does a Pole ever bierze autobus (take the bus, from the infi-
nitive brać), though he does sometimes happen to brać taksówkę (take a taxi).
For the time being, I  intend to support the claim that texts cannot be pro-
duced without access to extralinguistic information,12 that is to say, that trans-
lation is more than a re-coding on the linguistic level.13 The world, experience, 
 11 On the notion of “equivalence” [równoważność], see: T. Micewicz, Zarys teorii przekładu 
(Warsaw 1971), p. 54.
 12 In other words: extralinguistic information is necessary to gain access to the deeper 
structure. Cf. T. van Dijk, Beiträge zur generativen Poetik (Munich 1972).
 13 A. Popovič, “Teoria przekładu w systemie nauki o literaturze.” In: Konteksty nauki o 








and language – these are the three apexes that demarcate the terrain explored by 
translation theory. In experiencing the world, the speaking and receiving sub-
ject, and in translation also the intermediary subject, takes it in through speech. 
A  game is played between the world, the speech, and the speaker  – as such, 
between the world and the speech, or between the world and the language, there 
is no relationship of “mapping:”
To be sure, what comes into language is something different from the spoken word itself. 
But the word is a word only because of what comes into language in it. Its own physical 
being exists only in order to disappear into what is said. Likewise, that which comes into 
language is not something that is pregiven before language; rather, the word gives it its own 
determinateness.14
This can be empirically ascertained by investigating the possibility of transla-
tion into an artificial language (not a formal one, but one that imitates a natural 
language – e.g. Esperanto). If a group of Esperanto speakers were to find themselves 
on a desert island and were to use only that language, after some time Zamenhof ’s 
creation would become less “aseptic,” because it would come to contain social expe-
rience. For the time being, Esperanto is only a dictionary with a grammar, affiliated 
with European languages (chiefly Romance, partly also Slavic); it has neither past 
nor future.
3   
One of the classic translatological misunderstandings concerns the literalness 
of translations. Arguments in favor of translating sense for sense, and not word 
for word, endorsed by Cicero (non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere; “De 
Inventione”), Horace (Nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus Interpres; “Letter to 
the Pisos”, V 1313), and St. Hieronymus (Non verbum e verbo, sed sensus exprimere 
sensu; “De optimo genere interpretandi,” Letter 57 to Pammachius),15 are seem-
ingly so natural to accept that they hide a number of traps. St. Hieronymus, in fact, 
was less opposing a word-for-word approach than calling attention to the fact 
that the sensus might lie in units of various length – from a word to a fragment, 
 14 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Second, revised edition, Translation revised 
by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshal (London–New York 2004), p. 470.
 15 The reader will find some interesting remarks on the ancient theories of translation 
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sentence, parable, book, or the whole of the Holy Scripture.16 Today we would 
say that Hieronymus and Horace were opposed to acknowledging a word (every 
word) as a finished text, and so they were essentially examining the issues of 
textual delimitation and coherence. Only this rewording of the issue clarifies the 
subsequent development of the debate on translation accuracy. Diderot claimed 
that he got down to translating having read a book once, twice… and having 
closed it.17 Novalis permitted or even recommended a similar tactic, though with 
an opposite justification  – he called such translations mythical (unlike gram-
matical and modifying translations). “Adhering to the tastes of the Romantic 
era, he viewed mythical translations as maintaining ‘the highest style,’ as while 
they might not render the actual work, they do transmit its ideal.”18 Perhaps we 
would not be incorrect in seeing Diderot’s and Novalis’s concepts as an avant la 
lettre conviction that there is a deeper overall structure of a work, reconstructed 
or rearticulated in translation. The difference between two languages and the 
possibility of their correspondence is another prevailing classical issue in the 
history of translation theory. The questions raised by the greatest of practitioners 
and theorists are:  Is translation transparent? Should it be transparent? Should 
the original be recognizable in the translation? Or rather, as Cazamian opines, 
comprendre c’est unifier, wherein unifier means “to unify, reconcile,” but also “to 
level”?19 Ghazar Parbeci, a fifth-century Armenian poet, is said to have claimed 
that words pass through the gate of translation as foreigners, then as guests, then 
as acquaintances, and finally as relatives.20 This is a very beautiful turn of phrase, 
but it is not entirely apt. In a less evocative but more accurate manner, we might 
say that, entering through the gate of a translation as foreigners, words some-
times acquire the citizenship of the city they visit, but sometimes, on the con-
trary, they impose their presence and their foreignness upon their hosts.
These are two schools, or at least two methods of translation. One aims to 
make the color of the original vanish in the translation, and the other permits 
 16 St. Hieronymus stressed that the meaning (or mystery) of the Holy Scripture can be 
contained in both the longer sequences of the text and in a single word or series of 
words (Patrologia latina, Vol. 22, Col. 431).
 17 Cf.: V. Ogniev, “Czas syntezy,” trans. M. Zagórska. In: Przekład artystyczny. O sztuce 
tłumaczenia księga druga, ed. S. Pollak (Wrocław 1975), p. 225.
 18 Novalis, “Blüthenstaub,” Athenaum 1798. Quoted in: K. Dedecius, Notatnik tłumacza…, 
p. 111.
 19 With reference to R. S. Crane, Critical and Historical Principles of Literary History 
(Chicago 1967), p. 51.












the translation to be tinted by the original, and even appreciates the effect of 
foreignness. Already Luther himself grappled with this problem, but as a great 
artist, he put forward a flexible solution: sometimes he spent weeks searching for 
a German equivalent, and when none was forthcoming, he relied on Hebrew or 
Greek borrowings:
Thus for the dignity of this study and the tranquility of the conscience these words 
should be kept and assimilated, and thus the Hebrew language should be admitted 
where it serves better than our German language would be capable.21
This meant that either the original is “moved toward the reader” or that the 
reader bends toward the original.
Luther’s dilemma lost none of its relevance in more than four centuries. 
Schleiermacher believed that speech has a certain malleability (Biegsamkeit), 
thanks to which the boundaries between a foreign and a native language can 
shift. A good translation from, for example, Latin into German, is a text that is 
composed as if written by a Roman with a perfect command of German.22
Wilhelm Humboldt took a different approach, finding the workings of a spe-
cial force he called enérgeia in language; it was active and fruitful only in the 
translator’s native tongue. “A clear recognition of diversity,” he said, “requires 
a third component, a simultaneous consciousness of both one’s own linguistic 
form and a foreign one.”23
This contention between the effect of foreignness and the assimilation effect (if 
we might thus universalize the German terms Verfremdung and Eindeutschung) 
continued into the twentieth century. In 1930, Walter Benjamin, with reference 
to Rudolf Panwitz’s Krisis der europäischen Kultur (1917) and Goethe’s West-East 
Divan, wrote:
Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a wrong premise. They want to turn 
Hindi, Greek, English into German, instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, 
English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language 
than for the spirit of the foreign works. […] The basic error of the translator is that he 
 21 M. Luther, Summarium über den Psalter und Ursachen des Dolmetschens [1533], qtd 
in: R, Kloepfer, Die Theorie der literarischen Übersetzung (Munich 1967), p. 37 [trans-
lation by S. G.].
 22 R. Kloepfer, Die Theorie der literarischen Übersetzung…, p. 53; F. Schleiermacher, Über 
die verschieden Methoden des Übersetzens (1813)…, p. 219; H. J. Störig (Hrsg.), Das 
Problem des Übersetzens…, p. 48.
 23 W. von Humboldt, Uber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues (1828–1829), 
Vol. 6, Berlin 1903–1920, p. 121. Qtd in: Rolf Kloepfer, Die Theorie…, p. 51; cf. R. M. 
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preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his 
language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue.24
“Powerfully affected by the foreign tongue!” Does this mean that the concept 
of fidelity is of not much use in translatology? The joke about translations and 
women who are faithful and ugly or unfaithful and beautiful, though merely a 
joke, has its academic worldview – a Crocean one. Such a worldview hardly befits 
a linguist, so Zenon Klemensiewcz wrote quite (though not entirely) rightly:
The essence of adequacy can be encapsulated in the following way. The original should 
be conceived as a system, and not as the sum of its parts, as an organic whole, and 
not as a mechanical set of elements. […] The task of the translation is not to copy, not 
to recreate, not to speak of converting the elements and structures of the original, the 
words, sentences, prosodic units, visual language etc., but to capture their functions and 
to replace the original with those elements and structures of the target language which 
are, as far as possible, substitutes and equivalents with the same functional capacity, 
suitability, and efficacy, and in this, precisely, resides their adequacy, commensurability, 
equality of value.25
Indeed, it is true that we ought to speak of reproducing the function of the original 
and not of copying its elements and structures. Our doubts are raised by something 
else: by the excess of terms to explain the meaning of adequacy: capacity, suitability, 
efficacy, commensurability, and equality of value. Klemensiewicz used these terms 
as near-synonyms to present what he believed to be the most crucial property of the 
translated work, which “it is a carefully chosen construct of grammatico-lexical and 
stylistic elements in the language of the translation that can faithfully and effectively 
render the work’s impact on the reader’s psyche the author intended.”26
A different formulation of the concept of semantic equality was proposed 
by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz in the supplement to his Introduction to Translation 
Theory (1957). He encapsulates his definition of translation inthe following logi-
cal formula:
b = Tij (a) < = > [(a∈ Li) ^ (b∈ Lj) ^ (a≈b)]
which reads as: “b is the translation of text or word a from one language into 
another” means that “a belongs to language Li, b belongs to language Lj, and b is 
semantically equal to a,” wherein Tij indicates the operation of translation from 
 24 W. Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. H. Zohn (New York 1969), pp. 80–81.
 25 Z. Klemensiewicz, “Przekład jako zagadnienie językoznawstwa.” In:  O sztuce 
tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław 1955), p. 93 [see pp. 59–71 in the present 
volume – editors’ note].








Li to Lj, <=> denotes equivalence, ∈ symbolizes belonging to a set, ^ symbolizes 
logical conjunction (more or less corresponding to the conjunction “and”), and 
≈ symbolizes semantic equality (this formula is somewhat simplified, but suffi-
cient to represent the problem that interests us here).27
Thus, we are dealing with two ways of understanding semantic equality: one 
is naively psychological, the other logical and scientific, and thus reductive, and, 
to make matters worse, it is imprecise.
Equality of value (understood in logical terms) is achieved when two sentences 
result from each another. This also pertains to equality of value in the semantic 
sense. Semantic equality (in logical terms), is, in turn, a relationship of equal 
value that occurs between expressions with the same meaning. Semantic equality 
is generally conceptualized as a stronger relationship than equality of value.28
Wojtasiewicz is aware that, given the commutativity of conjunction, the above 
definition ought to be reversible, i.e. that not only b = Tij (a) etc. but also a = Tij 
(b) etc., and that as a result we might falsely conclude the symmetry of the rela-
tionship. Therefore, he adds that translation is not a fully symmetrical process, as 
“the rules of translating from one language to another are not a simple reversal of 
the rules of translation from the second language to the first one (only the rela-
tionship of semantic equality is symmetrical).”29
It is not only that the relationships between two texts are not fully sym-
metrical – worse, they are hardly ever symmetrical. In fact, we would have to 
abandon the terms “equality of value” and “semantic equality” altogether if we 
were to use them in the sense accepted and rigorously followed in logic.
Since the term “equivalence” (equality of value) is frequently used in 
translatology, however (and since equating the terminology of literary theory 
with that of logic does more harm than good), I  shall hereafter use the term 
“equivalence” in a slightly different, less precise sense. I will be using “equivalence” 
to describe the optimal relationship of correspondence30 of a translated text to 
the original. I am using the concept of “optimal” here in the sense approximating 
 27 O. Wojtasiewicz, “Wybrane zagadnienia z teorii przekładu.” In: Przekład artystyczny…, 
p. 347.
 28 Cf.: Mała encyklopedia logiki, ed. W. Marciszewski (Warsaw 1970), pp. 259 ff.
 29 Wojtasiewicz, “Wybrane zagadnienia,” p. 348.
 30 “For the science of translating the term equivalence is a core concept,” Katharina 
Reiss asserts, adding that “corresponding target language expressions may be consid-
ered optimally equivalent.” See: Translation Criticism: The Potentials and Limitations. 
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its application in game theory:  “The best solution from the adopted point of 
view, bringing the greatest gains with the minimal losses.”
We do not know (and we should rather doubt) if we might find two 
utterances, U1 and U2, belonging to two contacting languages, L1 and L2, of 
which one (U1) appears in L1 always and only when the other statement (U2) 
appears in L2. As such, U1 and U2, appearing together with sufficient frequency, 
ought to be considered equivalent in the translatological sense. I  can say, for 
example, that “brother” is equivalent to the French frère and the German Bruder, 
though I cannot be certain if in all the French or German equivalents of English 
statements containing the word “brother” we will use frère or Bruder.
Using the concept of the “equality of value” as an optimal concept does not 
release us from coming up with a definition of an ideal equality of value.
Presupposing that a sign is to be considered in three relations: to reality, to 
the user, and to other signs, i.e., dividing semiology into semantics, pragmatics, 
and syntactics, I  would propose the following terms for the postulated ideal 
equivalence of two statements belonging to two languages: 1) semantic equality, 
when we are dealing with a semantic relationship, 2) equality of value, when we 
are dealing with a pragmatic relationship, and 3) equality of form, when we are 







 31 Jerzy Pelc uses slightly different terminology, calling the relations between signs (of 
the same language or various languages) substitution: “Two signs substitute each other 
when one can take the place of the other without altering the logical value or sense of 
the statement …. It the first case, equivalent signs substitute each other and the sub-
stitution occurs salva veritate. In the second case, the signs that substitute each other 
are also semantically equal and then the substitution occurs salva sensu.” See J. Pelc, 
“Zastosowanie funkcji semantycznych do analizy pojęcia metafory.” In: Problemy teorii 




Thus, we will say that U1/L1 is the ideal equivalent of U2/L2 when it is also pre-
cisely semantically equal, equal in value, and in form.
4   
Languages are constructed from differently delineated semantic fields. This is 
a home truth and no one apart from a novice might suppose that an acquired 
foreign language is richer and more flexible than his native tongue: we all know 
that his is only an immediate, superficial impression, when one senses the 
inflexibility of one’s own language and admires the exactitude and precision of 
another.
Let us imagine a language that makes no distinction between “buy” and 
“sell,” which has a single term for both these actions. We might jump to the con-
clusion that such an imprecise language is primitive, that it reflects primitive 
trade customs in the society that uses this language. There is nothing more mis-
leading than drawing conclusions on the segmentation of the image of reality 
based on the segmentation of surface structures. On the other hand, it can be 
dangerous to underestimate the seemingly passive resistance of language on the 
surface level, i.e. the level of terms. When an Englishman learns that, in Polish, 
pożycz mi swój długopis means “lend me your pen,” he is only getting half the 
story, because the Polish verb pożyczyć can mean either “lend” or “borrow,” 
depending on the immediate grammatical context, analogous to our example 
of “sell” and “buy.”
We can also easily come up with examples of reverse situations, where an 
English word offers a wider range of meanings, such as the verb “to go.” The 
Polish equivalent of this, depending on the means of locomotion and the 
frequency of travel, parses into iść, chodzić, jechać, and jeździć – leaving aside the 
prefix-generated variants of these verbs and their perfective forms. Yet nobody 
suspects English-speaking people of not being able to tell these meanings apart, 
just as nobody suspects that Polish speakers might get confused about the direc-
tion of the transaction when using pożyczyć for both “lend” and “borrow.”32
This problem is widely known, not to say trivial. And yet in translation prac-
tice, various scopes of semantic attribution lead to the most frequent sorts of 
mistakes, caused not by the translator’s incompetence in a given language, but by 
a certain pressure of automatism exerted by the surface structure.
 32 The examples quoted above have been modified in order to make them more relevant 
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For example, the protagonist of a brilliant English novel, rendered by a fine 
translator, is found to be working in a (public) library nocami (INSTR pl. of noc, 
“night”). Indeed, the original does say that he is working “nights.” The error 
comes from the fact that the English “night” signifies the period between dusk 
and dawn, and thus “day + night” fulfills the condition of the additive function, 
which means that their sum covers the meaning of the concept rendered by the 
Polish doba (a twenty-four-hour period). The English language does, of course, 
have the word “evening,” which corresponds to the Polish wieczór, but “evening” 
is a facultative name for one part of the “night.”
Thus, our protagonist in fact worked wieczorami (INSTR pl. of wieczór, “eve-
ning”) in the library. He could have stated this more precisely, but he didn’t have 






It is true that in Polish we say dniami i nocami [by days and by nights], noce i dni 
[nights and days], dni i noce [days and nights], and dzień i noc [day and night], 
but this is when we are less concerned with a strict measurement of time than 
with signaling its rhythm and flow.
With this example we encounter the next problem in interlingual 
relationships: hyponymy. The physical universe accessible to the speaker’s expe-
rience is divided differently in various languages not only into surface segments 
(horizontally), but also into “levels” (vertically). This vertical division is known 
as hyponymy (and its reverse:  hypernymy). As such, the Polish dzień [day] 
and noc [night], regardless of how we delimit the range of their denotators, are 
hyponyms of the superordinate term doba [24 hours], which has no equivalent 
in English, German, or French. Thus:
doba
dzień noc day night 
This issue, of course, is not limited to nouns – it is only for the sake of clarity 
that we have provided examples with distinctive denotates.
The above-described phenomenon, familiar to both theorists and 
practitioners, actually has no widely accepted expert term. We speak of varying 
objective collocability characteristic of a given language, of semantic attribution 
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and segmentation. None of these terms, however, strike me as sufficiently accu-
rate. Because behind this terminological dispute there is a consequential philo-
sophical one, we must choose a term that would not predetermine the result of 
the discussion.
The subjective-objective universe creates a continuum that is consistent. 
As a dictionary and grammar, language is a collection of discreet or granular 
units of irregular distribution or granulation. Every natural language has a dif-
ferent granular distribution on the surface level of its structure; this is the basic 
translatological difficulty.
This difficulty is usually illustrated by the names of colors, because the 
semantic field of colors is relatively limited and because the spectrum of colors 
is identical for all language users, and can be measured and described fairly pre-
cisely. But are colors identically perceived? Does a speaker of Polish, with several 
words (niebieski, modry, błękitny, granatowy…) for the German blau and the 
French bleu, see this band of the spectrum more clearly?
Having analyzed the semantic fields of color, parts of the body, and plants, 
Bertil Malmberg suggests that “there are no concepts independent of language 
and determined only by ‘reality.’ ”33 Alfred Gawroński disagrees with this conclu-
sion, quite rightly seeing in Malmberg’s claim a continuation of the dispute over 
universals – the naive nominalist’s fight against the realist who is also naive, or 
put in a naive situation. Gawroński writes:
Let us note that the argument whose clear model is offered by Malmberg tacitly supposes 
only one alternative: the choice between two monisms, the nominalistic and the realistic 
monism. Given this alternative, we must either accept that semantic categories are a reflec-
tion of pre-existing categories of reality (a thesis combated by nominalism) or that it is solely 
man who, through language, conjures reality’s divisions and categories into existence.34
Indeed, the most difficult and most interesting problem of language is its equi-
vocal status as a product and a producer. Language is created by human beings, 
but it only submits to ad hoc interventions to a minimal degree. The speaker is 
both a creator and a user; the group of people using what we call a “national 
language” pass on their experience to this language, but it is also through this 
language that they experience the world.
 33 B. Malmberg, Nowe drogi w językoznawstwie, trans. A. Szulc (Warsaw 1969), p. 214. 
Cf: New Trends in Linguistics: An Orientation (Lund 1964).
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Differences in the granulation of various languages are not homological in 
terms of the experience and knowledge of various groups of users. Continuing 
his polemic with Malmberg, Gawroński writes (and he has a point):
The division of the whole semantic field through vocabulary itself should be understood 
less as a closed and finished process than as the first step of categorization, which is 
completed at a higher, syntagmatic level (i.e. at a sentence level), where certain regularly 
repeating sets of words play the same role as certain individual words play on other 
levels.35
This means that languages are either imprecise or extravagant. After all, why 
ought we to discriminate between an elder brother and a younger brother (in 
Hungarian, báty and öccs)? Why distinguish a maternal from a paternal uncle (in 
Polish, wujek and stryjek), or the wife’s mother-in-law, i.e. the mother of her hus-
band, from the husband’s mother-in-law, the mother of his wife (Polish świekra 
and teściowa). We might respond that a need to introduce such distinctions 
reflects social relationships (the importance of types and degrees of kinship 
in a given culture), while the disappearance and impoverishment of certain 
nomenclatures shows changes occurring in these relations. However, this would 
explain only a small fraction of changes in a language’s vocabulary, mainly and 
primarily nomenclature changes whose examples are easiest to find. Languages 
are sometimes imprecise, sometimes extravagant. Translation and all kinds of 
bilingualism reveal this quality of natural languages. Translation does not only 
interpret a text. Translation also interprets language. Translating means looking 
at one’s own speech in the light of the foreign one, and at the foreign in light of 
one’s own; it is admiration and critique, obscuring and illumination.
5  
Generally speaking, translation theories bemoan the untranslatability or incom-
patibility of languages, and the efforts of translation theorists and practitioners 
are directed towards effacing or at least reducing this punishment for building 
the Tower of Babel. Let us take a different course, however, and try to see the 
difference between languages as a virtue rather than a flaw. It is a truism that 
language is a system. Language is also irrational, disorderly, and unpredictable. 
In language, order (i.e. death) struggles with disorder (i.e. life). Because order 
and disorder are variously distributed in them, languages can see one another in 
the mirrors of other languages.






Understanding of one language in light of another entails continuous con-
frontation and ascertainment of capabilities:  of referential semantic equality, 
syntactic equality of form, and subjective equality of value. We already know 
that only if all three conditions are met, ideal equivalence of the two texts occurs, 
while if none of them is met, the meanings of the texts are completely different.
When I say that a door “leads out into the garden” I see nothing very pecu-
liar in this expression until I  try to translate it into French. It then turns out 
that doors don’t have legs and thus cannot “lead” us anywhere. I should use the 
expression La porte donne sur le jardin and wonder that a door should “give” me 
anything. I  say in Polish that something is ważne (important/valid) and, per-
haps, I do not sense the ambiguity of to ogłoszenie jest ważne (this announcement 
is important/valid), which is resolved when I translate it into German. Ważne 
becomes wichtig when we mean that something is of high importance and gültig 
when we mean it is legally binding or valid. As such, the Polish notice can be 
ważne in two ways. I say in English that something is “ready” and that someone 
is “ready,” and I might not register the ambiguity of the word. For example, “my 
lecture is ready” means mein Vortag ist fertig in German, while “I am ready to 
give the lecture” means that ich bin bereit den Vortrag zu halten.
These examples would be trivial if their aim was to illustrate, once again, the 
above-described phenomenon of polysemy and “heterogranularity” of languages. 
But I evoke them to make a different point: I want to say that translation difficul-
ties involve not only unearthing the deep structure of polysemous expressions, 
but also in establishing connections in the surface structure that can sometimes 
be hard to perceive. From this perspective, the astonishment of the German who 
learns that wichtig and gültig are identical in Polish is crucial. This identical ap-
pearance is a sign of a commonality, of a hidden similarity that one misses at a 
first glance: “readiness” as a cause and “readiness” as effect.
Now let us take a reverse example. The German brechen means “to break,” and 
in the vast majority of texts I will most likely find it thus translated indeed. But 
brechen can also mean “to clear the way” (die Bahn brechen), “to pick” flowers, 
“to plow” a field, “to fold” a letter (einen Brief brechen), or “to vomit.” The poly-
semy of the word brechen (and the accidental homonymy) creates, or rather 
unveils connotations that are partly shared: clearing (the way), picking (flowers), 
plowing (a field), folding (a letter, a sheet of paper), even vomiting. Indeed, each 
of these English expressions has to do with destroying or finishing, but also with 
a kind of a new beginning. […] In one instance the German brechen overlaps 
precisely with the English “break” in die Spalte brechen, to break columns in 
print. It could be that this meaning is a German borrowing – at any rate, it is an 
apt Germanism.
Translation – Understanding – Interpretation 183
Can there be an apt Germanism (or Latinism, or Russicism)? Of course. It 
can be useful and beautiful, particularly in idiomatic phrases. Usually, foreign 
borrowings, whether in the form of proper loans or calques, indeed disfigure 
a language; on the other hand, however, purism, that bastard child of national 
complexes, undoubtedly impoverishes it.
6   
To steer clear of sensitive matters, let us try to illustrate the illuminating role 
of translation with emotionally neutral examples. […] The noun dziecko is a 
rela tively exact match for the German Kind, the French enfant, and the English 
“child” (or sometimes “baby”), and nobody would think that this word holds its 
own kind of ambiguity, depending on whether we say “they have children” or 
“the teacher guides children.” In the former case, we mean “children” in the sense 
of “offspring,” while in the latter “children” means “people young of age.”
If someone were to tell us that there was a language which does not discriminate 
between “son” and “daughter,” we might find it to be fairly primitive or we might 
all too hastily search for cultural/anthropological reasons why this granulation is 
so thick.
In Swahili, which has an ancient written tradition and its own contemporary 
translation of the Bible, and thus could hardly be seen as a primitive language, 
mwana can mean either “son” or “daughter;”36 but at the same time, Swahili has 
the noun mtoto, which connotes the “person’s age” and not the kinship relation. 
This might be depicted graphically as follows:
English child daughter, son
Swahili mtoto mwana
This means that the “baby” the Three Magi seek (Luke 1:76) is a mtoto, while the 
“Son of God” (Mark 1:1) is Mwana wa Mungu. When it is absolutely necessary to 
indicate the gender of a child, however, as in the story of Jairus, whose daughter 
Jesus resurrected (saying in the Aramaic, which survived in the Greek text of 
the Gospel of Mark, talitha kumi!), the Swahili Bible keeps the Aramaic quote in 
the original form, calling the daughter kijana (girl), where the English translator 
would use either “child” or “girl.” Meanwhile, in the Book of Genesis (11:11), 
where it says that Shem lived five hundred years and had “sons” and “daughters,” 
 36 I base this on the dictionary of Swahili by Roman Stopa and Bolesław Garlicki: Mały 
słownik suahilijsko-polski i polsko-suahilijski (Warsaw 1966), p. 37 (entry: Mwana), 






East-African Bible scholars say that he had waume na wake, which means “men 
and women.”37
The examples, lists, and tables we have mentioned can be infinitely multiplied; 
what we actually do here is employ stylistic comparison or comparative stylistics, 
or at least we ought to, as so far there have been very few attempts at stylistic/
comparative syntheses of two languages,38 not to speak of multilingual syntheses. 
But our deliberations are not meant as a contribution to a future synthesis, but 
rather as a thesis that can be encapsulated in the statement that translation is a 
comparative activity and that the translated text is an interpretation of the ori-
ginal. It is an interpretation in the sense that it explains the meaning of utterance 
U1 expressed in L1 by building a model of this meaning (U2) in language L2. As 
such, U2 is a model of U1.
The conclusion we are slowly approaching requires certain modifications and 
specifications. Translation is an attempt to create a model of the original state-
ment: in this attempt, doomed to error and tempted by the possibility of clarifi-
cation, it is a special case of interpretation, which is interesting because it allows 
us to observe how the interpretandum is distorted by the interpretans under 
the pressure of the interpreter’s knowledge/ignorance and the target language’s 
structure. Language is looking at its own reflection in another language, text 
in text, experience in experience. To use more precise terminology: in transla-
tion we observe the work of three variables – reality, the subject, and language. 
The dispute between linguistic and literary translation theories is barren in that 
it lacks complementarity:  linguistic theories are chiefly interested in syntactic 
relationships in language, neglecting (sometimes programmatically and provoc-
atively) semantic and pragmatic relationships, while literary theories are often 
not even theories, but merely an assortment of cliches about the kinship of spirit 
between author and translator.
My thesis requires that we construct a proper concept of “the reader” who – 
contrary to popular custom – would read the translation as a translation, and not 
as a surrogate for the original. This reader might be called the “scholarly reader”39 
and amateur reader, and might be treated as either virtual or empirically real. He 
may be an idealization of sorts, or he may be a bookstore customer in search of 
editions with multi-language parallel texts.
 37 All Swahili examples are taken from the Bible: Maandiko Ma-takatifu Ya Mungu 
Yaitwayo Biblia Yanni Agano La Kale Na Agano Jipya (Nairobi 1970).
 38 E.g.: J.-P. Vinay, J. Darbelnet, Stylistique comparée du français et de l’anglais. Méthode 
de traduction (Paris 1958).
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Translation is a peculiar art because it must strive for identification with the 
original, while it profits from the impossibility of fulfilling this task.
As a result, translatology cannot simply view untranslatability as a drawback, 
a flaw, a contaminant that makes it difficult to take measurements and intro-
duce order. By nature, translatology is a study of heresy and schism: it studies 
translations as texts written by dissenters. Traduttore  – traditore:  the trans-
lator as a traitor? Not at all! The translator is not a traitor if treachery means 
abandoning one’s duties or breaking a natural or otherwise sanctioned relation-
ship. He is, however, a heretic in his passionate striving for truth and his sinful 
erring.
To clarify our argument, we should add that we are not interested in inten-
tional and conscious dissent. In other words – the four transformation types in 
poetry translation listed by Victor Koptilov40 (condensation, supplementation, 
restructuring, and substitution) should be regarded as operations that preface (in 
the logical, though not necessarily genetic sense) the translation proper. It seems, 
at any rate, that these sorts of transformations appear not only in between texts 
of various languages, but that they are variants of a wider sort of paraphrase, 
even occurring within a single language. Either way, we are dealing here with 
the very nature of necessary deviations and distortions. To speak of necessary 
distortions, we shall have to accept the premise that the essence of all translation 
activity is a utopian effort to make two texts correspond exactly. The result of this 
utopian pursuit, however, brings a certain real optimization of this correspon-
dence. The optimal state of similarity between text U1, built in target language 
L2, to text U1, built in original language L1, has been called equivalwence here. 
The relationship of equivalence is always unidirectional in translations from 
one natural language to another (it is not reversible, symmetrical, or transitive), 
which means that text U1is rewritten by text U2, but not the other way around, 
and that U2 is the equivalent of U1, but not the other way around. I stress this in 
order to take a polemical stance against terminologies that view equivalence as a 
subcategory of correspondence.41
 40 V. Koptilov, “Transformatziya Khudozhestviennovo Obraza v Poeticheskom 
Pyeryevodye.” In: Teoriya i Kritika Pyeryevoda, ed. B. A. Lari (Leningrad 1962), p. 34. 
Qtd after: E. Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka twórczości dwujęzycznej Brunona Jasieńskiego. Z 
zagadnień teorii przekładu (Wrocław 1968), p. 38.







All unidirectional correspondence between two texts articulated in two 
languages is equivalence; but since, as it has been said, pragmatic, semantic, 
and syntactic relationships can compete, or, in game-theory terms, they are 
antagonistic, the systematics of equivalence must take into account differences 
in how the two languages are used by two speaking subjects, to whom similar 
knowledge about a given objective-conceptual reality (shared or not) is (or is 
not) available. To simplify our systematics as far as possible, let us distinguish 
four varieties of equivalence:  transliteration, transcription, description, and 
loan. To facilitate our task, our first example will be less a translation from one 
language to another than the notation of a single language into two different 
alphabets. In this sense the reality which we hope to communicate is the pho-
netics of an ethnic language, while the code is the relevant alphabet. Let us com-
pare a Bulgarian word written in the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. Let us take a 
word with an international sound and meaning, but one that has an old-Slavonic 
ultra-short semivowel that survived in Bulgarian: the hard or back yer. For the 
clarity of the example, the remaining sounds should be similar to English in all 
their relationships (including, and above all, syntactic).42 Let us therefore take a 
name of a measurement, metъr. The ultra-short vowel ъ does not exist in English 
and the Latin-based English alphabet offers no equivalent for it. As a result, an 
Englishman with the code of the Latin alphabet at his disposal will find no way to 
transliterate the Bulgarian ъ in his phonic experience. For transliteration means 
rendering letter for letter so that, as far as possible, one letter does not represent 
two sounds, or that one sound does not require two letters – so that the system of 
both alphabets is perfectly equivalent. Transliteration, therefore, is only possible 
after applying the international phonetic alphabet, and this means the use of a 
new language – a lingua universalis of sorts. If I do not know this alphabet, I can 
do something else – I can search for a vowel in the English experience (in the 
English speech apparatus) that approximates and the ъ sound and render it with 
the short “i,” such as we find in the word “bit.” This adaptive approach, which 
respects differences of experience, we call transcription. If it should prove nec-
essary, in certain cases I can also forgo transcription and settle for what we call 
description: “a short, central, neutral vowel.” When description is inconvenient, 
 42 We should note here that the example of a translation from one alphabet to another 
merely serves as a convenient introduction to the issue. Transliteral equivalences on the 
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transcription imprecise, transliteration impossible, and we should like to avoid 
confusion, then we abandon all attempts at assimilation and simply borrow the 
ъ symbol for the Latin alphabet, writing: metъr, Petъr, etc.
8  
A translation is always an instance of “being for…” and “being for the sake of…”. 
The distinction between transliteration and transcription, description and loan, 
forms the systematics of rules for achieving equivalence according to the degree 
in which the speaking subject assimilates the world. For transcription, in a 
sense, is a hidden comparison – unfamiliarity with an object, its exotic nature, 
or its altered customary function causes substitution. Description, in turn, is a 
metalingustic operation.43 A  loan comes in tandem with the assimilation of a 
foreign concept and an object of foreign origin, most often a product of civili-
zation.44 A loan is sometimes replaced by a neologism and then removed from 
the language (as automobil in Polish became samochód), or sometimes coexists 
alongside the native word but has a narrowed, more specific meaning (as in the 
Polish wygoda and komfort pair).
Incidentally, all the above-named varieties of equivalence could and should 
be signaled in popular bilingual dictionaries by means of qualifiers. For instance, 
das Tor is correctly transliterated in German-English dictionaries as “gate” and 
“goal” (in football), but der Mundschenk rendered as “cupbearer” requires a 
qualifier that would indicate this equivalent as a transcription, because in both 
languages we are dealing with a title that pertains to official and customary 
relationships, which are comparable, though untranslatable (untransliterable). 
On the other hand, the Polish gazda [a farmer in the Tatra mountains] would be 
erroneously translated as the German der Gebirgsbauer except with a qualifier 
 43 Roman Jakobson (“On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” In: On Translation, ed. 
R. A. Brower, New York 1959) distinguishes between three varieties of translation: 1) 
intralinguistic, 2) interlinguistic and 3) intersemiotic translation. This division strikes 
me as logically flawed, given that re-editing is both intralinguistic and interlinguistic. 
Thus, the word “teach” can be “re-edited” using the phrase “a pejorative term in student 
slang, meaning ‘teacher’.” This word should be explained in a bilingual dictionary in the 
same fashion, so that an English-German dictionary would read: teach – (verächtlich 
im Schülerjargon): Lehrer. This would be an example of re-editing in a terminology we 
call “description,” as distinct from a kind of transcription from “teach” to Arschpauker.
 44 Despite all appearances, the situation of the language loan is complicated: it can be a 









that would categorize it as a description. A lack of such qualifiers is felt by all 
dictionary users. Das Tor, der Mundschenk, and gazda all “signify differently.” In 
other words, they have different relations of equivalence with their dictionary 
counterparts; they are equivalent in different ways.
We arrive at some interesting observations through analyzing ways of 
achieving equivalence in onomastic and toponomastic terms.
Let us take the French name Jacques. We will normally translate this into 
Polish as Jakub, presupposing that, in a certain sphere of civilization, this name 
is ordinary, widespread, and shared. If we apply the Polish familiar form of the 
name, Kubuś, then we have a transcription, for all hypocorisms are not universal, 
but characteristic and local (it is, for example, significant that Kubuś appears in 
the Polish title of Diderot’s Jacques the Fatalist). Jacques will still be called Jacques, 
as a loan word, if the fact that he belongs to French culture is an integral part of 
the text (or the literary genre). We do not take into account description when it 
comes to translating names (it is possible only in explaining telling names). We 
do translate, that is transliterate, the names of widely known cities. We say Rome, 
Florence, Vienna, and Moscow, but Bologna, Rostock, and Nizhny Novgorod. In 
this case it is exceptionally clear that the choice of equivalence depends on the 
genre convention and cultural factors. For instance, a contemporary realist novel 
often defies translation when it comes to the transliteration of proper names, 
whereas the common language custom requires us to transliterate places names. 
As such, the sentence Vittorio e stato invitato a Roma would be translated as 
“Vittorio was invited to Rome,” and not “Victor was invited to Roma.”
There are cases, however, where historical or political reasons oblige us to 
replace a correct transliteration with an erroneous loan. In a certain period, 
the Warsaw Radio began its program for Germans with the words Hier spricht 
Warszawa instead of Hier spricht Warschau. We can understand why this pecu-
liarity was invented, but the error remains an error, whose dimensions we can 
imagine by reversing the formula:  Tu mówi [here speaks] München or  – dis-
tancing ourselves from the conflict zone – Tu mówi [here speaks] Athína, etc.
It does sometimes happen, however, that transliteration and loan are equally 
justified, a situation which expresses an uncertainty as to the degree of assimi-
lation of the name, which is proportionate to the general knowledge about the 
referent. Ought one to say Cracow or Krakow, for instance? Loans are undoubt-
edly there in order to avoid confusion when it comes to international transpor-
tation timetables and information. I  take the train from Stockholm to Rome, 
but on the signboard I read: Sassnitz – Szczecin – Wrocław – Praha – Wien – 
Roma. Although rare, examples of toponomastic transcription do occur: in an 
eighteenth-century novel adaptation that gave the reality a Polish flavor, though 
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the original plot-line and intrigue is kept, Paris could be equivalently replaced 
with Warszawa.45
The Russian dub [oak] should, of course, be transliterated into Polish as dąb. 
Plant names should present no problem. And yet with a change of context, the 
Russian dub may cease to be a Polish dąb. I might only recall the well-known 
difficulties Julian Tuwim had in translating a passage from Pushikin’s Ruslan and 
Ludmila: U lukomorya dub zyeloniy (“By an arc of sea a green oak stands” in 
Roger Clarke’s translation). In Tuwim’s Polish version, the tree becomes a “green 
sycamore by the bay.” The transcription of dub as jawor [sycamore] is justified 
by the connotations of tree names in the folklores of the respective nations (in 
Polish folk songs:  “sycamore, sycamore, sycamore people” and “why are you 
standing under that sycamore, girl?”).
The doubts that come with the choice between transliteration and transcrip-
tion have often been discussed by translators. Jerzy Zagórski, for example, pleads 
guilty –unnecessarily, as I shall presently attempt to prove – to having once “too 
hastily” translated the phrase mi figue – mi raisin as pół figi – pół rodzynki [half 
fig – half raisin] instead of correctly (!?) offering ni pies, ni wydra [neither fish 
nor fowl].46 We ought to come to his defense against himself. While pół figi – pół 
rodzynki is a calque, ni pies, ni wydra is a transcription. In translating proverbs 
and phraseological expressions, a calque is not blameworthy; on the contrary, it 
often has more assets than a transcription.
Let us take the proverb (proverbial phrase) robić z igły widły [lit. “to make a 
pitchfork out of a needle,” fig. “to make a mountain out of a molehill”] and try 
to translate it into German. Preserving the moral sense (making a big deal out 
 45 In translating place names, we ought to take into account the complications that arise 
from a special addresser/addressee relationship, and their relationships to the language 
and to the referent: the peculiarity of these relations lies in the fact that all the elements 
participating in the communication act here are “of a certain nationality.” If A (of 
nationality a) talks with B (of nationality b) in language c (because A does not know b 
and B does not know a), then they must decide between them what language (a, b, or 
c) they will use to name a place that lies in country A (or B). Let us suppose that, due to 
historical circumstances, all three languages have their own names for a given place: for 
example, a Pole speaking German with a Slovak hesitates before asking: Wohnen sie in 
Pressburg?, but will also feel uncertain whether to say Wohnen sie in Bratysława or in 
Bratislava? This is a problem at the crossroads between stylistic and social norms. On 
a similar topic, see: T. Pretnar, “Nazwy geograficzne i ich odpowiedniki rzeczywiste. 
Na marginesie polskiego przekładu Symultanki Ingeborg Bachmann,” Literatura na 
Świecie 1977, No. 1.






of something small or trivial) and respecting German usage, we will say: aus der 
Mücke einen Elefanten machen (to make an elephant out of a moskito). And con-
versely: we render the German (though probably borrowed) aus der Mücke… as 
the Polish robić z igły widły, when the context permits or demands that we make 
the expression and the surrounding circumstances Polish. This procedure would 
be a transcription. But let us now check the opportunities for creating a calque 
with these proverbs and let us write robić z komara słonia in Polish and aus der 
Nadel eine (Heu)gabel machen in German. Of course, just as the Poles do not say 
pół figi – pół rodzynka, they do not say robić z komara słonia, but it is not an error 
if these phrases are used in a translation.47
To transcribe or to calque? That is a genological question. All this brings us 
back to the dilemma of Luther and Goethe. Are we to “Polonize” Shakespeare, 
or to subject the text designed for a Polish actor to a mild English stylization 
that could be seen though the perfectly correct Polish grammar (as Jerzy S. Sito 
manages to do)? In a fairly essayistic tone, we might rephrase the question: Is 
English the language of Shakespeare, or is it the language of Hamlet, King Lear, 
and Othello? There is no doubt that English is the language of Hamlet in a dif-
ferent sense than French is the language of Gargantua and of Jacques the Fatalist, 
and different again from how English is the language of Winnie the Pooh.48 The 
identification and distinction of the language of the protagonist from that of the 
author, or rather their differing relationships to a given ethnic language, which 
is also the language of the work – this remains one of the most interesting and 
practically unexplored problems in translation studies.
[…]
I have quoted all the above examples to emphasize again that interpretation in 
translation is a special case of confrontation between two kinds of competence. 
My initial claim that translation is interpretation through modelling can be 
now summarized as follows: since the modelling is performed in various kinds 
of material, the text and language of the translation and the original text and 
language can mutually explain each other.
[1979/1980]
Translated by Soren Gauger
 47 Some phraseological collocations are untranslatable (recte: which defy transliteration).









The history of the art of translation, in Poland as elsewhere, abounds in translators’ 
statements. These are appended to their works as various sorts of “extras,” as 
prefaces, afterwords, glosses illuminating “obscure” passages of the original 
text, and remarks pertaining directly to the act of translation itself, which, as we 
know, is a custom that has been practiced by translators since Antiquity. These 
are not infrequently testimonies of major importance for understanding the art 
of translation, and the postulate that “the history of the development of trans-
lation should begin with compiling inventories of [translators’ –J.S.] abundant 
statements on these matters”1 is all too correct. Fortunately, we now have such 
compilations; special attention should go to two important publications released 
under the patronage of the Translation Section of the Polish PEN Club: On the 
Art of Translation (1955) and Artistic Translation:  On the Art of Translation, 
Volume Two (1975), as well as an anthology edited by Edward Balcerzan, Polish 
Writers on the Art of Translation, 1440–1974 (1977).2 Such writing on strictly 
translation-oriented problems, the work of the translators themselves, has had a 
checkered history, as the aims of the translators/self-commentators have changed 
over the centuries; here, however, it is not our task to discuss this historical (if 
fascinating) issue. The present consideration shall be based almost exclusively 
on contemporary material, as our aim is to determine what is the place in the 
present-day translation research of statements by practicing translators, who, we 
might add, have no ambitions whatsoever to act as translation theoreticians or 
critics.
Every recorded statement, of whatever form or type, that bears the mark 
of authorial signature is important, relevant, necessary, indispensable, etc. 
and should thus be analyzed as carefully as possible – insofar as the scholar’s 
 1 P. Grzegorczyk, “Problematyka tłumaczeń. Szkic bibliograficzny.” In:  O sztuce 
tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław, 1955), p. 445 [further on quoted as: OST].
 2 Przekład artystyczny. O sztuce tłumaczenia księga druga, ed. S.  Pollak, (Wrocław 
1975) [further on quoted as: PA]; Pisarze polscy o sztuce przekładu 1440–1974. Antologia, 
ed. E. Balcerzan (Poznań 1977) [further on quoted as: PP]. [An extended version of 










competence and insight permits. Given that alongside, or on the margins of 
translations, so to say (though they need not be marginal in the pejorative sense) 
there appear the translators’ own statements devoted to translated texts, we need 
not ask to what extent they are important, relevant, or necessary. Since they exist, 
it is clearly in order to play a more-or-less important role with regard to the pri-
mary text, to fill a gap in the work which might dissatisfy the translator in certain 
respects, driving him to clarify or supplement it, or turn the reader’s attention 
to alternative translation solutions disregarded in the main text, etc. The trans-
lator can be his or her own censor, editor, and reviewer. A translation commen-
tary provides what for a multitude of reasons could not appear in the translation 
itself. It tells the reader what the main text is unable to communicate, at least 
not in an explicit fashion.3 The translator is sincerely concerned for the correct 
reading of the text’s intentions, particularly when the translation itself does not 
unambiguously give instructions to this effect. We might well doubt if the reader 
would glean all of the translator’s intentions embedded in the main work without 
this considerable assistance. Thanks to the translator’s direct statements we dis-
cover, for example, that the translation of a piece by a little-known American 
poet, W.S. Merwin, “Corps de ballet,” was created “to demonstrate the powerful 
present-day tendency to address various problems directly, that is, to rebuild 
the poem’s logical structure.”4 When the translator’s comments take the form 
of a more personal confession, they have yet different weight. “This time I did 
not intend to create an anthology of Russian poetry as such. I chose authors and 
works that spoke to me on the deepest emotional level.”5
Or in a similar vein: “I set out to translate something […] that could match 
my twentieth-century bitterness: The Kohelet, or: Ecclesiastes.”6
 3 It also sometimes happens that a commentary is embedded in the text. “When Neruda 
writes ‘the morphocypris butterfly’ [mariposa de muso], we have to add ‘the blue 
morphocypris butterfly;’ when he writes ‘the marvelous jacaranda tree,’ we have to 
add ‘the violet jacaranda tree,’ as for the poet, who knows the bright-blue morphocypris 
butterfly and the jacaranda with its violet blooms from everyday life, the colors are 
contained in the names themselves, whereas we have to explain them to our readers. Of 
course, such elaborations are possible only in a small number of cases” (J. Iwaszkiewicz, 
“Przekłady z Pablo Nerudy,” quoted from: OST, pp. 247–248). “The only solution is 
to translate and explain all at once, including a commentary into the text.” See: A. 
Sandauer, “Wstęp.” In: Arystofanes, Żaby (Warsaw 1956), p. 11.
 4 C. Miłosz, Kontynenty (Paris 1958), p. 359.
 5 J. Łobodowski, U przyjaciół (Lublin-Warsaw 1935), p. 126.
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The personal and sometimes even intimate (as in the above examples) nature 
of statements from translators, who reveal the deeper reasons for their interest 
in a given work, aims to convince the reader that translations are always born 
of particular inner needs and motifs that the readers do not and cannot know, 
for they have no direct access to them. Balcerzan correctly observes that self-
commentary “reveals the biography withdrawn from the text of the transla-
tion, transparent within it, and reduced to the role of an instrument.”7 Today’s 
translator (things once were different) does not wish to be relegated to a non-
subjective medium; in phrasing his other, more personal statement à part, he 
wants to sanction his right to speak in the first person as “myself,” and not only 
as the “representative of the author,” i.e. the person whose work he translates. 
“A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block 
its light, but allows pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to 
shine upon the original all the more fully.”8 Translator statements indicate the fic-
tion of the “pure language” Benjamin mentions; the translator’s biography is not, 
and never can be “transparent” in the work. It is in the translators’ statements 
that this truth is articulated. Thus, their intention, apart from purely personal 
aims, is to counteract the falsity of seeing translations as “pure” and “transparent” 
representations of foreign works.
It is easy to see, then, that translators’ commentaries serve as a sort of metatext 
to the main text, describing the work, the finished product; regrettably, they do 
so in the same language as the translation itself. Like every metatext, they con-
cern “either a set of sentences in a creative statement, or the rules governing this 
statement.”9 Thus, the aim of the translator is to reveal his hidden work method, 
to “tally” his mistakes with both the reader and his fellow translators, to give 
account of both necessary and arbitrary compromises that were made etc. The 
translator’s statement à part questions this attribute of the given work which is 
indisputable when it comes to all original works: its completion. Translators do 
not generally describe their finished products if they seek to find the readers’ 
(and scholars’) understanding for their decisions – this is done by focusing at-
tention on the various stages of their work, on the various phases of progress, in 
a word, by concentrating on the work in statu nascendi. “The following remarks 
are an attempt at almost stenographically recording the course of work on the 
 7 E. Balcerzan, “Wstęp” PP, p. 6.
 8 W. Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator.” In: Illuminations, trans. H. Zohn (New York 
2007), p. 79.
 9 K. Bartoszyński, “Pogranicza krytyki literackiej.” In: Badania nad krytyką literacką, ed. 








translation of the first four lines of the introduction from Pushkin’s epic poem 
Ruslan and Ludmila,” wrote Julian Tuwim in his now-famous “translator’s con-
fession,” titled “Working on a Quatrain.”10 An exceptional example comes from a 
relatively recent publication by Maria Kurecka, Devilish Troubles, covering, step 
by step, the dauntless and truly Benedictine labor of rendering in Polish one 
truly remarkable book: Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus.11 The inner imperative 
that made the author comment on her own work, showing the whole world the 
enormous scale of this effort, no smaller than the one needed to create the origi-
nal work, must have been considerable indeed, given that the “supplement” to 
the translation is a whole book in itself!
It is the ambition of today’s translators to present by means of such a creative 
self-commentary another version of the original; these are not, therefore, mere 
meta-statements on the main text, on the “first-degree” statements, but rather 
competing partner texts that rival the previous version. At the heart of these 
secondary statements lies a sense of insufficiency, of the inadequacy of the work 
he has managed to produce, albeit not in a form that he finds fully or partly satis-
factory. How often we find in translators’ confessions that works and authors 
they had once thought overcome now torture their mind. After many years they 
return to their translations, finding passages which, they believe, could sound 
“better” (which could mean either more “Polish,” or, on the contrary, more 
faithful to the original). Such was the case with Nerval’s beautiful sonnet “El 
Desdichado,” which, once translated, was a source of nagging doubt for the 
translator,12 or one line from Baudelaire’s “The Balcony:” Nous avons dit souvent 
d’impérissables choses. This was the only line in his work that later struck the 
translator (Czesław Miłosz) as less successful, which is why he tried to alternate 
the rendition.13 It is an old home truth that poetry translation means sacrificing 
some things for others, privileging certain aspects of a work (e.g. rhythm) at 
others’ expense; it should not surprise us, then, that poetry translators, aware of 
their losses and failures, should try to do things over. They feel driven to do this 
 10 “Czterowiersz na warsztacie,” first printed in Wiadomości Literackie 1936, No. 47; 
reprinted in: J. Tuwim, Pegaz dęba, czyli panopticum poetyckie (Warsaw 1950) and 
PP, pp. 280–294.
 11 M. Kurecka, Diabelne tarapaty, Poznań 1970. [Kurecka’s translation of Doctor 
Faustus, made in collaboration with her husband, Witold Wirpsza was published in 
1960 – editor’s note].
 12 A. Ważyk, “Przygody i doświadczenia,” PA, pp. 331–332.
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by the unchanging rules of the art, which hold that the translation should sacri-
fice as few of the original’s attributes as possible.
It seems that this motivation of translators’ commentaries first came to the 
fore in the Romantic era, though those translators owed a great deal to their 
predecessors from the Enlightenment. At that time both amateurs and masters 
of translation were increasingly coming round to the idea that there was not, 
and could not be a perfect translation, that every translation could only be an at-
tempt to wrestle with a foreign work – and this alone justifies its existence in the 
literary culture; that it could never bring satisfaction to those who would seek to 
see it as a faithful and exact recreation of the author’s “thoughts” and “feelings,” 
a meticulous rendering of the content and form (let us also bear in mind that in 
those days there were far more bilingual readers, who were able to translate the 
work on their own and were thus all the more capable of assessing the translator’s 
achievement). A translation is only one of many possible versions of a foreign 
work, a version created through a range of utterly random circumstances, and 
thus, if other “parameters,” occurred, the results of the translator’s work could 
be entirely different. The more adamantly and vociferously the “fidelity” of the 
translation to the original is postulated, the more clearly translators see other 
competing projects, which hence cannot be considered singular and final, as it 
was once assumed.14
This is why, in translators’ commentaries of that epoch, a ready and finished 
translation was sometimes furnished with a whole web of dubious and unhealthy 
suspicions that it was incomplete, in need of improvement, that it was the 
product of compromises in which the original author probably lost more than 
he gained. This made the urge to write a commentary all the stronger. Cyprian 
Kamil Norwid, who also in this respect had a viewpoint very much like today’s 
translators, advised against “providing the translation alone” – he was thinking 
of translations possibly “profitable for the present time,” as he was convinced 
that two parallel versions of the same work, a translation in the strict sense and 
a critical translation, need not be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they 
could coexist on equal terms, alongside each other. “If I were to translate Childe 
Harold’s Pilgrimage I would write a separate version alongside, in critical prose.”15 
Today this truth is considered patently obvious among poetry translators (largely 
aspiring to be called professionals and experts in a field we have come to call 
 14 J. Ziętarska, Sztuka przekładu w poglądach literackich polskiego Oświecenia 
(Wrocław 1969).
 15 C. Norwid, “O tłumaczeniach z Byrona (written in 1865),” PP, p. 169. On Norwid see 






the art of interpretation or “close reading”), who believe that the premise of all 
translation is experimentation, i.e. a trial, including critical, “commentary-like” 
rendering of a foreign work that has already been attempted by a translator. This 
kind of rendering only increases the range of possible solutions and, like all other 
versions, whether actual or potential, does not aspire to a greater “compatibility” 
with the original. Increasingly, the standpoint of the contemporary translator, as 
far as we can recreate it on the basis of the self-reflective statements, encourages 
us to think of the translation process in terms of a game. The game has replaced 
the old metaphor of a fight, a duel, in which rigid codes of honor held sway; 
the combatants (the translator and his author) had to respect these rules, and 
so there could be only one victor in this duel. The one who succumbed to his 
rival was defeated by “superior weaponry and an exhausted treasury of vocabu-
lary.”16 In a freer game, meanwhile, there are no victors nor losers; the results 
of the rivalry between the translator and the author are increasingly difficult to 
predict, and the rules of the game are always changing, for they are established 
anew on every occasion. As Maria Kurecka notes (following Ortega y Gasset), 
a game involves utterly free activity, unhampered by the restrictions of life; its 
repetitiveness, etc.17 Furthermore, “poets and translators of various movements 
write their own rules of the game […], which become relative, open to constant 
change.”18 This corresponds with the view that a translation’s proper “form of 
existence” is the series. “Even if a foreign-language work has been translated into 
our tongue only once, we apprehend this translation as the beginning of a series 
of other translations that will or may be created in future. It is vital that both a 
partially realized and a potential series are open to further development. They 
are sequences which, for all practical purposes, are infinite.”19
2   
The superordinate category that embraces the actual multiplicity of the 
translator’s roles in the translation process is that of the interpreter of the lite-
rary text (in the musical sense of the word; it is not by chance that the authors 
of commentaries devote so much attention to the analogy between a translator 
and a musician who the plays a melody according to the score). In the course of 
 16 L. Osiński, “O potrzebie, ważności w literaturze i warunkach przekładów,” PP, p. 111.
 17 Kurecka, Diabelne tarapaty, pp. 52–54.
 18 A. Ważyk, “Przygody i doświadczenia,” p. 333.
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his work, the translator also executes a great many “commissions,” feeling that 
none can be disregarded, that while he has various obligations toward his sup-
posed readers (to whom he supplies knowledge of the world, as an experienced 
guide through its sprawling labyrinths, sometimes called upon to be an adviser, 
teacher, and moral authority, at other times a promoter of new literary phe-
nomena), he is primarily obliged to the translated author. All the aforementioned 
roles must be acknowledged as secondary to his primary function as a reader, an 
interpreting critic, an insightful exegete, and a scholar. Translators’ statements 
demonstrate in a fine way the stages of designing and carrying out a work plan, 
illustrating the translator’s ever-changing self-perception as a “reader,” “critic,” 
“scholar,” etc. This means that he simultaneously identifies himself with each of 
these self-designed roles, seeking to attain the optimal result, the best one pos-
sible. The optimization of the translation process through the adoption of such 
self-suggestions or working hypotheses is the first important information to be 
gained by the the scholar and the critic from a patient reading of these texts. 
An initial remark:  none of the translator’s experimental trial versions should 
be disregarded; we ought to remember that the finished translation is the fruit 
of many individual interpretations, which leave an invisible mark on the whole 
text (the skill is in the concealing of mastery!). The translations are sometimes 
done by heart. “I eyed the quatrain. I have known it by heart for perhaps thirty 
years.”20A poem stored in the memory and often repeated (like a folk rhyme) – 
or rather recited “for oneself,” situated in the realms of auto-communication, 
where each time it is enriched by a new network of associations, becomes, as it 
were, an organic element of the translator’s life. We might say that we are dealing 
here with a Mallarmesque metaphor of Life woven around the Book. We gener-
ally tend to treat the translators’ statements as their private documents; but the 
autobiographies of translators that emerge from their “confessions,” even when 
at their most personal, are evidently constructed biographies; after all, “the life of 
the author is a kind of a text itself, its legibility and meaning derived from its con-
nection to the world of literature.”21 Let us not be misled by the private and con-
fessional titles, such as: “Tyetradi Pyeryevodchika,” “Notizbuch des Übersetzers,” 
“Some Reflections on the Difficulty of Translation,” etc.22 In all these examples 
 20 J. Tuwim, Czterowiersz na warsztacie, PP, p. 281.
 21 J. Sławiński, “Myśli na temat:  biografia pisarza jako jednostka procesu 
historycznoliterackiego.” In: Biografia – geografia – kultura literacka, ed. J. Ziomek, 
J. Sławiński (Wrocław 1975), p. 15.
 22 L. S. Barkhudarov, Tyetradi Pyeryevodchika, (Moscow 1964); K. Dedecius, Notatnik 








the translator’s biography has its own logic, which is by no means the logic of 
real life. The internal rhythm of this biography is created by the ebb and flow 
of a fascination with a given work; it is composed of phases of feverish work 
followed by rest, or in-depth study and then an entirely disinterested reading etc. 
Unquestionably, the only part of the translator’s life that has significance for him 
is what is directly linked with the work kept in his memory and often recreated. 
All the rest is meaningless chaos.
The work recreated in the memory is an endlessly paraphrased text in the most 
basic sense of the word: paraphrasing means saying the same thing, but in a dif-
ferent way. The impulses for internally recoding these texts through memory are 
supplied by the translator’s life itself, made meaningful by many years of acquain-
tance with the same work, which reveals a new, unfamiliar, and unexpected 
horizon of significance each time around. Thus understood, the translator’s life 
is the first, hugely important interpretive framework for the original work; it is 
a screen, as it were, which the work gradually crosses. In speaking of himself, 
the translator isolates certain “segments” of his biography. This biography is dia-
critical, so to speak:  every segment is deeply rooted in “its own” time, which 
indicates not only that the translator’s consecutive interpretations of a work are 
not only chronologically restricted and that the various interpretations accumu-
late, but also that they are always qualitatively different. Years later, translators 
are not certain if works signed with their names are really their own: “[…] I am 
far from certain if that is my translation, or merely the recollection of someone 
else’s translation that was lost and somehow survived in some corner of my 
memory.”23 Naturally, this is a tactic, a game, mere autosuggestion, but it is signif-
icant for the translator’s work, in his constant progress from one stage of his writ-
erly biography to the next. The translator is truly content not with “corrected” 
works but with utterly new ones, executed in a radically new fashion. The above-
mentioned book by Maria Kurecka is an instance of self-created biography (of 
two translators). Another fine example is Roman Brandstaetter’s Biblical Circle, a 
brilliant depiction of life in a close relationship with the Bible, a work he carried 
“inside him” for many years.24 Karl Dedecius’ Translator’s Notebook25 has a clearly 
of Translation.” In: A. Fang, R.A. Brower, eds, On Translation (Cambridge, MA 1959), 
pp. 111–133.
 23 A. Ważyk, “Przygody i doświadczenia,” p. 334.
 24 R. Brandstaetter, Krąg biblijny (Warsaw 1975). [Roman Brandstaetter (1906–1987), a 
Polish-Jewish writer and journalist, translated into Polish selected books from the Old 
and New Testament – editors’ note].
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biographical character. Mieczysław Jastrun, Adam Ważyk, and Czesław Miłosz 
have also left us extremely valuable testimonies.26
3   
Translators’ statements record their reading experiences; sometimes they give 
evidence, for example, of having read the original text out loud. The translator 
of Sophocles’ Antigone recalls that he recited the tragedy in the original Greek 
so as to “hear the rhythm of the internal melody and render this rhythm in the 
phrase of Polish poetry.”27 Many equally interesting remarks on a similar topic 
can be found in the relevant chapters of Kurecka’s book, which cover her work 
on the “musical” passages in Doctor Faustus.28 The translator first reads the text 
for himself, producing for private purposes, as it were, the fiction of the original 
reader of the work, and then in turn becomes the interpreter of the now different 
melody, and finally, its listener, gauging the sound of the text he created just 
moments before etc. “I heard those choruses of Sophocles in my translation […] 
and I assure you, they made a powerful impression.”29 Indeed, the translator is a 
Protean persona, transforming from the “quiet” reader to the “loud” interpreter, 
then into the composer of a different melody, and finally into an adoring listener! 
Every reading is a performance of the work; we might say, in the most general 
terms, that the translator is bound by the principle of an inordinately scrupulous 
reading, wherein it would be a sin to lose sight of the text even for a moment. It 
must be always at hand. This fact is frequently stressed in translators’ statements.
The above-cited Ludwik H.  Morstin argues that “no one gets to know the 
work like its translator; no one is so intimately acquainted with the author.”30 
Translation, as another author tells us, is “the art of minute details.”31 Indeed, in 
his quiet or vocal dialogue with the author, the translator is justified in believing 
himself initiated into rules of the poetic art that are hidden from ordinary 
readers. We might say that such reading always sets a new boundary between the 
 26 M. Jastrun, Między słowem a milczeniem (Warsaw 1960); Poezja i rzeczywistość. Eseje i 
szkice (Warsaw 1965); Walka o słowo (Warsaw 1973); A. Ważyk, Kwestia gustu (Warsaw 
1966) and Wybór przekładów (Warsaw 1979); Czesław Miłosz, Kontynenty, Prywatne 
obowiązki (Paris 1972), Ogród nauk (Paris 1981).
 27 L. H. Morstin, Moja praca nad przekładem utworów Sofoklesa, Horacego, Lope de Vegi, 
Calderona i Goethego, OST, p. 281.
 28 Kurecka, Diabelne tarapaty pp. 121–154.
 29 Morstin, Moja praca, p. 281.
 30 Morstin, Moja praca, p. 279.
















spheres of text and non-text (a semiotic mechanism of experiencing the text). 
Over the course of reading, the translator accesses what is normally inacces-
sible, or seldom accessible, to the ordinary reader: the poet’s individual language. 
Jastrun writes that “this language [he is referring to Mallarmé, Hölderlin, and 
Rilke – J.Ś.] is, in a sense, untranslatable, and the translator must combine his 
awareness of this fact with audacious and resilient persistence.”32 For today’s 
poet, translation becomes a measure of the poetic character of the utterance 
itself; attention has decidedly shifted from peripheral issues to, so to speak, the 
linguistic heart of poetry, the center of poetic speech, which is most difficult to 
define in other terms. Therefore, it is quite accurate to say that “poetry transla-
tion, as it is understood and practiced at present, is a relatively recent phenom-
enon.”33 At every turn, then, we are dealing with a type of interpretation reserved 
for “authorities” and “experts,” or readings that are seldom accessible to the ordi-
nary reader, if at all.
We might say, therefore, that translators’ statements create a testimony of var-
ious “reception styles” prevailing in a given epoch, and they have been rightly 
studied from this angle in the past. The translator’s choices are indicative not 
only of his conscious decisions, “they reveal not only his literary taste, but also 
indicate the ways of reading characteristic of the epoch when the translation was 
made.”34 Here we are interested in another issue, namely the translator’s con-
scious and intentional reading projections, that is the instructions, contained 
in the text, on how to read and correctly interpret it. We may repeat Głowiński’s 
claim that the translator’s reading always follows or departs from the reading 
standards dominant in the society (though these might be quite diverse, as we 
have indicated above). The translator projects the reader that is suggested to him 
as most appropriate through a certain “style” of reading; the whole strategy of 
his game with the reader depends on this projection, whether it is an “ordinary” 
reader, an “expert,” or a “disciple.” The translator should facilitate and not hinder 
the chosen reader’s understanding of the text. At any rate, in the game involving 
two, it is not translatability that is at stake, but the originality of the translation. 
The reader should not be aware that he is dealing with a translation. “A poetry 
translation is only worthy, and can only be considered when the reader does not 
sense that he has a translation in front of him.”35
 32 Jastrun, “O przekładzie,” p. 130.
 33 A. Kamieńska, “Pochwała niemożliwości,” PA, p. 134.
 34 M. Głowiński, Style odbioru. Szkice o komunikacji literackiej (Kraków 1977), p. 122.
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As we know, however, there is another way of reading assumed in texts, 
when they are attributed with the features of secondary texts, of a certain kind 
of quotations. Crucially, in both cases we have a projection of the reader as an 
active co-interpreter of the work. The translator cannot work without the hypo-
thetical reader, as this is how he checks his steps against the presupposed pres-
ence and participation of someone who is fully entitled to be reckoned with and 
not to be ignored in tallying the gains and losses which, from there on, will be 
their shared work. “It is only proper, Gentle Reader, that I inform you in advance 
what has guided us here in retranslating these sacred tomes after their initial 
translators, from Krakow and Brzesko.” With these words one of our oldest and 
worthiest translators, Szymon Budny, arranges the game with his assumed audi-
ence in the preface addressed to “the pious reader.”36 In this respect, nothing 
has changed over the years. In the past, the translator appealed to the reader’s 
bilingual capabilities. There would have been no real partnership between the 
reader and the translator in this game for a better understanding of the original 
text if the latter had denied the former the ability to transform parts of the source 
language into parts of the target language. In later periods the partners’ unequal 
language competencies caused conflicts to arise in the reception of the trans-
lated work in two different languages. In the projection of today’s reader, in turn, 
it is pivotal that he knows the two languages to a lesser degree than readers of 
times past, and thus his co-interpretation will be of an utterly different kind. The 
reader, “that third person in the dispute between the original and the translation, 
hardly knows the original, does not know the principles of the foreign language, 
nor does he know anything about the differences between Polish and Russian, 
between the structure of the Russian poem and the Polish one.” Consequently, 
this reader “wants a beautiful Polish work, trusting that it is the equivalent of a 
foreign work in form and content.”37 A vast shift has occurred: the old bilingual 
reader has been replaced by a new one who accepts on faith that the translation 
is “faithful” and “accurate.”
Making a translation sound “pleasant to the Polish ear”  – and this is the 
undying wish of our translators – is an element of “bad faith,” of an unwritten 
agreement between the translator and the reader, in which the latter commits to 
pretending to read the work as if it was written in Polish, to “interpret” the text 
in reading just as he would read and interpret an original work. This explains the 
repeated attempts at measuring the “naturalness” of translation, as mentioned 
 36 Biblia, to jest księgi Starego i Nowego Przymierza (1572), PP, p. 44.






by translator Gabriel Karski, who urges us to read “our text as though it were 
an original work.”38 This statement testifies to a sort of unaware “performance” 
that the translator introduces in his work, to a game played with himself, which 
then must be replicated by the reader: the act of reading the translation as if it 
were an original work. The history of the art of translation, as Edward Balcerzan 
asserts, has seen a clash between “two concepts of translated literature […]: on 
the one hand, an effort to retain the memory of the work’s two-phase (bilingual, 
biauthorial) history, and on the other, attempts to sanction a kind of amnesia 
(an invalidation of this history).”39 This has always created a range of communi-
cation tensions between the translator and reader. In their self-commentaries, 
translators either seek to justify the choices that could potentially generate 
conflicts with the reader’s habits, or to voice approval for existing reading habits. 
A translation that is consciously created as native version, as the translation of 
a foreign-language work, does not “fit” readers’ expectations. Sometimes, so to 
say, there is no place for it whatsoever in the repertoire of literature decoding 
techniques. The “quotational” nature of translations can be seen as a sign of a 
“falsely understood accuracy” (an accusation Kazimierz Kumaniecki levied at 
translators of classical Roman literature).40
4  
It is a common view among translators that it is they, and not scholars-theorists, 
who are the best critics of their own translation work. The creators of true 
translations are themselves poets who, “as one might assume, owe nothing to 
translation theory.”41 “No weakness of the author can be concealed from his 
translator, particularly when the latter is a writer himself,”42 which obviously 
leads us in practice to some dangerous and slippery conclusions – that the trans-
lator is “better” and “wiser” than the original author. As such, the translator’s 
brand of criticism ought to be called active, creative, unafraid to boldly meddle 
with the text of the original work, a criticism that justifies the right to experi-
ment, to make trial, provisional, auxiliary interpretations.43 For the translator, as 
 38 G. Karski, “Kłopoty tłumacza,” OST, p. 258.
 39 E. Balcerzan, “Wstęp” to: PP, p. 21.
 40 K. Kumaniecki, “Nad prozą antyczną,” OST, pp. 99–109.
 41 A. Międzyrzecki, “O przekładach,” PA, p. 179.
 42 Morstin, Moja praca, p. 289.
 43 See:  E. Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka twórczości dwujęzycznej Brunona Jasieńskiego. Z 
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we have mentioned, ruthlessly reveals all the “weaknesses” and “insufficiencies” 
of the work – he shows how, in his view, the work “really” ought to look. As a 
critic, the translator always uses the concept of perfect and ideal solutions, which 
need not indicate his anachronistic Classicist impulses, but rather his conscious 
search for an abstract model to illuminate all the qualities of the work being 
translated. At any rate, his critical acumen reaches above and beyond what is 
found in the work itself, into what necessarily determines its final shape. We 
might say that it is indeed as a critic that the translator competes with the author 
for a finer reproduction execution, a reconstruction of the world model that a 
given work achieves in a limited capacity. “The translator must understand the 
model of the world of the poet he is translating,” a theorist44 has opined; for 
our part, we would add that this model is describable in general semiotic cate-
gories. Thus the “fidelity” of the translation depends on how accurately and in 
what detail the model has been reconstructed. In essence, it boils down to an old 
debate – whether to translate the “spirit” or the “letter” of the text.
In light of translators’ commentaries, this phenomenon acquires particular 
importance. The translator works with models, which, in our day, so evidently 
likens his abilities as a critic of the text to those of a scholar, an expert. And thus, 
conscious departures from the original are justified by the hypothesis of the work 
as a whole, as a “body” or an “edifice,” whose overall meaning cannot be reduced 
to the sum of the meanings of its parts; it is a certain quality that overrides them 
and is given directly, in its visible aspect. This is why, as we find out, the trans-
lator of poetry has no choice but to translate a poem in its entirety, or not at 
all. “A statement that contains a discursive thought can be transformed,” Ważyk 
writes. “Where there is no discursive thought, there are no variants.”45Tertium 
non datur. “One does not sit down with the intention of translating phonemes 
or morphemes. One sits down to translating the poem as a whole. […] A work 
of poetry is a whole. Nerval’s line Où sont nos amoureuses? is such a whole, too; 
one can either translate it entirely, with its trembling emotion and tightly packed 
semantic and phonetic space, or not translate at all.”46 An either/or situation, 
no other way out (we are not concerned, at present, to what extent translation 
practice goes against this theory of translation; we are interested here in the 
hypothesis of the work as a whole, conditioning the translator’s later work on the 
text). Translators’ experience confirms the aptness of a claim that gest effectively 
 44 E. Etkind, “Swoboda tłumacza jako konieczność uświadomiona,” trans. 
E. Siemaszkiewicz, PA, p. 45.
 45 Ważyk, “Przygody i doświadczenia,” p. 331.








defended today by one of the most influential branches of the art of interpreta-
tion, i.e. close reading:  the guarantee of a “faithful” or “good” translation is to 
grasp the organic unity of a work, its character as a coherent text, as a sign. We 
ought to translate “not the parts, but the whole, take as a point of departure not 
the individual words, but the character of the poem.”47 This opinion derives from 
translation practice, not from theory.
What do we translate anyway? Does a text as an object of interpretation 
maintain its full identity and integrity in the act of translation? Should the 
translator respect those meanings that are communicated directly, regardless 
of the interpreter’s changing tastes and predispositions (here we have in mind 
the “coefficient of the translator’s individual understanding and experiencing of 
the text”48)? Does the translator face the work in its only and final shape, sanc-
tioned in this very unique form by the author’s will (the translator is then its 
guardian and defender), or does he only deal with a figment of his own imagi-
nation? What, then, is being critiqued and interpreted – the author’s intention 
hidden in the text and explicitly formulated in various statements, or the imma-
nent expression of the work, justifying the postulate of “objective interpreta-
tion”49? The work “in itself ” or its various concretizations (in reading, criticism, 
translations), piling up over the centuries, over the epochs, which the work itself 
does not contain? Is the object of interpretation the work as it was understood by 
its contemporaries, or, given the evident impossibility of reproducing its original 
historical meanings, ought it to be seen in a “contemporary” light? Where, then, 
to use the language of today’s hermeneutics, is the border between the inner and 
outer horizons of the work50? Throughout these questions posed by translators 
there is a correspondence to the claims of hermeneutic, including the risky one 
about the translator/interpreter’s identification with the author: “the translator 
should try to think and feel like the poet he is translating.”51 The identification 
concerns “personae,” not “shadows,” that is, the translator’s conscious ego: the art 
of translation is mastered by those who “possess the invaluable ability to conquer 
their egos and to incarnate themselves with the highest degree of artistry as the 
author they are translating.”52
 47 A. Sandauer, “Troski tłumacza,” OST, p. 344.
 48 S. Pollak, “Granice swobód,” PA, p. 272.
 49 E. D. Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation,” PMLA, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Sept. 1960), pp. 463–479.
 50 Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation.”
 51 A. Stern, “Nad Majakowskim,” OST, p. 349.
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The author as a “persona,” the translator as his “double,” and the work as a 
structure (“organism,” “construction”) are all just examples of model projections 
that appear in the act of translation. Translators mention them in their 
confessions. Another aspect at play here would be the concept of perfect bilin-
gualism, fully symmetrical, categorized typologically as “creative bilingualism.”53 
Space restrictions do not permit us to explore this matter, however important 
it may be. Undoubtedly, the most important model the translator uses in his 
work is the model of language as an instrument assisting the process of under-
standing and interpretation. Translator statements reveal the range of linguistic 
assessments they perform. Between two different ethnic languages, carrying their 
own traditions, a network must be established, or rather, a complicated system 
of mutual relationships, a tally of differences and similarities (“Every language 
has its own sphere of strengths. Sometimes the spheres of two languages par-
tially overlap, and then they have a common sphere in which a good translation 
is attainable”54). Ongoing comparison is required; the “sphere of strength” etc. 
must be established for each language. This is why in operations of this sort a 
mediating sphere comes to being, one that corresponds to no one particular lin-
guistic reality (neither of the source nor the target language) – it is a sphere of 
pure potentiality. Understanding involves establishing equivalence between the 
units of the two codes. The ability to understand statement “S” formulated in 
language “L” is measured by the degree of an individual’s capacity to paraphrase 
it, to “translate” it, whether within the same code (intralingual translation) or 
into a foreign code (interlingual translation). The transformational theory of 
translation deals with these phenomena in detail.55
Yet translators explore them as well. Mere knowledge of the language in which 
a text has been written is insufficient; it is also necessary to be competent in the 
rules by which the information contained in statement “S1” is equivalent to the 
information carried in “S2.” The equivalence of these two pieces of information 
and two statements can only be achieved through applying the correct rules of 
transformation – the recoding of language “L1” into language “L2.” The medi-
ating sphere in the act of translation – the auxiliary language or the “interlan-
guage” – covers the sum of these transformational rules. If, in a self-reflective 
commentary, the translator returns to the phase in which the work was being cre-
ated (“I proceed […] from the finished poem, crystallized as it were in its fame, 
 53 Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka…, pp. 11–14.
 54 Milosz, Ogród nauk, p. 176.








back to its nascent state,” Paul Valéry confessed on the margins of his translations 
of Virgil’s Eclogues56), then he performs an act of understanding and, simulta-
neously, translating the work through a whole range of paraphrases, from the 
most primitive and “content-oriented” to far more complicated ones, respecting 
the formal (artistic) properties of the original. The sum of these paraphrases, the 
selection made among them, determines the final form of the translation.
We do not want to ascribe to translators the accomplishments that are surely 
more deserved by scholars; yet it is a fact that their observations can often supply 
valuable inspiration to theory. The above-mentioned issue of the metalanguage, 
for instance, appears in the reflections of many translators today. If saying that 
translation is “looking at one’s own speech in the light of the foreign one”57 is apt 
(and compelling), then this act – carried out without the translator’s awareness – 
occurs only upon distancing oneself from one’s own language, which then plays 
an auxiliary role as a linguistic tool (it does indeed find its application in trans-
lator commentaries). Based on a critical assessment of both languages (source 
and target), an “interlanguage” of sorts is created, resulting from the translator’s 
compromise in attempting to address two contradictory postulates: “adequacy” 
(the translation should be read as the original) and “naturalness” (the translation 
should be read as an utterance in the target language).58 The “interlanguage” is 
not merely an invention of scholars; it indeed emerges during the translation 
process, wherein the translator always plays the role of a comparative linguist, 
and thus, the creator of a metalinguage. The essence of all translatorial interpre-
tation is that “it elucidates the meaning expressed in L1 by building a model for 
this meaning in L2. U2 is thus a model of U1.”59 And here is how things look in 
a translator’s reflections: “Something like an empty space is created in my mind, 
or more accurately, a frame that can be meaningfully filled depending on double 
critical reflection: on both the original language and the language of the trans-
lation. These two languages critique each other, but on a neutral ground, as it 
 56 P. Valéry, “Variations on the Eclogues,” trans. D. Folliot. In: J. Biguenet, R. Schulte 
(eds.), Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida (Chicago 
1992) p. 120.
 57 J. Ziomek, “Przekład – rozumienie – interpretacja,” in: Zagadnienia literaturoznawcze 
interpretacji, eds. J. Sławiński, J. Święch (Wrocław 1979), p. 57. See p. 261 in the present 
volume.
 58 G. Toury, “Interlanguage and Its Manifestations in Translation,” Meta 1979, Vol. 24, 
No. 2, pp. 223–231.
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were, through a language of empty signifiers.”60 The translator/critic has to con-
stantly overcome his own resistance against everything which he tends to per-
ceive as “foreign,” “not ours,” “hostile,” etc., as a result of his image of the world 
being determined by linguistic categories. The “foreign” is more often described, 
and thus evaluated, from the perspective of the user of a given language, who, 
consciously or not, privileges “our” point of view, than from the opposite per-
spective, which requires tolerance for all that is “foreign.” In reflections on trans-
lation, ethnocentrism and xenophobia are far from rare. Our language, which 
has been ascribed with noble ancient kinships,61 was best qualified to “assess, 
weigh, and compare the words and turns” of a foreign language.62 The translator 
of yore had still to adhere to the mandatory division into “better” and “worse” 
languages, that is, those which were allegedly more advanced in their develop-
ment, and those which, in comparison, were underdeveloped, less capable and 
refined, both as tools of communication and as means of artistic expression. 
A confrontation of two ethnic languages, with all respect for their distinctive-
ness, brought about a much greater chance of creating an “interlanguage” than 
in times previous – and in particular one that stood a chance of taking root in 
the native culture and literature. Such translators as Roman Brandstaetter and 
Czesław Miłosz have fought for the equal status of the biblical style in contem-
porary Polish.
Linguistic production of this sort can only be created when one has a per-
fect command of both languages. The observation that translation is “learning 
about one’s own language, testing its capabilities and incapabilities, its strengths, 
its limits”63 requires some elaboration. The translation process means, to a no 
lesser degree, delving into the “strengths” and “limits” of a foreign language, to 
make the cost of importing foreign attributes into the native system lasting and 
advantageous. Here we come upon the above-mentioned issue of bilingualism, 
which the statements by practicing translators also show from a slightly different 
angle than translation theory does. Obviously, the translator was and is expected 
 60 W. Wirpsza, “Parę aktualnych czynników współczesnego przekładu poetyckiego,” 
Poezja 1976, Vol. 6.
 61 “If any living language,” wrote Warsaw University professor and translator Ludwik 
Osiński in 1824 in all seriousness, “can claim to have a closer affinity with the Classical 
speech of the Greeks and Romans, then this honor surely belongs to the Polish 
language.” L. Osiński, “O tłumaczeniach z obcych języków,” PP, p. 112.
 62 A.K. Czartoryski, “Myśli o pismach polskich, z uwagami nad sposobem, pisania w 
rozmaitych materiałach” [1801], PP, p. 91.










to have a perfect command of two languages to the same extent, one of which 
is his native tongue, and the other a learned language. A translator deserves to 
be called “good” only if he acquired and permanently assimilated the ability to 
use the two languages actively; as a postulate this causes no controversy among 
authors, though we know that in everyday translation practice “the decisive factor 
is the creative skill in the native language,”64 and not both. This is true, though 
obviously, we read a great deal about the necessity of the translator “getting inti-
mate” with the foreign language, which is meant to safeguard him from making 
overhasty correspondences between the two languages, from the temptation of 
succumbing to false analogies etc. “It is only through long, daily engagement 
with another language,” writes Maria Kuncewiczowa, “that the translator can 
be an author’s co-creator.”65 Thus, the translator ought not to be seduced by the 
“close kinship of languages, the contrasting opposition of the aural fabric, the 
differences and deceptive similarities of form.”66 “Creative bilingualism” appears 
everywhere as a postulate, a condition sine qua non, upon which the profes-
sion depends. Translators commenting on their own work thus confirm Roman 
Jakobson’s observation that “a faculty of speaking a given language implies a 
faculty of talking about this language.”67 “Functional bilingualism” in turn, is a 
matter of translation practice.
Examining translators’ statements, we see that the concept of “creative” 
bilingualism plays an important role in their writing strategies as an auxiliary 
working hypothesis. To execute their task as well as the author, or perhaps even 
better (what translator does not dream of this in the depths of his soul!) – this 
must imply entering the author’s sovereign territory, the realm of his own cul-
ture, literature, and above all, language. It is only upon gaining deep insight into 
the possibilities that once or presently stand open to the author, upon, let me 
reiterate, the hypothetical “adoption” of the role of the consumer and, at the same 
time, producer of the work created in the original language, can the translator 
point out the author’s errors and inconsistencies – and duly avoid them. In the 
phase of planning and executing the translation work, over whose course the 
translator dons several masks, plays several roles at once, he must, at least for a 
moment, feel “more at home” in the author’s own language, as though executing 
his role better than the author himself. If the translator wants to be an attentive 
 64 J. Pilař, Trzy aspekty przekładu artystycznego, trans. J. Bułakowska, PA, p. 261.
 65 M. Kuncewiczowa, “Inne języki,” PA, p. 163.
 66 Ważyk, “Przygody i doświadczenia,” p. 336
 67 R. Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” In: A. Fang, R.A. Brower, eds, On 
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and just critic of the original, he must acquire and master the rules and principles 
of the author’s code – in a word, he must consider himself an equal executor of 
the same tasks and commissions, and to this end, he requires the competencies 
provided by creative bilingualism: parallel and equally valuable creativity in two 
languages. For only the truly bilingual writer can write literary works of value in 
both languages. Translators’ commentaries, therefore, constitute an interesting 
addendum to the matter of bilingualism – such as becomes a component of the 
writer’s roles.
5   
In the game of translation, the image of the author is usually made in the 
translator’s likeness, and interestingly enough, in this theatre of language, the 
more the original author is sure of his right to speak in his own voice, the more 
strongly he goads the translator, now fully aware of all the author’s shortcomings 
and assets, individual tendencies and mannerisms, into taking a polemical stance. 
And conversely: there is no polemic – or at least not one that would bring artis-
tically fertile results – without acknowledging the artist’s full autonomy. After all, 
one of the most important articles in the unwritten contract between the trans-
lator and the author is the recognition of translator’s independence, a respect 
for all his distinctiveness. This is one of the most enduring and least disputed 
conditions for starting the game. What does this full creative autonomy mean 
for the translator? In a nutshell, each partner plays according to his own rules of 
the game. It is telling that a translator of a sonnet by Mallarmé utterly ignored 
the author’s commentary to the poem, considering it to be “non-binding,” pre-
ferring his own reading, thus disregarding what the author wanted to say “on 
his own behalf.”68 Both here and elsewhere the dialogue with the author shifts 
from a “personal” level to a field where the sovereign rules of poetic game reign. 
Whether approval or dissent – always with full respect for the autonomous rules 
of the art.
But what art? The literary art, of course; after all, in every epoch translations 
have been a response to some social need, meeting (to a greater or lesser degree) 
the expectations and hopes of a (larger or smaller) target audience, though both 
these “needs” and these “expectations” strictly concerned literature (poetry). 
Translations have always appeared as a result of the translator’s more or less keen 
assessment of the literary situation at a given moment, which he could, for a 






variety of reasons, regard as unfavorable. They were a response to the condition 
and opportunities that seemed, at the time, insufficiently explored by the native 
literature. In brief, they were born from a sense of excess (oversaturation) or 
deficit in the native writing. Evaluations of the current situation occupy consid-
erable space in translators’ monologues; they do not forget for an instant that 
their true vocation as producers of valuable literary works is to constantly probe 
the opportunities and verify the condition of literary communication at a given 
time. A  certain system, of style, versification, or genre, may seem thoroughly 
exhausted, and thus affords no tension whatsoever between the author and the 
reader. For this reason, translations aim to monitor, so to speak, the “capacity” of 
a convention; as we know very well, they strive to be an active factor in literary 
evolution.69 The translator has always aspired to the title of a discoverer of novel-
ties; translations were to stimulate change in literary communication. He wanted 
to open before the reader perspectives of unprecedented artistic solutions and 
achievements. He wants to be the first to acquaint the reader with something 
new to his aspirations and expectations. The translator promises the reader an 
adventure he has never embarked on, because writers have never before pro-
vided the opportunity. If, by way of generalization, we say that in every literary 
synchrony the role of the translator gravitated toward either the pole of “archaist” 
or “innovator” (we seldom deal with such polarizations in the art of poetry), 
then nowadays it has swung toward the latter – or so it would appear based on 
statements by translators themselves.
As such, it would be hard to speak of translators’ commentaries on their own 
work without mentioning their significance in learning the tastes, habits, and 
aspirations expressed in the “current” literary production, as well as projects 
for future, now merely intimated solutions. Translators’ confessions often give 
us a basis to speak of an outline of a literature that has yet to exist, a literature 
which, perhaps, in the near future, will emerge through the concerted effort of 
writers and translators, equally concerned for the future of their country’s liter-
ature. Compared to such aspirations, translation practice must always involve 
compromises; even the most realistic projects never have a chance of fully 
coming about, though this does not detract from their significance as fascinating 
visions of the literary future. The same goes for the view of the literary past, for 
with the advent of translation projects in the form described here, the vision of 
tradition changed considerably as well. We are well aware that, like any memory, 
tradition is not “solely a synthesis of either synchronic or diachronic parts; it is a 
 69 A. Popovič, Preklad a výraz (Bratislava 1968). 
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whole made up of both at once.”70 Every new translation reorganizes this whole, 
much like every new literary translation project establishes a new relationship 
between “dead” and “active” layers of tradition. If finished translations do not 
always indicate this with sufficient clarity, translators’ statements undoubtedly 
aid them in this respect.
The significance of these important documents also derives from the fact that 
they show an awareness of the standards and rules of the art of translation, to 
which every translator should remain true if he does not want to be accused 
by his colleagues of shoddy craftsmanship, all sorts of blunders and sloppi-
ness, one-sided succumbing to the rules of the market etc. As a critic of others’ 
achievements and inadequacies, the translator always stands up as a guardian 
of the good name of his profession. He defends the autonomy of an art which 
demands that every novice respect its firm and eternal principles. These rules 
hold to varying extents: the universal ones are obligatory to the highest degree, 
while a lower degree involves the time-honored national habits in translation 
practice (e.g. the Polish tradition of translating poetry in verse, whereas in France 
a poem is rendered in prose). Translators’ monologues can also be an articulation 
(sometimes polemical) of rules that were shaped at a certain time and treated as 
binding because of the prestige of a particular accomplishment. We know, for 
example, that the Polish Shakespeare canon, which is now fiercely contested as 
a translation standard, was created in the nineteenth century and is the work 
of such translators as Józef Paszkowski, Leon Urlich, and Egbert Koźmian.71 
The canonical “Polish Conrad” is, as we know, established in the translations of 
Aniela Zagórska etc. It is the same translation practice, rather than prescriptions, 
that produced rules which proved advantageous up until a certain point in time, 
and then lost their significance. Following one’s predecessors for some time 
one could achieve fine results, but then these solutions ceased to hold people’s 
interest. “Leo Belmont’s old translation of Onegin is now no more than a respect-
able historical document.”72 It is important, however, that both in accepting and 
rejecting the experiments of times past, the translator treats his predecessors as 
autonomous partners, participants in the game.
 70 C. Znamierowski, Oceny i normy (Warsaw 1957), p. 89.
 71 S. Skwarczyńska, “Przekład i jego miejsce w literaturze i kulturze narodowej (Na 
przykładzie “Hamleta” w wersji Józefa Paszkowskiego).” In: O współczesnej kulturze 
literackiej, eds. Stefan Żółkiewski and Maryla Hopfinger, Vol.  1 (Wrocław 1973), 
pp. 287–330. See pp. 121–142 in the present volume.









In conclusion, let us return to the question posed at the outset: What signifi-
cance do translators’ statements, those more-or-less personal monologues, have 
for today’s reflections on the art of translation? There can be no doubt that this 
genre of “explicatory” writing has only evolved on a wider scale in our day, and 
is, to a considerable degree, a product of the “academicization” of the transla-
tion profession. The translator’s faith in his intuition diminishes steadily, and 
now he maintains that “the results of his work can be picked apart with a lancet 
and a pair of pincers.”73 The infiltration of academic concepts and terms into 
this seemingly strictly subjective field is tangible. It suffices to compare the two 
publications which have supplied the majority of our quotations: On the Art of 
Translation and The Artistic Translation. The twenty-year period that separates 
them shows that the standards of professionalism, the sui generis translator’s 
academic slant, have developed to a considerable extent. In our day, the trans-
lator shows increasing assurance in using analytical tools heretofore reserved for 
initiated specialists. The result has been a split in his personality, the definitive 
division of two roles, each of which is articulated differently: the writer and the 
scholar/observer. Where the translator focuses on the translation process itself, 
the understanding of a foreign text, and gives a glimpse behind the scenes of 
his work, he always speaks to the reader as “someone else” – as a self-critic, self-
censor, and self-corrector. He undermines his own work in its ready and defin-
itive form, now presenting it in statu nascendi, and thus supplying an alternate 
version of the original work. He appears now as a critic, interpreter, or scholar, 
and not as a translator.
Translators’ commentaries increasingly, therefore, betray their own ambitions; 
they aspire to being creative statements, that is, other renderings of the text, 
using different, more private devices. These new “interpretations” of the original 
work tap into the possibilities which the translator had failed to perceive, or con-
sciously ignored. For all the trust that today’s translator has in “hard” academic 
expertise, there is much to indicate his loneliness and abandonment. He finds no 
assistance in dictionaries and encyclopedias, for he explores regions that have 
yet to be appropriated by academia. What seems to him crucial in achieving his 
desired effect remains entrusted to his own intuition, and thus to the “feelings” 
and not to the “glass and the eye.”74 The translator is forced to decide in matters 
 73 Tuwim, “Czterowiersz na warsztacie,” p. 283.
 74 Allusion to a famous quote from Adam Mickiewicz’s ballad “Romanticism”: “Feelings 
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where institutionalized academia is said to still be ineffectual, which it has yet 
to assimilate and conceptualize in its system of notions and terms. In a word, 
today he often seems to venture into the margins (of a culture, a language, of cus-
toms) which have yet to enter the scope of academic paradigms. This is why the 
translator’s thoughts on the art of translation constitute a sphere of new theory, 
a study that stands up for the impossibility called translation. This theory has 
its own hypotheses and projections, and thus own ways of pursuing the truth, 
against whose backdrop the dispute between the “linguistic” and “literary” 
concept of translation, intractably forced by expert theories, can only lose sig-
nificance. Speaking of the role of translation in contemporary literary culture, 
therefore, we cannot overestimate the value of these documents.
[1984]
Translated by Soren Gauger

Stanisław Barańczak
The Poetic Model of the World and Problems  
of Artistic Translation
(Based on the Polish translations of G. M. Hopkins)
1   
The premise of the present article is the simple statement that artistic transla-
tion – if indeed it is to deserve this name –must be a reconstruction of the model 
of the world implied in the original text.
Of course, this statement in itself is nothing particularly new:  phrased 
in slightly different terms, it has carved a niche for itself in contemporary 
translatology, and especially in its subfield that studies problems of poetry trans-
lation (among Polish scholars Edward Balcerzan puts special focus upon this 
question). My task involves using Polish translations of the poems of Gerard 
Manley Hopkins as a series of concrete examples to indicate the multiplicity of 
translation methods that attempt to access this model of the world; the various 
understandings of the essence of the original text’s model of the world in con-
temporary translatorial practice; and finally, the sources and mechanics of the 
resulting misunderstandings and failures.
The “model of the world” concept might well seem too general and imprecise, 
and thus we ought to begin our observations with a definition. According to 
semioticians Ivanov and Toporov, a “model of the world” is:
a behavioral program for individuals and groups defining the repertoire of operations for 
interacting with the world, as well as the rules of their application and the motivations 
behind them. A model of the world can be enacted in various forms of human behavior 
and in the products of this behavior (e.g. in language texts, social institutions, cultural 
monuments); […] we call every such enactment a ‘text.’1
Moving on to poetry and the poetry texts to be analyzed here, we immedi-
ately note two important consequences of this universal definition. Firstly, it 
presupposes that a “model of the world,” as a “behavioral program” inscribed 
 1 To the best of our knowledge, this is a paraphrase from: V.V. Ivanov, V.N. Toporov, 
Slavianskiye jazykovyie modielirushchiye semioticheskiye sistemy (Moscow 1965), p. 5. 








in a text, is enacted in certain sociological categories, in the social micro-model 
called the “internal communication situation” of the poetry text. From this we 
draw a key conclusion: a reconstruction of a model of the world requires less 
an analysis of directly formulated worldview statements than an analysis of the 
“internal communication situation,” the system of tensions between the poetic 
“I” and the “You” (singular or plural), the (external) “World,” “Language,” and 
ultimately the “Text” itself. And secondly, poetry is special in that its language 
(perhaps most of all) is in itself a project and a reflection a “model of the world.” 
If we see poetic language as a “special organization of natural language, dictated 
by a specific concept of the world” (Jerzy Faryno), then it is clear that this defi-
nition could well be upended, i.e. that we could try to decode a “specific concept 
(resp. model) of the world” through analyzing the laws of linguistic organization 
in a given poetry text.
Thus, to encapsulate this introductory and most general stage of our argu-
ment, we shall state that the reconstruction of a poetic model of the world must 
be rendered not only through examining the work’s concrete philosophical, reli-
gious, moralist, or social statements, but also through analyzing the “intratextual 
communication situation” and the organizing principles of the poetic language – 
since a model of the world is reflected in both these fields on the basis of a par-
ticular homology. (Of course, this presupposition applies to an ideal state of 
things – it concerns maximally “poetic” poetry, so to speak. On the other hand, 
we can raise a whole gamut of  examples – drawn from “philosophizing,” propa-
gandistic, didactic, or devotional poetry, for  example – where the language is 
relatively transparent in terms of its significance, and where its organizational 
principles betray no particularly precise or meaningful homologies vis-à-vis the 
overriding model of the world. Yet in addition, such writing in a way is funda-
mentally disloyal to the essence of poeticness and the autonomy of poetry, occu-
pying the margins, as it were, of the genre of poetry).
So far, we have discussed the “reconstruction of the poetic model of the 
world” in general terms. But what are its rules when such a reconstruction is 
attempted not by a scholar or an ordinary reader, but by a translator – that spe-
cial interpreter for whom the reconstruction is only an initial stage in creating 
the work itself, the translation, i.e. in transfiguring a given model of the world 
into the substance of another ethnic language? It is common knowledge that the 
poetry translator who seeks to replicate the model of the world from the original 
text as faithfully as possible is sometimes faced with insuperable difficulties. This 
resistance chiefly derives from the objective differences between two language 
systems and then the objective differences between two systems of literary tradi-
tion with differing principles and organization, including the poetic language. If 
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the translator apprehends the essence of a model of the world in a primitive and 
simplistic fashion, as a set of one-to-one worldview statements appearing in the 
text – and this unfortunately occurs with remarkable frequency – then their task 
is obviously a relatively simple one. However, poetry translations of this sort are 
most often regarded as translatorial mistakes. What remains in them is the “bare” 
content of the worldview, while what vanishes is the peculiar poetic grasp of the 
worldview. Meanwhile, the ideal would be to communicate both these values at 
once. This is, naturally, an extremely difficult task, and one that involves a whole 
array of semantic compromises and substitutions that do not always render 
the full significance. Yet the more “poetic” the poetry (in the above-described 
sense), the more a translator is required to choose the most challenging method 
of translation: delving into the original’s “model of the world” by analyzing its 
intratextual communication relations and forms of organization in the poetic 
language, and then organizing the structure and language of the translation ac-
cording to homological principles.
2   
It seems that Gerard Manley Hopkins might serve as a particularly instructive 
case here. His work is, above all, an example of highly “poetic” poetry, i.e. with 
a maximal degree of linguistic structuring of the language, and at the same time 
strongly rooted in a particular worldview, in this case religious and philosoph-
ical. Additional difficulties arise for every translator in the peculiar place of this 
poetry in its native literary tradition: chronologically it belongs to the Victorian 
era, though its innovations in style and worldview look far into the future – it is 
no accident that Hopkins is widely regarded to be the forefather and precursor 
of modern English language poetry, much as Cyprian Norwid is in Poland.2 This 
comparison is also appropriate in that Hopkins – and this is another attribute 
that makes the translator’s work difficult – is a “dark” poet, whose work often has 
layers of cryptic meanings. This quality of his work, combined with its stylistic 
innovation, made Hopkins an utterly unknown poet during his own lifetime, 
one who was “discovered” almost thirty years after his untimely death. English 
literary history likes to recall the astonishing paradox – a memento in the spirit 
of Norwid’s “None knows the paths to posterity…”  – of the posthumous and 
lifetime fame of two poets: Hopkins and his close friend, Robert Bridges. They 
were peers, hailing from a similar intellectual environment, yet the first died at 







the age of forty-five, not having managed to publish a single poem, and the latter 
lived to the ripe age of eighty-six, releasing numerous books and receiving the 
greatest honor in the English literary world of his day – the title of Poet Laureate. 
Today, the former is considered a genius and a groundbreaking innovator, while 
the latter is recalled on occasion, though primarily as a publisher of Hopkins’s 
works… Nota bene, in releasing a selection of poems by his prematurely deceased 
friend in 1918, Bridges – even then! – felt compelled to note in the introduction 
that, in his view, this was a poetry full of “rare masterly beauty,” though not free 
of “oddity,” “obscurity,” “affectation,” and “faults of taste.”
If we add to this all of Hopkins’s attributes that make him such an individual 
and difficult poet, isolated from his own epoch, we can hardly be surprised that 
the vast majority of Polish translations of his poetry – which are not, at any rate, 
numerous – make for a textbook series of translatorial failures. These failures are 
worth examining up close – not only to provide facile criticism (I should like to 
avoid this accusation by proposing my own counter-solution in each case), but 
because they are, through negation, as it were, instructive examples of the vital 
importance of the translator’s ability to reconstruct the original’s “model of the 
world.”
Before we proceed to our translatological investigations, however, we shall 
require a longer digression on the problematics of Hopkins’s worldview. To 
delve into the latter, we ought to begin by recalling the basic biographical facts. 
Hopkins was not, essentially, a poet of autobiographical confession, yet following 
the paths of his life is crucial to appreciating the gravity of certain elements of 
his worldview.
The poet was born in Stratford, Essex, in 1844, as the son (the eldest of eight 
children) of a higher functionary, a wealthy man of wide-ranging scientific and 
literary interests. A religious atmosphere (in the Anglican spirit) reigned in the 
home, yet there was a free cultivation of artistic interests. Hopkins graduated 
from Highgate School with excellent marks (showing the first signs of a budding 
poet), and in 1863 he began studies in Classical Literature at Balliol College in 
Oxford. His fellow student was the above-mentioned Robert Bridges, and his 
instructors were such famed figures as Walter Pater, John Ruskin, and Matthew 
Arnold – the leading minds in England during the period. Hopkins, theretofore 
an Anglican and a fierce advocate of the “Oxford movement,” which strove for 
the spiritual restoration of Anglicanism, soon came under the powerful influ-
ence of John Henry Newman, a famous thinker who, twenty years previous, had 
converted to Catholicism (later becoming a cardinal). In 1866 Hopkins decided 
to follow his example, and after graduating, he joined the novitiate of the Jesuit 
order in 1868.
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This is one of only two truly pivotal dates in his brief life. Pivotal also for his 
poetry since, upon entering the order, Hopkins set fire to his entire collection 
of poetry manuscripts (only four juvenile poems survived, without his knowl-
edge), resolving “to write no more, as not belonging to my profession, unless by 
the wishes of my superiors.” He began a nine-year study period (at St. Beuno’s 
College in Northern Wales), preparing for the priesthood. For Hopkins, this was 
a period of spiritual ripening, formative for his worldview, whose first outlines 
were sketched in his early youth.
An extremely interesting journal of the future poet survives; it was kept in the 
period from 1866 to 1875. What catches our eye in these pages is an abundance 
of observations, of detailed notes and reflections on the natural world. Delving 
into the essence of beauty found in a tree, a knoll, or a cloud, Hopkins gradually 
constructs his view of the outer reality, in which every object is individual and 
unique, containing a peculiar quality characteristic to itself alone; at the same 
time, this is what makes it a tangible reflection of God’s presence in the world. 
To define this inner quality of an object, Hopkins used the neologism “inscape” 
in his journals, a term most difficult to translate. It signifies an object’s speci-
ficity and uniqueness composed of sensory data, making up its internal unity; 
the term “instress,” in turn, signifies the complementary concept of existential 
energy, which defines and animates the inscape. These two terms play a central 
role not only in shaping Hopkins’s concepts of the natural world, but also in 
shaping the outlines of his poetry theory.
The latter emerged only several years later, in 1872 to be precise, when 
Hopkins, who was studying Medieval philosophy, came across the writings of 
Johannes Duns Scotus and – by his own admission – “was flush with new stroke 
of enthusiasm.” As a later biographer, W. H. Gardner, phrases it (with perhaps 
a touch of exaggeration), the influence of Duns Scotus’s thought was decisive 
in that “this theologian seemed to give him [i.e. Hopkins – S. B.] a sanction for 
doing as a Christian poet what, as a Jesuit priest, he could not possibly do, that 
is, assert his own individuality.” Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises remained 
a signpost for the future poet, of course – as was soon to be demonstrated in the 
dazzling sonnet “The Windhover.” Yet Duns Scotus’s categories gave this ascetic 
religiousness a new dimension. Doctor Subtilis, as the philosopher was called 
by his contemporaries, attached great importance to the principle of the unique 
individuality of people and things, which he called “thisness” or haecceitas. 
Haecceitas is Hopkins’s “inscape”  – the “inner form” of the object, as it were, 
which makes it precisely what it is, rather than something else. While St. Thomas 
of Aquinas, the “official” philosopher of Catholicism, maintained that, unlike the 
“universal,” the “individual” is essentially unknowable to human mind, Duns 
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Scotus stressed that it was precisely individuality that can be known directly, 
through the senses and the intellect combined. It is only the retroactive pro-
cess of abstraction that allows the mind to travel from the “particular” to the 
“general.”
For the time being, the philosophy of the Medieval thinker (to whom Hopkins 
pays tribute in the sonnet “Duns Scotus’s Oxford”) only formed the general out-
look of the young Jesuit: soon, however, it would also affect the shape of his entire 
poetics, the incomparable sensory aspect of his work, and his concrete vision of 
the outer world. As already Bridges so aptly phrased it, Hopkins’s poetry is “the 
naked encounter of sensualism and asceticism” – and however impro bable this 
combination might seem, Hopkins did indeed manage to join a unique “self-
hood” of the things of the world seen with the mind’s constant attempt to rise to 
the aims of the supernatural world.
Let us return to Hopkins’s biography, to the second pivotal date:  1875. In 
December of that year he broke his seven years’ vow of silence at the urging of 
his rector, and in an outburst of pent-up creative energy he wrote his greatest 
work: the brilliant long poem “The Wreck of the Deutschland.” This is an occa-
sional poem: it was a tribute to the memory of five German nuns who drowned 
in a widely-reported sea disaster off the coast of England. But Hopkins puts 
everything into the work all at once:  his Christian notion of human fate, his 
complex thoughts on the paradoxical nature of God, his Scotus-inspired philo-
sophy of nature and language, his new poetic style, even an innovative approach 
to verse rhythm. In this first work after his long-past juvenile attempts, he shows 
himself to be a fully mature poet – and one who was so original that he did not 
fit into any of the contemporaneous molds. Small wonder that the Jesuit journal 
The Month rejected the poem, and his closest friend, Bridges, was unable to con-
ceal his distaste after a first reading.
Hopkins was embittered, but he did not abandon poetry. In 1877, when he 
entered the priesthood, he created a series of marvelous “sonnets of nature”: “God’s 
Grandeur,” “The Starlight Night,” “Spring,” “Hurrahing in Harvest,” and others. 
Their only reader remained Bridges, and later two of Hopkins’s other close 
friends, R. W. Dixon and Coventry Patmore, with whom the poet corresponded, 
tirelessly explaining to them the principles of his theory and creative work.
Until 1881, Hopkins served as a preacher and missionary in various towns in 
England and Scotland; he particularly worked in many of the poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods of the large industrial centers, which took a depressing toll and 
weakened his already frail physique. The observations he took from the working 
class environments also brought about the swift radicalization of his social views. 
This combination of factors made the monastery authorities withdraw Hopkins 
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from the priesthood and steer him toward university work. From 1882 to 1884, 
the poet taught Latin and Greek at Stonyhurst College in Blackburn, then taking 
the chair of Classical Literature at the University College Dublin. Yet his health 
was quickly fading, the tragic spiritual dilemmas were multiplying, and his cre-
ative powers were also at a low ebb. A compelling testimony to this are the “dark 
sonnets” of 1885, or the final poems:  “Thou art indeed just…” and “To R. B.” 
W. H. Gardner is correct in stating, however, that even in these poems there is 
more heroic acquiescence to his fate than barren moping about, more faith in 
man, “that immortal diamond,” and in “the comfort of Resurrection,” than doubt 
and helplessness. This, at any rate, serves as the triumphal coda of one of the 
most outstanding poems of the last period, “That Nature Is a Heraclitean Fire 
and of the Comfort of the Resurrection:”
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and
This Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood, immortal diamond,
Is immortal diamond.
In 1889, Hopkins fell into a typhoid fever, complicated by peritonitis. After a 
brief struggle with the illness, the poet died on 8 June.
3   
Were he only a philosopher poet, a Christian artist pondering God, nature, and 
mankind, this would have been enough to make Hopkins, with his insightful 
sensitivity and depth, a remarkable poet. As it stands, he is a doubly remark-
able poet in that, during the Victorian Era, in a time of didacticism and ver-
bose rhyming philosophizing, he discovered that a poem should give the reader 
reflections upon the world in its own private way. It should less instruct the 
reader, directly supply them with information or didactic postulates, than focus 
their attention upon what is central to poetry: the language. Poetry is the art of 
the word. As such, it should govern the word and the sentence so that the very 
manner of their formation give the reader certain information – albeit in need 
of decoding. Furthermore: language should be a miniature model of the world 
the poem describes.
It is an extraordinarily difficult task to tear away from the conventions of the 
epoch in order to harness all the elements of a style to do poetic work, begin-
ning with the tiniest atoms of speech. What is fundamental for Hopkins from 
the outset – from “The Wreck of the Deutschland” – is to choose stylistic oper-
ations which would bring to language what derived from Scotus’s “thisness” in 




and unto-itself through the senses, if in everything we can perceive its inscape, 
i.e. that what makes it what it is, and not something else, then the language of 
the poem (which is, after all, the discovery of the individual uniqueness of the 
things of this world) must be marked by an analogous drive toward the con-
creteness and uniqueness of names. “Down to the least separable part [a poem 
should have] an individualizing touch,” as Hopkins worded his creative credo in 
a lecture.
This tendency begins, of course, with the choice of vocabulary. Hopkins’s 
poetical lexicon abounds in unusual expressions, rare ones used once only, yet 
immediately striking in their concreteness, their semantic targeting of the cru-
cial attribute of an object; often such words are additionally emphasized because 
of their placement in a rhyme scheme (see, for example, the remarkable rhyme of 
“billion – sillion – vermilion” in the “The Windhover”). Hopkins’s commentaries 
to his own works in essays or, more directly, in letters to his friends, bear testi-
mony to his persistence in seeking words to render most precisely the sensory 
qualities of an object, as in the unexpected use of “foil” (whose meaning might 
seem rather too technical for poetry) in the second line of “God’s Grandeur:”
The world is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
The poet copiously justifies the choice in a letter to Bridges, stating that he was 
chiefly after a lighting effect created by gold foil when shaken  – a flash that 
resembles lightning. He similarly corrected his correspondent when the latter, in 
the midst of a polemic, misquoted a passage from “Duns Scotus’s Oxford:” it was 
not “airy between towers,” Hopkins protested, but “branchy between towers,” as 
Oxford, as his memory informed him, was most striking for its thick foliage 
between its towers, and the poet felt the change of “branchiness” to “airiness” 
upset the “inscape” of the view he described. Seeking expressions with the most 
of an “individualizing touch,” Hopkins does not shirk from colloquial speech, 
or even from dialects (“God rest him all road ever he offended” from “Felix 
Randal”); through context he mobilizes peripheral meanings of words; and 
finally, he creates neologisms – an utter horrendum for the English poetry of the 
time – or multi-word compounds. “I have invented a number of new words,” he 
explains in a letter, “I cannot do without them.” Indeed: at the core is the neces-
sity of individualizing naming, extracting the “inscape” of the things described – 
this end justifies violence to the stylistic conventions of the epoch, and even the 
grammatical and dictionary rules of the language.
And thus, the precision in names, and by the same token, the precision in 
image. Even when tackling the most abstract issues, Hopkins always translated 
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them into a language of concrete, tangible visions. This was not only to avoid 
a rhetoric that was hollow and diluted; it was also because such a seemingly 
abstract problem as the presence of God in the world manifested itself to the 
poet through a range of extremely concrete phenomena and images, through the 
existence of those countless things “swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim” in the 
poem “Pied Beauty:”
Glory be to God for dappled things —
For skies of couple-color as a brinded cow;
For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim;
Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches’ wings;
Landscape plotted and pieced – fold, fallow, and plow;
And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim.
All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;
He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change: Praise Him.
Perhaps, the poet’s most outstanding expression of an analogy between the 
nature of the world and the nature of language is the sonnet “As Kingfishers 
Catch Fire, Dragonflies Draw Flame.” Let us have a look at the text in the original 
and in an attempted Polish translation:
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
Stories ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves – goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.
I say more: the just man justices;
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces;
Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is –
Christ – for Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men’s faces.
I ważek wartkie wrzenia, zimorodków zimne
Ognie; i krągła studnia, gdzie kamień rzucony
Brzmi echem; i ton struny tkniętej, i skłon dzwonu,
Co swą szeroką mową głosi własne imię –
Wszelka rzecz tego świata czyni to jedynie:
Wydziela z siebie wnętrze swe, tkwiąc w nim jak w domu;
Trwa sama w sobie – i swe ja rzuca nam do nóg,
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Krzycząc Po tom powstała: by być tym, co czynię.
Więcej powiem: człek prawy sobą prawo tworzy;
Łaska jest w nim – i w tym, co czynić mu się zdarzy;
Tym chce się Bogu wydać, kim jest w oczach Bożych —
Chrystusem – bo w tysiącach miejsc Chrystus się jarzy
Blaskiem, co ciała cudze prześwietla i oczy,
By Pan mógł dostrzec światłość w rysach ludzkich twarzy.
Here again we can make out, above all, the complete  – and discursively 
presented  – theory of “inscape.” Everything of this world, Hopkins tells us, 
possesses a “self ” that distinguishes it from other things. This “self ” is a kind 
of inner essence of things but at the same time the thing as if extracts its “self ” 
from itself, manifesting it through its work perceptible to the senses (“What I do 
is me”).
Yet there is something even more important worth noting here. Hopkins not 
only lays out his theory of reality in his poem discursively; his poetic speech 
also constructs its parallel reflection or illustration. An object manifests its “self ” 
by acting on our senses – thus, let us not only describe, but also demonstrate 
this phenomenon through what is both the building matter and the tool of 
poetry: through language. And thus the “bell” in this poem indeed “is what it 
does,” because the words referring to it (“hung – swung – finds – tongue – fling”), 
monosyllabic and based on nasal phonemes, onomatopoeically imitate the 
ringing of a bell. The kingfishers “catch fire” and the dragonflies “draw flame” not 
only because these metaphors have a sound visual basis, but also because each 
of them is based on alliteration, creating, as it were, an extra bond between the 
parts of the metaphor. The link between the internal “self ” of the object and its 
external sensory effect, including its name, is “proven” through language alone.
Thus, we come to the second fundamental problem in the relationship 
between the model of the world and poetic language. The second basic com-
ponent of Hopkins’s philosophy is his conviction that the visible world reflects 
the Divine harmony of all things. Many poems – such as the above-cited “Pied 
Beauty” or “God’s Grandeur” – speak of this directly. But all of the poet’s works, 
even the most tragic and internally at odds, document this conviction in an indi-
rect manner: through molding the poetic language to be a model and tangible 
proof of the harmony of Creation. First of all, this is the harmony between word 
and thing: as we have seen, the name selected by the poet is never accidental. It 
not only needs to define a sensory aspect of the object accurately, but, insofar as 
possible, it also has to be an aural equivalent of this aspect. This accounts for the 
great quantities of onomatopoeia in Hopkins’s verses, sometimes borrowed from 
a language outside of poetry, but more frequently foisted upon words through 
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the poetic context. It is as if the task of the poet were to prove that, contrary to 
everyday experience, one can perceive a natural motivation and necessity in the 
relationship between the name and the thing.
However, the harmony of all things must find its reflection not only in the 
link between word and thing, but also among words themselves. This explains, 
in turn, the true orgy of alliteration and other means of phonological orches-
tration that Hopkins’s contemporaries found excessive, while we tend to find 
it striking and delightful, as a show of remarkable poetic virtuosity that serves 
defined aims. The phonological orchestration, in the forms of alliteration, echo-
lalia, and internal rhymes, has an important semantic effect in these works:  it 
links expressions, makes us seek a certain hidden necessity in their combina-
tion, a certain deeper similarity or kinship (in such cases we might speak of the 
use of paronomasia or pseudo-etymology). There is also a constructive effect, as 
the aural similarity extracts integrated structures from the words of the poem, 
thus more highlighting the inner architecture of the work. The poem as a whole 
becomes a reflection of the concealed plan according to which the harmony of 
the world was created; in both reality and in the poem, everything is necessary 
and exists in interrelation.
Hopkins would not have been a great poet, however, if this harmony lacked 
its opposite. The philosophy of this poetry is anthropocentric, and as such, it 
must contain an element of tragedy; unlike the harmonious world of nature, the 
human being is condemned to irreconcilable contradictions, to an awareness 
of the paradoxical nature of one’s own existence. As early as “The Wreck of the 
Deutschland” we find the conviction that God is the Creator of harmony, but 
also a harsh and punishing Father; that man’s lot is not only happiness, but suf-
fering as well. These contradictions are both focused and resolved in the figure 
of Christ and the phenomenon of Incarnation: yet even for a Christian of such 
profound faith as Hopkins, the tragedy of human existence on Earth could never 
be a problem to be resolved with a gesture.
Such an important component of Hopkins’s “model of the world” must have 
found its analogy in the language of his poetry and its organizing principles, 
to highlight this point for the third time. Everything we might call “grating” in 
the poet’s style reflects the paradoxes and anxieties of human existence – and 
here we mean not only grating phonically, but also grammatically, syntacti-
cally, and semantically. Tactics so contrary to the ideal of harmony such as the 
seemingly arbitrary grammatical and lexical experiments, the defiance of word 
order hardly ever found in English, the oxymorons and antitheses that govern 
the poetic semantics, and finally, the general tendency to pile up the ambigui-
ties and semantic surprises – it all seems explicable only through the fact that, 
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in making his style, Hopkins sought an indirect means to communicate his 
understanding of human fate as dramatic and inherently contradictory to the 
extreme.
I would give a similar explanation for the unique phenomenon in Hopkins’s 
work  – the poetic rhythm. Undoubtedly it has many roots:  following the 
explanations of the poet himself, we might perceive, for example, an attempt to 
make versification more flexible, to make it close to the prosody of colloquial 
speech; we can also see the genesis of this concept of rhythm in the archaic forms 
of Medieval Anglo-Saxon poetry, as some scholars have suggested. Yet most 
important is the fact that the “Sprung Rhythm” invented by Hopkins is dynamic, 
restless, and dramatic. It juxtaposes the idea of regularity (a steady number of 
accents in a line) with a radical irregularity and freedom (varying syllabic spread 
of the lines), resulting in a singular tension, with enormous capacity for modu-
lation and intensification.
“Sprung Rhythm,” Hopkins’s great and entirely independent discovery, is a 
rhythm of stormy emotions:  euphoric delight (as in “Hurrahing in Harvest”), 
doubt and despair (as in “Carrion Comfort”), profound human sympathy and 
supernatural illumination (as in “The Wreck of the Deutschland”). This “explo-
sive rhythm” (as we could translate the English term, choosing from many pos-
sibilities,) combines, by the poet’s own admission, “opposite and, one would 
have thought, incompatible excellences, markedness of rhythm – that is rhythm’s 
self – and naturalness of expression.” It is significant that even those poems which 
Hopkins wrote in “standard rhythm,” i.e. in syllabic or syllabotonic verse, have 
a powerfully dramatic flow, artfully produced through enjambments, disrupted 
word stress patterns, leaps of intonation etc. Sprung Rhythm facilitates the same 
in much greater intensity and with a much greater number of variants. Hopkins 
recommended that poems with this rhythm be read aloud, to make audible the 
“explosive” clashes of accents and the ecstatic accelerations of tempo in places 
where several unstressed syllables are clustered. The appearance of his original 
texts in manuscript form is characteristic: they recall musical scores, with masses 
of complicated markings pertaining to accent, intonation, and other aspects of 
prosody.
Yet it ought to be repeated that the musical drama of the rhythm, like the other 
stylistic devices of analogous functions, is not an end unto itself: it also reflects 
in poetic language a philosophical concept of human fate, strung between the 
poles of ecstasy and despair, happiness and suffering. If Hopkins’s style were to 
have stopped at harmony, the philosophical layer of this poetry would not have 
gone beyond an uncomplicated, ecstatic pantheism. Only the element of the 
tragic dilemma – introduced in part through style – made Hopkins a Christian 
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poet: Christ appears in these poems as an ever-present link between the world of 
Divine harmony and human suffering.
4   
For the translator, one basic conclusion emerges from all these observations on 
Hopkins’s poetry:  as in the original, the stylistic dominant for the translation 
should be the constant clash between harmony, regularity, and similarity on the 
one hand and interference, irregularity, and contrast on the other. These values 
should coexist in mutual balance, in a dialectic interplay of forces that is never 
entirely resolved.
Let us take a simple example. In the first lines of “The Wreck of the 
Deutschland,” the translator finds the apostrophe:
Thou, mastering me
God! giver of breath and bread.
The translator must realize that the words breath and bread contain their literal 
meanings, but of equal importance is that these terms are clasped together by 
clear alliteration, and with this link they come together to render a new sig-
nificance. At the same time, the regularity and similarity (a paronomastic link 
between two words) thus created is juxtaposed in these two lines with a strong 
aspect of contrast and surprise (a sharp enjambment). Thus, the rendering by a 
Polish translator (Janusz A. Ihnatowicz):
Władający mną Boże,
dawco chleba i tchu,
[Mastering me God,
giver of bread and breath]3
albeit philologically correct (something which cannot be said, alas, for the 
remainder of the translation), strikes me as utterly wrong-headed as a transla-
tion of poetry. It has lost both the aspect of similarity (the translator has omitted 
the alliteration) and that of contrast (the enjambment has been eliminated); the 
tension and dramatization of the initial apostrophe have vanished, leaving the 
“literal” information, albeit made mundane and colorless; there is only the “the-
matic information” with none of the “implied information.” We might argue that 
salvaging these two types of information intact in another language is impossible 
(particularly bearing in mind that the quoted beginning of the stanza is continued, 






requiring additional – rhyming, rhythmic, and semantic – adaptations in the ini-
tial couplet). Indeed, this is true, yet with some compromises or substitutions 
of secondary importance – practically inevitable in translating poetry – we can 
salvage the main principle that governs the original text. A solution, for example, 
might be:
Władco mój, Boże,
który karcisz i karmisz. 
[Ruler mine, God,
you who punish and feed].
This is not a “literal” translation, of course, but, in a sense, it is more faithful. 
The necessity of rhyming with a subsequent line of the stanza means foregoing 
the sharp enjambment here; yet the aspect of contrast that it contained has been 
shifted, as it were, to a different field, namely to the sphere of semantic relations 
between the words karcisz [you punish/rebuke] and karmisz [you feed], which 
are key to this couplet. The phonetic similarity is juxtaposed with a semantic 
opposition; the basic stylistic principle of Hopkins’s poetry is salvaged. Though 
there has been a substitution of meaning (“you punish and you feed” in place 
of “bread and breath”), it does not disturb the intratextual communicative 
relationships of the poem, nor the premises of its worldview; on the contrary, it 
even reinforces and emphasizes them, as the contrast between the severity and 
mercy of God, which is constitutive for the human fate, serves as the main theme 
of “The Wreck of the Deutschland.”
To translate in such a way as to reconstruct the model of the world as implied 
by the stylistic form of the original text: this is, of course, a remarkably difficult 
task, and a risky one at that. As such, there is a notable trend of Polish translations 
of Hopkins’s poetry following the line of least resistance and settling for halfway 
measures.
We might observe two models for such solutions: in either of them the “half-
baked” reconstruction of the original’s model of the world involves something 
different. The first model, perhaps the most frequently chosen, is a translation 
that “lists” toward irregularity, abandoning the means and stylistic maneuvers 
which can balance off this irregularity with their considerable internal organiza-
tion. Possibly the most extreme example of this sort of solution (so extreme that 
it deserves to be called a translatorial experiment, albeit a failed one) would seem 
to be a rendering of the sonnet “Felix Randal” by Jerzy S. Sito. The two initial 
stanzas will serve to explicate our point:
Felix Randal, the farrier, O is he dead then? My duty all ended,
Who have watched his mould of man, big-boned and hardy-handsome,
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Pining, pining, till time when reason rambled in it and some
Fatal four disorders, fleshed there, all contended?
Sickness broke him. Impatient he cursed at first, but mended
Being anointed and all; though a heavenlier heart began some
Months earlier, since I had our sweet reprieve and ransom
Tendered to him. Ah, well, God rest him all road ever he offended!
Feliks Randal, od koni, ach, więc umarł? cóż, moje zadanie spełnione;
Kto go znał, grubokostnego, ho, ho, w ramionach szeroki,
chłop jak dąb, wiatr od niego wiał, kiedy tak młotem
po kładziwie, młotem, aż się potem, sadzą uwalał
i w zapamiętaniu, w kuciu, rozsądek i wszystkie zmysły w puch porozwalał
i zaniemógł; ciekawe? nie mógł zwalić choroby, więc go choroba zwaliła.
Klął, lecz kiedy go świętym olejem i ten… wydobrzał; choć serce
zanielało już pierwej, odkąd to ja, nasze słodkie zabieranie
darowanie mu przyniosłem. Ha, niech go Bóg pocieszy, jeśli co i zgrzeszył.
This translation calls our attention with its absolute nonchalance with regard to 
the literal meaning of the original text. The majority of the first stanza (from the 
words wiatr od niego wiał [the wind blew from him] up to choroba zwaliła [the 
illness knocked him down]) has nothing in common with the meaning of the 
original, and is a fully self-willed addition by the translator. We might merely call 
it a failed translation, probably arising from an insufficient examination of the 
complex and ambiguous lines of Hopkins’s sonnet; this supposition would seem 
to be confirmed by the fact that Sito has not included this verse in any subsequent 
reprints of his Hopkins translations. The matter is not quite so simple, however. 
The chaotic and free-form structure of the translation is, at least in part, the result 
of a conscious translation approach. We can see that Sito was quite careful to ensure 
that his translation retained all those (indeed striking and unusual) attributes of 
the original text marked by irregularity, dissonance, surprise, and contrast. As 
such, he has salvaged the sharp enjambments. He retains the intralinear leaps in 
intonation resulting from the use of embedded questions or exclamations, and 
the contrast between long and short sentences. Finally, he also saves the original’s 
lexical/stylistic dissonance created through the deliberate use of colloquialisms, 
interrupted sentences (“being anointed and all” – lecz kiedy go świętym olejem i 
ten… [but when they with the holy oil and, well…]), and dialect (“all road ever he 
offended” – jeśli co i zgrzeszył [if he even sinned something]).
Yet even if this is a conscious concept, it is a half-baked measure. In calling 
so much attention to the stylistic irregularity, Sito has failed to perceive that the 
poetic puissance draws from the contrast with the equally pronounced factor of 
regularity. This is represented in the original text, above all, by the versification 
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(the use of Sprung Rhythm, the deep and sophisticated abba abba ccd ccd rhyme 
scheme, the sonnet’s consistent stanzas), and the phonetic instrumentation (a 
whole gamut of alliteration, as in the second line: “mould of man,” “big-boned,” 
“hardy-handsome”). Salvaging both of these contrasting stylistic aspects was not 
possible, of course. Here is one translation possibility:
Feliks Randal, kowal, och, więc umarł? nie moja już moc go wskrzesi,
Kto się przyjrzał grudzie gliny, grubym gnatom, upartej urodzie,
Kto go widział, jak marniał i marniał, jak w dal jego umysł uchodzi,
Aż cios cierpień poczwórnie potwornych na wskroś jego ciało przeszył?
Choroba go zwaliła. Z początku buntował się, klął i złorzeczył,
Potem, po namaszczeniu i tym wszystkim, ścichł; zresztą z niebem w ugodzie
Był od paru miesięcy, od kiedy dostarczałem mu ulgi ubogiej
Swą służbą. Cóż przebacz mu Boże, jeśli jakoś tam nawet pogrzeszył!
An analogous “half-baked” concept is found in translations by Janusz 
A. Ihnatowicz. Here we have the same choice of a stylistic dominant; Ihnatowicz’s 
translation takes those qualities of Hopkins’s poetry which boil down to con-
trast, obscurity, and irregularity. This is how he translated “The Wreck of the 
Deutschland,” for instance:  what takes place in this translation, the omission 
of the rhymes (appearing here in a defined structure that repeats in all thirty-
five stanzas), the steady rhythmic structure of the stanzas, to say nothing of the 
remarkably rich and abundant instances of phonetic instrumentation, coinage, 
syntax, facilitates the task at hand, but it also upsets the whole model of the world 
implied by the language of the poem. Instead of a vision of a world that is tragic, 
though obedient to the unbending rules of God, we have a vision of the world as 
total chaos and absurdity. This is particularly true in that the language is struc-
tured to an even lesser extent than a reasonably correct colloquial statement 
would require. Ihnatowicz seems to purposefully pile on the methods for loos-
ening syntactic structures – even where nothing of the sort can be found in the 
original – making unexpected ellipses and inversions, disregarding grammatical, 
and choosing “wrong sounding,” anti-euphonic solutions (consonant clusters, 
and a too-frequent masculine cadence of lines and sentences):
       Uwielbiony wśród ludzi
   bądź, Troisty bycie, Boże;
skrusz buntownika, co się czai w norze,
   pożogą i burzą ludzką złość.
Nad wypowiedzenie słodki, ponad siłę słów,
tyś błyskawica i miłość, tyś zima i żar;
   ojcze i miłośniku serc, któreś zgniótł: masz
ciemne swe zstępowanie i najlitościwszyś wtedy.
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This is one of the relatively less chaotic stanzas of Ihnatowicz’s translation, and 
yet even here nothing remains of the organization and regularity so evident in 
the original:
     Be adored among men,
   God, three-numbered form;
Wring thy rebel, dogged in den,
   Man’s malice, with wrecking and storm.
Beyond saying sweet, past telling of tongue,
Thou art lightning and love, I found it, a winter and warm;
   Father and fondler of heart thou hast wrung:
Hast thy dark descending and most art merciful then.
Any translation of this stanza that would aim at a most basic fidelity to the sty-
listic virtues of the original would have to aim to salvage what is unquestionably 
the main dominant of the original text, i.e. the numerous parallelisms achieved 
through the work of alliteration, versification, and syntax, which seem to join 
forces. One solution might be the following:
     Niech będzie pochwalone
   Twe imię, troisty Boże;
Bunt i grzech ludzki skrusz burzą i gromem,
   Jak zwierza, co zjeżył się w norze.
Nie wysłowi słodyczy Twej słowo, nie wyjawi jedności język,
Błyskawicą i błogosławieństwem jesteś – wiem – miłością i mrozem;
   Ojcze i opiekunie serc, któreś skruszył, uwięził:
Z mroku do nas przyszedłeś i trwamy w miłosierdzia Twojego ogromie.
The model for translation solutions we have described here on the basis of a few 
examples might be called “half-baked measures” in that, during the translation, it 
is only the stylistic aspect of non-regularity, dissonance, or chaotic tumultuous-
ness that remains, at the expense of the contrasting aspect of regularity, harmony, 
and organization. The “half-bakedness” of the second model involves something 
else entirely. The second path often taken by Polish translations of Hopkins 
involves a total, or almost total dismissal of “implied information” in favor of 
“thematised information”; it involves an attempt to transpose the literal infor-
mation contained in the linguistic signs while neglecting the external forma-
tion of those signs and how they are organized, though this often carries a more 
pivotal set of messages than the literal meanings. In the previous solution the 
literal meanings of words and sentences were often considerably distorted (let us 
recall once more the first stanza of “Felix Randal” in Sito’s translation), while the 
translators attempted to salvage at least some of the stylistic qualities of the ori-
ginal text (the non-regularity, dissonance etc.). In terms of the solution which we 
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presently aim to describe, the meanings of the words and sentences of the orig-
inal text are translated in a way that is full and correct – such translations in their 
extreme forms approach “philological translations” – yet the translator disavows 
any attempt to reconstruct the stylistic attributes of the original in advance, as it 
were. In this way, almost all the “implied information” is amputated.
Here we should note that there is no clear and invariable line between these two 
models of how translators approach Hopkins’s poetry. It happens that the same 
translator has recourse to one method and then the other in rendering various 
pieces; it also happens that within the space of a single work the accepted model of 
translation has an “enclave” within which another sort of “half-baked” translation 
seems to hold sway. This is the case with “The Wreck of the Deutschland” as ren-
dered by Ihnatowicz, which is essentially an example of the first model, though in 
certain fragments of the poem the translator seems more concerned with a literal 
rendering than with communicating the aspect of stylistic tumult (one example 
might be the above-quoted initial couplet of “The Wreck…”). In other translations, 
the same Ihnatowicz decidedly opts for the latter “half-baked” model. Such is the 
case in the translation of the poem “Carrion Comfort,” whose striving for phil-
ological literalness forces the translator to eschew all forms of poetic language 
structure: one result of this is the necessity to lengthen the work, which has twenty-
two lines in the translation, while the original – being a sonnet – has fourteen, of 
course. Amplification of text is, in general, a common phenomenon in translation 
solutions of this sort, partly due to the necessity to make a clear articulation of 
the meanings of certain ambiguous passages of the original, and partly from the 
abandonment of a poetic form of textual organization, whose devices can permit 
a maximum concision of statement with a maximum multiplicity of meanings.
With regards to Hopkins’s poetry, the second type of translatorial “half-
bakedness” would seem as insufficient as the first. In this respect, it seems worth 
analyzing the translations of Adam Czerniawski in particular, which most fre-
quently correspond to the model of scholarly literalness, while eschewing the 
poetic information. Such is the case in the first couplet of one of the “dark 
sonnets,” “No Worst, There Is None:”
No worst, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief,
More pangs will, schooled at forepangs, wilder wring.
In Czerniawski’s translation, we have a colorless statement:
Końca temu nie ma: poza obrębem
Nieszczęścia ból bólem spłodzony przebieglej rwie.
[There is no end to this: outside the limits
Of misery the pain-begotten pain shoots more cunningly]
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What vanishes here is substantial amount of “implied information,” which in 
this couplet is particularly found in the clear phonetic/rhythmic organization of 
the incipit, or to be precise, the second hemistich. “Pitched past pitch of grief,” 
with the persistence of the plosive “p” (echoed in pangs and forepangs in the 
second verse) and the equally explosive cluster of accents, is the phonetic indi-
cator of the emotional temperature of the work, an aural image of the torment 
and thoughts in conflict addressed in the poem. A denial to make even a sub-
stitute rendering of this stylistic attribute in the translation is a semantic error 
tantamount to mistaking the Polish meaning of one of the words. Objective 
linguistic differences make it difficult to achieve an effect as pronounced 
as that of the original, yet it is possible to salvage the poetic information in 
part:
Nie ma dna udręk. Miota się za metą męki
Męka gorsza: przez tamtą szkolona i świeża.
[No bottom to torment. Beyond the finishing line of ordeal thrashes about
A worse ordeal: schooled by the other one and fresh]
And one more example, this time courtesy of Czerniawski in the translation of 
“That Nature Is a Heraclitean Fire…”:
Cloud-puffball, torn tufts, tossed pillows | flaunt forth, then chevy on an air-
Built thoroughfare
Obłoków purchawki, rwane, podrzucane pęki-jaśki | tańcują, harcują, gonią 
powietrza gościńcem
[Puffballs of clouds, torn, tossed up bundles-pillows dance, caper, run along 
the road of air]
The image of a piece of nature in Hopkins is generally supported by a vivid 
onomatopoeia. Such is the case in this excerpt:  the clouds that “chevy on an 
airbuilt thoroughfare” are not only metaphorically compared to “torn tufts” 
and “tossed pillows,” but this image is backed with equal vigor in a whole 
range of onomatopoeia (first in a “natural” onomatopoeia  – puffball  – then 
in poetic onomatopoeias), chiefly grounded in the recurring “p,” “t,” and “f ” 
sounds. Little remains of all this in Czerniawski’s translation; indeed, almost 
nothing. Meanwhile, if we make only minor departures from philological 
fidelity (exchanging, for example, the obłoki for chmury, i.e. the more for the 
less poetic Polish equivalent of “cloud”, admittedly somewhat less apt in this 
context), we can achieve an analogous series of onomatopoeias, derived (as in 
the original) from the natural onomatopoeia contained in the word purchawka 
[puffball]:
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Chmur purchawki, puch darty, poduchy | porwane przez paradny huragan
Gonią górnym gościńcem.
[Puffballs of clouds, torn dawn, huge pillows | blown away by pageant gale
Run along the upper road]
Apart from the two “half-baked” translation models we have described here, we 
should also find space for adequate solutions, which do not neglect the aspect of 
stylistic organization in favor of chaos, and which do not disregard the “implied 
information” in favor of the “thematic information.” When it comes to Hopkins, 
however, there are few such good examples (at most we might find a few examples 
geared in this direction – I have in mind some of Pietrkiewicz’s translations and 
some of Sito’s – though on closer inspection even these ultimately raise too many 
objections and critical observations). There is a more general tendency at work 
here; it turns out that what frequently gives the translator the greatest problems, 
what forces him to resort to “halfway” solutions, is the particular essence of 
poetic language that involves communicating a model of the world in an indirect 
and often ambiguous fashion:  through a specific organization of the linguistic 
level, one that purposefully juxtaposes incongruous stylistic aspects. We might 
say that, much as reflecting upon the essence of poetry is invaluable for the trans-
lator in making his interpretive and creative decisions, the reverse is also true – 
translators’ failures are valuable in that they help us to understand the special 
way in which a model of the world is made present in a poetic text.
[1984]
Translated by Soren Gauger
Anna Legeżyńska
The Translator as the Second Author
The phenomenon of translation arose from the need for communication 
between societies, languages, and cultures. The basic function of translation 
is to mediate between nations, epochs, and areas. Translation is “one of the 
rarest of missions, because it does good service to two different nations at the 
same time,” as Karl Dedecius has phrased it. And he adds: “If the Webster defi-
nition of culture is correct when it says that culture preserves the traditions 
and ideas that constitute the background of a given society, then we might say 
that, as a facet of culture, literary translations show to the linguistic commu-
nity which they address the background of the linguistic community about 
which they testify.”1
If translation is communication, all practical and theoretical translation 
problems should be addressed with the special conditions of this communica-
tion in mind. It follows a different path than in the case of an original work:
Addresser – message – addressee = translator – translation – addressee of the translation
Code 2Code 1  
This very simple formula shows the relationships between the addresser and 
addressee in the original and the translated work. It has been constructed 
by doubling Roman Jakobson’s famous model of linguistic communication; 
there would be no need to present it here were it not for the fact that we must 
outline the differences in the addresser/addressee circuits in these two types 
of text.
A translation is a literary utterance based on another work. It is built from a 
different linguistic substance and addressed to a different reader. Its addressee 
also inhabits a reality unlike that of the reader of the original. The author and 
the addressee of the original use the same language. They also occupy the same 
(or similar) geo-cultural space. As such, they are essentially of the same language 






(we are still speaking of communication through a single literary work). The 
translator is among the addressees of the original, but his competencies are 
broader, for he must be a bilingual reader (with the exception of the atypical 
cases of translating from “pony” translations, that is literal renderings prepared 
by other translators). The difference between the virtual addressee of the ori ginal 
and the translator lies in their different degrees of engagement, as the latter must 
not only carry out the reading program inscribed in the work, but then also 
record this act of reading in the form of a text in another language: the trans-
lation. (The literary critic is in a somewhat similar situation; however, the critic 
and the author both use the same language system). What makes the translator’s 
communication situation unique is the accumulation of roles:  he acts as the 
reader, expert, critic, and “second author” of the text.
The translator acts as a reader when he selects the text. “The translator has a wide 
choice. He chooses the language, theme, idea, and epoch; he selects the author, 
the work, the space, the form, the interpretation, and the meaning: he has as many 
possibilities as he cares to use.”2 And so we see that that the translator’s knowledge 
of literature and its context is extensive enough for us to call him an expert.3 At 
this stage of work the translator, like the reader, assesses, selects what he “likes” 
(though, obviously, there may be other motivations to translate: a polemic with, 
rather than celebration of, the original; the requirements of the current transla-
tion policies, the literary market, or simply material incentives). The overlap with 
the critic’s role comes in the interpretation phase, when the translator establishes 
the implied meanings of the work, interprets it holistically, seeking its structural 
dominant. This is also the phase when the overall poetics of the translation is 
decided; it is for good reason that translation is often called the “art of interpre-
tation.” The translator becomes a critic when he dismantles the original, com-
paring the meanings of lexical units, establishing the equivalents and activating 
further contexts – biographical, historical, sociological etc. Finally, he creates a 
new text, signaling his presence in an overt and conventional fashion, with the 
traditional phrase “translated by X.” His presence, however, is also felt indirectly 
in the manner of translation. He becomes another “addressing function,” which 
the reader is ready to see as the direct causal power behind the (original) work. 
The addressee of the translation might, of course, be a bilingual reader, and if he 
has the original at his disposal (in a bilingual edition, for example), then he is 
fully aware of the text’s origins. Usually, however, the translatorial nature of the 
 2 Dedecius, Notatnik, p. 26.
 3 In the sense given to this term by J. Sławiński in: “O dzisiejszych normach czytania 
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work is concealed and only indicated by the information “translated from the…”. 
Subsequently, the reader experiences the translation as he would a self-sufficient 
text. He faces no additional requirements; on the contrary, the translator wants to 
give the reader the illusion of reading an original work.
Alerting the reader, turning his attention to the text’s origin as a translation, can 
be the result of the translator’s incompetence, or it can be an intentional device, 
part of the translation strategy. The basic “signals” of the text’s “foreignness” include 
retaining proper names in their original form, syntactic structures that clash with 
the rules of the language of the translation, and exotic cultural phenomena. These 
can never, however, be seen as unequivocal signs of a work being a translation, 
because they also sometimes occur in self-sufficient works. As such, the transla-
tion cannot have any features that could reliably attest to its genesis in a foreign 
language. (Even the information “translated from the…” on the front page could 
be a false lead, a device used in a self-sufficient work in order to conceal the author-
ship.) The translatorial nature of the text only appears in context: in juxtaposition 
with the original, in a series of other translations of the same work, in a translator’s 
commentary, in reviews etc. It must be confirmed by another statement.
Anton Popovič writes: “Translation is a matter of style.”4 Indeed, it is the art of 
skilled stylistic transformations. But the translatorial nature of a work manifests 
itself beyond style and beyond the work, and if it can sometimes be deduced in 
the structure of the translation, then this is at the level of “large semantic fig-
ures.”5 This is also why translation criticism (properly understood, that is) rejects 
the analytical method of juxtaposing microstylistic components of the original 
and the translation. A  comparison of this sort can only be a point of depar-
ture and should lead to describing the poetics of the translation as a whole. This 
has been understood since translators of old, beginning with St. Jerome and his 
famous formulation: non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere sensu.
The relationships between the translation personae are arranged somewhat 
differently from the self-sufficient work. They become more complicated, as 
illustrated by the following table (based on Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska’s 
well-known model).6
 4 A. Popovič, “Teoria przekładu w systemie nauki o literaturze,” trans. M. Papierz. 
In: Konteksty nauki o literaturze, ed. M. Czermińska (Wrocław 1973), p. 137.
 5 I understand “large semantic figures” here to be the higher units of significa-
tion, constructed by sentences and utterances that can hold autonomous meaning 
(characters, the narrator, phenomena in the presented world).
 6 A. Okopień-Sławińska, “Relacje osobowe w literackiej komunikacji.” In: Problemy 




























Internal author + 
the image of the 
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In the case of translation, literary communication grows more complicated 
at the higher levels, where the “internal author” and the “image of the trans-
lator” appear as the work’s subject. We ought not to suppose that the two cat-
egories exist autonomously; they are linked, and can only be separated in an 
academic critical analysis of a translation. The subject of the original artistic 
endeavors is manifested in translation through the translator’s stylistic opera-
tions. Depending on the type of translation (which is, in turn, conditioned by the 
translation conventions of a given epoch, the genre, and the individual poetics 
of translation), one of these profiles – the author’s or the translator’s – is more 
foregrounded. The closer we come to the para-translation genres, with their 
“nostalgic poetics” (re-workings of all kinds), the more visible the translator. 
Examples include Łukasz Górnicki’s Dworzanin [Courtier],7 Hertz’s fables,8 or 
 7 See note 23 on p. 131 in the present volume [editors’ note].
 8 Benedykt Herz (1872–1952) – Polish writer, satirist and journalist; author of several 
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some translated works for children that appear to have been authored by one 
person. In Who is Happy in Russia?,9 The Bronze Horseman or Eugene Onegin,10 
(read in Polish), the authorship is never in doubt, because in these works the 
translator conceals his presence, he “covers his tracks” of creative involvement.
The category of the addressee undergoes similar transformations. The reader 
implied in the translation might be equipped with the same competencies as the 
addressee of the original; on the other hand, he might be given additional or dif-
ferent tasks. The reading conventions are never the same for the original and the 
translation, though they do overlap (in general terms) when we are dealing with 
“translation proper” and when the translated work (the original) comes from a 
related cultural circle. The translations of Dante’s Divine Comedy in European 
literature activate similar addressee programs. Translated into Japanese, The 
Divine Comedy would be addressed to a reader utterly unlike the addressee of 
the original. Similarly:  the literature of contemporary Latin American writers 
translated into European languages is appreciated within conventions unlike 
those implied the original. These differences are the result of the discrepancy 
between cultural contexts. The latter example further proves that conventions 
or, as Michał Głowiński would say, styles of reading foreign to the translator’s 
literature can be “grafted on” thanks to translation, generating further reading 
programs already in a given literature (at one point, Julio Cortazar’s structurally 
complex works Hopscotch and 62: A Model Kit served this function for Polish 
literature).
The virtual addressee of the original and the implied reader of the translation 
coexist in the translated text, much as the intratextual images of the author and 
translator. The translator establishes the relationships between the two reading 
programs, yet he takes into account and favors “his” reader, the reader of the 
translation. “We might say that such a reader determines the structure of the 
translator’s gambits: he stimulates the ‘meta-creative’ act which brings about a 
new text,” Anton Popovič writes.11
The mechanism of guiding the addressee can be explained through ana-
lyzing the interpretation inscribed in the translation. Additional guidelines 
come from translators’ comments of all varieties, which also pave the way for 
 9 A poem by Nikolay Nekrasov (1821–1878). Translated into Polish by Julian Tuwim 
[editors’ note].
 10 Narrative poems by Alexander Pushkin (1799–1937). Translated into Polish by Julian 
Tuwim [editors’ note].
 11 A. Popovič, “Rola odbiorcy w procesie przekładu literackiego,” trans. J. Sławiński. 







the reading program; they explain to the reader the principles of translating a 
given text, and also facilitate its understanding. Clear examples of a total subor-
dination of the translation to the expectations and capabilities of the potential 
addressee are translations for children; on the opposite end of the spectrum we 
find translations that are maximally faithful to the reading program of the orig-
inal. Thus, we ought to qualify the above-quoted remark by Anton Popovič: the 
translation’s virtual reader indeed is a norm for the translator; however, this 
norm is subject to gradation.
The expectations of the presupposed addressee of the translation determine 
the translator’s methods on various levels (in various layers) of the work. The 
particularly frequent and marked “concessions” to this reader can be observed in 
the make-up of the presented world. […]
The tension between the visibility of the author and the anonymity of the 
translator is always there in a translated work, though it is tempered by the 
genre and conventions. Also the tension between the competencies of the reader 
implied in the original and the virtual reader of the translation appears in every 
translated work. It can be nearly eliminated; it can also be greatly enhanced when 
the translator “corrects” the author, reinterprets the meanings of the original, 
and encourages the reader to perform tasks not intended by the original. This 
phenomenon is most visible in translations where worldviews and ideologies 
collide, and the addressee is forced to perform axiological actions.
In terms of extraliterary communication, the dual roles of the addressing 
functions of translation show in the context of two types of testimonials: biog-
raphy of the author, and self-commentaries and criticism concerning the trans-
lator. The context of the translator’s biography is very seldom introduced. 
Whereas the life of the author may cast light on his work, the biography of the 
translator strikes us as rather dispensable in interpreting the translation (the 
exception that proves the rule might be Artur Sandauer’s “theory of equivalents” 
and his translation of Mayakowsky’s Good, whose form was largely determined 
by the translator’s living situation during the war – the necessity of remaining in 
hiding and summoning the original text from memory).
It would seem that the duality of addresser/addressee categories of the trans-
lation does not pertain to the lower levels of intratextual communication. 
Nonetheless, in a translation the protagonist and narrator (or the speaker in 
poetry) are also hybrid categories. Their ontology is conditioned by the nature 
of the translated text. In the translation, the character, as well as other “large 
semantic figures,” are signs of the model of the world designed in the original. 
They do exist, however, and manifest themselves through the language of the 
translation, which in turn reflects the extralinguistic reality of the translator, and 
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not of the author. Thus, the protagonist (also the narrator), exists on the border 
between two presented worlds (“invented” in the original and “articulated” in 
the translation), and on the border between two creative consciousnesses:  the 
author’s and the translator’s. And again, the hybridity of the figures can be 
unevenly distributed, like the duality of the subject of the creative act. For 
example, in Julian Tuwim’s translation of Who is Happy in Russia? by Nikolay 
Nekrasov, the protagonists inhabit the social reality of Czarist Russia, they bear 
Russian names, but they often speak in a Polish local dialect. In translations of 
Ivan Krylov’s fables for adults, the fictional character attains maximum cultural 
autonomy; in translations of his works for children, the protagonists are adapted 
to the intellectual capacities of its virtual addressee and the context of the Polish 
culture. When the characters in a fictional world become primarily signifiers of a 
foreign cultural reality, this enhances the cognitive function of the world created 
in the translation.
The way the characters (and the narrator) speak is of prime importance not 
only for reconstructing the worldview of the original, but also for describing 
the translator’s strategy. This is why, in the following analyses, some questions 
are reiterated: Who is speaking? And how are they speaking? A comparison of 
the rules shaping an utterance in the original and in the translation allows us 
to see the mechanisms of translation transformations and isolate its dominant, 
to reveal the range of options discarded by the translator, the range of potential 
variants of the poetic language of the original.
Literary communication in translation is, as we have said, doubled; at least 
doubled: it would be more accurate to speak of multiplied communication. We 
ought to consider the fact that a translation is not always directly relative to the 
original. The “dialogue” between the translation and the original can also be indi-
rect. This is true, firstly, in a literal sense, when the translation is created through a 
“philological translation” developed in a different language (this is common prac-
tice in translations from Asian languages into European ones). The premise of a 
philological translation is to achieve maximum precision in communicating the 
meanings of the original, bypassing (or diluting) its linguistic over-organization. 
In other words, the aim is to preserve the referential, and not structural meanings. 
Still, as the philological translation is made by a person using a natural language, 
its “transparency” (let us thus call the zero-degree subjectivity of the translator) 
would seem impossible, at least for statements composed of several sequences. 
We might translate the Russian Otyetz ponyat’ yevo nye mog as “father could not 
understand him,” but a more complex sentence, like Otyet zponyat’ yevo nye mog 
I zemlyi otdaval w zalog might have at least two variants: “Father couldn’t under-
stand him and mortgaged his land” or “Father couldn’t understand him and 
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mortgaged the villages.” In the verse translation of Eugene Onegin that contains 
this line, we find a third option “His father never understood/And mortgaged all 
the land he could.”12 Here, the translator in-between would have to choose from 
the range of meanings of the word ponyat’ (understand, conceive, grasp), zemlyi 
(land, village, property), and otdavat’ w zalog (to mortgage, to give up for mort-
gage). He would also need to choose a syntactic variant, with or without subject-
verb inversion. The choice from the range of translation options depends on the 
individual understanding of the nuances of meaning in the translated text and 
the translator’s stylistic preferences. As such, the philological translation retains 
the “image of the translator” superimposed on the “image of the author.” When 
on the basis of this translation another foreign-language translation is rendered, 
three different languages collide within it, and three models of reality:  that of 
the author, that of the first translator, and that of the second translator. Another 
variant of an intermediate “dialogue” between the translation and the original is 
translations that exist in a series. If the translation of work X is created in a given 
language as a successive one, the law of competition prevails, but also that of “rep-
etition,” as Franciszek Siedlecki says: “often, a crucial stimulus for a retranslation 
is the previous translation.”13 This means that the new translation questions the 
structural variant of the original put forward in earlier translations, as it seeks to 
be superior. It cannot be, however, an absolute negation; it retains the “memory” 
of previous solutions, repeating the same heteronyms and images at the micro-
stylistic level, and sometimes also repeating the interpretation of the work as a 
whole. Like a parallel mirror, it reflects the devices and communication models 
constructed in the previous translations. […] We ought to add that this bears on a 
fundamental question: the translation’s form of existence14 (not in Ingarden’s sense 
of the phrase). The original work is singular. Of course, there is no such thing 
as total innovation in literature; every literary work is immersed in tradition, it 
draws upon ideas, motifs, and a vast repertoire of artistic strategies from the dawn 
of literary history, either endorsing or negating them. We ought to understand 
innovation as a unique combination of elements of a repertoire; in this sense, 
a work’s uniqueness is linked to a “minimal innovation of the system.”15 In the 
 12 A. Pushkin, Eugene Onegin: A Novel in Verse, trans. J. E. Falen (New York 2009), p. 8.
 13 F. Siedlecki, “Przekłady z poezji rosyjskiej.” In: Siedlecki, Pisma, pp. 663.
 14 The seriality of translation is discussed by E. Balcerzan in his essay “The Poetics of 
Literary Translation” [see pp. 105–119 in the present volume].
 15 J. Sławiński, “Synchronia i diachronia w procesie historycznoliterackim.” In his: Dzieło. 
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literary art, repetition means derivativeness – i.e. plagiarism. The literary system 
cannot produce a work that is literally analogous and written by another author. 
Various versions, remakes, and reinterpretations are permitted. Plagiarism is not. 
The uniqueness of a work is thus gauged by its originality. Works that allude to 
existing literature always differ from the original, at least to a minor degree. In 
the case of translation, the opposite is true. A translation seeks to be as close as 
possible to its original; similarity is the idea behind every translation. It may be 
conceived differently in various epochs, conventions, and genres, but the aim 
is always similarity. A translation does not aim to be either “better” or “worse” 
than the original. The criterion for evaluating translations is the concept of opti-
mality, not originality.16 The translation series results from the failure to achieve 
this optimal similarity to the original, and repeated efforts to do so. The history of 
literature has seen “congenial” translations, ones that could not be improved. But 
even this concept is historically relative. Ever since Julian Tuwim’s translation of 
Alexander Pushkin’s The Bronze Horseman, no translator has tried to retranslate 
the poem. Thus, Tuwim’s version stands as optimally similar to the original. This 
does not mean, however, that it has closed the series, and that this optimum will 
never change. In more extensive series, the impetus for development is precisely 
the inability – or difficulty – to achieve optimality, which need not result from 
the artistic quality of the original but can also come be conditioned by factors 
external to the work: the degree of kinship between the languages, the intercul-
tural relations, or the translators’ competencies.
It is these basic differences between the original and the translation, and their 
relationship to the literary system, that give rise to limitations in the translator’s 
space of creative activity. The translator adopts a role different to that of the 
author. According to translators themselves, it is a role that is sometimes inferior, 
sometimes equal. Miguel Cervantes de Saavedra famously said that Translating 
from one language to another is like looking at Flemish tapestry from the 
back:  the figures are visible but covered by threads that obscure them, devoid 
of the smoothness and color of the front of the tapestry. Franciszek Ksawery 
Dmochowski:
If you doubt the power of your pen
Or your wit or the breadth of your ken,
That you might in writing bring forth your own fruit;
 16 This category was introduced to translation theory by J. Ziomek in his essay: “Kto 




Waste not time, why practice when you can loot
Foreign works, by making them Polish.17
Valery Bryusov: “In translating poems, you succumb, time and again, to bouts 
of artistry, one might say, ‘you create,’ and thus you lose the capacity to critically 
evaluate what you write as a ‘translation’ ” (193). Nikolai Gumilov: “Here is the 
ideal situation – translations ought not to be signed with the translator’s name” 
(189). This is the view of people for whom translation should supplement to the 
original, rather than fighting for equal rights. Others see the roles of the author 
and the translator on a par. Ignacy Krasicki: “Translating books is a nobler art 
than one might suppose at first glance; in order for it to be properly proclaimed, 
then, we ought to free from error all those who call translators, be it of older or 
contemporary books in foreign tongues, and their valuable work, craftsmanship 
and not the labor of the intellect” (76). Vasily Zhukowsky:  “The translator of 
prose is a slave, the translator of poetry – a rival.”18 Natalia Modzelewska: “For 
understanding the author’s method is an indispensable condition for the 
co-creating that translation ought to be.”19 Karl Dedecius:  “Art presupposes 
freedom. Translation limits this freedom, yet it demands art” (385).
Translation supplies implied information about translators. This is informa-
tion about how they use the language. Only a dual-text analysis (of the transla-
tion and the original) reveals the competencies of the translator in the original 
language, along with information on how he has transferred meanings from one 
message to the other. A description of the language of translation also enables 
us to establish the translator’s temporal and spatial location, as well as allowing 
to characterize his idiolect, his individual stylistic attributes. Less frequently, the 
translation holds topical information, which can appear in footnotes and com-
mentaries to the main text. Usually, these concern the translation process itself, 
the impossibility of rendering certain fragments of the text, the necessity of sub-
stitution or interpreting the meaning of the original etc. A  dual-text analysis 
increases the scope of this information to include neglected options (potential 
translatorial solutions). The two texts might be further supplemented by other 
versions of the translation (rough drafts, notes) made by the same translator; 
 17 Quoted from Balcerzan’s Pisarze polscy, p.  88. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
quotations in this chapter are from this anthology, with page numbers in parentheses. 
Translations by S.G. [editors’ note].
 18 Quoted from E. Balcerzan, “Tłumacz i tłumaczenia. Wstęp.” In: E. Balcerzan, Oprócz 
głosu. Szkice historycznoliterackie (Warsaw 1971), p. 232.
 19 N. Modzelewska, “Refleksje tłumacza.” In: Przekład artystyczny. O sztuce tłumaczenia. 
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this makes the description of the translation process fully reliable.20 The pool 
of implied information on the translator decidedly outweighs the topical infor-
mation. The latter might appear in an accompanying text, outside the presented 
reality. The implied information, on the other hand, can be found throughout 
the text, from the title onward. The title of the translation gives us our first signal 
as to the poetics of the translation; in a sense, it introduces the “program” of 
the work.21 It is no accident that the translation of titles has been studied by 
critics,22 and it often allows us to infer the global interpretation of the original. In 
a self-sufficient work, hidden information about the author allows us to recon-
struct his image as the “arbiter of the linguistic rules.”23 Based on a translation, 
we are able to say not only how the translator has used language, but also how he 
reads another text. This is the chief difference between the “image of the author” 
and the “image of the translator”; the translator exists in the translation both as 
a subject creating a literary statement and as a subject interpreting a foreign-
language text. This latter function emerges, however, only in a description of 
the dual-text. When reading only the translation, the reader encounters the 
translator-as-interpreter as an implied, and not overt category.
As we have already said, both  figures – the “external author” and the “image 
of the translator” – co-inhabit the text as a kind of alternating interference. The 
author is the addresser, usually seen by the reader as the sole and ultimate one. 
Simple reading experience tells us that one generally recalls the name of the 
author of the translated work, and far more seldom the name of the translator. 
If we managed to reverse the publishing convention and foreground the name 
of the translator over that of the author, however, it would probably turn out 
that the reader would blame all the work’s shortcomings on the incapability of 
the translator. This might be done by an addressee who is conscious of the text 
being a translation, but does not compare it with the original. It is thus that the 
addressee as though separates the spheres of presence of these two categories: to 
the author he attributes the effort of creating a fictional reality and everything 
that occurs within it, while the translator is held responsible for the linguistic 
form of this reality. In rhetorical terminology, we might speak here of the plane 
 20 One example might be Julian Tuwim’s rough draft of the first stanza of Chapter Seven 
of Eugene Onegin, commented upon by Juliusz Wiktor Gomulicki in the review “Z 
rosyjskiego Juliana Tuwima,” Twórczość 1955, No. 2. p. 37.
 21 Cf.: A. Popovič, “Rola odbiorcy,” p. 215.
 22 E.g. K. Chukovsky, Vysokoye Iskustvo (Moscow 1964).
 23 J. Sławiński, “O kategorii podmiotu lirycznego. Tezy referatu.” In: Wiersz i poezja, ed. 










of invention and disposition as the author’s hegemony, and the plane of elocu-
tion as the translator’s territory. To some degree, this is accurate; the model of the 
world contained in the original is reflected in the translation. But since we must 
not separate the fictional reality from the language through which it exists, the 
translator can only be regarded as its co-creator. This issue only emerges differ-
ently in non-artistic translations, such as scientific ones, in which the linguistic 
composition is not a primary genre marker of the text.24
The “image of the translator” thus emerges on all levels of the text, much like the 
“image of the author.” The relationship between them, however, is re-established 
anew in every translation. In the above-quoted views the images of the ideal trans-
lation were quite varied: from overtly signaling the translator’s participation in the 
“creation” of the work, to utter anonymity of the translation, using only the author’s 
signature. The intratextual “original author – translator” relationship was modified 
by the literary conventions of particular epochs.
In every translation there is a tension between the visibility and anonymity of the 
translator. It can be alleviated by the genre of the original. Highly codified genres 
(e.g. fairy tales) set limits on expression. Non-codified forms help strengthen the 
“voice” of the translator, because they are more open and “individual.” (This can be 
observed in many contemporary translations, such as Maciej Słomczyński’s ren-
dering of Finnegan’s Wake).
Yet translators also have complexes. These concern the radically unequal creative 
contributions of the author and the translator, or the issue of “limited freedom.” 
They are expressed in translators’ abundant commentaries on their own work. We 
do not find that many statements by writers who have felt the need to justify their 
need to create literature and reveal the quandaries of the creative process. They are 
far fewer, at any rate, than statements by translators justifying the existence of the 
translation and showing the limits of the creative act. The translator’s statement 
arises from the eternal need to appreciate the role of the translator and to reveal his 
position as a subject.
The historical shifts in the translator’s degree of visibility in the text are linked 
to varying notions of the nature and role of translation in the system of native 
literature. In the Pre-romantic era translations are chiefly a way to bolster its 
development. In the Post-romantic era translation is increasingly seen as serving 
 24 See: R. Ingarden, “O tłumaczeniach.” In: O sztuce tłumaczenia, ed. M. Rusinek (Wrocław 
1955), p. 127. See pp. 85–104 in the present volume.
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to represent another culture.25 The beginnings of translated literature are born 
of the need to supplement the native culture, and thus there is a more powerful 
imperative to naturalize the translated work. After all, it is significant that in 
older Polish literature there are no extensive translation series. A once-translated 
work did not inspire rival retranslations, as the artistic status of the translation 
mattered less than the fact of the introduction of the foreign-language work into 
the domestic literary system. In the Post-romantic era the poetics of translation 
was a vital issue not only because of the wealth of existing literary conventions, 
but also because the dilemma of what and whom the translation ought to be 
representing emerged in all its intensity. Is it the foreign literature and the fo reign 
writer, or the translator and the literature into whose bloodstream the text is 
injected? From these two opposing perspectives come a variety of concepts of 
translation technique, as well as various ways of seeing the translator’s status, 
which nonetheless generally aspire to elevate the art of translation. […]
The translators’ statements that have emerged over the space of centuries to 
illuminate the role and nature of language, the craft of translation, the reproduc-
tion of the original, the poetic genius required to create correct translations, and 
finally, fidelity, the relationship between the original and the translation, and the 
translator’s creative competencies and their limitations, constitute material for 
studying the translation concepts binding in various epochs. These statements 
lay out the general rules of translation; they co-create the system of transla-
tion norms which I call the formulated poetics of translation. They reveal the 
translators’ convictions that mark the limits of creative freedom. And yet apart 
from these norms (which, after all, are not always respected in practice), there 
are also the limits of the translation’s sovereignty determined by the features of 
the original’s genre. The “image of the translator” and the degree of its visibility in 
the translated work primarily depends on the genre. As I have mentioned, “open” 
genres strengthen the translator’s voice. Highly conventionalized forms weaken 
this voice. Moreover, a great role is played by the position of the genre form of 
the translated work within the literary tradition that the translator represents. 
For the translation can be the genre equivalent of the original when the trans-
lator appeals to the genological awareness of his reader and uses conventions 
preexisting in his native tradition. If these conventions are foreign or under-
developed, however, the translation might serve to introduce a genre that is far 
 25 The thesis on the Romantic caesura in the history of translation is formulated by 
E.  Balcerzan in his paper “Sztuka przekładu jako przedmot badań literackich,” 




from assimilated, or even entirely new. (Such was the case in Polish with Nikolay 
Nekrasov’s digressive epic poem Who Is Happy in Russia?).
In terms of reception, the translator is the “second author” of the text when his 
presence is noticed by the reader. (Although, as I have already argued, the reader 
must fulfill certain conditions:  he must know the language of the translation 
and the original, and make a comparison of the two artistic messages). Reading 
the translation alone, the addressee is unable to establish the functions and the 
consequences of the translator’s operations. One exception to this rule might 
be in reading a translation that has already been the object of critical attention 
(such as Maciej Słomczyński’s translation of Joyce). Here the reader might not 
know the original or its language, yet he can be aware that the work expresses 
the translator’s personality. The same goes for the reception of translations that 
are tangibly archaic, emphatically burdened with mannerisms (such as Goethe’s 
Faust in Emil Zegadłowicz’s translation). A  hint of the translator’s interven-
tion remains in every translation, but it seems that among the translatorial 
transformations we can distinguish between the necessary and the redundant 
ones. Necessary transformations are those which serve to transfer the meanings 
of the poetic message; here the translator regards the original as a system of 
directives that should generate equivalent semantic fields in the foreign-language 
text (the translation). Redundant transformations modify the original structure 
and most often appear in the prevalence of two types of non-neutral translation 
approaches: amplification and reduction. We can distinguish between the two 
kinds of translation interventions using the criterion of congruency of styles of 
the original and the translation. When the author’s style ceases to be recogniz-
able in the translation, the “image of the translator” as the creator of the literary 
work appears most vividly. The translation must show a relative balance in the 
“participation” of the author and the translator. Should the scales tip, and the 
author’s style be entirely eliminated, the work shifts from translated literature to 
paratranslation.
Redundant transformations can pertain to various areas of the text; but when 
they become the rule in the immanent poetics of the translation, we are dealing 
with the maximum subjectivity of the translator. In artistic translation prac-
tice we equally seldom encounter zero-degree and maximum translator visi-
bility. The entirely absent translator and the omnipresent translator are merely 
model translation situations that are aspired to or derided in various translation 
conventions. In the main, a translation has two authors and is heterophonic, 
with the voices of the author and the translator creating a sort of counterpoint. 
In research practice we observe cases where this heterophony is disrupted in 
order to show boundaries that the translator cannot cross, lest he annihilate the 
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text-as-translation, and beyond which he ceases to co-create the work and begins 
to usurp the rights of the author.
The category that appears most frequently in […] descriptions of the transla-
tion process is “selection.” As I have mentioned a number of times already, this 
selection has two aspects. The translator selects elements of style and convention 
from his native linguistic/literary paradigm, but simultaneously makes choices 
within the semantic field of the original. The author selects only from the former 
system, since he is creating an original work, for which there is no prototype 
(provided, of course, that we ignore the issue of genre rules). Thus, we could 
say that the translator’s selection is wider and more alternative. And yet this is a 
factor that limits the translator’s “freedom” rather than increasing it: “In the sim-
plest of terms, the translator has no creative freedom in his choice of means and 
ways of speaking […]. In all circumstances the translator’s message simplifies 
the ambiguity of the original; it gravitates naturally toward the unambiguous,” 
claims Anton Popovič.26 “The other’s” voice and “one’s own” words in a transla-
tion are the result of the creative work of two authors. When the words of the 
translator prevail over the style of the original author, this interferes with the 
principle of reproduction. Then translation becomes a creative work in the sense 
of a process and a product. The “subjective truth” of the author is replaced by the 
truth of the translator, and thus the text becomes, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the work of a single author.
In translation practice we seldom find such extreme interference with the 
translation convention. We usually observe the translator’s dramatic oscillation 
between humility and the desire to communicate “the other’s” voice, and the 
intention of leaving something of his own “image” in the text.
[1986/1999/2013]
Translated by Soren Gauger





Philosophical Dilemmas of Translation
To refuse translation is to refuse life.
Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other, trans. Peggy Kamuf
In the eighty-third aphorism of The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche addresses 
the subject of translation. This is the most substantial piece devoted to trans-
lation in his oeuvre. Briefer remarks can be found in his early lectures On the 
Future of Our Educational Institutions, where he speaks of translation exercises 
as “splendid” (herrlichen) and the “most beneficial” (heilsamste) means of “fer-
tilizing” (befruchten) native speech, in The Wanderer and His Shadow, and 
Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche points out the difficulties in translating 
signifiants, speaking of the impossibility of rendering the “pace” of the original 
language. It was in the above-mentioned passage from The Gay Science, however, 
that he laid the framework of his translation theory and gave it a wide philosoph-
ical context. To Nietzsche, translation is closely linked to history, or, quite signifi-
cantly, to the historical sense (historische Sinn): “The degree of historical sense of 
any age may be inferred from the manner in which this age makes translations 
and tries to absorb former ages and books.”1
This does not just mean that every translation is grounded in some past, 
but also, and perhaps primarily, that the relationship between the original text 
and the translation is not a simple correspondence, for history writes itself 
through the differences and in the space of difference between the two works. 
Hence, speaking of the historical sense, we inscribe the art of translation into 
the interdependencies between what constitutes the generally unperceived aura 
around my body and what encompasses phenomena such as language, writing, 
and ideology (in The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche says that thanks to the “his-
torical sense” we can easily deduce what values a given society lives by), and the 
 1 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York 1974), pp. 83–84. All 






body itself (in the concluding sections of The Gay Science, the philosopher calls 
“historical sense” the “sixth sense”).
In other words, translation, which has been traditionally subject to the 
demand of a dual fidelity  – a fidelity to the original and a fidelity to its own 
present day (for is it not by now a classical belief that every epoch must have its 
own Homer?) – is in a highly suspect situation, for, as we find from Nietzsche’s 
analysis, the fidelity to one’s time consists precisely in betraying the original. 
The books the philosopher mentions are “bygone,” as are the times (vergangene 
Zeiten und Bücher). Thus, the translation is (theoretically) meant to be faithful 
to something that belongs to the sphere of imperfectum, to something that once 
was, and whose contours are imprecise: it is not books that one translates, but 
books and times (Zeiten und Bücher). The translation, therefore, is to be faithful 
to something that is unfaithful to itself: the text is not defined by contours, but 
always “spills over” into times, changing its scope; it is always “the text and the 
times.” And if the original is not loyal to itself, not faithful to itself, it is “the text 
and the times,” so it is the text only at times, only at times is it the thing we are to 
translate –what is it that the translator should be faithful to? The only fidelity in 
translation is the fidelity to yet another form of betrayal.
Do we even have any basis for speaking of fidelity and betrayal? Is there a 
point beyond sequences of betrayal and loyalty from which we might establish 
precise criteria of truthfulness, fidelity, love for the text? Can we conclusively 
state: this is a faithful translation, this is an unfaithful translation? This is a trans-
lation free from sin, untouched, virginal, beyond the danger of violation? And, 
above all, why this list of questions inscribing translation into the themes of the 
body and sin, the erotic and transgression, sensuality and passion? There are 
two reasons: firstly, because the “historical sense” is our “sixth sense,” and thus 
is inevitably linked with the nature of our corporeality; secondly, because this 
is the rhetoric of the knowledge which Nietzsche calls “joyful”(or “gay”).This 
knowledge (or “science”) sees translation as “assimilation,” or rather “incorpo-
ration” (einverleiben), “taking possession,” a “conquest” (bemächtigten), “forcible 
taking hold of ” (gewaltsomlegtees seine Hand auf…). As such, the “historical 
sense” is the historical figure of sensuality; if we translate the German term 
historischer Sinn acoustically into English, we get “historical sin.” Historischer 
Sinn = historische Sünde.
In the age of Corneille and even of the Revolution, the French took possession of Roman 
antiquity in a way for which we would no longer have courage enough – thanks to our 
more highly developed historical sense. And Roman antiquity itself: how forcibly and 
at the same time naively it took hold of everything good and lofty of Greek antiquity, 
which was more ancient! How they translated things into the Roman present! (GS, 84)
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The sin chiefly consists in our belief that we can stand outside the series of 
distortions and transformations, and pass judgments on the translation’s degree 
of accuracy; in other words, we believe that we can attain a point which is beyond 
sin and thus beyond sensuality and beyond history, beyond the body. Nietzsche 
argues that this is impossible. The course of history is a sequence of perspectives, 
and therefore a sequence of errors; its limit cannot be ascertained. As Jacques 
Derrida has noted, the limit can only appear in the succession of differences and 
fissures:
The limit [la limite] has the form of always different faults [failles], of fissures whose 
mark [trace] or scar [cicatirce] is borne by all the texts of philosophy.2
In Nietzsche’s aphorism, the series of distortions goes as follows: In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries the French “conquer” the Romans, who in turn 
had appropriated Greek heritage, and thus in fact Corneille is translating a whole 
mosaic of Greek texts mediated through the Roman poets, and he is not even 
aware of this. Thus, translation is an exponent of the “historical sense,” i.e. the 
individual and social ways of appropriating the world. Nietzsche calls this appro-
priation “absorption” or “incorporation” (einverleiben). This term deserves our 
attention; with it, translation becomes part of politics and (again) the body. We 
“incorporate” the original text into our own culture much as an independent 
city or state is incorporated into the empire. Nietzsche clearly recognizes this 
imperialistic aspect of translation, drawing parallels between the work of a trans-
lator and the politics of the “great Roman Empire.” This point of view alters the 
dependency between the text of the work that is being translated and the text of 
the translation. So far, this relationship has borne all the hallmarks of a master/
slave relationship:  the translator was to carry out the author’s commands. The 
text of the translation was merely a to-do list left by an absent employer. The situ-
ation changes with the introduction of the concept of “incorporation”: the trans-
lator/slave is suddenly put in a position in which, firstly, he is forced, as it were, 
to compete with the author/master, and, secondly, this competition inevitably 
leads to a subversive ending:  the servant will overpower his or her master. In 
the traditional translation model which prevails in Western culture, the author’s 
idea, message, the signifié reigned supreme over the signs of the text, the body of 
the work, and the body of the author. The classical instruction declared that the 
translator should render the thoughts, not the words, the signifié, not the signi-
fiant; completely devoted to his or her work, the translator remained celibate, as 
 2 J. Derrida, Positions, trans. A. Bass (Chicago 1982), p. 57. 
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it were, eliminating him/herself and his/her desires for the sake of the author’s 
thoughts, restricting his/her own presence to but a shadow of the author’s divine 
presence. It was no accident that in Medieval Europe monks were the masters of 
translation; nor was it by chance that their actual names remained hidden behind 
monastic names or faded into oblivion. Nor is it by accident that translations 
have yet to enter the classical literary canons of the languages into which they are 
translated. The translator under the rule of the author, the body governed by the 
spirit, the significant at the mercy of the signifié – these are the foundations of the 
philosophy of translation.
Nietzsche however uses the term “incorporation” (einverleiben), and this con-
cept changes everything. “Incorporation” presupposes resistance, or at the very 
least, the solid, material nature of both elements: the incorporating and the incor-
porated. “Incorporation” means entering the body and becoming its part, func-
tioning within its sphere. What is corporeal and material, and keeps appearing 
on the horizon of the spirit-possessed translation, is the TEXT. With the politics 
and erotics of “incorporation,” the physically absent (yet spiritually omnipresent) 
author, ruthlessly though discreetly surveilling the translator’s actions, and the 
equally “disembodied” translator, always retreating from his own presence and 
his own desires, are called to order by the appearance of the TEXT.
As we know from Roland Barthes, TEXT differs from work in that it is a 
methodological field rather than the sum total of cautions and completed forms; 
in that it is paradoxical, for it is located beyond the sphere of doxa; and in that it 
is a multiplicity of languages irreducible to a single langue. In a word, TEXT is 
where the pleasure principle is enacted. This means that the stakes of translation 
are in regaining the pleasure of the TEXT. This pleasure is Barthes’ jouissance 
and Nietzsche’s frohliche Wissenschaft, and the main battlefield is the relationship 
between ourselves, the past, and the foreign. In his meditations, Nietzsche writes 
that the Romans
did not know the delights [Genuß] of the historical sense; what was past and alien was 
an embarrassment for them; and being Romans, they saw it as incentive for a Roman 
conquest (das Vergangene und Fremde war ihnen peinlich, und als Römern ein Anreiz zu 
einer römischen Eroberung). (GS, 84)
The pleasure of history (let us note the erotic rhetoric of the whole sentence) 
consists in the fact that the past must remain past and foreign, which means that 
it is not subject to translation to the extent that the translator’s work focuses on 
the translation of “bygone times” into our times and of the foreign language into 
(his own) national language. And yet translation does not cease, as it is a condi-
tion of history (and not only literature). Without translation other times would 
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remain foreign to us, and thus incomprehensible; history would become a sphere 
of impenetrable gloom or even total oblivion. As such, the translator translates 
what must be both translated and left untranslated if it is to be understood: his-
tory must cease to be foreign, it must speak my language, but if it is to be his-
tory as a source of pleasure, it must contain what is foreign, it must continue 
to speak in a language I do not quite understand. This is precisely how Roland 
Barthes describes what his theory calls a text of bliss (text de jouissance), which 
gets me out of my comfortable rut of perceiving of the world, revealing the world 
as fo reign, history as a space of non-continuity, and language as a domain of an 
epistemological crisis.
Succumbing to the text as jouissance, the translator alters the course of his 
work: now the translation is meant to reveal the fact that the translated past is 
a construct of the present, and thus it must rely on the paradoxical assertion 
that the translated text is not translated completely, for we only translate it at all 
because it contains what must remain “bygone and foreign.” Translation reveals 
what is untranslatable not because of syntactic or lexical incompatibilities, but 
for a far more serious reason: the structure of human temporality. Let us note, 
above all, the play of numbers: the translation is always an attempt to translate 
times past (vergangene Zeiten) into the language of some other time, though it 
must inevitably be reductive, as the original was also created in the aura of its 
present time and spatial topography. But a text is not and cannot be entirely 
“original” for, as Nietzsche reminds us, it is the domain of “private things,” and 
thus must inevitably be a “translation” of other texts, not necessarily literary 
ones. The text is inextricably entangled in the intertextuality of the world:  the 
private nature of the text is a translation of the world’s gestures, whose language, 
for Nietzsche, is the primary text of existence, upon which consecutive layers of 
translation are inscribed. This explains his apologia, in Ecce Homo, for the phys-
iology of existence, for that pre-semiotic state of being where translation begins:
You must know the size of your stomach. Inadvisable for the same reason are those long-
drawn-out meals which I call sacrificial feasts with intermissions […]. – No snacks, no 
coffee: coffee makes you gloomy. Tea beneficial only in the morning. A little, but strong; 
tea is very harmful and makes you feel sickly all day if it is just slightly too weak. […] 
In a very agaçant climate it is inadvisable to begin with tea: one should lead off with a 
cup of thick, oil-less cocoa an hour beforehand. – Sit as little as possible; do not believe 
any idea that was not born in the open air and of free movement – in which the muscles 
do not also revel. All prejudices emanate from the bowels. – Sitting still (I said it once 
already) – the real sin against the holy ghost.3
 3 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. D. Large (New York 2009), p. 21. 
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What we consider the beginning and an absolutely present moment, i.e. the 
“original” text, turns out to be a complex structure, or as Nietzsche puts it, “the 
languages of gestures and glances.”4 To examine the problem of translation must 
mean contemplating the substance of the present; even though it seldom occurs 
to us, translation is an awareness of the awareness of “now,” a meta-awareness 
of the present. According to the philosopher, in translating the Greeks into the 
Roman present, the Roman poets exchanged the multiplicity and diversity of the 
past for the homogeneity of “now.” Nietzsche writes:
How deliberately and recklessly they brushed the dust off the wings of the butterfly that 
is called moment! 
(Wie verwischten sie absichtlich und unbekümmert den Flügelstaub des Schmetterlings 
Augenblick!) (GS, 84)
Therefore, translation is a deliberate, inevitable loss. The essence of this loss is the 
removal – double removal – of the “present” moment. This movement has two 
phases. First, the translator acknowledges the inadequacy of full self-realization 
“now” in the “original” text, presented in Nietzsche’s aphorism as dust raised by 
the wings of a butterfly, and then he recognizes that the work of the translator 
also (and intentionally – absichtlich) wipes away the traces of the “now” moment. 
Thus, like it or not, translation is a meditation on the impossibility of capturing 
and actualizing the “now” referred to as Augenblick.
In a manner of speaking, Augenblick is a pre-semiotic element, and all the 
work of the writer of the “original” text (now we must place the word in inverted 
commas as evidence of our mistrust for it) already is a translation, as it consists in 
entrusting to signs the stuff of experience (Nietzsche asks: “What was it to them 
[the translators] that the real creator had experienced this and that and written 
the signs of it into his poem?” [GS, 84]), and the signs, too, have their own pasts, 
and, consequently, they can only efface the original, unique, irreplicable nature 
of the moment of Augenblick.
Hidden in Nietzsche’s beautiful phrase is an atmosphere of death: the butterfly 
has flown away, and all traces of its presence have been carefully and deliber-
ately removed. The “original” text is a place of mourning ritual, as it were (the 
Augenblick butterfly vanished or was caught and pinned, as suggested by the last 
aphorism in Beyond Good and Evil:  “Alas, always only birds that grew weary 
of flying and flew astray and now can be caught by hand […]. We immortalize 
what cannot live and fly much longer”5). The “original” text is doubly dead: it is 
 4 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York 1968), p. 422.
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dead for its own time (it cannot render the Augenblick moment) and dead for 
the future, which will have to breathe its own life into it (Nietzsche phrases the 
Roman translator’s question as: “Should we not have the right to breathe our own 
soul into this dead body? For it is dead after all” [GS, 84]).
As we can see, translation is an attempt to animate a creature which is seem-
ingly the incarnation of life and creative energy; yet Nietzsche does not enter-
tain the slightest of hopes when it comes to the efficacy of this undertaking. The 
translator begins his work in the face of the death encoded in the sign, but the life 
which he intends to bestow on the breathless being, is nothing but the multiplica-
tion and intensification of that mortality: the translator pursues the mysteries of 
the text’s life, rummaging among the monuments of death, like Dr. Frankenstein.
As Nietzsche argues, the Roman translator (and every translator shares this 
fate) gives his own life to the text, which is a political death (what perishes is 
the independence and autonomy of the work, which now becomes part of the 
empire) and the death of the present (the Augenblick of the translation is just as 
dead as the Augenblick of the translated work). Yet despite the whole gravity of 
death, translation is an activity that manifests what Nietzsche would have called 
“the will to power.” Through its constant confrontation with death, it opens 
up to hope for the future. Considering the futility of efforts to breathe life into 
something dead, to assimilate what is foreign (and what could be more foreign 
and untranslatable into any other language than death), the translator asserts 
the need for corrections, revisions – the interventions of the future. The trans-
lator is particularly focused on the future. He uncovers the truth fundamental 
for his work:  that true historicity is not about seizing and animating the past, 
but, on the contrary, about admitting death to the realm of times past and pre-
sent, about activity based on what is untranslatable, but which the future shall 
attempt to translate anyway. The movement of translations, therefore, not only 
monumentalizes the past or traces it back in the antiquarian mode; it is also an 
act that looks critically at the past (we are borrowing the terms for the three 
schools of historical thinking in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations) in order to 
preserve it as “past” and “foreign.” In order to “faithfully” preserve the past, to 
give the past to the present to understand, translation, as an attempt at con-
sidering the past, rendering it in the language of “now,” must demonstrate the 
“foreignness,” or the untranslatability of the past. To translate is to constantly 
reveal the limits of translatability. The translator is someone who, consciously or 
not, ensures that the work always speaks a language that is ultimately “foreign.” 
Translating is existence in an eternally self-renewing difference.
The past, foreignness, death  – three elements that provoke translation and 
three concepts describing what is untranslatable, but which conditions the 
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translator’s efforts and serves as their patron. Yet Nietzsche speaks of “incorpo-
ration” (einverleiben). How are we to understand these acts that imply enlarge-
ment, enhancement, expansion, if the translation’s context is set by the past, 
foreignness, and death?
We have said that the stereotype of the translator is the very model of the 
servant’s behavior toward the master, of Caliban toward Prospero: the translator 
is “conquered” by the author, taught his language, and discipline compels him 
to carry out the tasks he is given. The master is life, and the servant lives by 
the grace of his superior. Let us bear in mind that Prospero, the master, author, 
director, omnipotent God on the small island of the text where wondrous things 
can happen, is also the guardian of morality, of the purity of his offspring. Caliban 
is outcast into the periphery of the island and the text, as (according to Prospero’s 
accusation) he attempted to “violate the honor of [his] child” (Act I, Scene 2).
The author, Prospero, tends to the purity of his art and the virginity of his 
daughter:  in a word, he increases the obstacles for those who should seek to 
possess either one or the other. The daughter and magic weave into one:  they 
are a product of Prospero’s actions, they are his book. As such, the assault on 
Prospero’s authority must be a violent conflict with his authorial language of 
structure and order. Rebelling against Prospero, Caliban first attempts to relin-
quish his speech:
You taught me language, and my profit on ‘t
Is I know how to curse. The red plague rid you.
For learning me your language!
(Act I, Scene 2)
Later, when the rebellion becomes open, he advances on Prospero’s house 
repeating two phrases: to destroy the books and sate himself on Miranda’s beauty 
(Act III, Scene 2). Prospero deprives Caliban (as the author does the translator) 
of the sanctuary of his own speech; before Prospero’s arrival on the island, his 
language was speech that ensured a seemingly harmonious existence in the 
world. This harmony was only apparent, as it was reduced to the immediate sur-
roundings; it made the world a home, but this home proved to be vulnerable, 
permeable, even only apparent. Harmony guaranteed a non-confrontational 
relationship with the world, which became just like a toolkit; and in this manner, 
it domesticated the world, which responded confidently to every question and 
satisfied all our needs. The foreign language, the speech of a newcomer from 
distant shores and the “abysm of time” (Act I, Scene 2) shatters homeliness by 
demonstrating the limited nature of the domestic topography: Caliban functions 
within his immediate surroundings, but has no relationship with the sun and the 
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moon. Prospero disrupts the seemingness of native speech, so obvious and auto-
matically taken for granted, by “calling in” the heavens into the native tongue. 
We might say that the speech in which and for which a man is born cannot 
make him aware of the power of language that calls the most remote beings into 
speech. The intervention of a foreign tongue will show that what we accept as 
evident – so evident that it scarcely seems to be speech or a sign, it is simply the 
world – in fact contains vast spaces of namelessness. It seems to us that the native 
tongue exhausts the world in the perfection of naming, yet a foreign language 
reveals the inexhaustibility of the world with regard to the capacities of language. 
Prospero, the author, the defender of purity, teaches Caliban to name the Sun 
and the Moon. When asked what naming things is, Heidegger once responded:
The naming call bids things to come into such an arrival. Bidding is inviting. It invites 
things in, so that they may bear upon men as things.6
If what belongs to the “sky,” “day,” and “night” is to appear in the consciousness of 
the native language, it will appear through a foreign element. This lies at the basis 
of both the phenomenological (Heideggerian) and deconstructive (Derridean) 
methods, choosing translation and the processes involved in it as the primary 
fields of philosophical inquiry. Answering a question about the meaning of 
the word bauen, Heidegger resorts to translation into Old English and Upper 
German, and, in an etymological game, combines bauen with the verb “to be” 
(ich bin) and the Latin noun cultura, in order to demonstrate that bauen means 
“to dwell,” a meaning which belongs to the sphere of silence in the shadow of the 
dictionary meaning of bauen as “to build.”
Heidegger’s procedure involves three instructions:
 1. every meaning is a translation, an idea well rendered in the word play between 
the Polish expressions “tłumaczyć/przetłumaczyć/wytłumaczyć” [translate, 
explain IMPERF/translate PERF/explain PERF]; or the double meaning of 
the English “interpreting”.
 2. every translation goes through many languages and associative territories;
 3. translation does not establish the truth once and for all, but merely unveils it 
for a brief moment, gives it a voice, and then silence falls.
The truth of translation is truth conceived as aletheia, not homoiosis – i.e. we 
understand it as an oscillation between what has suddenly been unveiled and 
the murky sphere that conceals many other meanings. The truth of translation 
must recall the silence that resounds in every word that is spoken’ this silence 
 6 M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York 2013), p. 197. 
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is inhabited by other recollections and other words. Heidegger’s English trans-
lator, William Lovitt, reminds us of this constantly. Here is one of his cautions 
regarding the term das Ge-stell:
Stellen embraces the meanings of a whole family of verbs: bestellen (to order, command; 
to set in order), vorstellen (to represent), sicherstellen (to secure), nachstellen (to entrap), 
verstellen (to block or disguise), herstellen (to produce, to set here), darstellen (to present 
or exhibit), and so on. In these verbs the various nuances within stellen are reinforced 
and made specific. All these meanings are gathered here in Heidegger’s unique use of the 
word that is pivotal for him, Ge-stell (Enframing).7
Even a proper name is included in the translation game; translation opens it to 
the workings of a pun that can only be preserved in the native language: take Mr. 
Choakumchild from Dickens’s Hard Times, who appears in an older Polish trans-
lation as pan Dławibachor,8 which keeps the linguistic associations contained in 
the English original, but at the same time it interferes with the author’s intention 
(the translator presumes that this surname is not accidental, that it alludes to the 
character’s personality).
A proper name is something that presupposes familiarity, knowledge, and 
the confidence of possession: a proper name excludes presence, and thus eludes 
translation. But the translator listens to the calls resounding in words. He defends 
foreignness. For the translator, even a proper name is foreign, as language ceases 
to be an expression of human thought, a cognitive tool, as Heidegger as demon-
strated, and begins to speak for itself. The translator listens to the language, not 
the author speaking.
At the opening of his bizarre, multilingual book Glas, Jacques Derrida includes 
his deliberations on Hegel, but he begins them (or does he really “begin,” given 
that Glas, like Finnegans Wake, has no “beginning” or “end,” and begins with a 
lowercase letter) with a question: Qui, lui? Is the answer “Hegel”? Who would 
even hazard a comprehensive answer, if the philosopher’s surname, which ought 
to be doubly beyond the possibility of translation (as a proper name and as a 
part of a science called philosophy, synonymous with wisdom), has already 
been translated, and doubly at that (from a proper name to a common one, and 
from German to French). Through a game of signifiants, Derrida’s jouissance 
has changed Hegel into a parody of the Nietzschean figure of the eagle soaring 
 7 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W.  Lovitt (New  York 
1977), p. 15.
 8 This remark appears in a footnote to Apollo Korzeniowski’s 1866/1867 translation. Qtd 
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through the icy mountain air:  the Derridean eagle seems encased in a block 
of ice.
“His name is so strange” (Son nom est si étrange), Derrida writes. Small 
wonder, given that the French pronunciation (another translation – from seman-
tics to phonetics) turns Hegel into aigle and gel.
From the eagle it draws imperial or historic power. Those who still pronounce his name 
like the French [à la française] (there are some) are ludicrous only up to a point:  the 
restitution (semantically infallible […]) of magisterial coldness and imperturbable seri-
ousness, the eagle caught in ice and frost, glass and gel [l’aigleprisdans la glace et le gel].9
With this image of the eagle encased in frozen water, trapped in ice, the eagle of 
philosophy resting in an ice-cold crypt, we return in somewhat parodistic form 
to the Nietzschean concept of einverleiben. The translation “incorporates” the 
“original” text. It devours and consumes it, feeds on it (this meaning lives in the 
German reflexive form of sich einverleiben, “to eat or drink something,” as well 
as in the noun Genuß, which Nietzsche used in the same passage). At the same 
time, given the still active notion of the author as the highest sanction, quasi-
divine presence, this act of consuming the “original” text is a ritual act, in which 
a totemic animal is sacrificed. According to Freud’s interpretation of the totem, 
this concept brings together all the attributes of an author: paternal authority 
and the ambivalent feelings toward him.
The totemic animal, as Freud states in his Totem and Tabu (1913), echoing 
Robertson Smith, can be sacrificed to the gods with which it is identified. 
Translation, therefore, is a sacrifice of the “original” text in place of the author, 
whose text is his child, a totemic animal.
Another restriction concerning the totem (the first, let us recall, prohibits acts 
of aggression against the father/author) is the taboo on relationships with women 
belonging to the same totem. We have seen how, in The Tempest, Caliban – the 
figure of the translator stripped of the certainties of existence by Prospero’s 
fo reign language – is punished for attempting to rape Miranda.
In the context of this Freudian analysis, the translator’s situation thus emerges 
as follows: he competes with the father/author by whom he has been, to some 
extent, created, for the text/daughter (Miranda in The Tempest), which plays the 
object of desire. Thus, incorporation (einverleiben) is a form of sacrifice made in 
order to reconcile oneself with the father, the author, God; and simultaneously, it 
is a substitute burial of this many-headed creature, so that the translator can seize 
the text in his name alone (one “struck out the name of the poet and replaced it 
 9 J. Derrida, Glas, trans. J. P. Leavey, R. Rand (Nebraska 1990), p. 1. 
 
Tadeusz Sławek262
with one’s own – not with any sense of theft,” Nietzsche writes in the last sentence 
of his meditation on translation).
Incorporation now becomes a combination of the act of putting the text in 
the crypt of another language and a mourning ceremony, an act of grieving. 
The “original” text, cannot, as it were, be abandoned to its own fate and its own 
language like other “normal” statements in the native language; the text that 
was the object of conflict between the author and the translator; the text that 
played the role of pharmakon and a totemic animal. In their enactment, these 
roles inevitably lead to death; the text is absorbed by the language of the trans-
lation, surrounded by other sounds and words, which, at the same time, are the 
words that bemourn the death of the text. The text is laid into the coffin of the 
translator’s native language.
When I  read a text in the “original” it is dissolved, as it were, internalized 
through my work as a reader. When I do the work of a translator I begin to ask 
the text questions that reaffirm it as an object; but at the same time, in face of the 
aura of death that surrounds this object, they make the answers come as voices 
“from beyond the grave.” Then I have to deposit or bury10 the text in order to per-
form a mourning ceremony through the gesture of translation. The text returns, 
naturally, animated by questions (much as repressed experiences return through 
a psychoanalyst’s questions), summoned by other texts; it returns as a “foreigner,” 
as an “alien body,” a “living dead.”
[1991]
Translated by Soren Gauger





Film Adaptation as Intersemiotic Translation
The ties between literature and film have often been considered from various 
points of view. Over the last fifty years, film has struggled for autonomy, freeing 
itself from literature’s hegemony; this has changed the views on the mutual 
relationships between these two arts. Initial assertions about influences and 
genetic dependencies, and then about film’s structural and functional links with 
literature1 have given way to the opposite thesis, emphasizing film’s role as an 
inspiration for the avant-garde movements of twentieth-century art.2 In the 
pano rama of film theory, there are also exponents of the parallel development of 
the two art forms3 and even tentative suggestions of the mutual relationships and 
conditioning of literature and film in European culture.4 One aspect of this broad 
subject area concerns film adaptations of literary works.
A great deal has already been written on adaptations, from both the his-
torical and the theoretical perspective. Apart from the longer or shorter arti-
cles,5 our literature also boasts two monograph books: Władysław Orłowski’s 
From Book to Screen6 and Maryla Hopfinger’s Film Adaptations of literary works. 
 1 See: M. Marcjan, M. Salska-Kaca, “Koncepcja ‘przyliterackości’ filmu w teorii Bolesława 
W. Lewickiego.” In: Dzieło filmowe – zagadnienie interpretacji, ed. J. Trzynadlowski 
(Wrocław 1987).
 2 A. Hauser, “Pod znakiem filmu.” In:  Społeczna historia sztuki i literatury, trans. 
J. Ruszczycówna, Vol. 2 (Warsaw 1974). Following Hauser’s lead, the filmic provenance 
of contemporary narrative techniques was underscored, in particular the shaping of 
time (I have written about this in Problematyka symultanizmu w prozie (Poznań 1981), 
pp. 152–154). On the influence of film on the work of the Polish avant-garde of the 
1920s, see: W. Banaszkiewicz, W. Witczak, Historia filmu polskiego, Vol. 1 (1895–1929), 
Warsaw 1966.
 3 A. Jackiewicz, “Proces literacki a film.” In: Proces historyczny w literaturze i sztuce. 
Materiały konferencji naukowej, ed. M. Janion, A. Piorunowa (Warsaw 1967).
 4 M. Hopfinger, Adaptacje filmowe utworów literackich. Problemy teorii i interpretacji 
(Wrocław 1974), pp. 26–68.
 5 These are listed in the bibliography compiled by Andrzej Gwóźdź: “Polski film fabularny 
w relacjach z innymi sztukami. Wybór polskich publikacji z zakresu metodologii, 
teorii, estetyki I krytyki filmu z lat 1945–1977, dotyczących powojennej kinomatografii 
polskiej (bibliografia).” In: Film polski wobec innych sztuk, eds. A. Helman, A. Madej 
(Katowice 1979).
















Theory and interpretation7 which treats film adaptation as intersemiotic trans-
lation. Today, we can already observe a certain exhaustion with the issue of 
adaptation and “literature-centrism,” as the juxtaposition of works of film and 
literature seems to privilege the literary-theory perspective, and breaks little 
new ground. Edward Balcerzan has postulated the alternative of studying the 
literary origins of film, i.e. tracing the transformations of themes and motifs 
in terms of “long duration.”8 Marek Hendrykowski has suggested that adapta-
tion is only one of many possible variants for dialogue between film and liter-
ature, and that the correspondences should not be studies on the level of the 
text itself, but the whole of literary culture.9 Yet the most comprehensive attack 
on “adaptology” has come from Alicja Helman.10 In her view, the fact of adap-
tation does not determine anything; the value and rank of the literary work 
does not translate into the value of the film, whose quality is independent of 
the model it is based on  – films polemical towards their literary sources are 
often successful. Furthermore, an adaptation in no way differs from an original 
film; it does not have its own poetics, it can only be recognized as an adapta-
tion if one knows the literary source. Essentially, then, it is the viewer’s know-
ledge that is all-decisive.11 According to Helman, “film does not adapt literature 
but uses it.”12 Given the difference in material, this use cannot be covered by 
a universal model. There are no principles of transcription or equivalence 
between literary and film signs, and so we cannot speak of intersemiotic trans-
lation. This undermines the theoretical approach to adaptation once and for 
all. Nonetheless, I should like to return to it, because adaptation is a convenient 
point of departure for juxtaposing literary and film signs, and it should provide 
an answer as to whether sign translation is possible, and whether we can speak 
of intersemiotic translation in this case.
 7 Hopfinger, Adaptacje filmowe utworów literackich.
 8 E. Balcerzan, “Gdy film rozstaje się z literaturą.” In: Kręgi wtajemniczenia (Krakow 1982).
 9 M. Hendrykowski, “Zagadnienie kontekstu literackiego filmu (na przykładzie polskiej 
szkoły filmowej).” In: Film polski wobec innych sztuk, pp. 44–60.
 10 A. Helman, “Modele adaptacji filmowej. Próba wprowadzenia w problematykę,” Kino 
1979, No. 6.
 11 Helman elaborates on this in “Adaptacje filmowe dzieł literackich jako świadectwo 
lektury tekstu” (a lecture delivered at the Semiotics of Literary Culture conference, IBL, 
Warsaw 1984).
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The Phenomenon of the Plot
That the arts employ plot is beyond dispute. It is plot – the fictional characters 
and events – that seems to link literature, film, and even painting. Jerzy Ziomek 
has claimed that there is something like a class of plot-based arts that oppose 
the class of poetic arts.13 The universality of plot comes from its non-linguistic 
nature. Plot is a higher semantic figure14 formed beyond the material; it can be 
articulated in various languages. It is reconstructed by the viewer/reader through 
integrating lower-level units. A well-known film theorist, Christian Metz, ini-
tially even ascribed the central role in films to plot, claiming that the essence 
of cinematic language is the narrative structure; he sought syntactic rules at the 
level of the plot.15
Let us ask, then, how adaptation shapes the original plot. As an example, we 
shall take a passage from Maria Dąbrowska’s Nights and Days:16
One time, during an outing, our whole group were resting on a knoll by the river. Part of 
the riverbed was overgrown with blossoming water lilies, which Miss Barbara admired 
greatly.
‘What a shame,’ she said, ‘that we cannot pick them.’ Józef Toliboski looked at her and, 
saying nothing, without so much as a smile, as if it were less a whimsical joke than a 
grave testimonial of his readiness for anything, waded into the river up to his elbows, 
and returned with a handful of heavy white flowers. The others on the riverbank spent 
the whole while jesting, doubled over in laughter, and Barbara wept. After this event she 
was all the more pleased when Józef was among the guests.17
 13 J. Ziomek, “Powinowactwa przez fabułę.” In his: Powinowactwa literatury. Studia i szkice 
(Warsaw 1980), pp. 10–11.
 14 J. Sławiński, “Semantyka wypowiedzi narracyjnej.” In: Dzieło, język, tradycja (Warsaw 
1974). 
 15 C. Metz, “Zagadnienia oznaczania w filmach fabularnych (Przyczynek do semiologii 
filmu)” trans. M. R. Pragłowska, KulturaiSpołeczeństwo 1967, Vol. 11, No. 1. Metz later 
withdrew from this view and stressed a multitude of codes; see: C. Metz, Langage et 
cinéma (Paris 1971).
 16 Maria Dąbrowska (1889–1965) – Polish novelist, playwright, essayist and journalist. 
Author of the historical epic and family drama Nights and days (Noce i dnie, 1932–
1934). The film based on Dąbrowska’s novel was nominated for an Academy Award 
For Best Foreign Language Film in 1977 [editors’ note].
 17 M. Dąbrowska, Noce i dnie, Vol. 1 (Warsaw 1975), p. 15. Hereafter NiD with page 














This laconic episode with water lilies appears only once in Nights and Days. This 
is not the case in the film adaptation by Jerzy Antczak (1975).18 The terse dis-
course is translated into an impressionistic image that is a visual concretization 
of this scene. Not only the protagonist’s gesture is important, but also his garb: his 
snow-white suit sacrificed for Miss Barbara’s whim emphasizes his determina-
tion. This vivid image shows the beauty and poetry of the moment, and is far 
more expressive than its literary source. As such, the plot is “the same,” yet not 
“the same.” Not only has it been transposed from literature to film, but also mod-
ified in a special way, and this modification is inevitable: it has nothing to do with 
translation “fidelity” or “infidelity,” but results from the very nature of the film 
medium. The term “transcription” is quite suitable here, as it is used in linguis-
tics, cartography, or music – recording a phenomenon in a sign system different 
from the original’s “native” one, presupposing inevitable transformation.
The term “transcription” has found its way into translation theory as well. 
Jerzy Ziomek defines it as “adaptive approach, which respects differences of 
experience,” and sees it as one of four types of equivalence (alongside transliter-
ation, description, and loan). Its aim and ideal is correspondence on each of the 
sign’s three levels of meaning: 1. correspondence of semantic relations (semantic 
equality), 2. correspondence of syntactic relations (equality of form), and 3. cor-
respondence of pragmatic relations (equality of value).19
Are there any rules for plot transcription? We could theoretically transfer all 
the novel’s episodes and motifs to the screen, but the plot needs to be transformed 
further to accommodate the limited duration and the viewer’s endurance. Its 
supralinguistic nature means that these transformations occur in terms of the 
rhetoric, not the “grammar.” We can thus distinguish four basic rhetorical oper-
ations that modify the plot to achieve the adaptation’s semantic equality, equality 
of form, and equivalence with respect to the original. These are:
 1. detraction (the reduction of parts)
 2. permutation (the inversion of parts)
 18 Noce i dnie:  Part I  “Bogumił i Barbara,” Part II “Wiatr w oczy.” Scriptwriter and 
director: Jerzy Antczak, cinematography: Stanisław Loth, music: Władysław Kazanecki, 
featuring: Janina Barańska (Barbara), Jerzy Bińczycki (Bogumił), Karol Strasburger 
(Józef Toliboski), Elżbieta Starosiecka (Teresa Kociełłowa), Stanisława Celińska 
(Agnieszka), and others. Kadr Group 1975. Antczak also filmed a thirteen-episode TV 
version of Nights and Days (based on a different script), which I am not analyzing here.
 19 J. Ziomek, “Przekład – rozumienie – interpretacja.” In his: Powinowactwa literatury, 
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 3. substitution (the exchange of parts)
 4. addition (the supplementation of new parts)
Translation theorists see these operations as transformations resulting from 
systemic differences between the languages of the translation and the original, 
as well as differences between the artistic languages and individual styles.20 All 
these modifications can be easily explained using any example of film adaptation; 
they always raise the greatest controversies among critics. They oscillate between 
two extremes:  “fidelity” to the text and interpretive “freedom.” Reduction and 
inversion veer closer to the extreme of fidelity, while substitution and, above all, 
addition, suggest a freedom of approach to the subject.
Works on adaptation prove convincingly that methods of literary plot tran-
scription are historically defined. In her overview of Polish film adaptations up 
to 1967, Maryla Hopfinger distinguished several phases: 1919–1929, 1930–1939, 
1947–1955, 1956–1961, and 1962–1967.21 These periods were marked by cer-
tain choices in the literary works (preferred themes and poetics), ways of using 
the literary text (the role of interpretation), and above all, the selection of cine-
matic language (the word-based verbal type or the audiovisual type). Although 
external factors (e.g. cultural politics or literary movements) indisputably have 
an impact, we might speak of adaptation conventions in which the type of plot 
transformation plays an important role.
We should add that apart from the plot, the novel’s dialogue is also transcribed; 
it must be adapted to communicate information through film, becoming a cine-
matographic event.22
But even the most faithful plot transcription does not guarantee that the 
adaptation will capture the “spirit of the original.” This was demonstrated by 
Władysław Orłowski, who analyzed the TV adaptation of The Office (1963, dir. 
Andrzej Szafiański) and the film versions of The Shared Room (1960, dir. Wojciech 
Has) and Stanisław Dygat’s The Farewell23 (1958, dir. Wojciech Has). The reason 
is that a novel is not just the plot alone; even where it seems to be the constitutive 
 20 See: E. Balcerzan, Styl i poetyka twórczości Brunona Jasieńskiego (Wrocław 1968), p. 38, 
and Oprócz głosu (Warsaw 1971), p. 243.
 21 Hopfinger, Adaptacje filmowe.
 22 See: M. Hendrykowski, “Słowo w tekście filmowym.” In his: Słowo w filmie (Warsaw 
1982); cf. W. Orłowski, Z książki na ekran, pp. 78–87.
 23 Orłowski, Z książki na ekran. The Office (Urząd, 1960) – psychological novel by Tadeusz 
Breza (1905–1970); The Shared Room (Wspólny pokój, 1932) – roman à clef by Zbigniew 
Uniłowski (1909–1937); The Farewell (Pożegnania, 1948) – satirical novel by Stanisław 










element, the way its events are narrated also suggests important meanings (e.g. 
the metaphorical significance of the office in Breza’s novel, or Dygat’s irony). The 
problem, therefore, is the substance of language, the discourse, which cannot 
be mechanically translated into images.24 Hopfinger calls this part of the work 
the level of building material; it determines the specifics of the art form and is 
untranslatable, unlike the building material-semantic level, which is partly trans-
latable, and the semantic-cultural level, which is translatable.25
But every translator knows that if something has no direct equivalent in another 
language, and is untranslatable in the literal sense, he must find a different suitable 
equivalent. How does this work in film adaptation?26 Can we set any rules for the 
equivalence of signs? Before we answer this question, we ought to hone our concept 
of the sign in literature and in film.
The Literary Sign – The Cinematic Sign
As Roland Barthes once put it, literature is a parasitical system that feeds on language. 
It uses language signs as a raw material, sparking a wealth of connotations. What 
serves as a sign (signifiant + signifié) in a natural language suddenly becomes part of 
another structure – the literary work – and serves as a signifier (signifiant), opening 
a field of new meanings (artistic, ideological, philosophical).27
The concept of literature as a second-order system allows us to focus on how 
it differs from language – on its own special means of expression. Yuri Lotman 
has phrased this most aptly:
To say that literature has its own language, one which does not coincide with its natural 
language but is superimposed on that language, is merely another way of saying that lit-
erature possesses an exclusive, inherent system of signs and rules governing their com-
bination which serve to transmit special messages, not transmittable by other means.28
 24 Władysław Orłowski tried such an experiment, attempting to translate a few pages of 
the novel Wspólny pokój into the language of film.
 25 Hopfinger, Adaptacje filmowe.
 26 I am only considering film adaptations. According to scholars, TV adaptations, which 
prefer the code of language, are closer to the spirit of the original than film adaptations 
(Orłowski, Z książki na ekran, p. 237). The television series, taking a more pious ap-
proach toward the literary text, has opened a new chapter of relations between cinema 
and literature (W. Wierzewski, “Ekranizacje rodzimej klasyki literatury w powojennej 
twórczości filmowej.” In: Film polski wobec innych sztuk, pp. 36–37).
 27 Roland Barthes showed this process based on the example of another second-order 
system – the myth; see his Mythologies, trans. A. Lavers (New York 1972).
 28 J. Lotman, “The Language of Verbal Art.” In his: The Structure of the Artistic Text, trans. 
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Literary signs are, therefore, second-order signs. They are created from linguistic 
signs organized in a special artistic fashion. This means that not every language 
sign is a literary sign (e.g. a single word). It becomes one only when it is marked, 
loaded with extra meaning (e.g. an opaque poetic word). The literary sign can be 
built of many language signs and be a higher semantic figure, like the speaking 
“I,” time, or space.
Can literary signs undrerstood in this way be compared with film signs? And 
what is a film sign anyway?
The sign in film has been the subject of much debate, because it is closely 
linked to the concept of film construction. The status of the basic unit depends 
on what the scholar considers to be the essence of the work. This is why the 
thesis of the multi-code structure of film (combined with a critique of the lin-
guistic standpoint) led Christian Metz to negate the very concept of the film sign. 
According to Metz, there is no such thing as a signe cinématographique,29 because 
there is no one sovereign code in film. Numerous codes weave together, and we 
can only speak of minimal units that are parts of particular codes, and have var-
ious shapes and dimensions depending on the code’s specifics. For example, the 
smallest unit of language is the phonem; of myth, the character or motif; and the 
smallest unit of the technological code is the photogram. Minimal units link up 
like shingles: tightly fitted, they overlap.30
Seeing film as a multi-code phenomenon, Metz immeasurably multiplied the 
number of codes, and abandoning the concept of the sign, he relegated the issue 
of connotation to the background.31
Can we, therefore, speak of film signs? Adopting the general concept of the 
sign as an object that serves a semantic function, Łukasz A. Plesnar has proven 
that we can.32 But the conceptual layer of film that he proposed is based on the 
 29 Metz differentiates between the adjectives filmique and cinématographique. The latter 
refers to the properties of the code (or codes), while the former is a broader concept, 
including all the specific and non-specific attributes of filmic expression (the signifiant 
of the message). See his Langage et cinéma, pp. 33–36.
 30 Metz, Langage, pp. 139–156.
 31 Metz speaks, for instance, of an identification code for objects, audiovisual composi-
tion, sound composition, perceptual analogy, expression, mechanical images, montage, 
iconic nomination, content, movement etc. Later, influenced by psychoanalysis, Metz 
addressed the issue of the signifiant. See A. Helman, Słownik pojęć filmowych, Vol. 1 
(Wrocław 1991), pp. 91–92.










perception of sensory data,33 which inevitably highlights denotation, neglecting 
the specific nature of cinema.
What should we see as a film sign? The smallest unit of the narrative code, 
i.e. the film sequence (as Metz once suggested), or a moving iconic sign, as 
Umberto Eco preferred?34 Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. The narrative 
sequence is too large a unit, and the icon so small that the path from a single sign 
to an entire film seems impossibly long. Hanna Książek-Konicka’s reflections 
contained in Semiotics and Film35 are interesting and instructive in this respect. 
They are based on Eco’s analyses of the icon, challenging its “natural” character 
and its “similarity” to the signified object, and showing that recognizing the icon 
as a sign depends on the addressee’s knowledge and ability to “read” signs, i.e. 
on our culture’s codes of perception and recognition.36 The matter is important, 
because it determines the concept of the icon: whether it should be seen not only 
as having a motivated referential meaning, but also a high connotative potential.
Hanna Książek-Konicka expands on Umberto Eco’s thoughts, drawing from 
psychological laws and descriptions of the phenomena of visual perception. She 
sees the sign as non-identical to the object it designates or the image that appears 
on the retina, because this image undergoes double correction: by the sensory 
experience of the individual and by the brain’s correctors, which decode and 
revises even faulty images as representations of reality (e.g. sensory illusions). 
Thus, Książek-Konicka writes, “the icon is not the result of a simple reproduction 
of the visual form of an object, but comes from a translation of the total content 
of the sensory experience concerning this object into visual signals.”37
This translation is executed through perceptual patterns in the brain that con-
tain selected attributes of the model; this ensures the universal comprehensibility 
of signs:
Dictionaries of icons are unnecessary, because these signs, firstly, enact a subsystem 
of perceptual patterns, whose “card catalogue” […] is found in the gnostic field of the 
 33 Plesnar distinguished between the following layers in film: representing (the set of 
visual and audio stimuli), recorded (the reconstructed reality), represented (the fic-
tional universe), and communicated (the meaning). See Ł. Plesnar, Semiotyka filmu, 
Sposób istnienia i budowa dzieła filmowego (Krakow 1990).
 34 Views on the film sign are more widely discussed in H. Książek-Konicka, Semiotyka 
i film (Wrocław 1980); A.  Helman, Słownik pojęć filmowych, Vol.  1, Język, znak, 
denotacja – konotacja, identyfikacja.
 35 Książek-Konicka, Semiotyka i film.
 36 U. Eco, Pejzaż semiotyczny (Warsaw 1972).
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brain of every person with perceptual capacity and ability. This means that a practically 
unlimited number of possible enactments, facultative variants on the pattern, does not 
impede their recognizability.38
According to Książek-Konicka, individual icons connect to form a “pictorial 
syntagma,” which contains objective and extra-objective perceptual patterns, 
and has its own rules of combination. Pictorial syntagmas, in turn, can create a 
“multi-image utterance”; examples include photo novels, comics, and film.
We can raise one basic objection to this concept: it misses the essence of the 
art of film. The motion of the iconic sign in film, which distinguishes it from the 
other visual arts, vanishes here, becoming theoretically irrelevant. The proposed 
rules function in every pictorial utterance; it is not by chance that the author 
cites reference literature on drawing and photography. How is film unique in this 
approach? Because the pictures are linked? Have we returned to Metz’s theory, 
criticized before?
I believe that Książek-Konicka, rather than describing the filmic code, spoke 
of the visual code, whose nature is entirely unlike that of (verbal) language but 
which, like language, is a primary system. For there is no reason to claim that 
verbal language is the only primary system and the sole basis for the develop-
ment of other communication systems. There are far more arguments for the 
claim that at least two basic primary systems developed in the process of social 
progress, based on different receptors and using different signs:  verbal and 
visual. The secondary systems feed on the primary systems, using the conno-
tative potential of signs. Literature is a secondary language-based system, while 
film, in turn, is a secondary system based on the visual code.
Film is unique in that it is based on moving images and multiple codes, i.e. 
using other codes (e.g. language or music), which, however, are not equal or 
equally important: the basic (visual) code prevails.
The systemic nature of the film code can be seen as opposed to “ordinary” 
visual perception, to the convention of the visual code. It includes the rules for the 
mutual relations between codes involved in the utterance, that is the “grammar” 
of film language, the particularly shaped ways of “film speaking”. This approach 
allows us to highlight connotation and provides a theoretical basis for making 
comparisons between the arts.
 38 Książek-Konicka, Semiotyka i film, p. 229. The author’s views converge with 1980 theses 
of Italian semiotician Paul Bouissac, who, based on the psychophysiology of sight, 
regards the icon as a genetically programmed selective tool. See P. Bouissac, “Iconicity 




Both film and literature are second-order utterances, then, but based on a 
different primary system. Consequently, the film sign, like the literary one, is 
a second-order sign, a special organization of visual signs that, without losing 
their signifying functions within the utterance, mean more: they acquire addi-
tional psychological, philosophical or metaphysical connotations. This, too, 
is how Roland Barthes conceived of the nature of film, as creating “the third 
meaning,” beyond the symbolic and cultural meaning.39
The ontology of film signs is thus the same as in the case of literary signs: they 
are built onto a primary system and they are rich in meaning, resulting from 
semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic references. They differ in the material and the 
structuring rules inherent to every art. Is it possible to translate signs? And how? 
Let us consider this issue using several examples.
Narrative Distance
Zofia Woźnicka thus characterizes storytelling in film:
Another special attribute of film storytelling is that film is generally a narrative with a 
hidden narrator. Unless there is an off-screen commentary, even when the entire work 
or some of its parts are in some way attributed to particular narrators, the sphere of 
the narration and the narrated world are not clearly distinguished or juxataposed; the 
narrator’s personality is not clearly outlined, and the narrative distance diminishes. The 
photographic, reproductive nature of the representations, which foregrounds the con-
creteness of the “presented world,”, creates a sense of things happening now, making 
visions and recollections seem real.40
The narrator, the narrative distance, and time – the basic categories of epic litera-
ture, which determine the way in which phenomena are presented and assessed, 
the anticipation of the future and the disintegration of the past – are foreign to 
the nature of film. Most significant of all is the treatment of time. Language is 
capable of creating temporal oppositions, and the literary work uses this capacity 
in a variety of ways. Film is different. The visual code has nothing that could 
serve as analogous to verb forms,41 which is why there is a consensus among film 
theorists that the presented events seem to be happening in the present.42 So how 
does film show the basic temporal oppositions?
 39 See R.  Barthes, “Le troisième sens.” In his:  L’obvie et l’obtus. Essais critiques III 
(Paris 1982).
 40 Z. Woźnicka, Problemy kreacji i reprodukcji w filmie (Wrocław 1983), p. 227.
 41 Książek-Konicka, Semiotyka i film, p. 223.
 42 See S.  Kracauer, “Interlude:  Film and Novel.” In his:  Theory of Film (New  York-











Film Adaptation as Intersemiotic Translation 273
Let us return to the example of Dąbrowska’s Nights and Days and Antczak’s 
film adaptation of this novel. The plot is narrated from a considerable chrono-
logical distance and covers the history of the whole generation following the 
Uprising.43 But the novel’s narrator does not foreground the narrative situa-
tion; on the contrary, it is concealed, so that the opposition between the present 
and the past is blurred.44 Such a narrative situation seems convenient for a film 
adaptation; nevertheless, Antczak radically changed it, introducing a narrative 
frame that destroys the chronology of the novel and creates a sharp distance 
between “then” and “now”: fleeing from burning Kaliniec in the first days of the 
war, Barbara reminisces about her life. The frame opens and concludes each of 
the two parts of the film and recurs in the course of the film, emphasizing the 
distance from the past. Why? Is this device justified?
The blurring of time contrasts in the novel’s narrative does not mean that 
its chronology is one-dimensional; not with Dąbrowska’s narrative style, senten-
tious discourse, and aphorisms shaped as universal truths. In the words of Janusz 
Sławiński:
Through the generalizing formulations which, scattered throughout the narrative, allude 
to this hidden sphere, the concealed dualism of the epic performance is momentarily re-
vealed. The narrative situation emerges from its hiding. To be more precise, a part of it 
emerges which we might call the work’s “super-consciousness.” We have in mind the 
plane of rules and ethical values professed by the narrator and treated as directives of 
the presented world, as norms of selection, combination and evaluation of the narrated 
events, in a word: the “metalanguage” of the book, its system of moral principles, with 
respect to which the protagonists’ experiences are only one possible world, one of its 
probable manifestations, not the sole or ultimate manifestation.45
This narrative manner thus produces a special type of distance from the presented 
world, facilitating general, philosophical and moralistic reflections. However, 
Antczak ascribed this narrative superconsciousness and reflexivity to Barbara. 
Her words after Uncle Klemens’s death: “I don’t understand why all this goes on, 
passes…” (NiD, p. 60) are key to the film,46 justifying the narrative frame that 
Pamiętnik Literacki 1975, Vol. 2; J. Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, trans. M.E. Suino 
(Ann Arbor 1976).
 43 The January Uprising (1863–1864) – a Polish insurrection against the occupation by 
the Russian Empire [editors’ note].
 44 See J. Sławiński, “Pozycja narratora w Nocach i dniach Marii Dąbrowskiej.” In: Pięćdziesiąt 
lat twórczości Marii Dąbrowskiej, ed. E. Korzeniewska (Warsaw 1963), p. 96.
 45 Sławiński, “Pozycja narratora,” p. 85.
 46 The director mentioned this in an interview (D. Karcz, “Odwołuję się do sfery uczuć. 










makes us aware of the transience of people, things, and the world. As Ryszard 
Matuszewski put it:
A screen adaptation of a great epic work, whose main virtues lie in the author’s reflexive 
commentary and the psychological nuance of the prose that lazily meanders among 
gray and ordinary people and events, is undoubtedly more hazardous than most film 
adaptations of literary masterpieces.
But here we had a heartening surprise. […]
Director Jerzy Antczak clasped the sprawling plot of the book Nights and Days with the 
compositional brackets of the novel’s concluding episode: World War One breaks out, 
Kaliniec is burning, and with it, the entire world of Nights and Days, while Barbara, 
clattering along in old Szymszel’s cart, sees and contemplates all her past life. A simple, 
splendid idea, giving the whole thing the dimensions it requires – a sense of the epic, 
a view of life from afar that one gets in recalling things that are remote and finished.47
The narrative framework that reverses the chronology of events and shows the 
protagonist at the end of her life becomes a film sign equivalent to the narra-
tive structure of the novel and its philosophical meanings. In a filmic manner, 
it reproduces the syntactic relations between the literary signs and thus fills the 
condition of equality of form and semantic equality (it does not go beyond the 
plot).48
Narration
Like every epic work, Nights and Days communicates many events, and especially 
mental experiences, in a discursive fashion. Barbara’s quandaries and complexes, 
her romantic disappointment in early years, which weighed on her psyche and 
to which she continually returns in her mind, are scrupulously detailed by the 
narrator. During Barbara’s stays in Warsaw and in Krępa (this fills only half of 
the novel’s first volume) the narrator signals Toliboski’s “returns” of eight times:
[…] Bogumił came for her the following day in a remarkably beautiful, glistening sleigh. 
They sat in together on frozen navy-blue cushions amid the tinkling of bells, nestling 
their legs in between the locks of a gorgeous cloth-lined sheepskin. The sleigh gave a 
soft jerk, making them tilt backwards, and off they glided along the sparkling silver road 
with a swish. Barbara earnestly regretted that J. T. was not there to see her. (NiD, p. 33)
Sometimes she tried, on this or that occasion, to think: Why hadn’t he turned out to be 
like this, the one I had loved in vain for eight years? Or the contrary, she would see how 
 47 R. Matuszewski, “Filmowe Noce i dnie.” In: Z bliska. Szkice literackie (Krakow 1981), 
pp. 339–340.
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impoverished Bogumił’s words of love were compared to the things that Józef Toliboski 
knew how to say. (NiD, pp. 73–74)
She took a look around. Oh, how she missed that pair of steel-gray eyes, cool yet 
caressing, and the black hair, and the black beard that ringed the naughty, scarlet lips. 
(NiD, p. 100; cf. pp. 30–31, 42, 89, 101, 107.)
These nagging memories of the old amour become significant on the psycho-
logical and characterological level, which means the adapter had to find a way 
to work them in. He did so by translating discourse into images, giving it the 
status of a film sign. Two images featuring Józef Toliboski are extraordinary 
enough, and so incessantly recurring, that they rise to become film signs. One 
of them is the picking of the water lilies, the other has Toliboski dashing into 
the Niechcics’ miserable dwelling in Krępa. The vision-like quality of this latter 
image is suggested by a sharp montage and an unnatural shot repeated several 
times (Toliboski running straight at the camera).
These signs are the equivalent of the discourse:  they brilliantly render the 
semantic and syntactic relations of the novel’s narrative. They only differ in 
pragmatic terms. Dąbrowska’s transparent narration does not stir emotion in 
the reader; the Toliboski motif does not impose itself so insistently. In fact, it 
can even go unnoticed, as was the case with Stefan Otwinowski, who said: “The 
‘Toliboski refrain’ in the novel is barely sketched out. Dąbrowska does not return 
to it so clearly and so frequently as the film’s director. But this ‘correction’ of 
Dąbrowska is necessary for the film’s structure.”49
It was due to the pragmatic virtues of the sign that the critics preferred the 
Toliboski motif in the film to its literary source. Włodzimierz Maciąg commented:
[…] in my view, the Toliboski motif emerges as far more interesting and vivid on screen, 
where it is one of the main subplots. […] I believe that Antczak’s repetitions were quite 
necessary, for example the motif of Toliboski entering Barbara’s house recurs at least a 
dozen times, each of which gave me aesthetic pleasure.50
As with Barbara’s recollections, Antczak found a purely filmic equivalent for 
the story about Piotruś, the Niechcics’ first child. The images and sounds elimi-
nated the words: filmed in an impressionist landscape, the scenes of playing with 
the child need no dialogue  – they “signify” unlimited parental love and con-
trast with the later image of the cemetery dusted with snow and the recurring 
motif of Barbara at her son’s grave. The meaning of the signs on the semantic and 
 49 “W rodzinie… w społeczeństwie… w historii… O Nocach i dniach rozmawiają 
S. Balbus, W. Maciąg, M. Malatyńska, S. Otwiński,” Życie Literackie 1975, No. 43, p. 5.






syntactic level remain intact, only the means of expression change, determining 
the pragmatic aspect and evoking different responses in the audience.
Poetic Language
Jerzy Ziomek has contrasted “narrative literature” with “poetic literature.” The 
former focuses on representing things and events; it strives for language trans-
parency and imperceptible narration. The latter foregrounds the linguistic form, 
which becomes the source of additional, non-referential meanings. “The extreme 
of narrativity is the maximum transparency of language (or the code in general) 
with respect to the narrated events, while the extreme of poeticness is the min-
imum transparency, which results from the language being focused on its auton-
omous and egocentric organization in the text.”51
Nights and Days falls on the narrative side of the spectrum; we might even 
join Julian Przyboś in acknowledging it as the very center of transparent Polish 
language.52 The problems posed by translation of the plot and the narrative 
into the language of film are characteristic of adaptation – we might only say 
that they were solved with a varying degree of success. The “plot-based unity” 
have led many an adapter astray because, typically, it is traditional novels, in 
which the plot plays a major role, that have usually been adapted.53 This is why 
attempts to adapt works whose language is far from transparent, but which 
becomes a source of new meanings, seem all the more interesting. According 
to Edward Balcerzan, it is adaptations of this sort that provide a chance for con-
temporary cinema to revive film language and means of expression. In 1977, 
Balcerzan postulated the adaptation of works by Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, 
Witold Gombrowicz’s Ferdydurke, Miron Białoszewski’s A Memoir of the 
Warsaw Uprising, and Edward Redliński’s Konopielka. Witkiewicz, Konopielka, 
and Ferdydurke have already been done, so it is high time we considered the 
problem of translating “poetic literature.” It is all the more complex in that, at the 
“building material level,” it concerns internally diverse (one “poetic language” or 
many languages?) and inherently untranslatable literature. How is the adapter 
to deal with non-transparent language? Can he substitute it with film language? 
How? And to what effect? I will examine this issue on the basis of two successful 
 51 Ziomek, “Powinowactwa przez fabułę,”, pp. 10–11.
 52 J. Przyboś, “Centrum polszczyzny.” In: Pięćdziesiąt lat twórczości Marii Dąbrowskiej.
 53 Władysław Orłowski points this out in Z książki na ekran, p. 25. Edward Balcerzan has 
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screen adaptations by Witold Leszczyński: Konopielka (1981)54 and Siekierezada 
(English title: Axiliad1986).55
Edward Redliński’s Konopielka56 fascinated audiences and critics with its 
“Rabelaisian language”57 and unique take on reality. Maria Janion wrote:
Thumbing his nose at ‘avant-gardism’ and ‘traditionalism,’ reversing values so as to make 
the progressive seem backwards and the backwards quasi-progressive, and in general 
muddling concepts, emotions, and deeds that we ordinarily consider clear and unequiv-
ocal, Redliński presented his encapsulation of the ‘peasant question’ in Poland in a way 
never seen before, giving our literature an entirely new ‘image of the peasant’ and ‘image 
of man.’58
This encapsulation took place chiefly through the choice of the novel’s artistic 
language. The work is one long monologue by the protagonist, an inhabitant of 
the village of Taplara for many generations, Kaziuk Bartoszewicz. This mono-
logue is remarkable not only because it is stylized to resemble a dialect of the 
Polish-Belorussian broderland, but also because it expresses the peasant mindset 
and world of values, which is entirely different from the worldview of contempo-
rary readers of literature.
The speaker reacts emotionally to the world, so the narrative is expressive, full 
of exclamations, calls, and questions, immediately recording everything that the 
protagonist thinks, sees, and feels (this explains the frequent use of the present 
tense and iterative forms):
 54 Konopielka. Scriptwriter (based on the novel by Edward Redliński) and director: Witold 
Leszczyński; dialogues: Edward Redliński; cinematography: Zbigniew Napiórkowski; 
music: Wojciech Karolak. Featuring: Krzysztof Majchrzak (Kaziuk), Anna Seniuk 
(Handzia), Joanna Sienkiewicz (teacher), Jerzy Block (father), Franciszek Pieczka 
(grandfather, God), and others (see: Filmowy Serwis Prasowy 1982, No. 10).
 55 Siekierzada. Scriptwriter (based on the novel by Edward Stachura) and director: Witold 
Leszczyński; cinematography: Jerzy Łukaszewicz, music: Antonio Vivaldi (“Amen” 
from Stabat Mater) and Jerzy Satanowski. Featuring: Edward Żentara (Janek Pradera), 
Ludwik Pak (Peresada), Danial Olbrychski (Michał Kątny), Krzysztof Majchrzak 
(Kaziuk), Franciszek Pieczka (ranger), Magdalena Żentara (Apple Tree Branch), and 
others (see: Filmowy Serwis Prasowy 1986, Nos. 18–19).
 56 Konopielka (Konopielka, 1973), novel by Edward Redliński (b. 1940) belonging to the 
so-called “peasant current” in Polish literature, created by writers of rural origin and 
touching upon rural themes [editors’ note].
 57 A term used by Michał Sprusiński in Między prawdą a zmyśleniem (Krakow 1978), p. 41.













She [Handzia – S. W.] went out milking, and till she gets back you can have a good sit, 
let your mind roam. I sit by the stove, nodding off or not, thinking or not, so sweet. The 
day begins all by itself, everything goes the way it should, like yesterday, like long ago, as 
it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end, amen.
But now:
But now footsteps and shouts from the yard: Raba’s calved, come on Kaziuk, hurry up!
Calved? How could she calve when Advent has only just began, she was in heat before St 
Adalbert’s, she’s due before the Christmas.
What are you babbling about, woman, I say, Raba’s got almost a month left to go! […]
I make for the yard with long strides, peek into the trough, and sure enough: something 
black’s lying in the straw, but under the fence that separates the cow from the mare, so 
that I see both both the cow and the mare licking it! What the devil’s this freak show?59
Kaziuk’s consciousness has no past nor future, everything happens “now” and 
will always be happening. Every action has been passed down for centuries 
and revived multiple times by the members of the community, with whom the 
protagonist has a strong family and neighborly bond. There is no place here 
for change or innovation. Yet Kaziuk’s archaic, mythologized consciousness 
undergoes dramatic transformations in the novel. He is tempted by the “new” 
and, despite his resistance, he succumbs to it, which leads to conflict with the 
village. His monologue shows his quandaries in an ambiguous fashion, far from 
primitive moralizing, mainly thanks to the narrative style and the linguistic 
form. In an interview, Redliński confessed:  “Language is philosophy, a world-
view. When, after several years of attempts, I finally found the language or, more 
broadly speaking, the form for the content I wanted to communicate, the novel 
wrote itself, the work went quickly and was hugely enjoyable.”60
How to translate such a monologue into the language of film? How to show 
the protagonist’s inner self, an archaic way of seeing and experiencing the world, 
if the camera sees him from the outside? Witold Leszczyński suggested Kaziuk’s 
primitive consciousness in the film’s opening sequence. Making an inversion of 
the plot, he showed the protagonist’s dream about meeting God and the Virgin 
Mary on the border between fields. Naturally, they treat him kindly and want to 
make his dreams come true… The plot inversion seems intentional; it introduces 
 59 E. Redliński, Konopielka (Warsaw 1974), pp. 12–13. Translated by S.G. Hereafter K 
with a page number.
 60 “Raczej krowy na wygonie niż kossakowski koń…,” Edward Redliński in conversation 
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a fairy-tale atmosphere, but also creates some narrative distance from the pro-
tagonist, a naive simpleton.
The plot of Konopielka is transposed to the screen with minor cuts that serve 
to “tone down” the mood,61 but it is handled differently. In the novel the events 
are less important than the protagonist’s mythical consciousness created through 
language. In the film, however, a significant shift occurs:  the whole weight of 
the situation rests on the plot, which reveals itself to be fast-paced and lively.62 
Something is always going on, and the protagonists experience all events as dra-
matic: things big and small, an egg being crushed and the arrival of the “teach,” 
a luncheon in town and swamp draining. The village community is shown in a 
few collective scenes, directed in such a way as to evoke uncertainty and tension, 
later released in torrential carnivalesque laughter. The opening scene is a telling 
example; it builds on the laconic information from Kaziuk’s monologue:
[…] everyone was falling over themselves when the clerks came and the women and 
children gathered round the machine sitting on the water like they were coming to a 
wedding.
They’d never seen a boat like that before:  like a ferry, but with a quarter-deck on the 
front, glass windows, and behind the glass sits a soldier in a cap, munching on an apple. 
(K, p. 44)
Kaziuk describes the boat that astonished him; the director, in turn, uses this mo-
ment to “describe” the people of Taplara. The camera shows the rugged peasant 
faces gaping at the soldier eating his apple. In the end, the soldier lobs the core 
into the water and all the eyes follow the path of the projectile for a moment, 
until there is the splash, echoed seconds later by a rude physiological noise, 
an ironic accompaniment that eases the tension and makes the crowd erupt in 
hearthy laughter. The other collective scenes are constructed on the same pat-
tern:  congregating in town hall and digging up treasure, and the concluding 
Gombrowiczean “heap”. These scenes acquire the status of signs, characterizing 
Taplara’s inhabitants and their emotional and childish reactions63 that disarm 
their opponent. They are a semantic equivalent of the sociological content of 
 61 Apart from the motif of Gregor, which is only loosely connected with the action, the 
director omitted one flashback with an entirely comic flavor (a matchmaking scene), 
and a naturalistic episode (the death and burial of an infant).
 62 Leszczyński did not want the film to be “folksy,” so he shot it in black-and-white (see 
“Ład utracony. O filmie Konopielka mówi reżyser, Witold Leszczyński,” Film 1982, 
No. 14).
 63 See K. Nowosielski, “Ludowy i ludzki widnokrąg. O Konopielce Edwarda Redlińskiego,” 








Kaziuk’s monologue. Yet the atmosphere of this monologue vanishes because the 
protagonist’s individual, colorful language is limited to the dialogues (written by 
Redliński). As a full-blooded filmmaker, Leszczyński saw language as an auxil-
iary tool, as a filmic subcode that was utterly subordinated to a vividly directed 
plot. He openly admitted this in an interview:  “I believe the language-based 
material and the problems it may cause are not the most important. The basic 
issue is whether the work gives you a profound experience, whether it deeply 
stirs the imagination as it should.”64
Thus the film’s dialogues only accentuate the protagonists’ social standing, 
their “backwardness” and distinctness from literary culture. The director con-
sciously subdued the regional dialect and its phonetic peculiarities.
How did Redliński view the film adaptation of his novel? The director 
says: “After watching the finished film, Redliński said I had found my way back 
to the spirit he was in before writing the book. And that I had used the resources 
of film to express what he had said through literature.”65
Redliński was accurate in regarding the screen adaptation as a return to the 
plot before it had been clothed in language, which was enacted and directed so 
that it could support the socio-psychological content of the novel. But let us be 
clear: this only pertains to the socio-psychological meaning. It is unable to render 
the exotic language and mythic sense of time. This is a different Konopielka – 
Leszczyński’s Konopielka.
The film adaptation of Siekierezada66 has its own history. The script was 
written with Edward Stachura already in 1972, but did not make it to the stage 
of filming. Leszczyński recalls that this offended Stachura; nevertheless, over a 
decade later, he stands by this administrative decision:
Now, years later, I can confidently say that that wasn’t a good script. It was very amor-
phous, not cinematic enough. Stachura kept close to his prose, which cannot be trans-
lated into the language of film in a literal way. I worked toward concrete images, toward 
reality. How to show the fog that envelopes Janek Pradera on screen? And what is that 
fog? The onset of madness? A kind of poetic rapture?67
 64 “Ład utracony.”
 65 “Ład utracony.”
 66 Axilliad (Siekierezada, albo zima leśnych ludzi, 1971), psychological, partly autobio-
graphical novel by Edward Stachura (1937–1979).
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The problems that arose in writing the script have to do with translating poetic 
language, finding an adequate equivalent for Stachura’s lyrical prose. Here is an 
excerpt:
But when you are happy then you want everyone to be happy. That’s how it is and what’s 
wrong with that? That’s how I enjoyed the new day, which I felt tangibly on my eyes, 
on my eyelids, on my hands, all over my skin, on my chest and on my back beneath 
my shirt, sweater, jacket and coat, because I was dressed warm, I had a pile of clothes 
on. Winter. So I enjoyed the new day, which I felt spontaneously and tangibly all over 
my skin, as if there were ants crawling all over me, but not biting, only skittering about 
with their multiple legs, and that was pleasant, pleasantly tickling, and I couldn’t wait till 
Nikodem would finish skidding the trees so that I could get to work. I enjoyed the new 
day and I wanted everyone to enjoy it as I did, because when you are sad you don’t want 
everyone to feel sad, not at all, but when you are happy, you want everyone to be happy 
and what’s wrong with that?68
[…] now I fell in, I sank in that cloud, but I didn’t want to, I was very afraid of it; so first 
the feet, then the fog came up to my ankles, then to my knees, and crawled up higher 
over me, then I was up to my waist, in the fog in the fog, now up to my chest, in the fog 
in the fog, I threw my hands up like a drowning man, because the fog was now up to 
my mouth, my mouthful of fog, it was already over my eyes, eyes full of fog, my poor 
head was drowning, in the fog in the fog, and the fog climbed higher still, over my raised 
arms, from my elbows to my wrists and to the tips of my pointer fingers, but pointing at 
what? Pointing at whom? (S, p. 44)
[…] a mountain of that smoke blew down on him, that fog that fog, but it didn’t hurt 
him, not at all, on the contrary: he somehow felt good, very good even, nice even, intox-
icated even, he wanted to sleep and that was what surprised him, because a nerve of his 
consciousness that sliced through the thick layers of fog that engulfed him figured out 
that it was only noon, no later, and so that surprised him […] and so on from nerve to 
nerve, from thread to thread, he pressed on, he wound up into a ball, which he was, he 
saw himself as a ball, and right thereafter saw himself as a human ball, and right there-
after saw himself as an attacked human ball, he reached as far, over the nerves, over the 
threads, and it was only as far as he reached, to the human ball under attack, because he 
did not reach what he was attacked by, nor to whom and where he was, and what he was 
doing here, here, where he is, he only reached as far to the fact that he was a human ball 
under attack […]. (S, p. 72)
A fascination with the beauty of the world is expressed in the constant repetitions 
and paraphrases. Whole sentences, phrases, and single words repeat even 
in short passages. We might compare Stachura’s style to Peiper’s “blossoming 
 68 E. Stachura, Siekierezada (Warsaw 1975), pp. 36–37. Translated by S.G. Hereafter: S 




poem”69 – every repetition is also an extension, an expansion, and a clarifica-
tion of the first impression: “I felt [it] tangibly on my eyes, on my eyelids, on my 
hands, all over my skin,” “I felt spontaneously and tangibly all over my skin, as if 
there were ants crawling all over me”; “he saw himself as a ball, and right there-
after saw himself as a human ball, and right thereafter saw himself as an attacked 
human ball,” etc. All this is in order to delve into the sensations of the “I.” For in 
the center of everything is the cognizant “I” which becomes aware of the limits 
of human cognition every step of the way, and expresses this through rhetor-
ical questions: “and the fog climbed higher still, over my raised arms, from my 
elbows to my wrists and to the tips of my pointer fingers, but pointing at what? 
Pointing at whom?”
How to translate Siekierezada into the language of film?
Above all, Leszczyński attempted to create a story with metaphysical 
meanings. He abandoned all references to the student rebellion of the 1960s, he 
dropped Stachura’s realistic background of the events (the plot takes place in the 
so called Recovered Territories in Western Poland, inhabited by a non-integrated 
Polish, Ukrainian, and Belarussian population transferrd there after World War 
2; conflicts break out constantly etc.). He even rendered the Apple Tree Branch 
unreal, which the novel’s narrator remembers as a girl of flesh and blood, and in 
the film she becomes an apparition in exotic scenery. The limitation of referential 
meaning is meant to emphasize the sphere of the final things: of love and death.
The dialogues play an important role in this film. They often concern exis-
tential experiences, and even metaphysics, e.g. the conversation about “all the 
brightness” or about “our boys” (from the November Uprising) called in for help 
during the dance at the fire station. But not only the subject matter is important 
there. The protagonists’ dialogues are not simple exchanges of opinions between 
interlocutors; they have subtexts, they reveal the characters’ secret dramas. 
Their presentation makes them ambiguous, endows them with a metaphysical 
dimension. The best example of this is Kątny’s lighthearted conversation with 
the ranger, in which the former admits to having attempted suicide, eliciting the 
following comment from the novel’s narrator: “neither the ranger nor his wife 
thought of anything else, only I saw the possibility that this here person with a 
smile on his lips, who also puts smiles on other people’s lips, slowly plunges a 
knife in his heart” (S, p. 166).
 69 Polish Avant-garde poet Tadeusz Peiper (1891–1969) claimed poems should develop 
like living organisms. “The first paragraph would contain everything that will happen, 
the poem would be a further development of the content of the first paragraph, the last 
one would give us a full, wide-spread flower” (T. Peiper, Nowe usta, 1925) [editors’ note].
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In the film this conversation adopts a different tone. The camera uses close-
ups to show only the face of the speaker and to suggest his inner experience. It 
also shows that the ranger has intuited the protagonist’s mood and understands 
his situation. The conversation becomes ambiguous for both its participants and 
the viewers.
The dialogues in the film version of Siekierezada have no dialogical tension. 
The interlocutors are generally filmed en face, they speak slowly, with emphasis, 
more to themselves than to the other – this is true for the conversations between 
Pradera and Peresada, or between Pradera and Kątny. The way the dialogue is 
rendered suspends referentiality and stresses its “poeticness.”
The lyricism and emotionality of Stachura’s prose finds an equivalent in the 
moody landscapes and soundtrack of the film. The beauty of the forest, shown 
at all times of day and night,70 the music and singing (Jerzy Satanowski used a 
fragment of Vivaldi’s Stabat Mater) create the film’s poetic ambiance. It concludes 
with Stachura’s song “Is it worth it,” whose lyrics appear on the screen, as if the 
director did not trust the viewer’s sense of hearing and had to reinforce it with 
visual perception.
Semantic meanings have been limited in the film, in favor of syntactic and 
pragmatic ones, i.e. the suggestion of metaphysical significance and the emo-
tional impact on the viewer. In the latter respect, the director’s concept played 
a crucial role; he read the novel as autobiography and made some significant 
modifications, introducing the motif of suicide on the railroad tracks twice (the 
film begins with Kątny’s attempted suicide and ends with Pradera throwing him-
self under a speedily approaching locomotive). Thus, Siekierezada confirms the 
form of “life-writing”71 and reinforces Stachura’s legend.
The novel’s non-transparent, lyrical language found its filmic equivalent in 
the moody scenery, the soundtrack, and the special handling of the dialogues. 
We might say that all the film codes – image, sound, and speech – have been 
harnessed to influence the viewer’s emotions and communicate secondary 
meanings.
***
Time for some conclusions.
 70 Siekierezada is Witold Leszczyński’s first color film – the use of color motivated the 
monotony of the black-and-white winter landscape (see Filmowy Serwis Prasowy).
 71 A term coined by Henryk Bereza in “Życiopisanie,” included in: E. Stachura, Fabuła 






There is no reason to question the translatability of literary and film signs. 
Built onto (verbal and visual) primary systems, these signs can find equivalents 
in other material and preserve analogous meanings.
The laws that govern the adaptation of a literary work are the same as those 
that govern linguistic translation. As with translating from one language to 
another, adaptation must overcome three obstacles: different material, cultural 
distance and the resulting differences in the addressee’s expectations, and the 
narrative styles contemporary to the director, which can limit his choices in the 
translation process.72
The principles of translating signs are also analogous to the rules of 
translatology. As in translation, we ought to speak of modifying operations and 
principles of equivalence. The language of film can find equivalents for both epic 
and poetic signs, but the translation of poetic language involves an especially 
strong activation of film codes: image, music, and speech. As in linguistic transla-
tion, full equivalence is seldom achieved. But characteristically, most differences 
in equivalence involve pragmatic meanings. Film offers different sorts of aes-
thetic experiences to the viewer and works more powerfully on the emotions 
than the written word. The basic difference concerns the rules of perception of 
verbal and visual language, and is thus in the sphere of reception.
The outcome of this process – the finished adaptation – also functions like the 
translation in that it is a link in a series. While the literary work has its canonical 
form, it is singular, there can be infinitely many adaptations. There are already a 
good number of parallel screen adaptations of the Polish classics: two versions of 
Boundary, two of The Doll, two of The Promised Land…73
The rules that govern adaptation and the ways in which it functions thus allow 
us to speak of intersemiotic translation, which, overcoming the resistance of dif-
ferent codes, aims to achieve full equivalence of the semantic, syntactic, and 
pragmatic meanings.
How, then should we treat adaptations that are not fully equivalent or, worse, 
which diverge from the “spirit of the original”?74 We can find an answer to this, 
 72 All these barriers are brilliantly demonstrated by Anna Legeżyńska in Tłumacz i jego 
kompetencje autorskie, (Warsaw 1986). See pp. 235–249 in the present volume.
 73 Boundary (Granica, 1935) – psychological novel by Zofia Nałkowska (1884–1954); 
The Doll (Lalka, 1887–1889), the most prominent Polish realistic novel, written by 
Bolesław Prus (1847–1912), The Promised Land; (Ziemia obiecana, 1897–1898) – 
novel by Władysław S. Reymont (1867–1925) with the plot set in the city of Łódź 
[editors’ note].
 74 Various suggestions have been put forth. Władysław Orłowski postulated abandoning 
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too, in translation theory. Jerzy Ziomek once said: “Translation is a peculiar art 
because it must strive for identification with the original, while it profits from the 
impossibility of fulfilling this task.”75
[1994]
Translated by Soren Gauger
to the original. Andrzej Kijowski, on the other hand, argued that the strength of the 
adaptation consists not in slavishly repeating old concepts, but in offering a new treat-
ment of the subject (Dedal, “Film, czyli literatura na nowo,” Twórczość 1970, No. 3).






The Theory and Praxis of Cognitive 
Linguistics: An Oleograph and a Symphony for 
Two Pianos
Numerous speculations and opinions concerning translation in general, and lite-
rary translation in particular, can be divided into three basic categories, which 
are defined by the particular role that the translator is supposed to play in the 
process.
The first category is represented by proponents of the “stainless pane” theory: it 
is assumed that in the process of translation the translator should remain invis-
ible; the degree to which he or she manages to do so becomes the ultimate cri-
terion of success. This is the measure used mainly by literary critics and the 
so-called “common readers”, that is, by people who in general have neither theo-
retical knowledge about language nor, as it happens, comprehensive practical 
knowledge of the language in which the text had originally been written.
The second theoretical position is based upon opposite assumptions. It allows 
the translator to enjoy rights that are almost equal to those belonging to the 
origi nal author: the rights of a creative artist, for whom the work written in a for-
eign language is mainly – or perhaps even exclusively – a source of inspiration. 
This principle, which in the literature of the subject is associated with the notion 
of les belles infidèles, was quite popular in earlier epochs; in contemporary trans-
lation theory it does not find too many followers.
The third category includes opinions of theorists who believe that there 
exists a direct analogy between the translator and the copyist of a work of art. 
According to this view, a translation is a copy of an original – just as an oleograph 
is a reproduction of a painting. The measure of success is therefore the degree of 
fidelity to the model – just as in the case of sculpture or painting. In other words, 
what is measured is equivalence, the notion that has been subject to the theorists’ 
renewed attempts at creating an adequate definition. The task is taken up espe-
cially by those who would prefer to construct a theory of translation based upon 
a theory of language rather than a theory of literature.1






It is not my aim to carry out at this point a detailed analysis of advantages 
or disadvantages of these three theoretical positions. However, I am inclined to 
favor the last one – in my capacity as a practicing translator, a critic of transla-
tion and a theorist of both translation and language; I would like to indicate how 
linguistic analysis can contribute towards a more comprehensive description of 
the process of translation and to a fairer assessment of its final product. In earlier 
decades attempts at adapting the rigid framework of transformational generative 
grammar to the requirements of authentic texts (not necessarily belonging to any 
of the literary genre) have in general ended in frustration.2 It seems, however, 
that the recent dynamic development in American and European linguistics of 
the theory of language known as Cognitive Linguistics (inspired by American 
structuralism but based upon fundamentally different assumptions) will make it 
possible to offer more successful ways of bridging the gap between linguistics on 
one hand and linguistic theory and the theory of translation on the other.
All the three domains, that is, cognitive linguistics, poetics and translation 
theory (especially of the “copyist variety” defined above), use the same funda-
mental metaphor based upon the notion of “image.” In literary theory “imagery” 
is generally associated with what is called “poetical language”  – figurative 
language of similes and metaphors. In a wider sense, it is sometimes defined as 
the use of language to represent objects, activities, feelings, mental states and 
experiences.3 It is precisely in this sense that the semantics of the word “image” 
becomes almost identical to the meaning that the term acquires in the model of 
language proposed by Ronald W. Langacker, the most prominent theorist of the 
cognitivist persuasion. In Langacker’s work, “imagery” is language users’ ability 
to construe particular situations in different ways, selecting different linguistic 
means and different images, in order to think and to express their feelings and 
emotions.4 This ability is available to all speakers of all languages, and the idea 
of alternate construals – the notion which underlies all theoretical assumptions 
of Cognitive Linguistics and at the same time justifies its practical applications – 
finds an obvious parallel in the consecutive stages of the work of a painter cre-
ating an artistic image.
 2 Cf. E. Tabakowska, Cognitive Linguistics and Poetics of Translation (Tübingen 1993), 
pp. 6 – 20.
 3 Cf. e.g. J.A. Cuddon, Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory (London 1991), 
pp. 442–443.
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Thus, both the person who wants to construe a linguistic message and the 
artist who wants to paint a picture have to begin with organizing the particular 
representation of a fragment of reality which they had chosen to deal with in 
their own, particular way (in other words, they have to begin by “selecting the 
topic”). The selection depends crucially upon the perspective and the point of 
view of the observer – most frequently it will be that of the speaker or the painter 
themselves, although other choices are also possible. In linguistic messages such 
departures from the prototype are more frequent than in painting, the classical 
example being the narration in a novel, with the point of view of the narrator not 
necessarily being that of the author.
To refer to the fragment of reality selected as a particular topic of the verbal 
message Cognitive Linguistics uses the term “scene”; in agreement with the 
gene ral understanding of the word, a scene has its participants and its setting. 
After the selection of the subject has been made and the organization of the 
scene accomplished, both the speaker and the painter have to decide on the way 
in which the picture should be framed. The frames designed for a depiction of 
a scene delimit its scope in much the same way as the frames of a verbal mes-
sage delimit the scope (of predication) of the content intended by the speaker. 
Thus, when a still life is painted, the painter can set the limits of the scene along 
the edges of the table on which the objects have been arranged, but they can 
also include the interior in which that table stands. Similarly, when someone 
says:  “there is a red apple on the plate”, they can consciously ignore the fact 
that next to the apple there lies a fruit knife. The selection of scope, which in 
Langacker’s model constitutes a crucial dimension of imagery, is related to the 
choice of yet another aspect:  the level of specificity, which once again can be 
found both on a painter’s canvas and in the discourse of a language user. Both are 
obliged to decide how detailed their representation of the scene is to be. It can be 
just a sketchy drawing (for instance, when one smells burning and says: “some-
body must have burned something”), but, alternatively, it can become as rich 
in details as its author chooses it to be (for instance, when I say “my next door 
young neighbor must have burned her roast beef ”). Finally, when painting a 
scene, both the painter and the language user have to decide which constitutive 
elements of that scene are to be given most prominence, and thus perform the 
function of figure(s) (or constitute the painting’s foreground), and which have to 
be demoted and serve as the ground (or become what the painters call staffage).
There is one more aspect of construal that should be mentioned at this point. 
A most fundamental experience of the person who observes the surrounding 
world is that of physical objects moving through physical, three-dimensional 
space. But this elementary motion becomes the source of inspiration and the 
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starting point for innumerable notional extensions, which underlie and condi-
tion conceptual metaphors and thus make it possible to grasp highly abstract 
and/or complex phenomena. The proponents of the cognitivist theory of 
language consider this type of extension, which they call abstract motion, as the 
very gist of human understanding of the phenomenon of change. When one 
says: “John fell in love”, the metaphorical “falling” represents John’s rapid passage 
(in a metaphorical sense) from one emotional state to another. Moreover, like 
physical motion in physical space, metaphorical motion can be given a direction. 
When one says “the street runs parallel to the beach”, a message is construed 
which is considered meaningful (sensible) just because the verb “run” includes 
the metaphorically extended notion of “following something with one’s eyes”; 
the listeners’ imagination makes it possible for them to “follow with their eyes” 
two parallel lines – one representing the street, and the other representing the 
coastline. This type of motion can of course occur when watching an image cre-
ated by a painter.
According to the cognitivist theory of language, every dimension of imagery 
has its correlate (or correlates) in the resources of a given language, and every 
choice made on the level of concept making (conceptualization) conditions a sub-
sequent selection of element(s) that build up the repertoire of a given language 
at its speakers’ disposal. This can be a single word (for instance, the pronoun 
“something” as opposed to the phrase “roast beef ”), but it can also be a gram-
matical structure (for instance, in the sentence “John fell in love” the positioning 
of the noun “John” in subject position predetermines that its designate should 
play the role of figure). The association of a given dimension of imagery with a 
particular linguistic device that corresponds to it is sanctioned by the convention 
of a given language. Cognitive Linguistics aims at providing a description and 
an explanation of precisely those conventions, while an analysis of differences 
between them, which can be seen when comparing different natural languages, 
is the subject matter of contrastive studies. The theory of translation makes use 
of the achievements of both types of linguistic study, and treats them as its ancil-
lary disciplines.
The aims of this kind of linguistics, which consists in establishing the rela-
tion between the linguistic image and the linguistic form, are thus the same as 
the aims of both translation theory and translation criticism. However, there 
is an important difference: while for the linguists the relation constitutes the 
object of study, a translator, a theorist of translation or a translation critic 
make use of it ex post  – in order to describe the original and to assess its 
translation. This is precisely the approach that I wish to illustrate further in 
this essay.
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We all keep creating images painted with words, because imagery is the es-
sence of the process of construing verbal images. One could then assume that 
at this point the parallelism between painting things and talking about things 
breaks down: evidently, not all of us are painters. But each of us could paint a 
picture if we wanted to or if, for some reason, it should become necessary (as is 
speaking). It is just that most of those paintings would be bad paintings. We all 
speak, but not everyone is a poet. And bad poetry abounds.
Ultimately, the difference between a literary text and a non-literary text is only 
quantitative: it involves the degree of conventionalization of the image and the 
level of technical skills required for its creation. A good poem employs structures 
that are less conventional than those which appear in a press report. It is less 
trivial – like a good painting compared to one which has been pronounced poor 
by viewers and art critics. The parallel does not become meaningless.
The text presented below, selected as an example of an analysis carried along 
the lines described above, is an extract from a description of the royal chapel 
of Charlemagne in Aachen.5 Its author, the British historian Norman Davies, is 
a superb stylist. In the present context this simply means that he has mastered 
the ability to construe a scene with available linguistic devices (as described by 
Langacker and summarized above) to the degree which enables him to paint 
pictures that a sophisticated reader would intuitively consider as “good”. It 
follows, of course, that his translator has to do work that we would be inclined 
to classify (once again intuitively) as “artistic translation”. The passage runs as 
follows:
The decoration of the chapel is heavy with the imperial symbolism which Charlemagne 
and his successors had revived in a new and naive Christian setting. A mosaic inside 
the Dome represents the Adoration of the Lamb. The ambo or ‘pulpit’ is encrusted with 
fragments of Roman pottery, glass and an eagle cameo. Egyptian columns in green and 
rose porphyry support the second tier of arches. The pala d’oro or ‘altar panel’ portrays 
the Passion in classic Roman relief and in solid gold. The Lotharkreuz or “Cross of 
Lothar”, is a magnificent Christian ornament of beaten gold with antique gems. It is 
surmounted by a central portrait cameo of Emperor Augustus. The Imperial Throne, 
cut from simple slabs of white marble, looks down from the first-floor gallery as it did 
during all the thirty-two coronations of seven hundred years. The message is clear. The 
Empire, which Charlemagne launched, thought of itself both as Holy and as Roman.6
 5 For details, see E.  Tabakowska, “Linguistic Expression of Perceptual 
Relationships: Iconicity as a Principle of Text Organization (A Case Study).” In: Form 
Miming Meaning, ed. M.  Nänny and O.  Fischer (Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1999), 
pp. 409 – 422.






It was translated into Polish as follows:
W dekoracji wnętrza kaplicy uderza bogactwo elementów symboliki cesarstwa, którą 
Karol Wielki i jego następcy przywrócili do życia w nowym i naiwnym chrześcijańskim 
kontekście. Tematem mozaiki we wnętrzu kopuły jest Adoracja Baranka. Ambona jest 
inkrustowana kawałkami rzymskiej ceramiki, szkłem i kameą z orłem. Drugi rząd 
łuków wspierają egipskie kolumny z zielonego i różowego porfiru. Pala d’oro, panel 
głównego ołtarza, przedstawia Mękę Pańską; jest to klasyczna rzymska płaskorzeźba w 
litym złocie. Lotharkreuz, czyli “Krzyż Lothara”, wspaniałe dzieło sztuki zdobniczej o 
tematyce chrześcijańskiej, wykonane ze złotej blachy i wysadzane starymi klejnotami, 
wieńczy umieszczona centralnie kamea z portretem cesarza Augusta. Tron Cesarski, 
wykonany z prostych płyt białego marmuru, spogląda w dół z wyżyn galerii pierwszej 
kondygnacji – nieodmienny świadek wszystkich trzydziestu dwóch koronacji. Przesłanie 
jest jednoznaczne: cesarstwo, które założył Karol Wielki, uważało się za Święte, ale i za 
Rzymskie.7
The general “topic” of the description is what art historians call “Carolingian 
renaissance”. This, of course, must influence the interpretation of individual 
lexemes. For instance, the fact that the mosaic as a decorative technique was 
developed in Rome, and only later was taken over by early Christian art, belongs 
to an encyclopedia rather than to a common dictionary of both English and 
Polish languages. Similarly, the knowledge that the eagle (mentioned in the third 
sentence of Davies’s paragraph) was an important symbol revered in ancient 
Rome and that an eagle was a decorative ornament on Charlemagne’s cloak, is 
encyclopaedic in character; however, to those in the know it is evoked by the 
English word eagle and the Polish word orzeł. Yet in their context both elements 
are important: they occupy a particular place within a series of juxtapositions, 
built according to the schema “Roman vs. Christian”. In a context-free consti-
tuent analysis this feature of the text would be classified as connotative and left 
out of consideration. In contrast, in an analysis carried out in the cognitivist 
vein, the context would be seen as making this feature salient, and thus crucial 
for semantic interpretation.
In order to activate the encyclopedic elements of meaning the text has to 
use particular linguistic devices. In English the function is performed by the 
indefinite article (as claimed by all standard textbooks of English, the phrase 
a mosaic defines the referent as a “mosaic” without, however, allowing for its 
identification, which would require the definite article:  the mosaic), as well as 
placing the phrase an eagle cameo at the end of the series and thus making the 
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referent maximally salient (cf. the principle of “end focus”). The latter case was 
not problematic for the translator, since Polish has an analogous convention: the 
last element in a sentence tends to carry sentence stress, which makes it seman-
tically salient: in the Polish text, kamea z orłem becomes kamea z ORŁEM. On 
the other hand, the translator’s modification of the sentence which describes the 
mosaic has most probably resulted from her intention to emphasize the semantic 
contrast, otherwise weakened because of the lack of equivalent linguistic means.
The contrast between the Roman and the Christian designates the frame of 
the picture: out of the many decorative elements in the chapel the original author 
only “notices” those that make this contrast most clearly visible. Moreover, the 
perspective is not that of a tourist visiting the chapel, but rather of a narrator, who 
organizes ex post the fragments of the overall picture – such as were observed 
earlier. The organization follows a particular idea. From the formal point of 
view, this is just the kind of perspective which justifies the use of definite arti-
cles: the ambo, the pala d’oro, the Lotharkreuz, the Imperial Throne. Similar defi-
nite phrases could also appear in a guidebook, which characteristically assumes 
the perspective of a tourist. For instance, the expression the Imperial Throne (as 
used by Davies) means “the particular Imperial Throne that both of us are able to 
identify – I can do it because I know (about) it, and you can do it because you are 
just looking at it”. However, in the passage quoted above the Imperial Throne is 
“this particular Imperial Throne that I know can be found in the royal chapel of 
Charlemagne in Aachen”. This egocentric character of the description is empha-
sized by the particular ordering of individual images that constitute the descrip-
tion of the chapel. The kind of iconicity typical for tourist guidebooks8 would 
require the ordering corresponding to the direction and consecutive stages of the 
tourist route: elements of reality are represented linguistically in the same order 
in which they occur in space and time. But in Davies’s text the iconicity occurs 
on a higher conceptual level: the description “progresses” from symbols that are 
peripheral from the point of view of the history of Christianity to one which is 
central: the dome (of a chapel) – the ambo – the altar – the cross.
On the level of conceptualization, the sentence which mentions the cross 
differs from the others. This highest symbol of Christianity is adorned with 
antique gems, but on the other hand the description looks as if it came straight 
from a guidebook; it brings relatively detailed information about the craft, and – 
a kind of tribute to less sophisticated viewers – the only element of evaluation in 





the whole text: the word magnificent. The next sentence brings an iconic recon-
struction of what is (in the context provided) a normal course of events; it is 
only when the observer looks up that he or she will notice the cameo with the 
portrait of Emperor Augustus – the missing element of the contrast that builds 
up the leitmotif of Davies’s text. But in this particular text it is at the same time 
an instance of metaphorical iconicity. In the case of the cross such a “notional 
confusion” comes as a surprise: one might wish to put the metaphorical full stop 
and thus end the metaphorical sentence a bit earlier: before Emperor Augustus 
appears on the stage. According to the fundamental assumption that underlies 
Cognitive Linguistics, syntax directly symbolizes the content. And this is pre-
cisely why translating an image that the original author meant to be incoherent 
as a simple (though well-developed) sentence should be considered as an error 
on the part of the translator.
As a part of the overall image, the sentence which mentions Egyptian columns 
seems a poor fit. It lacks the marshalling description of the semantic contrast. 
However, it displays the second kind of “textbook iconicity:” the direction “from 
bottom up,” which is imposed by general sensuous experience. Thus, the visitors 
to the cathedral first classifies the columns as “Egyptian columns in green and 
rose porphyry”, and only afterwards, when they look up, they notice that these 
columns “support the second tier of arches”. It will be noticed that the translator 
has “put the description in order”: egipskie kolumny z zielonego i różowego porfiru 
(NB. in the original they are given indefinite determination: “Egyptian columns”, 
analogous to the earlier expression “a mosaic”) are shifted to sentence end posi-
tion. In this way the text gained in salience (the property of being “antique” has 
been promoted semantically), but on the other hand some of the original ico-
nicity has been lost.
While the “textbook sentences” suggest the Langackerian directionality moti-
vated by perceptual experience, the direction “from top to bottom” is directly 
included in the English phrasal verb “looks down”. At the same time this is the 
only verb in the text that refers to active interaction between scene participants; 
it has no direction and no timeless static reference, which is present in all the 
remaining verbs:  “x represents y”, “x is encrusted with y”, “x supports y”, “x 
portrays y”, “x is surmounted by y”. The Imperial Throne – like a living creature 
endowed with free will or the emperor who used to sit upon it – looks down 
upon its/his chapel, the other symbol of the Holy Roman Empire. In view of 
the “semantic activity” which constitutes part of the meaning of the verb “look” 
the contrast between grammatical tenses, the present and the past (looks down 
… as it did) builds up the timelessness of the relation. In the Polish translation, 
this is rendered by the introduction of the adjective nieodmienny (“indeclinable”, 
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“invariable”). The personification, which in the original is marked only by the 
choice of the verb (look), in the Polish translation shows somewhat more care 
for detail. The Throne spogląda w dół z wyżyn galerii and is świadkiem (“a wit-
ness”) of historical acts of coronation. However, the original image seems more 
illuminating: the throne looking down upon the chapel is – in terms of Cognitive 
Grammar – a figure that provides the foreground. Everything else serves as the 
ground against which it is shown – even the slabs of white marble of which it is 
made. The original author creates this effect by demoting the sentence “[was] cut 
from simple slabs of white marble” to a reduced subordinate clause.9 The Polish 
świadek is an additional, somewhat competing, figure, which breaks the compo-
sitional unity of the whole image.
In passive voice constructions or in structures with verbs which express time-
less relations the function of the figure is performed by grammatical subjects 
of sentences, that is, elements that are objects of the relations.10 In Davies’s text 
those figures are nouns or nominal phrases which are grammatical subjects of 
successive sentences: a mosaic, the ambo or ‘pulpit’, Egyptian columns, the pala 
d’oro or ‘altar panel’, the Lotharkreutz. In the sentence which includes the descrip-
tion of the Imperial Throne the figure is, as was said above, the relation between 
two things:  the throne which looks down upon the chapel. Thus the chain of 
parallel structures is broken, which adds to the ultimate effect.
It seems that making use of instruments provided by the notional setup of 
Cognitive Linguistics makes it possible to provide a description of a linguistic 
image which is more precise than that based solely upon the intuition and the 
sensibility of a mindful researcher. And this is precisely the ultimate aim of 
Cognitive Linguistics; it makes no claim to new discoveries. Its only goal is to 
give the form of a coherent theory to intuitions, and its main assumption, which 
one might think is right and well justified, is that a description of language must 
ultimately become a description of human cognition. And so must the process 
of translation itself, which  – like the prime process of conceptualization that 
underlies the process of construing an expression – is in its very nature a process 
of interpretation of the represented world and things that are found in it.
The Polish translation of Davies’s description of the royal chapel in Aachen 
is – like the English original – a description of the royal chapel in Aachen. The 
 9 More on the function of subordinate clauses in the construal of ground in L. Talmy, 
“Figure and Ground in Complex Sentences.” In: Universals of Human Language, ed. 
J.H. Greenberg (Stanford 1978), pp. 627 – 649.







main topic remains the same: the Carolingian renaissance. But, as we could see, 
the translator makes it stand out in relief, more than the original does. One could 
say that the picture is drawn with as thicker line. Or perhaps it would be better 
to say that the translator plays the same score in her own way. In fact, the com-
parison of the translator and the musician who plays someone else’s score is not 
new at all.11 It was beautifully explained by the same historian-artist whose text 
was the subject of the above analysis:  “Every translator has the right to be an 
artist. A history that was written in English and then translated into Polish is like 
a symphony in A-flat major, which was transcribed into F-sharp major, for two 
pianos.”12
[1995]
Translated by Elżbieta Tabakowska
 11 Cf. e.g. De Lange, “Reflections of a Translator.”






Foreignness in Translation and Foreignness  
in Culture
One of the more important motifs in academic translation studies to date is the 
observation that translations are texts of a specific sort, that they differ from 
other texts, i.e. from non-translations. Initially (and to this day) the translation 
was essentially perceived only in relation to the original, i.e. the text on which 
it was based, against which it can be defined and evaluated. According to this 
approach, the translation exhibits smaller or greater differences compared to the 
original; we might investigate what causes them, whether they are objectively 
inevitable or result from a translation strategy, or, finally, from the translator’s 
erroneous decisions due to insufficient professional competence. This is the ap-
proach that informs translation concepts we might call “equivalence-oriented,” as 
they take translation equivalence to be the fundamental category; as such, their 
reference point is the original text, with its language (more or less) as its back-
drop. In our day, these concepts unquestionably dominate translation research. 
They consider equivalence, i.e. the relationship to the original, as the defining 
feature of translation.
The specificity of the translation, based on its relationship to the original, is 
thus perceived as a similarity or parallelism with the source text. Let us note 
that this is due to the fact that the translation is a derivative text, resulting from 
and based on the original. It is thus to the original that the scholar refers in 
establishing or analyzing equivalence.
The linguistic derivativeness of the translation means that many of its features 
stem from its “attachment” to the original and to the language in which the 
original was created. Sometimes these features are visible, sometimes hidden; 
regardless of how well visible they are in reading the translation, however, there 
is always some probability that the reader might recognize them, seeing them 
as a certain departure from the target-language linguistic norms, typical verbal 
behaviors, or customary usage. Because of this departure, we may say that 
reading a translation involves activating the category of foreignness.
This means that foreignness appears in translation as a feature of its recep-
tion, or in other words, as a feature of the translation’s functioning. Placing the 
translation in the communicative situation in which it operates gives the scholar 




text operates. Above all, the translation functions as a text in the target language, 
among other texts in this language which are not translations. Its reader is usu-
ally unfamiliar with either the original text or the original language (this is, after 
all, why he has chosen the translation), and thus equivalence is, for him, prac-
tically irrelevant. This last statement is by no means too categorical; it suffices 
to mention examples of translations deeply rooted in the culture and literary 
circulation whose equivalence to the original leaves much to be desired (such as 
Winnie the Pooh translated into Polish by Irena Tuwim as Kubuś Puchatek).1 This 
phenomenon unambiguously indicates the irrelevance of equivalence for how 
the translated text functions. Since translations operate independent of the ori-
ginal, equivalence is not a factor determining the reception of the translated text.
Thus, when it comes to foreignness in translation, we might conclude that 
although it does appear as a feature of reception (and, consequently, of the 
translation’s functions), its roots are in the linguistic derivativeness of the trans-
lation: in its relationship to the original and the source language.
A translation is a derivative text by its very definition. This derivativeness is 
primarily rooted in language, though, as we have long been aware, it often also 
involves cultural derivativeness, as a result of the original text being designed 
to function in its native society. Only a handful of texts, written from the outset 
with their subsequent translation in mind, are entirely free from this intended 
purpose. Another translation feature that activates the category of foreignness 
in the course of reading is connected with the parallelism between the world 
presented in the texts and the language in which those texts were written. In 
non-translations this is a typical situation; the only time it is infringed upon is 
in texts that concern other countries, foreign customs etc. In translation, this 
kind of parallelism is, by their very definition, limited; although the realities 
depicted in the texts have many shared attributes (this makes translation at all 
possible), they also have differing features, so that the presented reality must 
be described in the translation using the resources of another language, i.e. one 
originally meant to describe another reality. It often happens that the contra-
diction between the translation’s presented world and its language comes to the 
fore – although it is a matter of convention, it does exist. And it is the existence 
of this contradiction that constitutes the second feature of translations “respon-
sible” for the relevance of the category of foreignness in their reception. Both the 
above-named translation features indicate that foreignness must be important in 
 1 On this topic see: M. Adamczyk-Garbowska, Polskie tłumaczenia angielskiej literatury 
dziecięcej. Problemy krytyki przykładu (Wrocław 1988), pp. 53–54, 113–116, 127.
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the reception of translations, because it arises from their very nature as deriva-
tive texts in terms of culture and language. As we might imagine, then, the for-
eignness of an old text to a contemporary reader or the foreignness of jargon to 
a reader unfamiliar with it, for example, are not vital in the study of translation. 
At the basis of examining translations in terms of their foreignness lies their lin-
guistic and cultural derivativeness. This foreignness results from the derivative 
nature of the text, and thus, from the very essence of translation, and it manifests 
itself as a feature of translation reception.
Let us examine how thus understood foreignness surfaces in translation, and 
how it relates to foreignness as a broad cultural category.
The traditional notion of foreignness in culture involves its various facets; 
given that culture as such is a human creation, however, the category of for-
eignness is first and foremost applied to people, whether individuals or entire 
groups. In culture, pride of place is taken by an individual’s self-identification 
and self-definition through the fact of belonging to a group. This explains the 
importance of the “familiar/foreign” opposition, which has been alive since the 
time of traditional societies to the present-day, also in developed societies. In 
the traditional approach, the differentiation between familiar and foreign often 
involves value judgments:  the familiar is good, the foreign is bad, despicable. 
The perception of people and groups as foreign has multiple causes, which can 
be summarized as a set of characteristics that distinguish these people from the 
group that evaluates them. These characteristics, in turn, are not selected arbi-
trarily or at random; they must in some way be integral for defining the group. 
Finally, the third crucial aspect of perceiving people and groups as foreign is that 
the above-mentioned set of their characteristics is defined from the evaluators’ 
perspective, and not by those to whom foreignness is ascribed, nor by any 
external authority. In short, we might say that foreigners are those who, in our 
view, differ from us in some appreciable way. The perception of other people as 
foreign is thus determined by a set of significant characteristics of the evaluated 
people or groups, which distinguish them from the evaluators. Specifically, these 
are (according to a classification by Alina Cała):  linguistic difference, religious 
(and, consequently, axiological) difference, difference of custom and the group’s 
social organization, difference in the activities, and thus, in the way of life.2
If we examine the category of foreignness in terms of the social perception of 
the products of human culture, including texts, we will see a partial parallelism 
 2 A. Cała, Wizerunek Żyda w polskiej kulturze ludowej (Warsaw 1992), p. 12. 
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with this set of relevant characteristics that activate the social and individual 
sense of foreignness.
The set of characteristics that are significant to the perception and evaluation 
of foreignness in translation somewhat varies from the one pertaining to the 
foreignness of a group of people. Comparing the translation characteristics that 
generate a sense of foreignness with those listed above, we might say that among 
Cała’s characteristics that refer to social relations, the foreignness experienced in 
translation reception is based on:
 – the linguistic difference of particular expressions used by the translator, 
regarded as atypical, unusual, strange, incomprehensible, or not quite 
clear;
 – cultural difference that consists in the difference between the situations 
described and those the reader knows from personal experience, or in a dif-
ferent interpretation and evaluation of particular phenomena;
 – religious and axiological difference.
Undoubtedly what most differentiates a translation from a non-translation is 
various manifestations of linguistic difference; they are also the most visible 
characteristics, especially in incompetent translations. This explains the old 
requirement to adapt the translation to the norms of the target language. As it 
has been pointed out,3 in order to be accepted the translation must be correct. 
And yet a complication emerges here: research shows that even if translations 
do not give the impression of being incorrect, they exhibit an essential differ-
ence in their use of linguistic forms, and treat the target norms more freely than 
non-translated texts.4 This is not only a question of linguistic correctness, but 
also of adherence to the textual conventions dominant in the community of the 
translation’s addressees. The reception of translations involves their evaluation, 
as in this society they are (generally, though not always, of course) assessed on an 
equal footing with other, non-translated texts.5
Relatively visible is the difference of the presented world, including in reli-
gion, customs/morals, and so forth. Less immediately apparent is the axiological 
standpoint of the author; it can sometimes be hidden in the use of vocabulary 
 3 See: e.g. A. V. Fyodorov, Osnovy obshchey teorii perevoda (Moscow 1968), p. 151.
 4 See: e.g., K. Klaudy, “Empirical Research in Translation Studies.” In: Translatologica 
Pragensia VI. Ed. M. Hrala, Praha: Univerzita Karlova, 1998, pp. 19–25; A. V. 
Okladnikova, Issledovanie v oblasti yazyka perevodov (problemy normy i uzusa) 
(Moscow 1980).
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and its emotional overtones. The axiological stance of the original author can 
also be incongruent with what the reader is used to. It seems, then, that in spite 
of some differences, translation foreignness is not accidental, for it is “built into” 
the category of foreignness that exists in culture. As such, investigating transla-
tion foreignness presupposes that translation should be regarded as a cultural 
phenomenon. This approach to translation research has been particularly visi-
ble in recent years; many works have appeared where translation is viewed as 
a record of the reception of cultural difference, a testimony to how the culture 
of a given society treats a foreign culture. In this context, we speak of assimila-
tion, of the concept of overcoming cultural barriers. Thus, translation is seen as 
combining the familiar with the foreign to form a new, complex cultural text.6 
Yet we ought to point out that these works, while undoubtedly valuable for pos-
iting the problem of translation as a cultural phenomenon and describing the 
various manifestations of intercultural confrontation in translation, draw exclu-
sively on literary material. Meanwhile, it would seem that translation is a cultural 
pheno menon regardless of whether it pertains to a literary text or not. In the 
former case, it ought to be seen in the context of artistic culture, satisfying our 
cognitive/philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic needs; in the latter, it also partly 
belongs to culture, if not artistic, then at least spiritual (e.g. translations of photo 
books or travel guides, academic or popular science literature), and partly to 
material culture, or, to be precise, to the “maintenance services” of material 
culture (translations of practical texts:  documents, manuals, advertisements). 
Consequently, foreignness is perceived not only in the reception of literary 
translations, but also in other sorts of texts, though the characteristics that evoke 
it may differ in various sorts of texts; similarly, the type of a text may determine 
the reader’s response to perceived foreignness in general and the foreignness 
 6 See especially: A. Tippner, Alterität, Übersetzung und Kultur. Chechovs Prosa zwischen 
Rußland und Deutschland (Frankfurt a.  M., 1997). Some works devoted to the 
“intercultural” approach to translation are: L. K. Latyshev, Perevod: Problemy teorii, 
praktiki i metodiki prepodavaniya (Moscow 1988), p. 86 (here see the concept of the 
cultural barrier in translation, though insufficiently separated from the language 
barrier); Translation as Intercultural Communication. Selected Papers from the EST 
Congress, eds. M. Snell-Hornby, Z. Jettmarová, K. Kaindl (Prague 1995); Übersetzung 
als Repräsentation fremder Kulturen, ed. D.  Bachmann-Medick (Berlin-Bielefeld-
Munich 1997); H. W. Dreschner, Transfer: Übersetzen – Dolmetschen – Interkulturälitat 
(Frankfurt a. M., 1997); Cultural Functions of Translation, eds. C. Schäffner, H. Kelly-
Holmes, (Clevedon-Philadelphia-Adelaide 1995); Differente Lachkulturen? Fremde 




of individual translation solutions. This is why it would seem appropriate and 
promising to embark upon a comprehensive scholarly investigation of foreign-
ness in translation reception, without restricting ourselves to a single variety 
of texts. Of course, this in no way means we ought to ignore significant typo-
logical differences, which, however, ultimately result from the communication 
intentions of both the original author and the translator.
The linguistic features of a translation that foreground its foreign origin are 
subject to linguistic description based on an analysis of the linguistic resources; 
this analysis will likely reveal not only features visible to the reader (insofar as 
this is a perceptive, well-read and sophisticated reader), but also those that are 
invisible to this “normal” perception, but which, following a linguistic analysis, 
could “expose” the text as a translation. Such analyses have been attempted in 
the past, with varying degrees of success. The reader’s perception of the linguistic 
features in question – whether we speak of the reader assumed by the translator, 
potential and general, i.e. the “addressee” in the translation model, or the real, 
individual reader – depends on his perception of foreignness as such, as well as 
the foreignness of particular cultural and linguistic features. In other words, the 
perception of the translation features that arise from its foreignness depends on 
the reader’s sensitivity to this category. Furthermore, the reader can react to or 
evaluate the aspects of the text he perceives as foreign in different ways: without 
getting into detail here, we might say that he can accept them or reject them. This 
means that his perception of the translation features derived from its foreignness 
also depends on the reader’s attitude towards foreignness as a cultural category. 
If the unusual nature of the text is accepted, with its non-standard qualities, the 
presence of proper names and other culturally unfamiliar elements, the foreign-
ness of the translation is seen as a value. If the unusual aspects are rejected, they 
are viewed as simply bizarre; the reader is irritated by the incomprehensibility of 
parts of the text, the difficulty in correctly reading the names etc. In this latter 
case, foreignness is not a value for the reader; he sees a value in the text being 
shaped in a recognizable way, being easy to read and familiar. With such a form, 
let us note, the derivativeness or “translatedness” of the text becomes invisible. 
Yet this readability and familiarity, as Piotr Fornelski has aptly observed, is a 
“concession to the fear of a mythologized foreignness, […] a search for shelter 
in an equally mythologized community: in what is your own, familiar, homey.”7  
 7 P. Fornelski, “Kontekstualizacja przekładu. Między mitem wierności a zdradą.” 
In:  Między oryginałem a przekładem, Vol.  I, eds. J.  Konieczna-Twardzikowa and 
U. Kropiwiec (Kraków 1995), p. 29.
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Indeed, this expectation contains a paradox: it would be hard to expect some-
thing that is “your own, familiar, homey” in a linguistically derivative text. 
Nonetheless, readers do often declare that they expect such things of a transla-
tion. The fear of foreignness is all the more paradoxical in the reader of a trans-
lation in that, as we have mentioned, the linguistic derivativeness of a translation 
is evident to him; the reader is aware of it; he knows that he is making contact 
with a text that speaks of another cultural reality. We might say that reading 
translations inevitably bears the risk of a culture shock.
A rejection of translation foreignness could be the sign of an instinctive, and 
thus unconscious urge to shelter oneself amid familiar things; this, I believe, is 
a normal manifestation of the human striving for a sense of security (evidently 
including verbal or communicative security). The unusual or atypical nature 
of some aspects of communication thus stand as a threat:  the threat of not 
understanding the text, but also of a disrupted sense of the stability of the sur-
rounding world, the sense of its familiarity. At the same time, there is an oppo-
site endeavor: to get to know new things, to encounter a world that differs from 
the everyday and familiar. We observe this attitude in readers who accept for-
eignness in a translation. The foreign traits of the text intrigue them; they are 
perceived as original and interesting. Curiosity about the world is generally the 
charactersitic (of people, and this also of readers) that makes them reach for a 
translation. This testifies to a certain cognitive alertness of translation readers. 
This is perhaps why the degree of tolerance for foreignness is relatively high in 
the reception of translations, as is shown by experimental research.8 At any rate, 
for now, in our general considerations of foreignness in translation reception, we 
can say that it is the tension between the two poles of a person’s cognitive stand-
point – striving for communicative security and a curiosity for the world, or a 
striving to discover its diversity – that determines the importance of foreignness 
for the translation reception in a society.
Regardless of the cognitive attitude of the readers, we see that – as with the 
foreignness of social groups – it is not the author of the original who decides 
upon the foreignness in the translation, nor the language of the original, nor an 
external authority (i.e. the translation scholar), but the reader, who identifies 
those characteristics that distinguish the translation from other texts and make 
it foreign. It is the reader who admits carriers of foreignness found in the trans-
lation, i.e. tolerates them or even deems them desirable, or rejects them out-
right. Hence the importance of the reader figure in researching the category of 
 8 R. Lewicki, Obcość w odbiorze przekładu (Lublin 2000), pp. 94–97, 153–157. 
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translation foreignness, as well as the individual manifestations of this foreign-
ness, i.e. particular translation strategies and devices.
Activation of the category of foreignness in translation reception is thus not 
unlike its activation in the perception and evaluation of other people and groups. 
I  believe we can say that one’s attitude to foreignness in translation reception is 
derived from, or perhaps even is a part of one’s attitude to foreignness as such, i.e. 
foreignness as a cultural category.
We can quite easily see that the perception of foreignness of people or groups is 
linked to the presence of useful social contacts between the evaluators (as a society) 
and the evaluated. Similarly, the reception of translation foreignness depends on 
the contacts between the two societies; they condition the knowledge of the for-
eign culture, which results in a “limited biculturalism” of the translation’s reader, 
and the knowledge of the foreign language, most often involving a knowledge of 
only some of its facts: particular expressions, linguistic behaviors in certain typical 
communication situations (“microtexts”), proper names, and so on, resulting in the 
reader’s “limited bilingualism.” Both these phenomena are of crucial significance for 
the existence of foreignness in a translation and its evaluation.
The limited biculturalism of a reader of translation means that there is one 
more significant fact in translation reception:  the awareness that the text is a 
translation, as a result of which the reader anticipates the presence foreign 
elements, such as proper names.9 This is why the partly expected foreignness of 
the translated text is a crucial marker of the reading convention for translations, 
shaping the translation norms, which is not identical to the norm for non-
translations. Anna Legeżyńska is right when she categorically states that “the 
reading conventions are never the same for the original and the translation”10 
 9 Many of the above-listed studies of the intercultural situatedness of translation, how-
ever, do not presuppose a description of the text of the translation in its culturally con-
ditioned functioning (as in A. Tippner’s Alterität, Übersetzung und Kultur…; Cultural 
Functions of Translation, ed. Ch. Schäffner, H. Kelly-Holmes), but rather a description 
of the translation process as intercultural transfer, e.g. Translation und interkulturelle 
Kommunikation, ed. J. Albrecht (Frankfurt a. M. 1987); Ubersetzungswissenschaft. Eine 
Neuorientierung, ed. M. Snell-Hornby (Tübingen 1986); Tradition und Translation: zum 
Problem der interkulturellen Übersetzbarkett religiöser Phänomene, ed. C. Elsas (Berlin 
1994), and earlier works: Vinogradov, Leksicheskie voprosy perevoda khudozhestvennoy 
prozy (Moscow 1978), pp. 85–108. Of course, such a description must necessarily be 
based on two texts (the original and the translation), i.e. it is impossible to study the 
translation without reference to the original.
 10 A. Legeżyńska, Tłumacz i jego kompetencje autorskie (Warsaw 1986), p. 15. See p. 239 
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These conventions can, of course, approximate each other, but this depends on 
the above-mentioned contacts between the two societies and not, as is some-
times supposed, on the affinities between the two languages.11
Speaking of the limited biculturalism of translation readers, we have to bear 
in mind that the distance between two given cultures fluctuates in time, as it is 
a function of their current positioning in respect to one another, the state and 
intensity of their mutual contacts, their historical sensitivities and resentments, 
and the mutual interest and fascination. This fact has already been pointed out.12 
We might only add that it also partly depends on the current aims of a given 
society (nation) in a given time: in the life of a society, there are ages of greater 
openness and ages of intensified striving for self-identification and accentuating 
difference. There are epochs of greater or lesser sensitivity (sometimes even over-
sensitivity) to foreignness. If we accept this point of view, the dynamic, i.e. chro-
nologically changing nature of foreignness becomes clear. Thus the connotations 
of foreignness will have a different reach in the reception of texts in various 
epochs (even in the reception of the same text). Readers’ habits also undergo 
constant change; this causes historical shifts in the acceptance of translation for-
eignness and its various manifestations.
This suggests that, as with the perception of people, the category of foreign-
ness in the reception of translations is historical in nature (it changes over time). 
In terms of the activation of the category of foreignness, translation reception 
undergoes constant changes; ultimately, it depends on the state of contacts 
between the target language and other languages, and more broadly speaking, 
contacts between the receiving culture and other cultures. Consequently, the 
translator’s tendency to use particular translation solutions, including features of 
foreign derivation, is also historically changing. And so is the readers’ acceptance 
of each of these solutions, and the acceptance of any textual features of foreign 
provenance in a translation.
 11 It is easier to agree with Legeżyńska’s thesis that both reading conventions “overlap (in 
general terms) when […] the translated work (the original) comes from a related cul-
tural sphere” (p. 239). Yet in my opinion, a more crucial factor is the contact between 
cultures, and not their proximity in belonging to the same sphere.
 12 E.g., A.  D. Shviyetzer, “Sotsiolingvisticheskie osnovy teorii perevoda,” Voprosy 






All these qualities should be taken into account in attempting to describe 
translation reception in terms of foreignness. The results bear testimony not only 
to the preferences of translation readers at a particular time and place, but also to 
their cultural awareness with regard to foreignness as such.
[2000/2002]
Translated by Soren Gauger
Tomasz Bilczewski
Trauma, Translation, and Transmission in a 
Postmemory Perspective: From Literature to 
Epigenetics
1.  A Displaced History
Pertaining to a mental or somatic injury suffered as a result of experiencing an 
event with an extraordinary impact power, the category of trauma has been known 
to psychiatry and psychoanalysis since the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
More recently, it has been readily employed in many fields of the humanities as 
helpful in diagnosing the condition of the (post)modern subject, struggling with 
the burden of extreme experiences of twentieth-century history and the over-
whelming excess of stimuli produced by the progressing modernization.1 At first 
glance, however, it seems that for a long time this category did not receive due 
attention from translation studies. Yet, seen in the context of cultural-linguistic 
transfer, it could well back up many efforts to explain those aspects of (post)
modern history that resist swift comprehension or various mechanisms of rep-
resentation, and conventions of textualization or depiction. If we are reminded 
today that history is experienced as trauma when “it returns as transmission and 
translation,”2 the categories of trauma, translation, and transmission deserve all 
the more to be discussed together in a postmemory perspective.
So much for the first glance. But if we look more carefully at the develop-
ment of translation studies over the last two decades, we see that at least two 
currents that have been gaining ground – feminist and postcolonial TS – have 
very often referred to traumatic experiences in building their narratives. Rape, 
injury, violence, and anxiety are key words in their lexicons. Translating highly 
experimental literary texts, revising fundamental myths and narratives or simply 
exposing mechanisms that have led to the marginalization of women translators, 
feminist TS scholars have shown in their most radical attitudes and projects 
the necessity to confront the painful effects of patriarchal authority and lin-
guistic and cultural oppression. In her influential piece titled “Gender and the 
 1 K. Bojarska, “Trauma.” In:  Wydarzenia po Wydarzeniu. Białoszewski  – Richter  – 
Spiegelman (Warsaw 2013), pp. 247–289.










Metaphorics of Translation,”3 Lori Chamberlain attacked George Steiner’s model 
of step-by-step translation hermeneutics, which he described, i.a., as an act of 
invasion and aggression, penetration and appropriation.
Numerous feminist rewriting strategies, aiming to achieve the redistribu-
tion of discursive power and often built on the premises of deconstruction, have 
echoed the ambitions of postcolonial translation studies, perhaps even more 
rigorous in tracing how injuries reflected in particular acts of translation and 
translation strategies are worked through. With even greater determination, per-
haps, postcolonial translation scholars explore the various geographies and his-
tories of hegemonies, painfully experienced invasions, conquests, and religious 
conversions.4
I am not going to describe here the numerous forms that this working through 
process has taken; I would like to pause, however, on the field of psychoanalysis, 
chiefly because it is conducive to the efforts to show the traumatic and at the 
same time translational dimension of the experience of (post)modern history, 
and in particular those of its traces which we are not (or not fully) conscious of,5 
and which affect, to a greater or lesser extent, the construction of our individual 
or collective memory, challenging to the epistemic frameworks we use to view 
the past.
Andrew Benjamin, who has examined Freud’s uses of the term “translation” 
(Übersetzung), states that two related contexts are of prime importance for psy-
choanalysis:  one pertains to the role of the analyst as a translator and inter-
preter, and the other to translation as a component of the subject’s mental life. 
Involving the active participation of both the patient and the therapist, transla-
tion is linked to the fundamental movement that transfers what is repressed into 
the consciousness. This process occurs on two levels, which are best revealed 
in the interpretation of dreams: what happens here is that the latent content is 
connected to the manifest content, and then the manifest content is translated 
into the language of the conscious. This movement pertains to both the interpre-
tation of dreams and the concept of “afterwardsness” (Nachträglichkeit), which 
bears mention, as it places the process of translation, fundamental to Freudian 
 3 L. Chamberlain, “Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation.” In: Translation Studies 
Reader, 3rd edition, ed. L. Venuti (London-New York 2012), pp. 254–268.
 4 For detailed discussion see T. Bilczewski, Komparatystyka i interpretacja. Nowoczesne 
badania porównawcze wobec translatologii (Kraków 2010).
 5 C. Bollas, The Shadow of the Object:  The Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known 
(New  York 1988); G.  Schwab, “Words and Moods:  The Transference of Literary 
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psychoanalysis, in the light of a traumatic experience, and also indicates other 
(also translational) contexts for the reception of psychoanalysis. The excerpt 
that introduces all these contexts is Freud’s famous letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 
6 December 1896, in which he speaks of the mechanism of repression, referring 
to its workings as die Versagung der Übersetzung. Following Andrew Benjamin, 
let me quote the key sentence, in which Freud defines repression as a refusal or 
failure of translation: “Die Versagung der Übersetzung, das ist das, was klinisch 
‘Verdrängung’ heisst.”6 Throughout its interpretive history, this passage first of 
all drew attention to the translation difficulties it presented. The translations 
of die Versagung der Übersetzung led readers in somewhat different semantic 
directions, as we can see through juxtaposing the English “failure of translation” 
with the French refusement de traduction (rather suggesting “refusal,” through the 
neologism refusement).7 Secondly, already in Freud’s letter itself we are dealing 
with an intralingual translation of sorts in Verdrängung, borrowed from clinical 
language. Thirdly, if repression is defined as a failure or refusal of translation, we 
might well ask what was to be translated – what was the source or the original.
In both Translation and the Nature of Philosophy and in an article that 
develops the psychoanalytical motifs discussed in that book, Translating 
Origins: Psychoanalysis and Philosophy, Andrew Benjamin shows the complex, 
relational, and ontologically problematic status of the source as an event, its 
entanglement in the act of repeating what has occurred, and its involvement in 
the process of creating something new, which has significant consequences not 
only for the anatomy of translation, but also for the mechanisms of repression 
and afterwordness. Benjamin points out the necessity of rethinking the view of 
the relationship between the original and the translation as a relation of an inte-
rior to a stable exterior. He argues that the past event does not demand total 
replication, or an “intact presence,” from the translation, but rather a repetition 
carrying the potential to transform the past into the “here and now.”8 Benjamin 
links the displacement of the source through space and time9 – as it ceases to be 
 6 A. Benjamin, “Translating Origins: Psychoanalysis and Philosophy.” In: Rethinking 
Translation:  Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology, ed. L.  Venuti (New  York–London 
1992), p. 19.
 7 See: Benjamin, “Translating Origins,” p. 20.
 8 A. Benjamin, “Psychoanalysis and Translation.” In: Translation and the Nature of 
Philosophy: A New Theory of Words (New York–London 1989), pp. 109–150.
 9 On the category of time in Lacan and Freud in the context of early trauma and the two 
concepts of the subject’s narrative identity see: A. Bielik-Robson, “Słowo i trauma: czas, 










apprehended as arché, the origin of something identical, and reveals its com-
plex and always already translational nature, which allows the old to be situated 
within a new order and a new network of relationships through repetition – to 
Freud’s description of hysteria, where the event itself resonates less than its later 
memory. In hysteria, Freud says, memory is repressed, and when it returns it 
becomes trauma.10 He tried to describe and investigate this mechanism on many 
occasions. It presumes the existence of two moments: the subject’s first confron-
tation with the event, the repression of the content connected with it, and its 
return or activation through a later event, which is the “actual” experience of 
trauma. It is only retroactively that the first scene of the confrontation can be 
understood, possibly introduced to the symbolic system, textualized, visualized 
and comprehended. In a dissertation on childhood neurosis,11 Freud pointed out 
that this first moment does not bring symptoms of an illness, which only appear 
later on. Adam Lipszyc explains this special duality as follows:
Although Freud himself does not state things so radically, we could probably say that 
the remarkable circular dialectic of Nachträglichkeit essentially has two complementary 
aspects: first, the later event lends a traumatic nature and agency to the earlier event; 
second, it is only the later event that creates an image of the earlier event, though itself it 
is, of course, an echo of the previous event!12
As Freud wrote in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), a work that is seen as the 
seminal statement in his theory of trauma, the image of hysteria approaches that 
of traumatic neurosis through a gamut of similar motor symptoms, the differ-
ence being that the latter surpasses hysteria
in its strongly marked signs of subjective ailment (in which it resembles hypochondria 
or melancholia) as well as in the evidence it gives of a far more comprehensive general 
enfeeblement and disturbance of the mental capacities.13
The characteristics of traumatic neurosis was here placed in a particular histor-
ical context: it came about as a result of
 10 Bielik-Robson, “Słowo i trauma,” p. 30.
 11 S. Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, trans. J. Strachey, in: The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917–
1919), pp. 1–124.
 12 A. Lipszyc, “W.G. Sebald: W noktoramie niepamięci.” In his: Rewizja procesu Józefiny 
K. i inne lektury od zera (Warsaw 2011), p. 145.
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severe mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a risk to 
life […]. The terrible war which has just ended gave rise to a great number of illnesses 
of this kind.14
In this essay, I  will focus on traumatic neurosis tied to the experience of the 
Holocaust, and particularly on the mechanisms behind its intergenerational 
transmission, which I want to consider in conjunction with the experience of 
emigration, a state of “suspension,” and a journey between languages. Although 
the link between psychoanalysis and translation deserves further investigation, 
particularly in terms of the French reception of Freud’s work and the more recent 
theories attempting to diagnose the condition of the (post)modern subject using 
the category of trauma,15 here I would like to recall only one work, which will 
guide my further argument, and in which translation and psychoanalysis illu-
minate each other.
I have in mind Paul Ricoeur’s late text, Sur la traduction. Returning to Walter 
Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator,” the author considers the problem of 
translation in terms of the double meaning Freud gives to the word “work:” 
in one essay it pertains to the work of memory, and in another to the work of 
mourning.16 This meaning reveals a modus operandi characteristic of translation, 
wherein the aim is lossless repetition, salvaging and retaining, but at the same 
time there is the necessity to reconcile oneself to loss. The logic of this oper-
ating mode comes from the translation’s ontological status of belonging to both 
the source and target cultures, as well as from its economy and politics, which 
shapes, on the one hand, the conviction that there cannot be two originals, which 
means emphasising the secondary, inferior, and subordinate nature of the copy, 
which more or less faithfully approximates the original, and on the other, the 
dream of a second original so perfect that even the well-armed eye and ear would 
be incapable of detecting its flaws and betrayals. Among the various expressions 
of a longing for the perfect translation, Ricoeur singles out two: the project of 
creating a total library born in the Aufklärung circles, the idea of a book collec-
tion as an infinite network of translations of all works into all languages, and 
a teleological vision of a pure language, which every translation contains as a 
“Messianic echo.” Both forms, pan-translation and the coming of the saving 
reign of reine Sprache, express the desire
 14 Freud, Beyond….
 15 See: K. Bojarska, Wydarzenia po Wydarzeniu…, pp. 247–289.








that translation would gain, gain without losing. It is this very same gain without loss 
that we must mourn until we reach an acceptance of the impassable difference of the 
peculiar and the foreign.17
This mourning would lead every time to working through the loss resulting from 
the departure of the ideal of the absolute translation, and to drawing joy from its 
dialogical nature and a “rational desire of translation.”
Meanwhile, I  would suggest moving on from the work of translation 
described in psychoanalytical terms to a literary perspective, in order to see how 
the language of literature problematizes the issues signaled above, and how it 
represents the post-traumatic condition of the subject.
2.  Traveling the Cracks There and Back
Although the issues I shall discuss could emerge from a mosaic of many texts from 
various cultural-linguistic traditions (the works of Wilhelm Dichter, Magdalena 
Tulli, Lisa Appignanesi, W.G. Sebald etc.), I will be focusing on Eva Hoffman’s 
1989 book Lost in Translation,18 as it makes the above anatomy of translation the 
basis of its composition in the context of psychoanalysis and inquiries into what 
happens to the subject at the moment of a painful shift from one linguistic image 
of the world into another. The three parts of this book, “Paradise,” “Exile,” and 
“The New World,” mark the stages of a real-life journey of the nearly-thirteen-
year-old Ewa Wydra, who was forced to leave her hometown of Krakow with 
her parents in the 1950s amid growing anti-Semitic moods. Sailing out from 
Gdynia, the ocean liner Batory brings Ewa to Montreal, where, following the 
painful uprooting, she faces the prospect of acculturation into a new and wholly 
unfamiliar world.19 The translation process, and thus, in accordance with the 
etymology of the Latin transfero, the transfer from one place to another, can be 
observed here in two closely interlocking aspects: on the one hand, the long-
term feeling of having left home, losing one’s possessions and oneself, the slow 
parting from language, perceived as an agony, and, on the other the necessity 
of coming to terms with a foreign geography and making one’s home in a new 
language.
 17 Ricoeur, On Translation…, p. 9.
 18 E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language, (New York 1989); here-
after: LiT followed by the page number.
 19 See: B. Karwowska, “Tożsamość postmigracyjna. Przypadki (między innymi) Evy 
Hoffman i Czesława Miłosza.” In her:  Druga płeć na wygnaniu. Doświadczenie 









Trauma, Translation, and Transmission 313
As images flash before the reader’s eyes of the protagonist’s happy childhood 
in Krakow, in a Jewish family that had moved from a small Ukrainian shtetl after 
the war in search of new opportunities in a big-city environment and to distance 
themselves from the difficult past, as we get a glimpse of young Ewa’s private 
world immersed in the communist reality of the 1950s, iconically represented 
by the colorful life of the house at 79, Kazimierza Wielkiego Street, “full of talk, 
visits, and melodrama,” we begin to comprehend the scale and intensity of her 
shock. It suffices to juxtapose two images:
I pick up a reddish brown chestnut and suddenly, through its warm skin, I feel the beat 
as if of a heart. But the beat is also in everything around me, and everything pulsates 
and shimmers as if it were coursing with the blood of life. Stooping under the tree, I’m 
holding life in my hand, and I am in the center of a harmonious, vibrating transparency. 
For that moment, I know everything there is to know. I have stumbled into the very 
center of plenitude, and I hold myself still with fulfillment […]. (3)
It is April 1959, I’m standing at the railing of the Batory’s upper deck, and I  feel that 
my life is ending. I’m looking out at the crowd that has gathered on the shore to see the 
ship’s departure from Gdynia – a crowd that, all of a sudden, is irrevocably on the other 
side – and I want to break out, run back, run toward the familiar excitement, the waving 
hands, the exclamations. We can’t be leaving all this behind – but we are. I am thirteen 
years old, and we are emigrating. It’s a notion of such crushing, definitive finality that to 
me it might as well mean the end of the world. (41–42)
And thus, the Eden of childhood, in which the girl experiences the compatibility of 
language and experience and which constitutes the “original” of life, begins to fall 
apart with the trauma of displacement, adopting a very physical dimension. During 
a train journey from Montreal to Vancouver, both Ewa and her sister experience 
a physical pain of immersion in a foreign, majestic space. Their response is many 
hours of numbness, fever, and refuge in sleep. The translation machine that Ewa 
had discovered in childhood, which allowed the musically talented girl to transfer 
the score written in her mind to the physical movements of her fingers, breaks 
down.20 “The verbal blur covers these people’s faces, their gestures with a sort of fog. 
I can’t translate them into my mind’s eye” (LiT, p. 108). Apart from the language of 
emotions and images that reproduce the state of exile from the childhood paradise, 
from a world that is losing not only its meaning, but also colors and shades, there 
appears the work of the intellect, a conviction that “the signifier has become severed 
from the signified.” As in other parts of this book, Freud always looms large:





The worst losses come at night. As I lie down in a strange bed in a strange house – my 
mother is a sort of housekeeper here, to the aging Jewish man who has taken us in in 
return for her services – I wait for that spontaneous flow of inner language which used 
to be my nighttime talk with myself, my way of informing the ego where the id had been. 
Nothing comes. Polish, in a short time, has atrophied, shriveled from sheer uselessness. 
Its words don’t apply to my new experiences […]. In English, words have not penetrated 
to those layers of my psyche from which a private conversation could proceed. (LiT, 
p. 107)
As in every act of translation, loss also pertains to the space of acculturation; 
it becomes most visible when most of what Ewa reads is lost in a flood of mis-
understood words. From here on we accompany her in the process of building 
a whole architecture of language; we observe how a dramatic suspension in 
a transitional zone triggers in her new waves of melancholy, a feeling once 
linked to beauty, and now closer to the Freudian category of the “empty sub-
ject.” Increasing nostalgia and longing grow to the proportions of a sickness, 
of a devastating sense of loss called a “phantom pain” (LiT, p.  115). This is 
halted, however, by the narrator’s decision to turn from Ewa to Eva, to enter the 
mourning phase, which, as Freud would say, facilitates the transfer of libidinal 
energy to a new object, a new language. Beginning the work of transfer, Eva 
starts to write a diary, to let English into her private world, treating her first 
language as a part “of the untranslatable past” (LiT, p. 120). The attempt to estab-
lish a voice that seems “tight, thin, and mat – a voice without the modulations,” 
without the “dips and rises it had before” (LiT, p. 122), the attempt to inhabit 
a new home proves to be a constant struggle, the agonic task of the translator, 
who must overcome the double resistance of unwanted separation and difficult 
acceptance: “each language modifies the other, crossbreeds with it, fertilizes it” 
(LiT, p. 273). Each makes the other relative. “Like everybody,” Hoffman writes, 
“I am the sum of my languages – the language of my family and childhood, and 
education and friendship, and love” (LiT, p. 273). The zones of incompatibility 
in between them become a window through which the world shows its diver-
sity, and the subject builds the multidirectional consciousness that allows to 
understand that there is no one center, that we are constantly being dislocated, 
and various topographies compete for our attention. The geography of dis-
placement demands that we seek various points of reference, established by 
the dialectic clash of the familiar with the foreign, which Hoffman calls a tri-
angulation process:
we need to triangulate to something  – to the past, the future, our own untamed 
perceptions, to another place – if we’re not to become creatures of ephemeral fashion. 
(LiT, p. 276)
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This process does not ensure, however, a return to the lost paradise; the whole-
ness of childhood cannot be recreated. A new subject is born in the experience 
of displacement, as a result of the work of memory and mourning; the writing 
inscribed in translation becomes a kind of therapy, a “talking cure,” the medicine 
of the second language:
For me, therapy is partly translation therapy, the talking cure a second-language cure. 
My going to a shrink is, among other things, a rite of initiation:  initiation into the 
language of the subculture within which I happen to live, into a way of explaining myself 
to myself. But gradually it becomes a project of translating backward. […] It’s only when 
I retell my whole story, back to the beginning, and from the beginning onward, in one 
language, that I can reconcile the voices within me with each other; it is only then that the 
person who judges the voices and tells the stories begins to emerge. (LiT, pp. 271–272)
But in my translation therapy, I keep going back and forth over the rifts, not to heal 
them but to see that I – one person, first-person singular – have been on both sides. […] 
And so, while therapy offers me instruments and the vocabulary of self-control, it also 
becomes, in the long run, a route back to that loss which for me is the model of all loss, 
and to that proper sadness of which children are never really afraid. (LiT, pp. 273–274)
The translation process which Hoffman’s writing inaugurates with the interna-
tional success of Lost in Translation has been divided into stages marked by her 
subsequent books. Each of which also marks a new stage in the work of memory 
and mourning. Especially After Such Knowledge21 makes us realize that the 
experience of exile from one’s native land and language is part of a broader per-
spective on translation, tied to the experience of trauma passed down through 
generations. It is probably no accident that the scene of the ship leaving port 
in the debut volume of the recollections is accompanied by a memory of the 
parents’ pain, inherited by both sisters, the elder of whom bears the name of 
her grandparents, and the younger, Alina, her aunt, who had suddenly turned 
gray and had to dig her own grave before she perished in a gas chamber. The 
younger child stirs constant feelings of sympathy and anxiety in her mother, 
which she shares with Ewa: “I inherit some of this fear and look on my sister as 
a fragile, vulnerable creature who needs all my love and protection” (LiT, p. 7). 
Ewa notices a sea of pain and death surrounding her; she realizes that her “true 
origin” is the war. Years later, in New York, having met in a café a woman who 
remembered her parents and life in the Ukrainian shtetl, she confesses that her 
parents’ pain is the place of her beginning.





3.  Postmemory: Psyche and Somatics
After Such Knowledge reminds us about two main areas of interest in the trans-
lation of the effects of boundary experiences connected with the Shoah. First, 
there is the medical focus, with an extensive reference literature. Including the 
noteworthy contribution of Polish psychiatrists, who, as Maria Orwid has often 
mentioned, for many years had been unable to present their research results 
at international forums because of the Iron Curtain.22 Second, there is the cul-
tural studies focus, examining mainly postmemory, the artistic expression of 
the experience of the “second generation” of survivors, who suffer recurring 
nightmares, anxiety or panic attacks, and a sense of persecution.23 They have 
not lived through the Holocaust like their parents, but it works its way into their 
experience in a different way (as I shall explain momentarily), leaving traces in 
the mental and somatic spheres.
Works of the latter sort, among which the most well-known are by Marianne 
Hirsch,24 draw from the intergenerational theory of trauma inheritance devised 
by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok; this theory reveals the existence of an 
inaccessible mental crypt, which, it is often claimed, throws a wrench in the 
gears of the narrative mechanism or calls attention to a painful “secret.” The 
mental effects of the crypt are called the “phantom”; it is active in the field of 
postmemory as a
figure of a transitive intergenerational anxiety, passing from the parents’ unconscious 
into the children’s unconscious […]. According to Nicolas Abraham, the phantom 
is marked by a modality that resembles the dynamic of repression:  its insistent, per-
iodic returns are not part of the symptom, conceived as a return of the repressed: “it 
 22 Mainly work inspired by S. Kłodziński and A. Kępiński, picked up by M. Orwid, 
A. Teutsch, A. Szymusik, R. Leśniak, J. Mitarski, then continued by a team which 
included: M. Dominik, J. Gątarski, Z. Ryn, K. Pietruszewski, J. Zadęcki, E. Domagalska-
Kurdziel, E. Czaplak, R. Izdebski, M. Kamińska, K. Szwajca, K. Prot, Ł. Biedka, J. Bomba, 
M. de Barbaro, M. Szaszkiewicz, and B. Treger. The team investigated transgenerational 
transfer, asthenia, and emotional anesthesia. See: M. Orwid, Trauma (Krakow 2009); 
M. Orwid, Przeżyć… i co dalej? Rozmawiają Katarzyna Zimmerer i Krzysztof Szwajca 
(Krakow 2006).
 23 N.P.F. Kellerman, “Epigenetic Transmission of Holocaust Trauma: Can Nightmares Be 
Inherited?” Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences, 2013 No. 50/1, pp. 33–39.
 24 See, e.g: M.Hirsch The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after 
the Holocaust, (New  York 2012); E.  van Alphen, “Second-Generation Testimony, 
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constantly operates […] like a ventriloquist, like the voice of a stranger (foreigner) in 
the subject’s mental topography.”25
This phantom and this secret are at the forefront in Hoffman’s writing. The 
former returns in the opening fragments of Lost in Translation as an identified 
figure (“My own sister is named after this person who exists like an almost con-
crete shadow in our lives” LiT, p. 7), while the latter is most evidently explored 
in The Secret,26 where the seventeen-year-old protagonist, Iris, senses that a dark 
mystery is lurking behind her bizarre family situation, her unsettling relation-
ship with her mother and the absence of her father. She makes the startling dis-
covery that she has been cloned, and takes off on a journey of self-discovery, to 
flee her mother and to seek her grandparents. We get the impression that the 
themes of existence and translation so present in Hoffman’s debut have returned 
here in the form of different voices: in the questions about the clone’s chance for 
her own, independent life, the ties that bind the original and the copy, and the 
border between repetition and uniqueness.
We can easily see that, through the returning phantoms of ancestors and the 
family secrets, Hoffman’s writing evokes the experiences of replacement chil-
dren, recorded extensively in numerous works of literature, of which perhaps 
the most famous is Art Spiegelman’s hybrid Maus (whose origins go back to 
the 1970s) and Philippe Grimbert’s 2004 bestselling novel Un Secret27 (based on 
which Claude Miller made a film under the same title). The latter is the story of 
a Parisian psychoanalyst who, feeling lonely as an only child, grows up believing 
that he is constantly accompanied by an imaginary brother, visiting his dreams 
and possessing everything he lacks:  strength, endurance, and the love of his 
father. Over time, Louise, his confidante and a family friend, reveals a secret he 
 25 B. Dąbrowski, “Postpamięć, zależność, trauma.” In:  Kultura po przejściach, osoby 
z przeszłością, ed. R. Nycz (Krakow 2011), p. 268; In the same volume see also: A. 
Szczepan, Polski dyskurs posttraumatyczny. Literatura polska ostatnich lat wobec 
Holokaustu i tożsamości żydowskiej, pp. 239–256; M. Żółkoś, Tworzenie pamięci. O 
powieściach autobiograficznych Ewy Kuryluk, pp. 271–282; A. Mach, “Polska kondycja 
posttraumatyczna  – próba diagnozy,” pp.  217–238. These texts comprehensively 
describe the ways of understanding the category of postmemory, the differences 
between the second-generation and third-generation experiences, and the role of 
objects that establish a relationship with the past (Roland Barthes’ and Marianne 
Hirsch’s category of “punctum,” Bożena Shallcross’s “precarium”), or the imagination 
(Dominick LaCapra’s “acting out”).
 26 E. Hoffman, The Secret. A Fable for our Time (London 2001).








long suspected: Philippe had Jewish ancestry, and he also had a brother, Simon, 
who was born from his father’s first marriage and perished in Auschwitz. This is 
the most important, but not the last family secret; others concern the relation-
ship between the father and his first wife, Hannah, and Philippe’s mother, Tania. 
The narrator’s story of discovering a family secret is an experience that changes 
his entire life; it records an attempt to understand his painful relations with his 
parents, his own obsessions, his astonishment at the fact that his “imaginary,” 
strong, and nearly perfect brother (who also appears in Spiegelman – let us recall 
that a photograph of this phantom, “unbeatable” rival was allegedly found in the 
parents’ bedroom) suddenly turns into a real figure from the past, and not a mere 
phantom created through the language of scenes enacted between the narrator 
and his parents.
This tale shows the mechanisms that lodged the deceased child in Phillipe’s 
psyche: a crypt inhabited by a living corpse. At the same time, we see how de-
scending to the crypt becomes part of the narrator’s rebirth, of a mourning pro-
cess which aims to stop the intergenerational transmission of trauma. Gabriele 
Schwab, the author of Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational 
Trauma,28 shows that here the mourning process consists in the gradual transfer 
of emotions connected with the dead brother and that it is made up of many 
symbolic gestures, both personal and political (Philippe travels to Serge and 
Beate Klarsfeld’s archive in Paris, where he discovers the details of the family’s 
deportation to Auschwitz; the decision to write a memoir is made at a dog ceme-
tery, which turns out to be owned by the daughter of Pierre Laval, the politician 
responsible for the deportations). Referring to Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever, 
Schwab also shows how writing and archive research become the reverse of the 
destructive effect of the crypt, and the attempt to counteract the influence of the 
family secret acquires a communal aspect.
Recent Polish prose features many motifs which could illuminate from var-
ious angles the experiences of the boy described by Grimbert. Born back during 
the war, Roma Ligocka depicts a difficult mother-child relationship in the 
shadow of war trauma in The Good Child.29 She is aware of the mechanisms of the 
post-traumatic syndrome and her resulting vulnerability to anorexia in a home 
where there is a language of silence, a language of shared depression, gestures 
attesting to emotional disorders and difficult contact with the others.
 28 G. Schwab, “Replacement Children: The Transgenerational Transmission of Traumatic 
Loss.” In: Haunting Legacies. Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma (New York 
2010), pp. 118–150.
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We find similar awareness in the second-generation narrative of Ewa Kuryluk, 
who long struggled with family secrets pertaining to her mother’s Jewish roots. 
In Frascati, the protagonists read Trio for the Hidden together, which leads to the 
following conversation:
‘The next sentence sticks in my throat, I’m afraid of choking, my dear daughter,’ she 
complained. ‘Is it easier to write than to read?’ ‘I think so, Mama.’ ‘An injury is like a 
taboo,’ she complained, ‘it passes from mother to child, from generation to generation.’ 
‘I know.’ ‘But it can’t last forever,’ she waved her hands, ‘no one wants to sit under the 
floorboards until she dies!’ ‘That’s true, Mama.’ ‘Read me this sentence aloud, starting 
from “I like how Carol keeps transforming”.’ ‘Softly,’ she mumbled, ‘so that they can’t hear 
you.’ ‘I like how Carol keeps coming transforming,’ I read in a whisper, ‘from the Jewish 
girl who wants to hide into the Jewish girl who wants to give herself away, because she 
feels guilty for having survived.’30
Another second-generation narrative, Magdalena Tulli’s Italian Stilettos – which 
strikes me as interesting also because it situates the personal landscape of post-
memory in the perspective of bilingualism, translation, and functioning in at 
least two different worlds – takes us into an atmosphere of tensions shaping the 
life of an Italian-Polish family, vented in “scenes of aggression and humiliation:”
We were too young to know what past events were causing our suffering, sixteen years 
after the war was lost. Eighteen years after Yalta, where our fate was sealed, in advance, 
even before we were born. Eighteen years was an eternity for us […]. Stalin was already 
dead. But Hitler was still alive and kicking. He sent over Germans who, in the mornings 
at breakfast, set the tone of our minor frustration, nurtured by a deep and wider frus-
tration, omnipresent as groundwater, or as streams of bile hidden beneath the surface.31
Feeling cut off from the environment, haunting dreams (“Sometimes I dreamed 
about the Germans”; WS, p.  20), the recurring absence of the father and the 
trying presence of a cold mother  – “a beautiful woman with a sad gaze that 
held a mystery” (WS, p. 26), fleeing from the past and losing her memory (WS, 
p.32), who, during her illness, seemed like a character plucked from a concen-
tration camp, seeking a mysterious child and recalling relatives the daughter 
never knew – then struggles with apathy, powerlessness, and a sense of being 
overwhelmed by an excess of the past: all this is a way of paying an inheritance 
tax of sorts, a payment that extends “to the end of one’s life, if not longer:”
 30 E. Kuryluk, Frascati. Apoteoza topografii (Krakow 2009), p. 136. The passage translated 
by S.G.
 31 M. Tulli, Włoskie szpilki (Warsaw 2011), p. 8. Hereafter quoted as WS followed by a 






The protagonist of this story would like the war to finally end for her as well. But once 
the war starts, it has no end. Not for everyone, at any rate. […] And for civilians the 
silent, invisible war is still underway. They bleed in it day after lonely day, night after 
night, year after year. To the end of their days, and some much longer. War, like bank-
ruptcy assets, is passed on to one’s descendants. (WS, pp. 64–45)
Replacement children, children of families crippled by Holocaust trauma, 
growing up in an atmosphere of tension and anxiety, full of disturbing secrets, 
and realizing their inadequacy with regard to their parents’ expectations, more 
or less consciously grapple with the consequences of the intergenerational 
transfer, in which, as Gabriele Schwab writes, the parents establish an affective 
economy of fantasy, where living and dead children become indistinguishable. 
At the same time, it is interesting that the “replacement” with which the child 
is burdened need not be limited to a single dead person; it can be all those who 
have passed.32 The economy of the phantom’s haunting can operate not only at 
the level of the individual, but also collectively. Moreover, it affects perpetrators 
as well as victims.33 As the parents maintain their silence, their flow of uncon-
trolled emotions or emotional frigidity, and frequent mood swings, the child 
experiences something like cumulative trauma,34 losing a sense of stability, 
dealing with serious identity issues, and becoming someone who is not fully 
him/herself, an embodiment of memory.
Meanwhile, lest we confine the issue of intergenerational transmission 
of trauma to the unconscious, or the reception of uncontrolled behavior and 
gestures, it is time to focus on the somatic side of traumatization. This requires 
references to the most recent findings in biology and medicine, which I men-
tioned in the introduction. Although these fields are far from offering a precise 
explanation of the mechanisms of the intergenerational transmission of trauma, 
the findings of biologists exploring the structure and mechanisms of the human 
genome cast new light on this problem. This is particularly true of the flourishing 
field of epigenetics, which explains changes in the expression of genes uncon-
nected with the modification of DNA sequences, but resulting from methy lation 
of double helix fragments, modification of histones, or the RNA interference 
(Andrew Z. Fire and Craig C. Mello received the Nobel Prize in medicine and 
 32 See: G. Schwab, Haunting Legacies… p. 125; see in particular the chapter Haunting 
Legacies. Trauma in Children of Perpetrators, pp. 67–91.
 33 Schwab, Haunting Legacies… p. 126.








Trauma, Translation, and Transmission 321
physiology for this discovery in 2006). To replace the extensive conceptual 
apparatus with a metaphor (justified by relevant footnotes), we might say that 
epigenetics uncovers the mechanisms of “cellular memory,” which activates or 
dampens the process of gene transcription and mRNA translation into a chain of 
amino acids when affected by environmental factors, for example. Methylation 
plays a key role here: the joining of methyl groups to the relevant fragments of a 
DNA chain, in a reaction caused by enzymes. The main premise of the new field 
of epigenetics is that genes have a kind of memory, or, as it was phrased in the 
description of a BBC documentary: “that the lives of your grandparents – the 
air they breathed, the food they ate, even the things they saw – can directly af-
fect you, decades later, despite your never experiencing these things yourself.”35 
Studies on the mechanisms behind this sort of transfer also incorporate various 
fields of medicine, including psychiatry, in the hopes of not only understanding 
certain physiological processes, but also discovering new forms of therapy.36
In terms of postmemory, the most interesting aspect would of course seem to 
be the findings concerning the impact of traumatic experiences on epigenome 
modifications and their intergenerational transmission. For example, it was dem-
onstrated that sexual damage incurred in childhood impacts the functioning of 
the “stress axis,”37 and Canadian researchers have shown the repercussions of 
pregnant women’s mental disorders on how this axis functions in their children.38 
Special note should be made of work on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),39 
which is classified as a mental disorder resulting from painful events of unprece-
dented impact (involving death, a threat to life or personal integrity), combined 
with an experience of fear and evoking terror or a deep sense of helplessness.40 
 35 See: www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/horizon/ghostgenes.shtml (access: 16.08. 
2013). The Ghost in Your Genes, dir. by N. Paterson, BBC 2005.
 36 See: J. David Sweatt, “Experience-Dependent Epigenetic Modifications in the Central 
Nervous System,” Biological Psychiatry 2009 No. 65/3, pp. 191–197.
 37 P. O.  McGowan et  al., “Epigenetic Regulation of the Glucocorticoid Receptor in 
Human Brain Associates with Childhood Abuse,” Nature Neuroscience 2009 No. 12/3, 
pp. 342–348.
 38 T. F.  Oberlander et  al., “Prenatal Exposure to Maternal Depression, Neonatal 
Methylation of Human Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene (NR3C1) and Infant Cortisol 
Stress Responses,” Epigenetics 2008 No. 3/2, pp. 97–106.
 39 In the late 1960s, this was called KZ syndrome, concentration camp syndrome, or 
Holocaust syndrome. See: A. Kępiński, “The KZ syndrome,” in his: Rytm życia (Kraków 
2012) pp. 106–123; M. Orwid, Trauma.
 40 See: The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, Diagnostic Criteria 














The causes of the mental dysfunctions of Holocaust victims – described in lit-
erature and memoirs, as well as in works that draw from psychoanalysis, psy-
chodynamic theories or socio-cultural communication models – for some years 
have been researched by Rachel Yehuda, a psychiatrist and neurobiologist from 
The Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York.41 Yehuda and her coworkers have 
broadened their initial scope of inquiry to include the traumatic experiences of 
not only the second generation, but the third one as well, adding observations of 
the effects of the attack on the World Trade Center in women who witnessed it 
during pregnancy.42 Their research shows the impact of shock on epigenetic pro-
gramming, making us realize that trauma has a wider resonance than we have 
suspected, affecting not only the mind, but also the biological sphere. This opens 
new avenues for therapy, creating opportunities for combining psychotherapy 
and pharmacotherapy more effectively.43
Future research on genome structure and the workings of epigenetic 
mechanisms could eliminate many doubts on the process of intergenerational 
transfer, and not only when it comes to trauma, casting new light on the inter-
pretation of problems raised by Eva Hoffman and other authors, such as Ewa 
 41 R. Yehuda et al., “Maternal, Not Paternal, PTSD Is Related to Increased Risk for PTSD 
in Offspring of Holocaust Survivors,” Journal of Psychiatric Research 2008 No. 42/13, 
pp.  1,104–1,111; T.  B. Franklin et  al., “Epigenetic Transmission of the Impact of 
Early Stress Across Generations,” Biological Psychiatry 2010 No. 68/5, pp. 408–415; 
R. Yehuda, “Current Status of Cortisol Findings in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America 2002 No.  25, pp.  341–368; R.  Yehuda, L.  M. 
Bierer, “Transgenerational Transmission of Cortisol and PTSD Risk,” Progress in 
Brain Research 2008 No. 167, pp. 121–135; R. Yehuda, L. M. Bierer, “The Relevance 
of Epigenetics to PTSD: Implications for the DSM-V,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 
2009 No. 22(5), pp. 427–434; R. Yehuda et al., “Ten-Year Follow-Up Study of PTSD 
Diagnosis, Symptom Severity and Psychosocial Indices in Aging Holocaust Survivors,” 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 2009 No. 119/1, pp. 25–34; R. Yehuda et al., “The Role 
of Genes in Defining a Molecular Biology of PTSD,” Disease Markers 2011 No. 30/2–3, 
pp. 67–76.
 42 R. Yehuda et al., “Gene Expression Patterns Associated with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder Following Exposure to the World Trade Center Attacks,” Biological 
Psychiatry 2009 No. 66/7, pp. 708–711; R. Yehuda et al., “Transgenerational Effects of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Babies of Mothers Exposed to the World Trade Center 
Attacks during Pregnancy,” The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism 2005 
No. 90/7, pp. 4,115–4,118.
 43 S. M. Stahl, “Psychotherapy as an Epigenetic ‘Drug’: Psychiatric Therapeutics Target 
Symptoms Linked to Malfunctioning Brain Circuits with Psychotherapy As Well As 
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Kuryluk, Piotr Paziński, Andrzej Bart, Anda Rottenberg, Magdalena Tulli, 
Bożena Keff, Piotr Szewc, Marek Bieńczyk, Mieczysław Abramowicz, Agata 
Tuszyńska, and Igor Ostachowicz:  on the translation work of memory and 
mourning as a way of dealing with historical shock. The rise in the social signif-
icance of postmemory issues is signaled by the significant growth of literature 
that problematizes mechanisms of intergerational trauma transmission, which 
is naturally linked to the present historical situation; witnesses to the Holocaust 
are passing away, and the memory of this event must now be constructed in their 
absence. The growing alignment of postmemory perspectives and questions of 
translation, in turn, is linked to the increasing significance of the ability to adapt 
to a “life in translation,” which has become an important modus vivendi of (post)
modernity, our age of global flow and migration. The categories of trauma and 
translation transfer from the optic established by attempts at dealing with the 
consequences of the Shoah to the optic focused on the effects of injuries inflicted 
through torture, colonialism, slavery, and contemporary conflicts. These effects 
arise in a different geography of memory, which we can see in Gabriele Schwab’s 
aforementioned book, in which the phenomenon of intergenerational trans-
mission is seen in the context of two works representing Māori culture:  Witi 
Ihimaera’s The Whale Rider and Patricia Grace’s Baby No-Eyes. This tendency is 
confirmed by the developments in translatology in the past decade: apart from 
a book devoted to the work of Primo Levi,44 in which recurring images of trans-
lation are a tool for dealing with the (in)expressibility of the experience of the 
Shoah, and a project under the patronage of Derek Attridge and Susan Bassnett,45 
which brought, i.a., Piotr Kuhiwczak’s inspiring study (based on translations and 
pseudo-translations of Władysław Szpilman’s The Pianist) on how the knowledge 
of painful wartime events is shaped by cultural-linguistic mediation, we also find 
attempts to show the translational aspect of boundary experience. One such 
example is Bella Brodzki’s juxtaposition of a narrative by the French Holocaust 
survivor Claude Morhange-Bégué with the postcolonial novel of the Nigerian-
born writer T. Obinkaram Echewa.46
 44 L. N. Insana, Arduous Tasks: Primo Levi, Translation, and the Transmission of Holocaust 
Testimony (Toronto–Buffalo–London 2009).
 45 Tradition, Translation, Trauma. The Classic and the Modern, eds. J. Parker, T. Mathews 
(New York 2011). See also: P. Kuhiwczak, Mediating Trauma. How do we Read the 
Holocaust Memoirs?, pp. 283–298.
 46 B. Brodzki, “Scenes of Inheritance: Intergenerational Transmission and Imperiled 









The importance of literature that strives to uncover and work through the 
wounds and obsessions arising from traumatic past events passed down through 
intergenerational transmission comes from the fact that it allows us to delve into 
unconscious or barely conscious realms of individual and shared history; that 
it can serve as a “transformational object,” to borrow a term from Christopher 
Bollas, a catalyst that allows us to reassess the past, to understand and change our 
lives. In other words, the language of literature provides a chance to gain missing 
knowledge about the ties that bind us to the historical events of our times,47 fil-
ling gaps in other discourses, including the language of the natural sciences. The 
latter has been included here in order to present the issue of intergenerational 
trauma transfer from another angle. It would seem that both languages used in 
this essay mark out separate territories of knowledge and imagination, but there 
is no reason to limit ourselves to one of them in a world where translation is 
gaining significance, to forsake attempts at moving freely between them, even if 
this kind of “translation” should prove risky.
[2013]
Translated by Soren Gauger
 47 S. Felman, D. Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 




You Say Nothing, I Will Interpret.
Interpreting in the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
Concentration Camp
Introduction
Community interpreting is the type of interpreting which takes place in the public 
service sphere to facilitate communication between officials and lay people: at 
the police station, immigration departments, refugee and social welfare centers, 
medical and mental health offices, schools, and other institutions of this kind. 
This type of interpreting is bi-directional and carried out consecutively. It covers 
interpreting in face-to face situations and is probably the most common and the 
oldest type of interpreting in the world. Sometimes it is performed by volunteers, 
untrained bilinguals, friends or relatives, and even by children.
The role of an interpreter is as vital to successful communication in commu-
nity interpreting as it is in any other type of interpretation. Involvement in face-
to-face interaction emphasizes the interpreter’s function as both language and 
social mediator. Nowadays the interpreter also plays a crucial and complex role 
in the process of integration in society, often acting as a coordinator, a cultural 
mediator or even a censor.
The fact that interpreting takes places in different institutional contexts, 
involving various aspects such as empowerment, equity and access to social capital, 
makes it necessary to also examine interpretation from a historical perspective.
Accounts of the work of interpreters in extreme situations – critical situations 
which are important and difficult in their human aspect for all the main 
participants (i.e. the involved parties and the interpreter her/himself) – have been 
presented on numerous occasions in the writing on interpreting, both those of an 
empirical, observational, and interactive character and those more analytical and 
theoretical in nature. These accounts include reports on interpreting at the trials 
of the Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg1 or at Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem,2 as 
 1 D. Bowen, M. Bowen, “The Nuremberg Trials (Communication through Translation),” 
Meta Vol. 30, No. 1, 1985, pp.  74–77; F.  Gaiba, The Origins of Simultaneous 
Interpretation: The Nuremberg Tria (Ottawa, 1998).
 2 R. Morris, “Court Interpretation: The Trial of Ivan Demjanjuk. A Case Study,” The 









well as more recent reports on the role of interpreters at the hearings conducted 
by the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa3, at the UNO 
peace missions in Lebanon and the countries of former Yugoslavia4, and the 
humanitarian missions of NGOs in Iraq or Afghanistan5. Equally extensive has 
been the research on interpreting at public prosecutors’ offices and at all stages of 
court hearings and interrogations. Researchers of both empirical and theoretical 
aspects of court-based community interpreting have tried to reveal the ethical 
norms binding on an interpreter in her/his work.6 These norms are deonto logical, 
sui generis, and include:  reliability, morals beyond reproach, linguistic compe-
tence and expertise, faithfulness in interpreting, impartiality and neutrality, 
acting in an unassuming way, awareness of social and cultural peculiarities, high 
resistance to stress and observance of the rules of professional ethics. Among all 
the norms described, impartiality and/or neutrality are usually assigned primary 
importance; most studies emphasize that, above all, a court interpreter is expected 
to be accurate and impartial. This means the interpreters are expected to be neu-
tral with regard to the people and discourse they interpret.
In all the studies on community interpreters, there has so far been very 
little research into the work of the interpreters in the concentration camps 
and at Gestapo interrogations during World War II. Interpreters were needed 
in those extreme conditions, as is evidenced in the diaries, the memoirs and 
records of the former concentration camp inmates. These might have been ex 
officio interpreters who over-zealously joined these functions with other police-
like duties, or, not infrequently, prisoners themselves like the camp Schreiber/in 
(‘regi strar’) or Läufer/in (‘messenger’).
The aim of the present research is to study the records of the Auschwitz-
Birkenau concentration camp in order to trace the recollections of and about 
camp interpreters, their work and their attempts to ease the hardships of other 
prisoners, often risking their own lives in the process. It is also my intention to 
show that the generally accepted norms applicable to interpretation in courts, 
 3 Ch. Wiegand, “Role of the Interpreter in the Healing of a Nation: An emotional view.” 
In: The Critical Link 2:  Interpreters in the Community, eds. R. Roberts, S.E. Carr, 
D. Abraham, A. Dufour (Amsterdam–Philadelphia 2000), pp. 207–218.
 4 R. Thomas, “United Nations Military Observer Interpreting in a community setting.” 
In: Carr et. al., The Critical Link, pp. 249–257.
 5 M. Szymczukiewicz, “L’inteprétation communautaire dans l’armée. Etude de 
cas: missions polonaises de paix.” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Warsaw, 2005.
 6 M. Tryuk, L’interprétation communautaire. Des normes et des rôles dans l’interprétation 
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police stations, jails and holding cells were not applicable to concentration 
camps, and that different norms were adopted, which were highly justified by 
the circumstances.
This work is based on the collection of testimonials and recollections of 
former concentration camp inmates, which is held at the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
Memorial and Museum Archives. The collection includes 134 volumes of re-
corded statements (3,000 separate items), 200 volumes of recollections (1,000 
reports), and 76 volumes of the trial of the General Commandant of the Camp, 
Rudolf Höss.7 This material is a unique example of the ontological narratives 
referred to by Mona Baker.8 It relates the experiences of the victims of the Nazi 
regime and presents an account of their arrest, their life in the camps, their 
relationships with other prisoners and their expressions of fear of the SS men 
and other camp officials. An important strand which is evident to the careful 
reader is that many accounts mention ‘the good chap’ who would help one sur-
vive, who would be willing to share his meager rations as well as any information 
he has obtained. The “good chap” could also be the interpreter. Despite the mas-
sive amount of material, it should be noted that references to interpretation are 
rather scant, and when they do occur, they tend to be random, brief and laconic, 
usually consisting of dry facts. Moreover, inmates often offer differing versions 
of the same event. For these reasons, obtaining an objective, empirical account of 
events is virtually impossible. This chapter focuses mainly on the profiles of the 
official camp interpreters, the Lagerdolmetscher.
Why Were Interpreters Needed in the Concentration Camps?
In each Nazi concentration camp, the inmates represented between 35–40 dif-
ferent national or ethnic groups, each having their own language. All the inmates 
lived in extreme conditions. The communication, if any, with the German Kapo 
had to be in German, the ever-present language, and if any postal services were 
allowed at all, all the paperwork had to be in German, too. In the barracks 
and work blocks all rules, orders, and directions were delivered in German. In 
Konzentrationslager (KL) Auschwitz the use of Polish, Russian or Italian was for-
bidden.9 The General Commandant of the Camp, Rudolf Höss, issued an order 
 7 Throughout the paper the quotations from the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and 
Museum Archives are marked as APMA-B with the relevant volume and page numbers 
in brackets.
 8 M. Baker, “Narratives to and on translation,” Skase Journal of Translation and 
Interpretation 2005, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 4–13.










on July 30, 1940, forbidding the camp staff to use any foreign language they 
might know, in particular forbidding the use of Polish or Czech. This order was 
directed to the Silesians and Volksdeutsche (‘ethnic Germans) who performed 
various function in the camps. In addition, every inmate was required to mem-
orize some basic phrases in German:  their concentration camp number, their 
barrack number, and the texts of songs they were required to sing for the amuse-
ment of their guards. Only in a few instances were certain signs posted in both 
German and Polish, for example “Halt! Stój!”. Concentration camp German was, 
however, of a specific nature. Michael Cronin defined it as follows: “German, in 
this instance, is a language not of requests but of orders.”10 Survival in the con-
centration camp without some knowledge of German was practically impossible. 
Primo Levi notes that:
The greater part of the prisoners who did not understand German – that is, almost all 
the Italians – died during the first ten to fifteen days after their arrival: at first glance, 
from hunger, cold, fatigue, and disease; but after a more attentive examination, due to 
insufficient information. If they had been able to communicate with their more experi-
enced companions, they would have been able to orient themselves better: to learn first 
of all how to procure clothing, shoes, illegal food, how to avoid the harsher labor and 
the often lethat encounters with the SS, how to handle the inevitable illnesses without 
making fatal mistakes. I don’t mean to say that they would nor have died, but the would 
have lived longer and had a greater chance of regaining lost ground11.
Further on, he writes about French prisoners (Alsatians or German-Jewish or 
Polish-Jewish emigres to France, knowing German or Yiddish):
They were our natural interpreters: they translated for us the fundamental commands 
and warnings of the day, “Get up,” “Assembly.” “Line up for bread,” “Who’s got broken 
shoes?” “By threes,” “By fives,” et cetera. (DS, p. 83)
In essence, however, two languages were used in the camps: German and the ‘unof-
ficial’ language, that is Polish or its sociolectal variety, so-called Lagersprache.12 
Polish was used owing to the dominating number of Polish inmates. Lagersprache 
was created out of Polish, Yiddish, Silesian dialects, and Hungarian. It was a camp 
slang – a way for the inmates to communicate among themselves in the camp, 
although it also occurred that some German functionaries and even SS troops 
took some expressions from Lagersprache. It is noteworthy that there were two 
 10 M. Cronin, Translation and Identity (London – New York 2006), p. 77.
 11 P. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. R. Rosenthaler (New York 2017), p. 80. 
Hereafter marked DS with a page number.
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varieties of this sociolect: a different Lagersprache was in use in the men’s camps 
and in the women’s camps. Reflecting on the role of Polish for inmates coming 
from other countries and nationalities, Levi writes:
To this day I remember how one pronounced in Polish not my registration number but 
that of the prisoner who preceded me on the roster of a certain hut […]. As a matter of 
fact, in that hut the soup dispenser and the greater part of the prisoners were Polish, and 
Polish was the official language; when you were called, you must be there ready, holding 
out your bowl in order not to miss your turn and, so as not to be caught by surprise, it 
was a good idea to jump when the companion with the immediately preceding registra-
tion number was called. (DS, p. 80–81)
Levi also notes that another ‘language’ was frequently used in the camp:  “All 
Kapos gave beatings; it was […] their more or less accepted language. After all, 
it was the only language that everyone in that perpetual Tower of Babel could 
truly understand […] like the Tower of Babel, beating was the one language 
understood by all” (DS, p. 60). Similarly, presenting the profile of Karl Broch, 
the sadistic Unterscharführer from the Politische Abteilung (‘Political Section’) in 
the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, Lore Shelley recalls that he had a ‘saying’ that Die 
Peitsche ist der beste Dolmetscher, sie spricht alle Sprachen (‘the whip is the best 
interpreter; it speaks in all languages’).13 The camp inmates’ first contact with an 
interpreter occurred during their interrogation by the Gestapo. Janusz Karwacki 
recalls:14
Here I have to explain that the way of interpreting the message didn’t really reflect the 
form in which we prisoners were addressed. I came to understand it much later, when 
there were no interpreters and we were addressed directly in German. We were always 
addressed as Sie. It was equally true of common talk, orders, commands, abuse or rid-
icule. Always Sie was used. It was a dismal farce. You were civilly addressed with Sie. 
You were selected to be transported to the gas chamber with Sie, you were abused and 
punished with Sie. You were downtrodden in what remained of your human dignity, so 
stubbornly defended, with Sie. Everything with Sie.
I think that inherent in it was an additional perfidy of making the victim break down 
psychologically. Due to this Sie, every utterance involved a hidden sneer: sneer at a Sir 
in rags and in total degradation, the state to which anyone can be brought as a result of 
undernourishment, overwork and permanent life in fear of what other kind of anguish 
is to follow.
 13 L. Shelley, Secretaries of Death. Accounts by Former Prisoners who Worked in the Gestapo 
of Auschwitz (New York 1986), p. 363.






Interpreters for the Gestapo did not understand the full significance of the sneer 
involved in this form of address and translated it as ‘you’ This gave them the delusive 
feeling of superiority over the prisoner.15
An equally dramatic picture of the interpreter during the Gestapo interrogation 
is given by Jerzy Mostowski, as detailed in the memoirs stored in the Auschwitz-
Birkenau Memorial and Museum Archives:
I asked for an interpreter, since I wasn’t confident in my knowledge of German. I only 
knew some German from my school lessons, and knew that I was bound to encounter 
expressions which were completely foreign to me. But when I finished the session with 
my interpreter – of Silesian origin – I felt as though I’d gotten less than nothing from 
him. I was not beaten by the German officer conducting the interrogation and asking the 
questions; nor was I beaten by the underofficer taking down the protocol; but this greasy 
and obese interpreter went out of his way to insult and humiliate me […]. (APMA-B 
vol. 20: 11–14)
Just like in any other multilingual social situation, interpreters were needed in 
the concentration camps. Auschwitz-Birkenau was no different. Upon arrival 
in the camp a number of inmates listed their profession as Dolmetscher. These 
declarations can be found in the registration documents of new arrivals to 
the death camps. In the majority of cases persons declaring themselves to be 
interpreters were Jews born in Poland or Russia, often transported to the camps 
from France or Belgium. Very few of them survived.
Who Were the Interpreters?
It is not easy to present a profile of those persons choosen to act as interpreters 
in the concentration camps. From the memoirs held in the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
Memorial and Museum Archives, it follows that they belonged to a very spe-
cific type with multilingual competencies but with German as the dominant 
language. In the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp three groups of persons acting as 
interpreters can be distinguished.
The first group consisted of the SS men from the Politische Abteilung 
(‘Political Section’), often Volksdeutsche or Silesians fluent in Polish and 
employing Polish during the initial interrogation. Shelley names the following 
SS members:  Klaus Dylewski, Gerard Lachman, who most likely joined the 
French Foreign Legion after the war, Johann Schindler from Łódź, Joseph 
Stetnik, a Pole from Silesia, Karl Broch, Alois Lorenczyk, a Volksdeutscher 
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from Rybnik, Joseph Pach from Silesia, as well as the Volksdeutsche Witold 
Witkowsky and Georg Woznitza.16 The SS guard Lachman also assumed the 
function of Lagerdolmetscher.17
The second group consisted of female prison inmates working in the Politische 
Abteilung. These were mostly Slovakian or Hungarian Jews, Schreiberinnen 
(‘registrars’) or Läuferinnen (‘messengers), for example Mala Zimetbaum, 
working in the following sections:
 – Registratur (‘Registry, Document section’). Among the persons working 
there was one Hella Cougno, a Greek from Thessaloniki, who later described 
here arrival at the camp as follows: “My mother’s number was 38911, mine 
38912 – and work began. We were assigned as interpreters.” When the trans-
port of inmates from Greece ceased, Ms. Cougno writes that: “My mother and 
I were no longer needed as interpreters. We were therefore dispatched back to 
Auschwitz, to the Politische Abteilung.”18
 – Schreibstube (‘Secretariat’). Shelley worked here. She recalls:  “I also served 
as secretary for out-of-town Gestapo officials who came to interrogate camp 
prisoners. […] Frequently, one of the girls of my commando served as inter-
preter for Polish, Ukrainian or Russian prisoners.”19
 – Vernehmungsabteilung (‘Interrogation section’)
 – Standesamt (‘Civil section’)
 – Rechtsabteilung (‘Legal section’)
 – Aufnahmeabteilung (‘Reception’)
 – Erkennungsdienst (‘Photographic section’).
The third group of interpreters were those prisoners who declared that they 
knew German (or another language necessary in the camp). They were singled 
out as camp interpreters, that is Lagerdolmetscher. The rest of the present chapter 
is devoted to this group of inmate interpreters.
Stanisław Skibicki writes:  “The camp commanders communicated with us 
using interpreters as intermediaries” (APMA-B vol.  149:  99). The interpreters 
often had to perform this function in addition to the other murderous work 
activities forced upon them like all the other inmates. Their interpretation work 
did not guarantee them any privileges in terms of how they were treated; for 
 16 L. Shelley, Secretaries of Death.
 17 See Pilecki’s statement (APMA-B, vol. 97: 190).
 18 Shelley, Secretaries of Death, p. 47.










example, they received no additional rations. Nor did it guarantee them survival. 
Their knowledge of German did, however, give them access to information, and 
enabled them to communicate better with other inmate functionaries, and in 
addition simply allowed them to help others.
Camp interpreters wore an armband on their striped prison uniforms like the 
other functionaries in the camp. Jerzy Poźmiński recalls it as a white armband 
with black letters reading ‘Dolmetscher’ (APMA-B, vol. 82: 2). Tadeusz Paczuła, 
however, writes that the “Lagersdolmetscher wore a black armband” (APMA-B 
vol.111: 155).
The function of the camp interpreter was fulfilled by the following persons:
 – Władysław Baworowski
 – Leonard Belewski
 – Franciszek Galus/Kalus
 – Józef Baltaziński/Balasiński
 – Kurt Machula
 – Egbert Skowron
 – Eugen/Łukasz Łukawiecki, who was the last interpreter in Auschwtiz-
Birkenau left until the final evacuation of the camp.
Władysław Baworowski
Władysław Baworowski was assigned concentration camp number 863. He was 
born on 10 August 1910 in Germakówka and was among those transported to 
Auschwitz from Kraków and Tarnów on 20  June  1940; he died from exhaus-
tion and hunger on 1  June 1942. Former Auschwitz camp inmates remember 
Baworowski as one of the first camp interpreters.
Stanisław Skibicki writes:
As I remember the camp interpreter was Franciszek Kalus, who arrived with the first 
Silesian transport (nr 1000), because Baworowski – who also should be mentioned – 
was then only an assistant interpreter. Kalus was really a nerd, but I have to admit that 
he was useful, wrote different letters and petitions for the inmates and was always willing 
to help. (APMA-B vol. 149, p. 99)
Kazimierz Zając notes:
I was taken to what was then barrack building nr 5, where Józef Baltaziński was desig-
nated as the barrack interpreter. He was a bad man. He was very afraid of the Germans 
and carried out all their orders with zeal. On more than one occasion was I abused by 
him. He came from the same area where I was born, from Jasień near Brzesko. […] 
He spoke very good German and immediately had a better position than others in the 
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camp. Together with Baworowski he first became an interpreter, and later advanced to 
barrack interpreter. (APMA-B vol. 136, p. 192)
In the recollections of the former inmates, Władysław Baworowski usually 
interprets the ‘welcoming’ speech given the inmates by the Camp Commandant 
Rudolf Höss or his assistants. Czesław Rychlik writes:
First there was a speech by the Commandant of the camp. His speech was translated by 
Baworowski. Pointing to the crematorium chimney, he explained to us that that was the 
only way out of the camp. Whether we lived longer or shorter depended on how hard we 
worked and our strict obedience to camp regulations. (APMA-B vol. 26a: 97)
Baworowski was present and interpreted a number of punishments and sentences 
handed out to the inmates Zdzisław Wiesiołek recalls:
After two months, during evening roll call, eleven of us were escorted to the front of 
the roll call area. In the presence of the other inmates gathered there Fritzsch [the 
Lagerführer] read out our death sentence. It was translated from German by the inmate 
Baworowski, who explained to us that Fritzsch, in the exercise of his pardon powers, 
was reducing our sentence to five years of hard labor in the stone quarries and 25 lashes. 
(APMA-B vol. 33: 29)
Henryk Król writes:
Following the escape of a prisoner, the interpreter – Baworowski – translated to us the 
punishment announced by the Camp Commandant: “You will remain standing for three 
days and three nights – without food or water.” (APMA-B vol. 76: 199)
Władysław Baworowski was treated even worse than others by the SS men on 
account of his origins and his pronunciation in German using the characteristic 
French “r”. As Alojzy Drzazga recalls:
During the installation of the inmates in the barracks, the most beaten inmate was 
Baworowski, later a camp interpreter, who was initially beaten on every occasion, 
accompanied by shouts of Graf [Count]. (APMA-B vol. 33: 47)
This same inmate writes about the first night in the camp, in a stuffy room without 
a bunk:  “The person who suffered most at the time was the Lagerdolmetscher 
Count Baworowski, against whom the SS guards had the greatest resentment.” 
(APMA-B vol. 86: 71)
Jan Zdebik notes:
Those persons in charge of supervising us, either SS guards or German criminal inmates, 
were characterized by a high degree of sadism. All their sadistic acts seemed to give 
them great pleasure. In particular they singled out Count Baworowski. He had a strange 
pronunciation and his lifestyle was also different from the other inmates. Generally 
speaking he was quite a fine man. He didn’t survive the camp. (APMA-B vol. 139: 90)
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The most dramatic recollections of Baworowski’s suffering is given by 
Henryk Król, who describes how the SS made him eat faeces (APMA-B 
vol. 76, p. 199). This incident also shows up in a number of statements by 
other former inmates. The humiliation of this individual greatly moved the 
other inmates and gave them an indication as to what might await them at the 
camp.
Among others, Janusz Walter writes of Baworowski’s death:
I also recall the matter of Count Baworowski, who before the war was a person with a title 
and fortune and had great influence in various governing circles. During his early days 
at the Auschwitz Camp he carried out the function of interpreter [Lagerdolmetscher] 
and enjoyed respect of the SS authorities. It is even said that he once ate supper with 
the Commandant of the camp. Over time however he sunk to a lower and lower rung 
in terms of his standing at the camp, sinking to a point where the German inmates 
made him sit up like a dog begging for food in order to obtain his bread ration. And he 
agreed. Baworowski was waiting for a release from the camp, and had swelled up like a 
Muselman (weighing almost 200 kg) and then died. Shortly afterward his release papers 
came through. (APMA-B vol. 74, p. 133)
Bronisław Cynka writes:
None of the inmates were ever certain of surviving the day, or even the hour. Some died 
from stupidity or lack of will power. For example Baworowski, upon being dismissed as 
a camp interpreter, deteriorated to such an extent that he went rooting through the gar-
bage in search of food scraps. (APMA-B vol. 75, p. 87–88, 95)
Józef Baltaziński/Baltasiński
Concentration camp number 749, later released from the camp, Baltaziński/
Baltasiński performed various functions in the camp, for example, block inter-
preter and block supervisor. He zealously carried out all the orders of the 
Germans. His inhumane treatment of young inmates, beating them and kicking 
them out in the snow, is recalled by Stanisław Hantz (APMA-B vol. 88: 163–165), 
Andrzej Rablin (APMA-B vol. 50: 6), Kazimierz Brzeski (APMA-B vol. 35: 38), 
Kazimierz Zając (APMA-B vol. 136: 189). As Baworowski has done, Baltaziński 
also interpreted the ‘prison welcoming ceremonies.’ Włodzimierz Borkowski 
writes:
These ceremonies were very disorganized and inefficient, for many in the audience 
didn’t understand the commands. It wasn’t until Józef Baltaziński approached individual 
columns and started giving the commands in Polish  – Baczność! W prawo  – zwrot! 
Naprzód – marsz! (Attention! Right-turn! Forward – march!) – that the columns began 
to move in an orderly fashion. (APMA-B vol. 115: 5)
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Kurt Machula
Concentration camp number 12355, born on 1  May  1913 in Katowice, 
transported to Auschwitz on 17 April 1941 from Katowice, Kurt Machula ful-
filled the function of camp registrar and interpreter. He was released in 1944. As 
far as possible, he tried to help the inmates. Adam Cyra writes:
My father, rest his soul, was also fortunate thanks to the intervention of one of his 
acquaintances, from the days prior to his capture, from Katowice, a man who ran a 
optic’s shop on Świętego Jana Street, who remembered my father from times when 
he changed camera film for him, and was known in the camp as an “old inmate” and 
worked in the canteen as Kurt Machula […], who became a Lagerdolmetscher. When we 
were “received” into barrack building 23 he wrote down the number of my father and 
tried to obtain work for him in DAW – Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke Holzbüro, and my 
father worked as a registrar until that fateful day on 28.10.1942. It makes one think – just 
how much good one can do in order to help another. (APMA-B vol. 133: 228)
Roman Nawrot notes, however:
Unfortunately, there were also some of us who helped others in the hope of securing 
a debt of gratitude in the future. One such man was the inmate Kurt Machula from 
z Bytom, an optician by trade. Supposedly he belonged to an SS formation and in 
September entered Silesia together with Hitler’s army. His homosexual inclinations (so 
it is said) landed him in the concentration camp, from which he was released in 1944. 
I don’t know his post-war history. In any case this Machula, when helping other inmates, 
scrupulously recorded their personal data, counting on future rewards upon the end of 
the war. (APMA-B vol. 80: 107–8)
Elsewhere in his memoir, he writes: “In 1942 I became ill with typhus and was 
taken to the hospital. I managed to get out early and escaped the gas chamber. 
I  learned about my fate from Kurt Machula  – a camp interpreter.” (APMA-B 
vol. 65:137).
The function of an ad hoc interpreter was fulfilled by any inmates, but only 
those referred to in the present chapter wore the ‘Lagerdolmetscher’ armband, 
hence it seems appropriate to refer to them as ‘official’ interpreters.
How Were the Interpreters Recruited for the Job?
Camp interpreters were either assigned ex officio, or selected from the groups 
of prisoners. We have little hard evidence of the process of choosing camp 
interpreters, only individual recollections, such as the following by Józef Kret:
I remember during my stay in the Auschwitz camp that in the early days of October there 






gather in front of barrack building nr. 25 following the roll call. About 100 inmates 
showed up and were organized into a line, after which they were led in, several at a time, 
to one of the rooms in the building. There they were examined in German and Russian 
by a committee consisting of the Lagerdolmetscher, two inmates and one SS officer.
When the exam was over the results were announced and 25 inmates, including me, were 
deemed to have ‘passed’. We were told to remain in the camp. During this time I heard 
that we were to join the transport of Russian prisoners of war and act as interpreters. 
(APMA-B vol. 4: 431–433):
What Were the Language Combinations?
In the camp there were primarily German-Polish interpreters and a group of 
young multilingual Jewish girls (in the Politische Abteilung) who interpreted 
during the interrogations of Polish, Slovakian, and Hungarian inmates, Russian 
and Ukrainian prisoners of war, and so on. Inasmuch as the predominant num-
bers of inmates were Polish, the primary need was for interpreters working from 
German into Polish. Nevertheless, a review of the recollections also reveals 
references to other language combinations, for example from German into 
French. Stanisław Lagus writes:
A large number of French worked in the Weberei. I  should point out that they were 
not French Jews, but maquis, many of whom were well-educated. Because I had a good 
knowledge of French (having studied in France before the war), I  spoke with these 
French inmates. The Untercapo Bogdan – I can’t recall his last name – who was from 
Czechoslovakia noticed this and informed the Obercapo. Thanks to this coincidence the 
Obercapo assigned me to the French as an interpreter – hence I was given a relatively 
easy job. (APMA-B vol. 78: 171–172)
There was also a need for interpretation from German into Czech. Karel Stransky 
recalls:
During our stay in barrack no. 11 a transport of criminal prisoners from Czechoslovakia 
arrived. The group, about 200 to 300 men, had previously been interned in the Prague’s 
Pankrac prison. During their intake registration the Germans were unable to commu-
nicate with them, hence they used me as an ‘interpreter’, since as a long-time worker in 
Czech I knew their jargon. As a sign of recognition of my services the barrack supervisor 
gave me a piece of bread and sausage. (APMA-B vol. 84: 54)
Owing to the large number of Russian prisoners of war there was a need for 
interpreters from German into Russian. Jakub Jan Szegidewicz/Jakub Sehyd 
writes: “As soon as the Russian prisoners of war arrived in the camp I was sent to 
barrack building nr 22a as a German interpreter. I carried out this task until the 
liquidation of the prisoner of war camp in Auschwitz.” (APMA-B vol. 45, p. 37–42)
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Service as a camp interpreter as well as knowledge of the functioning of the 
camp was sometimes useful following the liberation:
On May 4, 1945 the Red Army took control of the area where I hid out. I came out of the 
woods, and owing to my looks the Russians took me for a spy and wanted to shoot me. 
However, one of the Russian soldiers who had been a prisoner of war in the Auschwitz 
camp during the time I  served as interpreter intervened to save my life. (APMA-B 
vol. 45: 41)
Ludwik Kończal notes:
A month later I returned to barracks building no. 5 as a registrar and Russian interpreter, 
as there were then Russian prisoners of war in the barracks. This was just two weeks 
after they gassed the first transport of prisoners of war from barrack no 13. (APMA-B 
vol. 75, p., 76)
What Were the Duties of the Interpreters?
As indicated earlier, the interpreters’ duties included assisting at the hearings, 
acting as camp Schreiber or Läufer and some others duties. Above all all the 
interpreters were required to be active during the arrival at the camp of new 
prisoners, at times when punishment was inflicted and during the ‘management’ 
of inmates. Jan Janicki writes:
I remember that during my first days of imprisonment at the KL Auschwitz all the 
prisoners were escorted onto the roll call area to watch a public hanging of an entire 
family: father, mother and daughter, as punishment for the escape of their son from KL 
Auschwitz (as explained to us by the interpreter). (APMA-B vol. 94: 162)
Nikodem Pieszczoch recalls: “They were brought to Blockführerstube, where the 
interpreter, Count Baworowski […] dictated to the candidates for the orchestra a 
letter they were to send to their families with a request for musical instruments.” 
(APMA-B vol. 72: 14)
Jakub Orlik writes:
The head of the camp, SS-Obersturmführer Karl Fritzsch, screamed at the stuttering 
prisoners:  “Why are you bandits, you Polish dogs, barking and bothering us?!” The 
interpreter (Dolmetscher) was Count Baworowski from the Poznań area. He read out all 
the names on the transport list and acquainted us with the rules of the camp. Violation 
of any regulation was punishable by death. No complaints or appeals could be addressed 
to the SS authorities. (APMA-B vol. 94: 179)





That same day the messengers from Schreibstube came with the order that the fol-
lowing day we were to report to the Politische Abteilung. […] My trance of fear was 
broken by the call of my number. I entered the chamber. They told me to approach the 
desk. The initial questions concerned my personal data. I answered them only after the 
questions were translated from German into Polish by a female inmate. I addressed 
my answers to her rather than to the camp official seated behind the desk. An SS guard 
stood beside me. He appeared upset that I had directed my answers to the interpreter. 
He hit me, and as a result I didn’t hear the next question, and thus didn’t know how to 
answer. He then beat me repeatedly. I lost consciousness and awoke in the corridor, 
completely covered in blood, with my blood-smeared clothes sticking to my body. 
(APMA-B vol. 46: 92)
Wanda Sawkiewicz writes:
Mandel [the head of the female camp in Birkenau] led me to one of the buildings where 
the functionaries were German women; both the barrack supervisor as well as four 
Kapo. The only inmate whose name was mentioned, Hania Łukasiewicz, was the acting 
interpreter. […] After Mandel left, the barrack supervisor called me over to her and 
asked me who I  was, how old I  was, and what I  was arrested for […] Our talk was 
interpreted by Hania Łukasiewicz. […] Later I met once again with Hania Łukasiewicz 
in barrack no. 11, where she gave me her sweater. (APMA-B vol. 88: 145)
Józef Kret notes:
Along the entire length of the loading ramp stood a long train with boxcars. The boxcars 
doors were closed. It was explained to us that the boxcars contained Russian prisoners 
of war and that we were to translate into Russian the orders given by the SS troops.[…] 
An SS guard told us as interpreters to organize them into lines of 100 persons. […] The 
next day we went to the first floor of building no. 24, where our Schreibstube was – there 
we sat at tables and registered the prisoners of war who were gathered in lines in front 
of us. (APMA-B vol. 4: 431–433)
Interpreters also engaged in other “tasks.” Stanisław Cienciała writes:
An alarm sounded [following the escape of a prisoner], we stood and waited until our 
work crew returned. Lagerältester Franz immediately pulled us out of line. He knew our 
numbers. It appears that he was the new interpreter, the one who replaced Baworowski. 
We stood in front of the Lagerführer, a man with a pockmarked face who stood in front 
of us with his crooked legs spread and his hands on his hips. The inmates singled out 
stood around him, and the columns returned to barracks. The question arose:  Why 
didn’t you escape? Quite surprising! The interpreter wanted to interpret (Idzikowski and 
I had earlier agreed that I would do the speaking) when I said, in German: “I don’t need 
an interpreter!” Knowing the mentality of the SS, I hollered out like I was in a platoon, 
more or less as follows: “We live in the third barracks. We didn’t know Kutscher. He lived 
in the Kutchers’ barracks.” I tried to speak in a soldier-like voice; loud, quick and deci-
sive. […] Fritzsch answered with a hand signal: to the left, that meant to our barracks, 
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to the right, that meant to barrack no. 11 [the death barrack]. He signalled to the left. 
(APMA-B vol. 87: 37)
Girls from the Politische Abteilung also took part in the interrogations as 
interpreters. Hermine (Herma) Markovits (nee Hirschler) writes:
Erber employed me frequently as an interpreter for the Polish and Czech prisoners, 
although he himself, being a Czech citizen, probably understood just as much of what 
they said as I did. On these occasions I tried to frame the answer to favor the defendants. 
“Is your translation accurate?” Erber once suddenly asked me.
“As far as I understand Polish it is. I am Czech, not Polish,” I answered. He looked at me, 
frowning. “Your translation is incorrect. So shut your mouth.”20
Further on, she writes:
In the Politische Abteilung one could help only in the way I did, by making intentional 
typographical errors or interpretations in favor of the accused. With Brose this was not 
necessary. He himself changed the interrogations to the advantage of the inmates as 
much as possible21.
These examples show how the camp interpreters not only fulfilled the normal 
roles of an interpreter but also tried to divert the fate of their fellow inmates.
How Did They Perform Their Duties,  
What strategies and Techniques Did They Employ 
and What Were the Roles of Interpreters?
In light of the sparse data available, we know little about the techniques em-
ployed by the interpreters. Kazimierz Hałgas writes: “Lagerführer Fritzsch spoke 
to us from the steps of our barracks. His words were translated word for word 
by Count Baworowski” (APMA-B vol. 89: 174). None of the accounts explain 
precisely what is meant by the phrase “translated word for word”. Most likely 
this referred to translation sentence by sentence of military-like orders, which 
were short and to the point. In Primo Levi’s recollection of his arrival at the 
camp, an inmate by the name of Flesch steps forward and announces he will be 
interpreting the SS guards’ welcome’ into Italian. As Michael Cronin comments,
The Italian writer is struck by the physical toll of the interpretation task on the inter-
preter. Flesch is used as an instrument, a mouthpiece, but the mouth that utters the 
words also expresses its revulsion, the expressive and alimentary functions of the same 
 20 Shelley, Secretaries of Death, p. 120.








organ combining to articulate the distress of the interpreter who becomes a hostage of 
his own skills.22
Sometimes it happened in the camp that the interpreter’s help was invaluable, 
even to the point of saving other inmates’ lives. Alfred Wilk writes:
The day after Christmas Eve (or maybe it was another day) an inmate appeared at the 
gate, wishing to speak with the Lagerführer. The interpreter who was present, the inmate 
Baworowski  – quickly realized that the matter was of great importance. He tried to 
get the inmate to explain to him why he so badly wished to see the Lagerführer. The 
inmate did not want to reveal his reasons; he even became threatening. I don’t know 
what arguments Baworowski used, but in the end he learned the truth of the matter. 
The inmate was wandering around near the kitchen on Christmas Eve and heard 
other inmates singing the Polish national anthem – and this is what he wanted to tell 
the Lagerführer. He was counting on a favor in return. When Baworowski learned  
the truth, he told the appropriate person and the denunciator was finished off during the 
night by Brodniewicz (the Lagerältester) or the Kapo Arno. It was a very sad incident, 
and if Baworowski had not intervened, many inmates would have lost their lives, not 
excluding such prominent camp functionaries such as Brodniewicz and the Kapos Arno 
and Diego. (APMA-B vol. 78: 1078)
Zygmunt Kędziora remembers:
When I appeared in front of the Lagerführer, the interpreter present, an inmate with 
fair hair, whose name I cannot remember, told me: “You say nothing, and I’ll interpret.” 
I knew a bit of German, but I understood from his offer that he wanted to help me. The 
interpreter, turning to Aumeir [the Lagerführer] said that my matter was one of the 
“radio matters.” He added that one of the participants in that matter had been released 
from the SK [Strafkompanie, i.e. ‘punishment corps’] several days earlier. The interpreter 
handled the entire conversation with great skill and presented the matter such that the 
Herr Lagerführer understood everything completely and considered it obvious that 
I should also be released from the punishment corps. (APMA-B vol. 83: 263)
Zygmunt Jankowski recalls:
For some period of time a certain Olpiński - a camp squealer and traitor - worked in 
DAW. I knew him from the pre-war period. […] In the camp he told the inmates that he 
was arrested because he refused to agree to serve as Prime Minister in the Nazi puppet 
Quisting government. In this way he earned the trust of the inmates. We later learned 
from Ms Dąbrowska, who was an interpreter in the Politische Abteilung, that he passed 
all his information along to the SS […]. That’s why we had to get rid of him. We gave him 
a beautiful English sweater with lice infected with typhus. When he became infected, no 
one in the hospital took care of him and he died. (APMA-B vol. 65: 174)
 22 Cronin, Translation and Identity, pp. 77–78. 
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Concluding Remarks
An interpreter in the Nazi prison camp was not simply “a disembodied container 
of others’ messages,”23 as we can see. The recollections of the former inmates 
illustrate the complex role a camp interpreter had to assume, faced with tasks 
which went far beyond the neutral transfer of information. The picture of the 
interpreter presented above also illustrates the role of ethical norms in interpre-
tation. In court/police interpreting, the prevailing norms have been described in 
detail. The ideal picture of interpreters is that they do not demand any space of 
their own, but function as unobtrusive recorders or translation machines from 
one language into the other, conveying messages between speakers. A commonly 
held belief is that the interpreters are only conduits of information and as 
such have little impact on the communicative situation. Several studies have 
de monstrated that this ideal does not hold up when confronted with real-life 
interpreting interactions between humans in various institutional settings. The 
interpreter’s role is certainly not that of a passive conduit, but active, governed 
by their social and linguistic knowledge of the entire communicative situation, 
including not only competence in the appropriate ways of speaking, but also in 
the management of the intercultural interpreting event.
Particularly in extreme situations, such as interpreting during an interro-
gation, the role of an interpreter may be compared to that of a facilitator, an 
assistant to one of the parties, life-saver, informer and so on.24 It is through the 
interpreters that, often for the first time, those who until that moment have 
not had the opportuity to present their opinions and talk about their suffering, 
tortures and persecutions are finally given a voice, a rare occurrence in a con-
centration camp. The numerous examples quoted here show the interpreters 
tried to divert tragic lives of other inmates. Basing his observations on Levi’s 
recollections of interpretation in the camps, Cronin describes the role of the 
Lagerdolmetscher as follows:
The fact of Flesch [an interpreter] having a body situated in place and time not only 
means that his body will give expression, voluntarily or involuntarily, to his world-view. 
His embodied agency also means that he is immediately aware of the consequences of 
his interpreting activity. Not only as a speaking body is he affecting the bodies of the 
other deportees but as an embodied agent he is uniquely vulnerable to torture and worse 
should he fail to discharge his duties to the satisfaction of his superiors.25
 23 C. Wadensjö, Interpreting as interaction (London, New York 1998), p. 279.
 24 Tryuk, L’interprétation communautaire….










The Lagerdolmetscher found himself at the heart of the crisis, in the center of 
the interaction which likely changed his life as well as that of his fellow inmates. 
What he need to translate impacted on his life, as has been illustrated by the 
history of Władysław Baworowski, as well as other personal narratives quoted 
in this chapter. Camp interpreters were not, and could not, remain unbiased, 
neutral observers of the reality which they were required to interpret. In no other 
situation has an interpreter played such a deeply human role. By reflecting on 
their works, the complexities of interpreting and the dilemmas the interpreters 
have faced can be seen in new light.
[2011]
The author would like to express her gratitude to Dr. Piotr Setkiewicz, the head 
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Tamara Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz
The Conceptual Art of Translation
All that’s left is pattern* (shoes?).
*doubtful reconstruction
Armand Schwerner, Tablet 1, 1999: 13
Departing significantly from the rigid rules of translational illusionism,1 a con-
siderable number of twentieth-century writers and performers recognized the 
art of translation as being essentially conceptual. In many respects, their artistic 
experiments deserve the title of ‘conceptual translations,’ deriving as they do 
their creative impulses from the neo-avant-garde’s most radical artistic cur-
rent, which has come to be known as conceptual art, Kunst-im-Kopf, art-as-idea, 
or post-object art, also depicted as mental, dematerialized, theoretical, uncre-
ative, and impossible. When considering conceptual artists, it is important to 
acknowledge them as the inheritors of the discoveries and interpretations made 
by historical avant-gardes, who had succeeded in self-consciously expanding 
the boundaries of artistic language. Conceptual translation, as an experimental 
and innovative mode of writing, has been quick to elaborate upon the artistic 
strategies and techniques of Dada, Cubism, Futurism, Constructivism, Abstract 
Expressionism, concrete poetry, Letterist hypergraphics, and Oulipian poetics, 
among others, and has put itself at the extreme end of this historical continuum. 
In this respect, there is a certain continuity with Cubist translation.2 Yet while the 
 1 I refer to Jiří Levý’s classical distinction between illusionist and anti-illusionist 
translations in:  J. Levý, The Art of Translation [1963], trans. by P.  Corness, ed. 
Z.  Jettmarová (Amsterdam–Philadelphia 2011), pp. 19–20. Illusionist methods of 
translation, akin to the conventions of illusionist theatre and the realist novel, serve to 
build up an illusion of providing direct access to the reality of the original, whereas anti-
illusionist methods play on the fact that they are offering the audience a mere imitation 
of the original’s universe of discourse by various means of alienation (for example, 
ingenious language conceits and personal or topical allusions directed towards the 
intended target reader).
 2 For background and further discussion, see T. Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz, Modernist 
Translation. An Eastern European Perspective. Models, Semantics, Functions 








latter rotates the source text “through a sequence of potentially multidimensional 
angles, of different spaces and times”3 in order to explore the formal devices of 
historical avant-garde languages in a pastiche-like manner, and celebrates the 
unexpected blending and collision of mutually distant conventions, styles, and 
forms of literary production, the conceptual translator exploits the avant-garde 
achievements of the past as an effective framework for exhibiting the mental pro-
cesses behind his/her artistic project.
First theorized by Clive Scott, a vigorous advocate of the “creative turn” in 
translation studies,4 translation as a conceptual art is informed by the assumption 
that “the product is in many ways inadequate evidence of the conceptual pro-
cesses, ambitions and potentialities which the particular translation project has 
activated and developed, that, in short, the artistic concept is in striking excess 
of the artistic object.”5 The notion that conceptual art recognizes the primacy 
of intellectual inquiry and reflection over physical representation is expressed 
by Lucy Lippard:  “the idea is paramount and the material is secondary, light-
weight, ephemeral, cheap, unpretentious, and/or dematerialized.”6 It might be 
said that the conceptual translator does not actually produce a material target 
text; instead, (s)he produces the means for the target text’s production, i.e. “sets 
up a concept-machine that possesses the potential for a myriad of material 
creations.”7 In many cases, translation is reduced to the most simplified scheme 
and becomes merely the concept of translation. The idea behind this mode of 
artistic experiment, Carolina Martes explains, is to establish “the possibility of 
conceptualism as a democratic space (a place where artist, spectator, and trans-
lator can converse since they all share the knowledge of the means of the work’s 
production).”8
 3 C. Scott, Translating Rimbaud’s Illuminations (Exeter 2006), p. 252; C. Scott, “Translation 
and the Spaces of Reading.” In: Translation and Creativity: Perspectives on Creative 
Writing and Translation, eds. E. Loffredo, M. Perteghella (London 2006), p. 39.
 4 See E. Loffredo, M. Perteghella, “Introduction.” In: Translation and Creativity: Perspectives 
on Creative Writing and Translation.
 5 Scott, Translating Rimbaud’s Illuminations, p. 257.
 6 T. Godfrey, Conceptual Art (London 1998), p. 14; qtd in C. Scott, Translating Rimbaud’s 
Illuminations, 311–2.
 7 C. Martes, “Translation in Conceptual Writing,” UC Berkeley Comparative Literature 
Undergraduate Journal, Vol.  2, No. 1, 2012; online:  http://ucb-cluj.org/2571-2/ 
(access: 02.02.2013).
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Along with its economy of artistic means, conceptual translation provides 
an opportunity to reflect on its own possibilities, conditions and constraints, 
and, concomitantly, for examining the methodological capacities of transla-
tion studies. Inevitably self-referential and self-reflexive, it may be referred to as 
“metatranslation,” although in a sense which is not necessarily fully compatible 
with the Structuralist meaning of that term as introduced by Anton Popovič, 
where “[t] ranslation is a metatext within the system of literary communication.”9 
Nor is it completely parallel to the newly revived meaning of metatranslation 
as the “conscious and thoughtfully designed practice of making the translating 
subject visible,”10 as outlined by the feminist literary theoretician Luise von 
Flotow. For what is at stake here is neither the visibility of the translator nor 
the derivative (or “second-degree”) character of translation practice,11 but rather 
the idea of a “metatranslative self-reflection when translation observes its own 
operations and the factors conditioning those operations.”12 In Theo Hermans’s 
The Conference of the Tongues, conceptual translation becomes embroiled in the 
problem of “representation playing on the idea of representation,” as the target 
readers are invited to
consider not so much the way in which the translation re-enacts its donor text, but the 
way it interacts with existing translations and with expectations about translation. The 
self-referentiality of translation is raised to self-reflection when the translative act itself 
is rehearsed within a translation, when the form – translation as a form distinct from 
other forms – re-enters the form and the translation contract is renegotiated within the 
text. This happens when the performance of translation is thematised in a translation 
itself and metatranslation invades the translated text.13
The 1971 installation Active Poetry created by the feminist performance and 
installation artist Ewa Partum, who represented the first generation of the 
conceptual avant-garde in Poland in the 1960s and the 1970s, is particularly 
revealing in this context. An eloquent example of metatextual discourse, it also 
 9 Qtd. in: Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies: 1st Edition, ed. M. Baker 
(London –New York 2001), p. 256.
 10 M. Minier, “[…] the translatress in her own person speaks: A Few Marginal Notes on 
Feminist Translation in Practice, in Creative Writing and in Criticism.” In: Identity 
and Cultural Translation: Writing Across the Borders of Englishness. Women’s Writing in 
English in a European Context, eds. G. Macedo, M. E. Pereira (Bern 2006), pp. 40–41.
 11 G. Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Ch. Newman and 
C. Doubinsky (Lincoln & London 1997).
 12 T. Hermans, The Conference of the Tongues (Manchester 2007), p. 51.












demonstrates that the phenomenon of conceptual translation is by no means 
restricted to a single domain of verbal art, but rather operates across other media 
and forms of artistic utterance. The ephemeral Active Poetry public space inter-
vention consisted in scattering in a pedestrian underpass (beneath the junction 
of two central streets in Warsaw) large white cardboard letters that used to be 
mass-produced in socialist states for propaganda slogans which emblazoned the 
walls of public buildings during the communist party’s official ceremonies. The 
set of letters had been selected from a one-page extract of Maciej Słomczyński’s 
1969 rendition of James Joyce’s Ulysses.14 Apart from being an act of subversion of 
the official socialist ideology, like a number of Partum’s other conceptual poems 
and installations (though not primarily intended as experimental translations), 
this act has implications for translation theory.
 14 G. Nabakowski, “Apprehension and Masquerade. Letter Millionaire – Ewa Partum’s 
Path to Conceptual Poetry and Feminist Gender Theory,” trans. from the German by 
O. Kossack. In: Ewa Partum 1965–2001, ed. A. Stepken (Karlsruhe 2001), pp. 131–2. 
The Polish 1969 translation of Ulysses was an important moment in Polish literary 
life of the early 1970s; see J. Wawrzycka, “The Reception of James Joyce in Poland.” 
In: The Reception of James Joyce, Vol. 1: Germany, Northern and East Central Europe, 
eds. G. Lernout, W. van Mierlo (London–New York 2004), pp. 219–229.
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2: Ewa Partum, Active Poetry. Installation. Warsaw 1971. Reprinted 
by permission of Ewa Partum. A. Stepken, “Monograph,” trans. from the German by 
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The randomly scattered letters freed from the restraints of grammar and syntax, 
“devoid of political message and as if restored to the state of innocence,”15 were made 
openly accessible to passers-by who (accidentally or on purpose) moved them about 
on their shoe soles, creating diverse semantic and visual arrangements. As a result of 
this performance, Joyce’s Ulysses could “fan out into multiple versions of itself, not 
just interpretations of its meaning, but performances of the experience of reading,”16 
kinesthetically re-creating its collational formula and mosaic structure.17 What is 
particularly important regarding Partum’s conceptual, alternative retranslation of 
Ulysses is the fact that it was generated aleatorically from “ready-made” materials. 
As the cardboard letters wore out, the site-specific target text practically ceased to 
exist in its material sense.
A “tautologically” similar artistic action took place forty years later at the 
18th Biennale of Sydney “All Our Relations” (2012), where Partum presented 
her “Installation Metapoetry À la recherche du temps perdu according to Marcel 
Proust.” In a private communication, the artist reported that she used forty thou-
sand letters conscientiously selected from the first eleven pages of Tadeusz Boy-
Żeleński’s 1937 Polish translation of the first volume of Proust’s À la recherche 
du temps perdu: Du côté de chez Swann. These were scattered around the Prison 
Courtyard on Cockatoo Island. In this clearly self-repetitive gesture,18 Partum 
invited the biennale visitors to collect the random cardboard letters and form 
new words and phrases in an act of “linguistic liberation.”
Partum’s interactive metapoetry installations can be construed as target texts 
which struggle “to maximise linguistic materiality” and “to incorporate the cre-
ative sensibility of the translator and the receptive sensibility of the reader, in a 
word, to achieve a maximum of actualization.”19 They appeal to multiple sensory 
 15 G. Dziamski, “Ewa Partum – od konceptualizmu do feminizmu,” Odra 2006, Vol. 11, 
No. 539, p. 89.
 16 See the formula of synesthetic translation:  C. Scott, “Intermediality and 
Synaesthesia: Literary Translation as Centrifugal Practice,” Art in Translation 2010, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 155.
 17 On Joyce’s mosaic narrative technique see e.g. K.M. Booker, Joyce, Bakhtin, and the 
Literary Tradition: Toward a Comparative Cultural Poetic (Ann Arbor 1995), p. 86.
 18 The installation and performance with the text of the Polish translation of Joyce’s 
Ulysses were repeated at the “Collected Views from East or West” exhibition (Generali 
Foundation, Vienna, 2005), at the Turbine Hall Tate Modern in London (2006), Tate 
Modern in London (2012), during the opening of the retrospective exhibition “Nothing 
Will Stop the Idea of Art” at the Museum of Art in Łódź (2014) and as part of the 
“Umjetnik na odmoru u Valamaru” event in Poreč in the Croatian Istria (2015).












modalities simultaneously. Besides sight (white letters on a contrasting grey/red 
ground), hearing (the rustle of letters under the feet), touch (letters as tangible 
objects), and smell (waterlogged/dust-covered cardboard), the conceptual “ac-
tive translations” incorporate a sense of proprioception and kinesthesia. They 
strengthen the sensation of bodily movement in and through urban/open space. 
The target reader’s multisensory perception of the material serves to reinforce his 
or her assumed engagement with the translator’s conceptual process. In Partum’s 
translations “concept functions as the prosthetic extension of percept.20 At this 
point it is important to emphasize that conceptual translation tends to be not 
only intermedial, but also “synaesthetic” in the sense explained by Clive Scott:
Fig. 3: Ewa Partum, “Installation Metapoetry À la recherche du temps perdu according 
to Marcel Proust”. 18 Biennale of Sydney, “All Our Relations”, Australia 2012. Copyright 
© 2012 by Ewa Partum. Reprinted by permission of Ewa Partum.
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Intermedial translation […] is not primarily to be conceived of as a process of transfer 
from one medium to another; it is the translation of one medium out of itself into mul-
tisensory, or cross-sensory, consciousness; put another way, it is the translation of one 
medium back into whole-body experience.21
The Sydney “Installation Metapoetry À la recherche du temps perdu according 
to Marcel Proust,” together with the Proust metatranslations that Partum 
presented in other locations,22 can themselves be considered “tautolog-
ical” repetitions of one of her earlier self-referential and self-reflexive works 
from poems by ewa (1971–1972), entitled fragment W POSZUKIWANIU 
STRACONEGO CZASU Marcela Prousta [An Excerpt from IN SEARCH OF 
LOST TIME by Marcel Proust; capitalization in the original]. This poem can 
be considered a conceptual translation of the opening lines of À la recherche 
du temps perdu. Technically speaking, it was again a retranslation of the initial 
section of Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński’s 1937 Polish rendition of the French orig-
inal. In this work, one of the most celebrated texts of European Modernism 
was decomposed into single letters dispersed arbitrarily over a sheet of paper 
in a manner reminiscent of both Dada and Concrete poetry.23 The artist used 
Letraset fonts (see Fig. 4 below).
It is interesting to note that Partum’s conceptual poem with its “constellational”, 
centripetal pattern, resembles in its layout Heinz Gappmayr’s concrete poem 
ohne Titel (1986). Waltraud “Wara” Wende wrote about Gappmayr’s work that its 
“letters are presented topologically no longer as a closed composition of a word, 
but as a typographical phenomenon with signs concentrated around a centre.”24 
Moreover, both visual texts share the theme of time, which binds them together 
in a relation of interdependence, and are practically unreadable without the 
 21 Scott, “Intermediality and Synaesthesia: Literary Translation as Centrifugal Practice,” 
p. 154.
 22 E.g., the installation and performance with the text of the Polish translation of Proust’s 
À la recherche du temps perdu: Du côté de chez Swann at the “Formes breves, autres 25” 
exhibition (Frac Lorraine, Metz, France, 2012).
 23 Partum’s early visualizations of semantic material are closely influenced by the works 
of Kurt Schwitters, Louis Aragon, and Polish avant-garde poets:  Julian Przyboś, 
Jan Brzękowski, Stanisław Młodożeniec, and Stanisław Dróżdż (see:  A. Stepken, 
“Monograph,” p. 17).
 24 W. Wende, “Sehtexte – oder: Vom Körper der Sprache.” In: Über den Umgang mit der 










awareness of this intertextual relation. The irregular, multi-linear configuration 
of discrete letters and their occasional collisions serve to picture the “lost time” 
and to visualize its potential connotations, such as movement, momentum, dis-
location, inconstancy and transience. However, while the randomly mixed letters 
of Gappmayr’s poem can be easily integrated into the German word for time – 
zeit – the dispersion of letters in Partum’s work does not allow for a reconstruc-
tion of the opening lines of À la recherche du temps perdu. The verbal language 
is dissected into its smallest visual signs which gain an aesthetic validity of their 
own and allow for unlimited reconfigurations. One might even, with Gislind 
Nabakowski, see Partum’s conceptual metapoetry as a visualization of the post-
structuralist division of the signifier from the signified, where “meaning is not 
immediately present in a sign,” but is “scattered or dispersed along the whole 
chain of signifiers: it cannot be easily nailed down, it is never fully present in any 
Fig. 4: Ewa Partum, poem by ewa. fragment W POSZUKIWANIU STRACONEGO 
CZASU Marcela Prousta, 1971. Sig. Nationgalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. 
Reprinted by permission of Ewa Partum. A. Stepken, “Monograph,” p. 37.
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one sign alone, but is rather a kind of constant flickering of presence and absence 
together.”25
Finally, Partum’s multiple and essentially self-repetitive versions of fragments 
of Proust’s quasi-autobiographical novel on remembrance of things past are 
tautological (self-referential and self-reflexive) in the sense that they might 
be regarded as an autobiographical statement by the artist herself:  in her 1984 
Pirouette performance Partum proclaimed playing with ideas of representa-
tion, substitution, and authenticity:  “what passed and what was important to 
Fig. 5: Heinz Gappmayr, ohne Titel, 1986. J. Linschinger, ed., TEXTBILD/BILDTEXT, 
mit einem Vorwort von Peter Weiermair und einer Einleitung von Eugen Gomringer 
(Piesport 1990), p. 17.
 25 T. Eagleton, Literary Theory. An Introduction (Minneapolis 2008), p.  111; see 
G. Nabakowski, “Apprehension and Masquerade. Letter Millionaire – Ewa Partum’s 





us connects with us in a way the mirror’s reflection connects with its original.”26 
This thread has continued throughout her career. Since the early 1970s, the artist 
has been analogously rewriting excerpts from Kafka’s Journal, Camus’ The Plague 
and Goethe’s Faust,27 using their Polish translations.
The choice of literary works and excerpts as conceptual sources of Partum’s 
metatextual practices was not accidental. As the artist herself explained, insofar as 
the works were drawn from the core canon of European literature and were firmly 
located in the mental spaces of the target recipients, they could resist the most 
radical attempts at distorting their canonical form.28 As Nabakowski observes, 
Partum’s conceptual appropriations of masterpieces from world literature did 
not “entail contaminating or destroying, but rather reshaping them in liberal 
variations.”29 These ostentatiously synecdochic translations of European classics 
were exhibited in juxtaposition with the originals. As often in the case of con-
ceptual translation, the juxtaposition of source and target texts – whether in the 
spectator’s mental space or in the physical space of a gallery/museum – appears 
to have been a necessary condition for revealing the full semantic potential of the 
artist’s intervention into the original’s universe of discourse. In an allusion to the 
Cageian notion of notation, Partum exhibited the source texts on music stands, 
while the conceptual target texts were hung on the wall (see Fig. 6 below).
The significance of the juxtaposition of the source and target texts in the 
domain of conceptual art was reinforced in Partum’s 1997 Aussage Pur – Goethe in 
Goethe installation in Berlin-Charlottenburg. The action consisted in scattering 
over two thousand letters from Feliks Konopka’s Polish translation of Faust’s 
monologue (Tragedii część I, Noc) [Part I, The Night] along Kurfürstendamm 
and Fasanenstraße, while a choir performed the text. Conducted by the artist, 
the choir-members declaimed Faust’s monologue of Goethe’s tragedy in sev-
eral languages simultaneously. As one critic commented, Partum’s metapoetry 
provides “signs of a language without words, symbols of an international script 
that requires no translation.”30 The artist’s emancipating textual practices are an 
 26 See E. Partum, Pirouette, Galerie Dialog, West Berlin, online: Filmoteka Museum 
http://www.artmuseum.pl/filmoteka/?id=1274&l=1 (access: 23.01.2011).
 27 M. Ławrynowicz, “Ewa Partum’s Metapoetry” [1980]. In: Ewa Partum 1965–2001, 
p. 143.
 28 I draw here on a private conversation with Ewa Partum (February 8, 2013).
 29 G. Nabakowski, “Apprehension and Masquerade. Letter Millionaire – Ewa Partum’s 
path to conceptual poetry and feminist gender theory,” pp. 129–139.
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attempt to create a kind of common mental space or a conceptual Esperanto, 
which could operate beyond the cultural and linguistic differences of its target 
recipients.
Interestingly, Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu also became the source 
text for Michael Maranda’s Marcel Proust:  All the names in “In Search of Lost 
Time” (2006). This work belongs to a sizeable number of conceptual translations 
that reduce the material presence of the originals to the point of their complete 
erasure, through the substitution of extra-verbal (graphic) features for the source 
text. The Parasitic Ventures retranslation of Proust’s novel retains only proper 
names. All other words are replaced with a series of dots while the punctuation 
is left intact:31
Fig. 6: Ewa Partum, Text installation with music stands, National Museum, Warsaw 
2001. Reprinted by permission of Ewa Partum. A. Stepken (ed.), Ewa Partum 
1965–2001, p. 95.
 31 See Against Expression:  An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, ed. C.  Dworkin, 





……. ……. ….. (…….)
…..
MADAME SWANN.. ….
.. ……, …..  …….... … …… M. de Norpois.. …… … … ….. …., ……  ……… …  …… …. Professor  Cottard
… …. …. …., … …. …  ……. … …..  …….. … …….... Swann, ….. …….. ….. ….. …. …….. ……… … …  ……,
.. …… ……. …... …….. …..,,.. ………….. ….. ……... Cottard ….. ….... ….. ….....  …………, … ….  Swann
.... … ……….., … ….... …… ….. …. …  ……… … …... …….. …... ….,  ……. …….., ….. ………. ………  ….
… Marquis de Norpois ….... …... ……...... … … … ……... ‘………’ …… … …. ……...... …….’ …. ….. …...
An excerpt from Michael Maranda, All the Names in “In Search of Lost Time” (2006)
Through Maranda’s conceptual gesture, the Modernist stream of conscious-
ness novel is turned into a complex visual poem reminiscent, as Craig Douglas 
Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith remark, of “Cageian writing-through”; but 
whereas John Cage “used proper names as a way to begin composing mesostic 
poems, for Parasitic Ventures, the name is the end point, an indexed reduction, 
parasitically feeding off a primary text.”32
In a very similar way, the graphic equivalent of a text became the con-
structive principle of Timur Kibirov’s metatextual Ekvivalent teksta (a to 
uzh slishkom mnogo pro lubov) [Equivalent of the text (which is already too 
much about love)]. This was presented as a counterpart to Alfred Edward 
Housman’s LII lyrical ballad Far in a western brookland and published 





(a to uzh slishkom mnogo pro lubov)
 
Far in a western brookland
 
………………………
 That bred me long ago ………………
The poplars stand and tremble …………………………
 By pools I used to know. ……………....
 32 Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, p. 472. 
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There, in the windless night-time, ………………………
 The wanderer, marvelling why, ………………
Halts on the bridge to hearken …………………………
 How soft the poplars sigh. ……………....
He hears: no more remembered ………………………
 In fields where I was known, ………………
Here I lie down in London …………………………
 And turn to rest alone. ……………....
There, by the starlit fences, ………………
 The wanderer halts and hears …………………………
My soul that lingers sighing ……………....
 About the glimmering weirs. …………………………33
Kibirov’s poem functions both as an interlingual translation and as an extra-
verbal (graphic) substitute for the poetic text, a phenomenon first theorized by 
Yuri Tynianov in his Problema stikhotvornogo iazyka (1924) [The Problem of 
Verse Language,  1981]. The Moscow postconceptualist almost preserves the 
verse structure of the traditional ballad quatrains and mimics their visual internal 
organization as if a verse form could exist outside language. Retaining merely the 
visual metrical contour underlying Housman’s poem, Kibirov provides nothing 
but a geometric scheme of a mimetic metapoem in the sense explained by James 
Holmes in an algebraic formula:
FP ~ FMP
where FP designates the verse form of the original poem, FMP that of the 
metapoem, and ~ fundamental similarity.34
The Russian poet was apparently mocking the approach of the translator who 
“looks squarely at the original poem when making his choice of verse form, to 
the exclusion of other considerations.”35
In a certain respect, in his mock-mimetic translation Kibirov managed to 
achieve absolute agreement between the metrical patterns of the translation and 
 33 T. Kibirov, na polakh “A Shropshire Lad” [2007]. In his: Stikhi o lubvi (Moscow 2009), 
742–3.
 34 J. Holmes, Translated! Papers on Literary Translation and Translation Studies. 
Introduction by R. van den Broeck, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam [1972] 1988), p. 26.








the original, which is virtually unattainable between source and target texts.36 In 
line with Tynianov’s ideal, the metrical energy of the original is certainly commu-
nicated through the translation.37 Kibirov’s gesture of mock-equimetrical trans-
lation thus seems to encode a critique of the “fanatical interest in preserving the 
metrics of the original” that formed a basic principle of Symbolist translation.38 
Moreover, the semantic potential of Kibirov’s conceptual metatranslation could 
be said (although again with some irony) to be greater than that of the orig-
inal. For, as Tynianov asserted, “the phenomenon of equivalents does not sig-
nify a lowering or a weakening, but rather the pressure and tension of unspent, 
dynamic elements.”39 The target reader is presented with
an uncertain text (the uncertainty of which, however, is quite limited and semi-revealed), 
but the role of an uncertain text (of any text in the semantic aspect), instilled into the con-
tinuous construction of verse, is immeasurably greater than the role of a definite text. 
The feature of this partial uncertainty is filled with the maximum tension of the missing 
elements, of that which is potentially given.40
Irony is a common feature of such graphical translations, in relation both to the 
original and to the activity of translating.
Ekvivalent teksta can further be seen as a materialization of Sergey Eisenstein’s 
idea of the “invisible text as a universal equivalent.”41 According to the Russian 
director, only a decomposition of a form reduced to a bare scheme can guar-
antee equivalence, the interaction of two texts and their mutual substitution. 
Kibirov inspects the original with X-rays and preserves exclusively its met-
rical skeleton, which functions as a synecdoche of Housman’s ballad. Kibirov’s 
dots could be conceived of as a momentary solidification of what Mikhail 
Iampolski calls the “invisible inner text,” “graphic memory,” “third text,” struc-
tural invariant, “hidden equivalent” of reality,42 allowing a comparison of the 
 36 See L. Pszczołowska, Wiersz polskich przekładów poezji Puszkina. In: “Słowiańska 
metryka porównawcza,” Vol.  IV:  Wiersz przekładu. Mickiewicz i Puszkin, eds. 
L. Pszczołowska, D. Urbańska (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1992), p. 145.
 37 See Y. Tynianov, The Problem of Verse Language [1924], ed. and trans. M. Sosa, B. L. 
Harvey (Ann Arbor 1981), p. 44.
 38 See M. Wachtel, Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition: Goethe, Novalis, and the 
Poetics of Vyacheslav Ivanov (Madison 1994), p. 184; A. Wanner, Baudelaire in Russia 
(Gainesville 1996), pp. 78, 98–99, 108.
 39 Y. Tynianov, The Problem of Verse Language, p. 44.
 40 Tynianov, The Problem of Verse Language, p. 44.
 41 M. Iampolski, The Memory of Tiresias: Intertextuality and Film (Berkeley 1998), p. 221.
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two texts:  Housman’s Far in a western brookland and its possible illusionist 
translation.43
When viewed against Russian Ego-Futurist experiments in poetry, Kibirov’s 
poem reveals its paradoxical stage potential. One can imagine a performance of 
Kibirov’s non-acoustic Ekvivalent teksta as a mini-pantomime, comparable to 
Vasilisk Gnedov’s kinesthetic performance based on his aphonic Poema kontsa 
[The Poem of the End] (1913), which consisted of the title and a blank page. 
Adrian Wanner describes the following scene: ‘Gnedov would raise his arm and 
then quickly let it fall in a dramatic gesture, eliciting stormy applause from the 
audience.’44 In Gnedov’s stage experiment, it was not the word but the move-
ment of a body part (‘gesture as such’) that became the most important means of 
poetic expression and the ultimate goal of poetry. Kibirov seems to follow this 
Ego-Futurist idea of kinesthetic writing in his translation of Housman’s poem.
An interesting combination of the four distinctive features of conceptual trans-
lation mentioned above (its performance method, the introduction of a graphic 
equivalent of a verbal text, aleatorical methods for target text construction, and 
the utilization of “ready-made” materials) can be found in Jackson Mac Low’s 
1955 collection of 5 biblical poems. The first four sections of 4.5.10.11.2.8.4.2., the 
2nd biblical poem read as follows:
thither; /___/ to /___/
not /___/ /___/ tribe /___/
every /___/ the not /___/ /___/ the before lest /___/
Arabah, a thy /___/ All /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ the /___/
Get /___/
/___/ /___/ thy /___/ them, /___/ thy /___/
/___/ /___/ shalt /___/
/___/ this
/___/ /___/ /___/ /___/
/___/ /___/ of this /___/
which round many slack /___/ /___/ the might /___/ fathers
Of thus /___/ from /___/ the /___/ great Israel; /___/ you.
I /___/
and ye shalt /___/ God there, and of
/___/ lent /___/ /___/
/___/ /___/
 43 Cf. R.  Shusterovich’s Russian translation:  V kraiu ruchev dalekom, http://raf-sh.
livejournal.com/522561.html (access 03.08.2015).







If the the /___/
/___/
God to /___/ /___/
thou /___/ /___/ chosen /___/ /___/ /___/ spoken, shall established
/___/ not /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ Jebusite; neck /___/
son /___/
thou took /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ /___/ die:




Mac Low translated the Jewish Publication Society’s Hebrew Bible into sequences 
of words and ellipses by a random-selection system utilizing a single die. The 
outcomes of successive throws of the die “determined both the structure and the 
contents of the poems: the number of lines and stanzas, the number of ‘events’ 
in corresponding lines of each stanza, and the nature of each event in each 
line: whether they are words (or names) from the Hebrew Scriptures or silences 
(each silence is represented in the text by a ‘box’).”46 The “hollowed” text provides 
the basis for its realization in an acoustic performance. Ellipses are to be read as 
temporal gaps equal in duration to any word the reader chooses.47 Barrett Watten 
writes of 5 biblical poems:
In what appears to be a reenactment of the textual project of romantic hermeneutics, 
the horizon of the text’s ‘original’ meaning can thus only be realized in the historical act 
of the poem’s reinterpretation in a way that fuses the horizons of the original language 
of the Old Testament, the interference of the printed version, and the contemporary 
meanings of what has now been rendered as a neutral and pseudo-objective poetic 
vocabulary.48
Mac Low’s biblical poems, in a way similar to all conceptual translation, become 
both an abstracted model of translation activity and a critique of translation 
theory. They may be understood not only as a realization of the hermeneutic fu-
sion of horizons in translation, but also as an algorithm for translation conceived 
of as a game, “a decision process:  a series of a certain number of consecutive 
 45 J. Mac Low, Thing of Beauty: New and Selected Works, ed. A. Tardos (Berkeley 2008), 
pp. 39–41.
 46 J. Mac Low, qtd. after N.  Zurbrugg ed., Art, Performance, Media:  31 Interviews 
(Minneapolis 2004), pp. 255–6.
 47 Mac Low, Thing of Beauty: New and Selected Works, p. 39.
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situations – moves, as in game – situations imposing on the translator the neces-
sity of choosing among a certain (and very often exactly definable) number of 
alternatives.”49 According to Jiří Levý, the process of translating “has the form of 
a GAME WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION – a game in which every suc-
cessive move is influenced by the knowledge of previous decisions and by the 
situation which resulted from them (e.g. chess, but not card-games).”50 Chance-
derived translation determined by throws of a die encodes a critique of a trans-
lation theory that posited that “it should be possible to apply to translation the 
formal methods of GAME THEORY.”51 However, while Levy emphasizes the 
translator’s responsibility and decision-making role, Mac Low clearly seems 
to strive to eliminate the translator’s subjectivity from the translation process, 
testing the possibilities of an “unintentional poem.”52
Inter- and intrasemiotic transfer53 can take the form of the sign of a transfer, 
as in the case of two conceptual translations of Christian Morgenstern’s Fisches 
Nachtgesang [Night Song of a Fish], from his 1905 book of poems Galgenlieder 
[Gallows Songs]. This work has been hailed as a unique example of iconic min-
imalism, a proto-form of Concrete poetry and the “crowning achievement of 
all sound poetry, for it represents sounds emanating from a mute creature.”54 It 
is composed of alternating sequences of symbols used in ancient vowel length-
based metrics for determining the long and short syllables within the foot, but 
here they are isolated and arranged in such a way that they resemble no known 
metrical scheme. Leo Spitzer recognizes them as iconic signs of open and closed 
 49 J. Levý, “Translation as a Decision Process.” In: To Honor Roman Jakobson. Essays on the 
Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, 11 October 1966, vol. II (The Hague–Paris 1967), 
p. 1171.
 50 Levý, “Translation as a Decision Process.” p. 1172.
 51 Levý, “Translation as a Decision Process.” p. 1172.
 52 Mac Low, Thing of Beauty, p. xxxiv.
 53 In Gideon Toury’s terminology. See G.  Toury, Translation. A  Cultural-Semiotic 
Perspective. In: Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, vol. 2, ed. T.A. Sebeok (Berlin–
New York–Amsterdam 1986), p. 111. Interestingly, Toury points to the possibility of a 
translation without the participation of any linguistic code.
 54 A. Liede, Dichtung als Spiel: Studien zur Unsinnspoesie an der Grenze der Sprache 
(Berlin 1963), p. 292, qtd. in J. White, “Forms of Restricted Iconicity in Modern 















fish mouths.55 Other critics have seen the poem’s graphic shape as resembling 
the contours of a fish and the signs for short syllables representing fish scales.56
Apart from the conventional translation in verbal signs of the poem’s 
title: Fisches Nachtgesang – Fish’s Night Song, the transfer is marked by a reversal 
of metric symbols. Remarkably, these changes were enough for Knight’s version 
to be recognized as translation in the target culture or, as Andrew Chesterman 
put it, as a text which “fall[s] within the accepted range of deviance defined by 
the target-culture product norm ‘translation’.”57
The possibility of a graphic translation of the “textual equivalent” (in 
Tynianov’s terms) has not generally been considered in translation studies.58 In 
 55 L. Spitzer, “Zur Interpretation Christian Morgensternscher Gedichte,” Euphorion 1921, 
23, pp. 96–7, qtd. in J. White, “Forms of Restricted Iconicity in Modern Avant-Garde 
Poetry,” p. 133.
 56 See: J. Drucker, “Visual Performance of the Poetic Text.” In: Close Listening: Poetry and 
the Performed Word, ed. Ch. Bernstein (New York 1998), p. 150.
 57 A. Chesterman, “Hypotheses about translation universals.” In: Claims, Changes and 
Challenges in Translation Studies, eds. H. Gyde, K. Malmkjær, D. Gile (Amsterdam–
Philadelphia 2000), p. 59.
 58 See:  e.g. E.  Balcerzan, Tłumaczenie jako “wojna światów” (Poznań 2009), 
pp. 91–2: “Graphic creations should not be taken into consideration by the theory of 
interlingual translation since they are neither translatable nor untranslatable.”
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an illusionist translation, the graphic is simply reproduced in its original form, 
as in the case of Marian Hemar’s 1936 Polish translation of Morgenstern’s poem, 
Rybi śpiew nocny [Night Song of a Fish].59 However, conceptual translations urge 
us to revise what has hitherto been considered as a “zone of untranslatability.”60 
What is at issue here is not the question of the (un)translatability or otherwise of 
a poem’s graphic devices, but the “textual equivalent” as a method of conceptual 
translation.
In a bilingual concrete poem by Zbigniew Makarewicz (1971),61 a tra-
ditional interlingual translation of the formula of Symbolum Nicaenum 
Constantinopolitanum [The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed] – visibilium om-
nium et invisibilium [of things visible and invisible] with the end of the last word 
cut off, hiding what should be visible, is accompanied by the transformation of 
the original into a textual equivalent:
Fig. 8: Christian Morgenstern, Fish’s Night Song. Trans. Max Knight. Ch. Morgenstern, 
The Gallow Songs/Galgenlieder. A Selection, trans. by M. Knight (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles) 1963, p. 31.
 59 See: M. Hemar, Koń trojański (Warszawa 1993), p. 189.
 60 E. Balcerzan, Tłumaczenie jako “wojna światów,” p. 86.
 61 Makarewicz’s work is referred to in Balcerzan’s study as an example of “bilingualism 
made visible in a translation.” See E. Balcerzan, “Jedno – oraz dwu(wielo)języczność 
literackich “światów”. In: Kultura w stanie przekładu: translatologia – komparatystyka – 









The left-hand side textual equivalent is a graphic substitute of Symbolum 
Nicaenum Constantinopolitanum, while the right-hand side replaces the Polish 
version of the Creed.
The juxtaposition of the two differently-sized and variously-structured texts, 
which may remind the reader of stone tablets, makes one aware of the inev-
itably transformational nature of translation  – even of the interlinear, literal 
translations historically associated with the hermeneutics of sacred texts, which 
set the translational norms for “all texts in almost all languages”62 from Late 
Fig. 9: Zbigniew Makarewicz, tekst, 1971. Reprinted by permission of the author. 
S. Dróżdż, ed., Poezja konkretna. Wybór tekstów polskich oraz dokumentacja z lat 1967–
1977 (Wrocław 1978), p. 41.
 62 S. Brock, “Translation in Antiquity.” In: A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings 
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Antiquity through the European Middle Ages into the Renaissance. Despite the 
obvious differences in size and structure, the (left-hand) target text retains all the 
verse markings of the Latin Creed and supports its perception as an organized 
structure. The pair of texts in the Polish concrete poet’s work are the product 
of an intersemiotic translation (transmutation), i.e. an interpretation of verbal 
signs by means of nonverbal sign systems.63 Within Makarewicz’s tekst [text], 
the target (left-hand) column exhibits extreme formal equivalence: the number 
of dots in both text equivalents (right- and left-hand) closely mirrors (maps) 
Fig. 10: Reconstruction of the double text: Symbolum Nicaenum Constantinopolitanum 
and its Polish translation [T.B.-T.].
 63 See: R. Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” In his: Selected Writings, 





the number of letters in the words of the The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed 
(respectively: Latin and Polish). Interlingual verbum e verbo translation is thus 
accompanied by a faithful translation of verbal signs into signs from the non-
verbal sign system. At the same time, Makarewicz’s concrete poem has an iconic 
character – the invisible poetic text corresponds to “things invisible.”
The graphic textual equivalent is the constructive principle behind Armand 
Schwerner’s poem The Tablets (1968–1991) which sets itself up as a transla-
tion of Sumero-Akkadian clay tablets from more than four thousand years ago. 
Schwerner’s The Tablets is a sophisticated translational mystification in the tradi-
tion of James Macpherson’s The Poems of Ossian, the Son of Fingal (1799) or Václav 
Hanka’s Rukopis královédvorský [The Queen’s Court Manuscript] (1817). The 
graphic textual equivalent serves as a means of stylization after the original. The 
Scholar/Translator meticulously records all the gaps and blanks due to the supposed 
physical degradation of a Mesopotamian monument, as well as the lack of sufficient 
knowledge of its archaic (and, in fact, fictitious) language: dots of ellipsis […] stand 
for untranslatable passages, plus-signs enclosed in circles for missing ones, question 
marks (???) for variant reading, and square brackets for comments supplied by the 
Scholar/Translator. For example, Tablet X begins in the following way:
........................................................................................... + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + +.............................................................................
...................... + + + + + + + +....................... + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +............ + + + + + +....................... + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
........................................................................................................................
...............................................................................
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +....... ......+ + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + [the the] + + + + + + + 64
The apparatus of non-alphabetic signs mimics the symbols used in authentic 
scholarly editions of historical sources. The text equivalent is not only an example 
of translational mystification, but above all, strongly dynamizes the structure 
of the poem, increasing the “sensing of form,” its pure movement, caused by 
the interaction of structural factors. In Tynianov’s terms, its “ ‘unfinishedness’ 
becomes an aesthetic fact.”65 “Instead of verbal matter, there is a dynamic sign 
 64 A. Schwerner, The Tablets (Orono 1999), p. 35.
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pointing to it. Instead of a definite semantic weight, there is an indefinite, enig-
matic semantic hieroglyph, which serves to complicate and semantically impede 
the following stanzas and lines.”66 The construction of Schwerner’s “apocryphal 
translation” rests on the assumption that “no matter how compelling (artisti-
cally) the omitted stanza, it is weaker than the sign of omission and the dots.”67 
Thus, poetic translation acquires the status of a self-model of translation activi-
ties, a reflection on the possibilities of performing translation and the efficiency 
of translation studies. The Tablets becomes an archaeology of translation, a pas-
tiche of scholarly discourse and palaeographic archaeological research.
The introduction of the graphic equivalent of a text in the target poem changes 
the translation into a methodology of translation.68 Metatranslations that make 
use of the graphic equivalent of a text as an artistic device are not only a veritable 
literary/translational laboratory, they are also an area with considerable labora-
tory significance for verse and translation scholars, in that they foreground the 
technical aspects of translation. In a way similar to Constructivist translation,69 
they ostentatiously disclose the constructive factor of the original, for example 
through implementing the principle of equimetricity, agreement between the 
metrical patterns of the translation and the original, and equilinearity (e.g., 
Kibirov’s Ekvivalent teksta). Conceptual target poems tend to parody translation 
as a rule-governed activity. They lay bare the transformational and inevitably 
manipulative nature of translation. They demonstrate the extreme consequences 
of understanding translation as a game involving a sequence of choices from a 
limited repertoire of elements. They make the reader aware of the multivariant 
character of translation, calling into question the dogma of the infallibility of 
the interpreter. They undermine the idea of the translator’s invisibility and 
 66 Y. Tynyanov, “On the Composition of Eugene Onegin.” Trans. S.S. Hoisington. 
In: Russian Views of Pushkin’s “Eugene Onegin”, ed. S.S. Hoisington (Bloomington 
1988), p. 78.
 67 Tynyanov, “On the Composition of Eugene Onegin,” p. 78.
 68 To paraphrase M. Głowiński’s formula describing “the novel as a methodology of 
the novel.” See his: “Powieść jako metodologia powieści.” In his: Intertekstualność, 
groteska, parabola. Szkice ogólne i interpretacje (Kraków 2000), p. 122. For a detailed 
discussion of various realisations of “translation as a methodology of the translation”, 
see: T. Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz, “Przekład jako metodologia przekładu.” In: Reguły 
gier. Między normatywizmem a dowolnością w przekładzie, eds. P. Fast, T. Markiewka, 
J. Pisarska (Katowice 2016), pp. 8–29.
 69 For background and further discussion, see: T. Brzostowska-Tereszkiewicz, Modernist 











non-intentionality. In terms of Andrew Chesterman’s “translational memetics,” 
the graphic equivalent of a text in translation allows the researcher to lay bare 
the “translation supermemes,” such as the idea of the directionality of translation 
(source-target), the transformational nature of translation, the supermemes of 
equivalence and untranslatability, the binary opposition between free and lit-
eral translation, and finally, the assumption that any writing is a translation. It 
highlights the evolutionary variability of translation norms which ossify into 
translation memes and seem to be ineffaceable. Most importantly, it gives trans-
lation scholars “new knowledge of the patterns, and patterns of patterns, which 
helps us to make sense of what we are looking at.”70
The graphic equivalent of a text turns it into an intermodal translation. It involves 
a change of the sensory channel through which the original message is received by 
the target reader. An acoustically realized text becomes a visual/kinesthetic state-
ment. The graphic equivalent of a text restitutes the dynamics of the relationship 
between the source and the target texts and leads to deautomatization of the target 
reader’s perceptual habits. These estranging functions can be performed not only by 
interlingual translations in which the graphic equivalent of a text plays an important 
structural role (although, it is often these examples that seem most eloquent), but by 
conceptual translations in general, which employ various paratexts and metatexts 
typical of illusionist translations in order to evoke particular responses in their 
audiences.
Having surveyed the various sensual and intellectual strategies used by artists 
to undermine translational illusion, one may say that, while it may be difficult 
to delineate specific characteristics of all conceptual translations – from dense 
constellations of Proustian letters to the graphic equivalent of a verbal original in 
Kibirov’s experiments – they always tend to lean towards visual, installation, and 
performance art. They are likely to be marked by an intense preoccupation with 
intermediality, the multisensory reception of artistic endeavor, and synaesthesia. 
The inherent tension between sensory and intellectual cognition or, as Clive 
Scott put it, the “aiding of percept by concept,”71 is particularly important in the 
translation process. As a rule, conceptual translations also introduce “the idea 
of the ludic, of jouissance, or playfulness” which Susan Bassnett diagnosed as 
 70 A. Chesterman, “Hypotheses about translation universals.” In: Claims, Changes and 
Challenges in Translation Studies, p. 11.
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“the missing element in so much writing about poetry and translation.”72 In the 
framework of Scott’s theory of synaesthetic translation, conceptual translations 
are distinctive for their “centrifugal” rather than “centripetal” attitude to the 
source text:
On the one hand, I am imagining a centripetal attitude to text, a continual return to 
a source text (ST), which believes that this ST fully possesses itself in its linguisticity; 
that the literary is a stable constant within it; that what one must gather from it is its 
meaning, by interpretation. On the other hand, my hand as it were, is the centrifugal 
practice of text, which believes that the text is constantly in search of itself; that it does 
not comprehend itself; that it has yet to fulfill itself, in paralinguistic realizations, in 
synaesthetizations; that it does not own its literariness, but that this literariness is 
unstable, continually reinventable, always at the text’s widening periphery.73
What is particularly relevant here is the conceptual translators’ focus on concep-
tual “pirouettes” rather than illusionist representations of the original. Indeed, 
conceptual translation as an experimental mode of literary production may not, 
at first, even be recognized or appreciated as translation in the target context. 
Clive Scott, who himself turned Rimbaud and Apollinaire translations into con-
ceptual experiments, asserted:
to call translation a conceptual art is … to presuppose that translation constantly 
questions assumptions about translation, about what translation needs to be in order 
to be translation, and implies that there are ways of achieving its ends which are much 
more ‘economical.74
The conceptual art of translation actively sets out to be controversial, insofar as 
it seeks to encourage a revisionist understanding of what the target audience 
tends to take for granted in the domain of interlingual and intercultural com-
munication. It makes creative use of graphic/urban space as a structural factor 
and as a means of conveying the translator’s idea. Rediscovering and mingling 
the techniques and strategies of historical avant-gardes, conceptual translation 
places a special emphasis on the materiality of signification (sound, shape, tex-
ture, layout) and the constructedness of the target text. It also privileges aleatoric 
and combinatory procedures in the construction of target texts. The utilization 
 72 S. Bassnett, “Translaplanting the Seed. Poetry and Translation.” In:  S. Bassnett, 
A.  Lefevere, Constructing Cultures:  Essays on Literary Translation (Clevedon–
Philadelphia 1998), p. 65.
 73 Scott, “Intermediality and Synaesthesia: Literary Translation as Centrifugal Practice,” 
pp. 154–5.








of “ready-made” materials (e.g. cardboard letters, a Biblical lexicon) is partic-
ularly significant in the context of the further evolution of literary translation, 
which eventually leads to postmodernism.
[2016]
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